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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the politics of popular music and youth culture in two 
geographically close but socioculturally distinct Indian Ocean islands: Réunion (a French 
overseas département) and Mauritius (independent from Britain since 1968). Neither island 
has an indigenous, pre‐colonial population: the respective societies have thus formed through 
successive waves of immigration, including the importation of slaves and indentured workers 
from Madagascar, Africa, and Asia, resulting in extremely ethnically diverse populations, on 
both a communal and individual level.  
The island societies both began the twentieth century as sugar‐producing plantation 
colonies, but by the beginning of the twenty‐first century, their socioeconomic landscapes had 
been dramatically transformed: independent Mauritius was proclaimed as an ‘African tiger’ 
thanks to astute state management of limited resources, and Réunion became a French 
département d’outre-mer, with living standards now similar to those of metropolitan France. 
Although both island societies experienced dramatic and rapid transformation, however, 
modern‐day Réunion and Mauritius have come to represent opposing postcolonial 
experiences. This has resulted in the adoption of opposing approaches to the question of 
ethnic and racial difference: whereas the Mauritian Constitution officially acknowledges the 
existence of ethnoreligious ‘communities’, ethnic difference is not officially recognised in 
Réunion due to colour‐blind French Republican policy. 
The following analysis seeks to show that the study of contemporary popular culture 
can provide particular insights into the workings of these two creolised, postcolonial societies. 
Considered here principally through the lens of popular music and youth culture, it will be 
argued that contemporary Réunionese and Mauritian popular music and youth cultures 
engage with political and social issues specific to each context. This is discussed in Part II in 
relation to Kreol language politics, which shows that popular music can be said to work 
towards changing mentalities still influenced by colonial language prejudices; and in Part III as 
concerns popular culture’s engagement with discourses of inclusion and exclusion within the 
national community. 
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Introduction: Pop Music, Youth Culture and Politics in the Indian 
Ocean 
The Indian Ocean: Isolation and Obscurity 
 
Ne pas pouvoir, pendant longtemps, nommer l’océan indien dans l’imaginaire 
occidental, signale une difficulté de représentation qui est de situation, une difficulté à 
penser cet océan comme espace. On pense l’Afrique, l’Inde ou les îles, mais on ne 
pense pas ce qui les relie. Même aujourd’hui, l’Océan Indien ne constitue pas vraiment 
un espace dans la pensée et dans la représentation, alors que l’on parle sans problème 
de monde atlantique, de monde caribéen, de monde pacifique.’1 
 
the Indian Ocean […] has been known and ignored, dismissed and described. European 
scholars often found it as a passive region, part of the unchanging East, on which 
impacted exogenous Roman, Islamic and Western European influences. The Indian 
Ocean was brought into history when some external force came to it. [...] the Indian 
Ocean is by far the oldest of the seas in history, in terms of it being used and traversed 
by humans.2 
 
Like the wider Indian Ocean region in which they are situated, Mauritius and Réunion 
are often overlooked, relegated to the periphery of our contemporary global world. The 
islands’ isolated geographical position means that they are often wiped from the global map, 
in both a metaphorical and literal sense: Françoise Vergès and Carpanin Marimoutou point to 
the fact that Réunion is effectively ‘une île souvent oubliée sur les cartes du monde, souvent 
confondue avec d’autres territoires français’.3 Viewed from the world’s metropolitan centres, 
the two islands feature in the global imaginary, if at all, perhaps only as tropical islands of 
imprecise geographic location, with amiable locals of uncertain ethnic origins.4 What figures 
perhaps more centrally in these touristic imaginaries are dramatic landscapes and geographical 
features, namely, Mauritius’ white sand beaches and turquoise lagoons, and Réunion’s 
‘intense’ mountainous scenery and breathtaking volcanic landscape.5 And this focus on 
dramatic but generally uninhabited landscapes is perhaps not without justification, given that 
both islands had no permanent human population prior to colonization.  
                                                          
1 Carpanin Marimoutou, ‘Littératures indiaocéaniques’, Revue de littérature comparée, 318: 2 (2006), 
131‐40, p. 133. 
2 Michael Pearson, The Indian Ocean (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 3. 
3 This observation serves as the starting point to their formulation of Indian Ocean creolisation. See 
Amarres: Créolisations india-océanes (Paris: L’Harmattan 2005), p. 7. 
4 Tourists arriving at Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam International Airport in Mauritius are greeted with a 
mural showing homogenous brown‐skinned workers in sugar cane fields: the only hint of ethnic or 
cultural specificity is perhaps a woman with a long ‘Indian’ plait in her hair. 
5 ‘L’île intense’ is one of the official slogans used by Île de La Reunion Tourisme, the official tourist 
board. See, for example, ‘La Réunion: l'île intense’, <http://www.france.fr/entreprendre‐et‐reussir‐en‐
france/la‐reunion‐lile‐intense.html> [Accessed 19th August 2014]. 
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Yet the islands’ human populations can also be successfully harnessed for their 
touristic appeal. As societies formed exclusively through immigration, with correspondingly 
high levels of ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity, there is a significant symbolic investment 
in the conceptualisation of Mauritius and Réunion as multicultural microcosms, where peoples 
of diverse origins have learned to successfully live together in peace. Both island societies are 
presented in tourist literature as harmonious, diverse, multiethnic, and colourful, with all the 
attendant exoticising connotations. The islands might even be seen as global tourism’s 
equivalent of the infamous images of human diversity in advertisements driven by ‘corporate 
multiculturalism’,6 in that they permit and encourage predominantly Western tourists to 
engage in a form of voyeurism concerning the beauty of biological and cultural métissage, 
whilst the historical context of colonialism and racial violence in which métissage took place 
remains under erasure. 
Nevertheless, it is increasingly recognised that despite their obscurity, the social 
dynamics and cultural practices and production of Réunion and Mauritius, and that of the 
wider Indian Ocean region, demand a more sustained and critical approach. Their cultures and 
societies can be said to constitute a burgeoning but under‐investigated area in terms of 
academic research. As Anjali Prabhu has observed, ‘La Réunion and Mauritius have not been 
central in an academic discussion of postcoloniality, yet they are situated, geographically and 
theoretically, at the crossroads of the most consequential ruminations in recent postcolonial 
theory’, given their collective experience of two major European empires (French and British) 
and of both slavery and indentured labour; their contrasting political statuses as French 
overseas department and independent nation; and their positions in relation to colonial trade 
routes and more recent military projects, from the Cold War to the wars in Afghanistan, in 
which the US military base on Diego Garcia which was used.7 Peter Hawkins, author of the only 
English anthology of Francophone and Creolophone Indian Ocean literatures and cultures, has 
suggested that the perceived marginality of the Indian Ocean region continues to play an 
important role in evaluations of the region’s cultural production: 
 
The geographical distance of the islands from both the mainland of the African 
continent as well as from the colonial decision‐making centres of the West is one of 
                                                          
6 Paul Gilroy offers a critique of ‘corporate multiculturalism’, the co‐opting of cultural and racial 
difference for corporate purposes, in Between Camps: Nations, Cultures and the Allure of Race, 2nd ed. 
(London: Routledge, 2004); and Darker than Blue: On the Moral Economies of Black Atlantic Culture 
(Cambridge, MA; London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010). 
7 Hybridity: Limits, Transformations, Prospects (New York: State University of New York Press, 2007), p. 
17. This study does not concern itself with the issue of whether or not the cultural output of Réunion 
and/or Mauritius can be qualified as ‘postcolonial’, a term which is more readily associated with 
literature rather than popular cultural expression. For this discussion, see Peter Hawkins, ‘How 
Appropriate is the Term “Post‐Colonial” to the Cultural Production of Réunion?’ in Francophone Post-
Colonial Cultures, ed. by Kamal Salhi (Lanham: Lexington, 2003), pp. 311‐20. 
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the factors that affect the status of the island’s cultures. In spite of the speedier 
communications of modern air travel and the internet, which have transformed the 
islands’ access to the mainstream cultures of Europe and North America, their relative 
isolation remains a determining factor in their own self‐image and their role in 
postcolonial development.8 
 
The ramifications, however, are not limited to appraisals of cultural output: Françoise Lionnet, 
has suggested that perceived or real geographical isolation contributes to ‘the level of 
disaffection among the peoples of Réunion’, which, she argues, ‘is deeper than that of the 
Antilleans whose cultural identity has always been somewhat better defined, in part also 
because of their geographic location in the Caribbean basin, which is larger and better known 
than the Mascarene islands of the Indian Ocean.’9 
The present study therefore aims to build on the work of researchers who have sought 
to establish that these remote places are worthy of greater attention, and to undo some of the 
common assumptions regarding the Indian Ocean region in general, and Mauritius and 
Réunion in particular. The particularly acute need to resituate Réunion in the Indian Ocean has 
been succinctly captured by Vergès and Marimoutou in their attempt to theorise Indian Ocean 
processes of creolisation. Using the Réunionese term ‘amarrer’ (attacher), they justify the 
need to deconstruct Eurocentric and Francocentric analytical frameworks:  
 
Quand l’Europe se pensait le centre du monde, organisait le monde autour de ce 
centre, nous étions quelque part, là‐bas, au bout du monde. Nous étions alors amarrés 
à la France, c’était une amarre imposée, le lien nous étranglait parfois. Aujourd’hui, 
alors que l’Europe est devenue l’une des provinces du monde, nous repensons nos 
amarres. Décentrer le regard, retracer une cartographie du monde, de l’océan indien, 
où la France, l’Afrique, l’Europe, l’Asie, le monde musulman se croisent, voilà notre 
projet. Inscrire notre île dans ces réseaux d’échanges et des rencontres, à la croisée 
des mondes africains, européens, asiatiques et insulaires. À la périphérie sans doute 
mais une périphérie pensée, travaillée, transformée en atout, en avantage. 
 
In a sense, this study itself can be said to constitute an attempt to rethink these ‘amarres’, in 
that one of the motivations behind researching both Réunionese and Mauritian culture was to 
resituate Réunion in its geographical, rather than political, context. The two islands’ societies 
and cultures are in fact rarely looked at comparatively or simultaneously within scholarly 
analysis; indeed, Mauritius is more likely to be compared to Trinidad and Tobago in the 
                                                          
8 The Other Hybrid Archipelago: Introduction to the Literatures and Cultures of the Francophone Indian 
Ocean (Lanham: Lexington, 2007), pp. 165‐66.  
9 ‘Créolité in the Indian Ocean: Two Models of Cultural Diversity’, Yale French Studies, 82: 1 (1993), 101‐
12, p. 102. 
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Caribbean or Fiji in the Pacific due to their shared feature of having a large population of 
Indian origin.10  
Moreover, the study applies the concept of transforming marginality into an 
advantage to its subjects of analysis, popular music and youth culture, both marginalised 
elements within the already marginal cultural production of Réunion and Mauritius. Their 
marginalisation is arguably further exacerbated by the tendency to confuse culture with 
tradition on the one hand, or with religion on the other, as is revealed by the Mauritian 
concept of ancestral cultures and of plural state‐funded cultural centres.11 Furthermore, the 
concern with marginalisation reflects the political position of this research project, which 
attempts to privilege those whose voices are not normally heard within discourses on culture 
in Réunionese and Mauritian society. This position is informed by feminist standpoint theory, 
which posits that the oppressed have a greater understanding of pertinent social issues, given 
that ‘one’s social situation enables and sets limits on what one can know: some social 
situations – critically unexamined dominant ones – are more limiting than others in this 
respect, and what makes these situations more limiting is their inability to generate the most 
critical questions about received belief.’12 
This study aims to generate some critical questions regarding received belief about 
culture in Réunion and Mauritius, or to at least provide the basis for further reflection. More 
precisely, the following analysis seeks to show that the study of contemporary popular culture 
can provide particular insights into the workings of these two creolised, postcolonial societies. 
It aspires to take popular culture seriously, and to privilege the experiences and cultural 
practices of young people from disadvantaged backgrounds. Considered here principally 
through the lens of popular music and youth culture, popular culture is understood as a site in 
                                                          
10 Important exceptions include Prabhu, and Lionnet, Le Su et l’incertain. Cosmopolitiques créoles de 
l’océan Indien, coll. Essais et critiques littéraires (La Pelouse, Trou d’Eau Douce, Île Maurice: L’Atelier 
d’écriture, 2012). For Mauritius comparisons, see, for example, Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Us and Them in 
Modern Societies: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Mauritius, Trinidad and Beyond (Oslo: Scandinavian 
University Press, 1992). 
11 For more detail, see Chapter 2 of this study. In the Réunionese context, see also Christian Ghasarian’s 
work on the renouveau tamoul, which might be characterised as the gentrification of Indo‐Réunionese 
cultural specificity, in, for example, ‘Patrimoine culturel et ethnicité à La Réunion (dynamiques et 
dialogismes)’, Ethnologie française, 99: 3 (1999), 365‐74; and ‘We Have the Best Gods! The Encounter 
Between Hinduism and Christianity in La Réunion’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 32 (1997), 286‐
95. 
12 Sandra Harding, ‘Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is “Strong Objectivity”?’ in Feminist 
Epistemologies, ed. by Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (New York; London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 49‐
82, pp. 54‐5. She argues here that purposefully including oppressed groups within our research agendas 
serves to undermine the implicit masculine, bourgeois and white Eurocentric bias of social research, 
resulting in ‘strong objectivity’. See, amongst others, Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: 
Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment (New York; London: Routledge, 1991). 
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which political issues are engaged with and contested.13 It will be argued that contemporary 
Réunionese and Mauritian popular music and youth cultures engage with political and social 
issues specific to each context. Some of the subsequent analysis may be seen to reveal 
parallels between the politics of culture within the two societies, as will become apparent in 
the analysis of engagement with language politics in Part II of this study; and some will be seen 
to reflect sharp contrasts, as in Part III on popular culture and the politics of belonging. In this 
regard, this thesis is not a comparative study in the strictest sense, and, with the exception of 
the brief consideration of Mauritian dancehall music in Chapter 3, the following chapters 
generally discuss the Réunionese and Mauritian contexts separately in order to give an 
adequate account of the specificities of each context. Nevertheless, the thesis aims to 
demonstrate that in both locations, popular cultural practices and output respond to the 
postcolonial politics and contemporary social issues of the two island societies, which in spite 
of significant political differences both remain fundamentally marked by asymmetrical power 
relations, deep‐founded old inequalities and dynamic and elusive new ones. The following 
analysis also seeks to explore how the cultural politics of popular music and youth culture 
drawn on, perpetuate, modify, counter, and/or subvert existing discourses on race, ethnicity, 
and the nation, including a critical consideration of the globalised images of blackness which 
circulate in globalised popular culture and the meanings which young people in Réunion and 
Mauritius attribute to these images. 
 
Popular Music, Youth Culture, and Academics 
 
On first appearances, however, neither pop music nor youth cultures would seem to 
lend themselves easily to political analysis, in the most commonly understood sense of the 
term. Contemporary commercially produced musical forms in particular would appear to have 
been irredeemably corrupted by their implication in their own commodification and global 
dissemination. This is seen to have rendered such forms incapable of engagement with 
political and social issues, and indeed many such forms appear outwardly apolitical, expressing 
a decided lack of interest in political issues in favour of individualism and corporate 
consumerism characterised by ‘bling bling’ aesthetics. As Halifu Osumare points out, however, 
                                                          
13 This understanding of the politics of popular culture is influenced by the work of Stuart Hall: ‘Popular 
culture is one of the sites where this struggle for and against a culture of the powerful is engaged: it is 
also the stake to be won or lost in that struggle. It is the arena of consent and resistance. It is partly 
where hegemony arises, and where it is secured. It is not a sphere where socialism, a socialist culture – 
already fully formed – might be simply ‘expressed’. But it is one of the places where socialism might be 
constituted. That is why ‘popular culture’ matters.’ ‘Notes on Deconstructing “the Popular”’ in Cultural 
Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader, ed. by John Storey, 2nd ed. (London: Prentice Hall, 1998), pp. 442‐
53,  p. 453. 
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even this process of commodification, itself inherently complicit in the spread of global 
neoliberal capitalism, can arguably be seen to have a democratizing potential: speaking of the 
now global hip hop movement, she suggests that ‘[h]ip hop’s involvement in commodification, 
ironically enough, is simultaneously implicated in its potential as a globally democratizing pop 
subculture.’14 Thus, though it may be tempting to characterise all forms of engagement with 
commercialised cultural expression simply as passive consumerism, we would do well to follow 
Hall’s maxim which insists that this engagement is neither inherently passive nor active, but 
first and foremost a site of contestation.15 
Academic engagement with popular and youth culture, though often admirable in its 
intentions, has however proved problematic. The research of the Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham in the 1960s and 70s is generally 
considered as pioneering in this field, notably for its attempt to situate popular cultural 
expression in relation to both political and social developments and critical theory.16 Dick 
Hebdige’s work on youth subcultures is still cited today as a foundational text in the 
sociological analysis of youth cultures.17 Yet the Cultural Studies project has also been mired in 
criticism. In particular, the tendency towards an uncritical celebration of the politically 
subversive nature of youth subcultures was denounced by scholars such as Jim McGuigan, who 
accused some CCCS researchers of adopting ‘a disingenuous selectivity in populist cultural 
research’ which failed to address the darker side of many elements of popular culture, 
including expressions of racism and misogyny.18 The cultural studies project has nonetheless 
since outgrown its initial context of post‐war British youth cultures, and as an academic 
discipline it has been exported internationally. Yet many supporters as well as critics of the 
project have suggested that it has lost its critical edge. Even Hall, one of the founding members 
of the CCCS, recently suggested in an interview with Sut Jhally that some elements of cultural 
studies research have become akin to an uncritical and depoliticised form of media studies: in 
                                                          
14 ‘Global Hip‐Hop and The African Diaspora’ in Black Cultural Traffic: Crossroads in Global Performance 
and Popular Culture, ed. by Harry J. Elam, Jr., and Kennell Jackson (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2005), pp. 266‐88, p. 286. 
15 See his ‘Notes on Deconstructing “the Popular”’. 
16 See, amongst others, Stuart Hall et al., Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order 
(London: Macmillan, 1978; and Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson (eds.), Resistance through Rituals: Youth 
Subcultures in Post-War Britain (London: Hutchinson, The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 
University of Birmingham, 1976). 
17 Subculture: The Meaning of Style (London: Methuen, 1979). For a critical reconsideration of the CCCS 
work on subcultures and application of the concept to contemporary popular cultures, see Rupa Huq, 
Beyond Subculture: Pop, Youth and Identity in a Postcolonial World (London: Routledge, 2006). 
18 Jim McGuigan, Cultural Populism (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 171‐2. 
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his words, ‘we cannot just go on producing another analysis of The Sopranos’ when ‘something 
more is happening which requires our attention’.19 
These criticisms notwithstanding, this study has in many respects modelled itself on 
the (British) cultural studies project. It aims to offer a political analysis of popular music and 
youth culture, using critical theory where it helps to elucidate certain social phenomena (as 
with Judith Butler’s concept of performativity discussed in Chapter 5), and is based on long‐
term ethnographic research undertaken in Mauritius and Réunion from October 2011 to 
August 2013. So at this point it might be asked, why apply an approach developed in relation 
to youth culture in post‐war Britain to that of the Indian Ocean in the 21st century? It is the 
author’s belief that the cultural studies approach has helped to highlight and uncover 
numerous ways in which popular music and youth culture engages with political issues, even 
through cultural output which is widely considered as indicative of global consumerism and 
thus often characterised as apolitical. It is hoped that this thesis may serve as a springboard for 
further research and reflection on the applicability of the cultural studies approach to 
Mauritian and Réunionese popular culture. 
It might also be asked, why study the cultural politics of youth culture and popular 
music in two isolated island contexts, whose painful histories appear to have been successfully 
overcome, albeit in very different ways, resulting in generally peaceful, multicultural societies 
which, from the dominant Western perspective, would appear to have much to teach other 
multiethnic and postcolonial nations about peaceful co‐existence and successful development? 
We could even ask what is the point of studying the political implications of popular culture at 
all, when more important things are occurring on the ground level. Stuart Hall has posed this 
question in relation to the AIDS epidemic:  
 
At that point, I think anybody who is into cultural studies seriously as an intellectual 
practice, must feel, on their pulse, its ephemerality, its insubstantiality, how little it 
registers, how little we’ve been able to change anything or get anybody to do 
anything. If you don’t feel that as one tension in the work that you are doing, theory 
has let you off the hook. 
 
He further explains that ‘[u]nless we operate in this tension, we don’t know what cultural 
studies can do, can’t, can never do; but also, what it has to do’, which, according to Hall, is ‘to 
analyze certain things about the constitutive and political nature of representation itself, about 
its complexities, about the effects of language, about textuality as a site of life and death.’20 
                                                          
19 See ‘Stuart Hall Interviewed by Sut Jhally’, (2012) <http://vimeo.com/53879491>, [Accessed 23rd 
September 2014]. For an overview of these developments, see Hall’s ‘Cultural Studies and its Theoretical 
Legacies’ in Cultural Studies, ed. by Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler (London: 
Routledge, 1992), pp. 277‐94. 
20 Hall, ‘Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies’, p. 285. 
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Whilst remaining sensitive to both historical experiences of violence and human suffering and 
the more elusive yet no less real forms of suffering experienced by subordinated populations 
today, this is what I aim to work towards in this thesis. In keeping with the ethos evoked by 
Hall above, and with the tension that he argues is an evitable and necessary part of successful 
political engagement within analyses of popular culture, this study aims to keep in mind 
questions of power within cultural representation, or cultural politics, within its analysis of 
popular music and related aspects of youth culture. Thus I aim to foreground issues of social 
inequality and cultural difference whilst considering the political nature of representations of 
Mauritianness and Réunionness within popular culture. These are understood here not as 
ready‐defined constructs, but rather as contested terms which actors try to counter, define, 
and redefine within their engagement with popular culture. 
Finally, it must also be acknowledged that the fact that this study chooses to explore 
the politics of popular culture in Réunion and Mauritius through an analysis of popular music 
and youth culture might appear to presuppose a ‘special relationship’, based on ‘a nearly 
always unstated assumption that popular music is a phenomenon associated with “youth”’.21 
For many scholars, the tendency to associate the two fields of study highlights the need to 
unpack this common assumption.22 For David Hesmondhalgh, ‘these ideas rely on particular 
notions of what popular music is, which are derived from an era, that of the 1960s and 1970s, 
when popular music became tied commercially and discursively to youth’; and as a result, in 
contemporary research ‘popular music should not be conceived as the privileged domain of 
young people’.23 However, it must also be recognised that this study’s interest in these fields 
results from the specificities of the two contexts, which have both been marked by rapid 
development at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries. The current generation 
of young Réunionese and Mauritians aged under 30 years old can thus be considered as a 
product of this period of accelerated development, the consequences of which will be 
considered in the historical overview below. Furthermore, the study has also been 
fundamentally shaped by two lengthy periods of fieldwork research with youth associations 
and youth music groups, in which music played a central role and served as a bridge between 
my own experience of adolescence in a relatively privileged, First World context and that of my 
research participants. Additionally, we should also remember that in much academic 
engagement with popular musical forms in Mauritius and Réunion, especially those recognised 
                                                          
21 David Hesmondhalgh, ‘Subcultures, Scenes or Tribes? None of the Above’, Journal of Youth Studies, 8: 
1 (2005), 21‐40, p. 36. 
22  Dan Laughey, Music and Youth Culture (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), p. 1. 
23 Hesmondhalgh, p. 22. 
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as folk forms, it is the older generations rather than the young who are generally considered as 
privileged informers.24 
 
Historical Context: The Colonisation of Île Bourbon (Réunion) and Île 
de France (Mauritius) 
 
The two small islands of Réunion and Mauritius, with respective land areas of 
2,511 km2 and 2,040 km2, are situated approximately 170km apart, 800km east of Madagascar 
in the south‐western Indian Ocean. Along with the smaller island of Rodrigues, now a 
dependency of Mauritius, the islands form the Mascarene archipelago.25 Both islands were 
known to Arab navigators,26 and were ‘probably visited by Arab or Swahili sailors before 1500’, 
but it was through Portuguese voyages in early sixteenth century that they first became known 
to the wider world.27 The Mascarene archipelago was given its current name during this period 
in honour of the Portuguese navigator Pedro Mascarenhas, who is thought to be the first 
European to land on one of the islands.28 Permanent settlement, however, is generally 
considered to have begun much later with European colonisation in the seventeenth century.29  
According to the Réunionese historian Sonia Chane‐Kune, although the three 
Mascarene islands came to be inhabited at different times, the colonisation of Mauritius, 
Réunion and Rodrigues followed to same pattern. Each island served first as a stopping point 
                                                          
24 See, for example, the unpublished PhD theses of Benjamin Lagarde, ‘Réunion maloya: La créolisation 
réunionnaise telle qu'entendue depuis sa musique traditionnelle’ (University of Aix‐Marseille, 2012); 
and Guillaume Samson, ‘Musique et identité à La Réunion: Généalogie des constructions d'une 
singularité insulaire’ (University of Montréal and Aix‐Marseille, 2006). 
25 Space does not permit me to discuss Rodriguan culture and society in this thesis. Formerly a colony, 
Rodrigues still remains to some extent in relation of domination within the modern‐day Mauritian state, 
and a binary opposition between ‘developed’ Mauritius and ‘poor, undeveloped’ Rodrigues is often 
evoked in public discourse. For more information see Christian Barat, Michel Carayol, and Robert 
Chaudenson, Rodrigues, la cendrillon des Mascareignes (Sainte‐Clotilde, Réunion: Université de la 
Réunion, Institut de Linguistique et d'Anthropologie, 1985); and Jean‐Michel Jauze, Rodrigues: La 
troisième île des Mascareignes (Paris; Saint‐Denis, Réunion: L’Harmattan, 1998). 
26 Historian Auguste Toussaint claims that the islands ‘figurai[ent] sous des noms arabes sur des cartes 
trouvées aux mains des Nakhoudas de la côte d’Afrique par les premier marins portugais que 
pénétrèrent l’océan Indien’. Histoire des îles Mascareignes (Paris: Berger‐Levrault, 1972), p. 21. Cited in 
Chane‐Kune, Aux origines de l’identité réunionnaise (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1993), p. 15. 
27 Richard B. Allen, Slaves, Freedmen and Indentured Laborers in Colonial Mauritius (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 9. 
28 Sonia Chane‐Kune, Aux origines, p. 16. 
29 A lack of information regarding the islands’ earlier histories has however led some historians to 
question the thesis that the islands were unpopulated prior to European colonisation. A conference 
organised by UNSECO reported that those present ‘did not accept as proven the hypothesis that these 
islands [Réunion, Mauritius, Rodrigues and the Seychelles] were not peopled at all until the Europeans 
settled there in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.’ See ‘Report on the Discussions’ in Historical 
Relations across the Indian Ocean. Report and papers of the meeting of experts organized by UNESCO at 
Port Louis, Mauritius, from 15 to 19 July 1974 (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), 1980), pp. 165‐84, p. 174. 
17 
 
on the route to India, then as a temporary settlement, finally leading to permanent 
inhabitation.30 Dutch colonisation of Mauritius, which was named in honour of the stadthouder 
of Holland Maurice of Nassau, began in 1638. However, the island was twice abandoned due 
to cost inefficiency, with the Dutch population leaving definitively in 1706.31 The French later 
claimed the island under the control of Compagnie des Indes in 1715, which was henceforth 
renamed as Île de France. Permanent settlement of the island began in 1721.32  
Meanwhile, Réunion was also claimed by France as one of the ‘îles adjacentes’ to 
Madagascar, their principal colonial project, in 1642, and named Île Bourbon after the ruling 
French dynasty.33 Mutineers from Fort‐Dauphin, a French outpost in Madagascar, were exiled 
on the island in 1646; yet after their release the former famously characterised the Bourbon as 
an earthly ‘paradise’ and as ‘l’île la plus saine qui soit au monde’, despite being uninhabited.34 
The island was to be used as penal colony again in 1654 before the first attempt at permanent 
settlement in 1663: the first inhabitants were two French men, and ten Malagasy male and 
female serviteurs.35 Biological miscegenation was a necessity given the absence of white 
women amongst early settlers, so the first children born on the island were of mixed 
parentage. Chane‐Kune maintains that during this initial period, ‘[d]es unions sont célébrées 
entre des Français et des femmes de Madagascar’, and ‘les métissages étaient fréquents et 
fort bien acceptés’.36 Yet the institution of slavery soon established a racially hierarchical social 
structure, even though initially Bourbon did not actively participate in the slave trade, and 
colonisers were more numerous than slaves.37 Françoise Dumas‐Champion thus suggests that 
                                                          
30 Aux origines, p. 16 
31 Gijs Kruijtzer, ‘European Migration in the Dutch Sphere’ in Dutch Colonialism, Migration and Cultural 
Heritage, ed. by Gert Oostindie (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008), pp. 97‐154, p. 105. For an account of the 
two periods of Dutch colonisation in Mauritius, see Megan Vaughan, Creating the Creole Island: Slavery 
in Eighteenth-Century Mauritius (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2005), pp. 4‐27. It would seem 
that some escaped slaves may have stayed on the island after this point: Vaughan notes that during the 
both attempts to colonise the island, slaves ‘escaped with apparent ease’, but that ultimately we cannot 
know whether slaves remained on the island, p. 12. Philip Baker and Chris Corne dispute this in their 
account of the peopling of the Mascarene islands in Isle de France Creole: Affinities and Origins (Ann 
Arbor: Karoma, 1982). 
32 Vaughan, p. 27. 
33 Chane‐Kune, Aux origines, p. 18. The island was renamed several times during the course of the 
nineteenth century, first as ‘Île de la Réunion’ during the French Revolution, then as ‘Île Bonaparte’ 
between 1803 and 1814, then once again as ‘Bourbon’ until 1848, when it was renamed as Réunion for 
the second time. 
34 Étienne de Flacourt, Histoire de la grande isle Madagascar (Paris: Karthala, 1995) [1658], p. 306, cited 
in Françoise Dumas‐Champion, Le Mariage des cultures à l'île de la Réunion (Paris: Karthala 2008), p. 23, 
and Chane‐Kune, Aux origines, pp. 18‐9. 
35 Aux origines, p. 20. 
36 Chane‐Kune, Aux origines, p. 27, p. 41. 
37 See Chane‐Kune, Aux origines, p. 41. There is some debate as to whether, as Michel Robert asserts, 
‘dès le départ, la société réunionnaise était organisée en société esclavagiste’, La Réunion, combats pour 
l’autonomie (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1976), p. 10. Toussaint notes that the term ‘slave’ was not used prior to 
1690, and thus was not initially used to refer to population of Malagasy origin, p. 30.  
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even before the practice of slavery became widespread, as early as the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, Réunionese society witnessed the development of ‘une classification à 
caractère racial qui persiste nos jours, même si le sens de ces catégories a considérablement 
évolué’.38 Following the start of coffee cultivation in 1715, in 1723 Bourbon applied the Code 
Noir (1685) decree, which served to regulate the practice of slavery in France and its 
territories.39 
It was in fact the value attached to the emerging coffee industry on Île Bourbon which 
appears to have been the initial trigger behind the settlement of neighbouring Île de France. 
According to the historian Megan Vaughan, ‘the very value of the crop was thought to pose a 
security problem, encouraging the attention of foreign enemies’, and Bourbon now ‘seemed 
dangerously exposed by the “emptiness” of the neighbouring island’ within the context of ‘the 
great power games of the Indian Ocean’.40 As she explains, 
 
[t]he initial purpose of colonizing Île de France, then, was to protect Île Bourbon from 
attack. The new colony would be productive and strategic: populating the island itself 
acted as a deterrent to foreign powers, or so it was thought.41  
 
Unlike Île Bourbon, then, Île de France was not initially conceived as a plantation colony; yet 
slaves were still considered indispensable to its functioning. The implementation of slavery, 
here as on Bourbon, was however by no means accepted without resistance. Slave owners on 
both islands were faced with the growing phenomenon of marronnage, the act of running 
away, often to mountainous regions, to escape the authority of the white colonisers.42 These 
runaway slaves, or marrons, were to become important symbolic figures of resistance to the 
colonial regime;43 however, as the historian Richard B. Allen observes, marronnage in 
                                                          
38 p. 26, in reference to the writings of Antoine Boucher who spent seven years on the island, from 1702 
to 1709. 
39 Chane‐Kune, Aux origines, p. 61. 
40 Vaughan, p. 21. 
41 Vaughan, p. 22. 
42 In Île de France/Mauritius, ‘[a]n average of four to five per cent of the island’s slave population 
marooned each year during the last third of the eighteenth century; during the early 1820s this rate 
climbed to 11‐13 per cent’. Richard B. Allen, ‘A Serious and Alarming Daily Evil: Marronage and Its 
Legacy in Mauritius and the Colonial Plantation World’, Slavery & Abolition, 25:2 (2004), 1‐17, p. 1. Jean‐
Marie Desport suggests that ‘On peut dire que le marronnage a commencé en même temps que le 
peuplement de Bourbon’. De la servitude à la liberté: Bourbon des origines à 1848 (Saint‐Denis: Océan 
Editions, 1989), p. 67. Toni Arno and Claude Orian also claim that the initial period of French settlement 
prior to 1735 witnessed high levels of marronnage. Ile Maurice, une société multiraciale (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 1986), p. 24. 
43 For a discussion of marronnage as a comtemporary cultural politics in the Réunionese context, see 
Edward A. Alpers, ‘The Idea of Marronage: Reflections on Literature and Politics in Réunion’ in Slavery 
and Resistance in Africa and Asia, ed. by Edward A. Alpers, Gwyn Campbell and Michael Salman 
(London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 37‐49. 
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Mauritius was not always motivated by the desire for freedom and also appears to have served 
as a form of temporary reprieve from harsh living and working conditions.44 
The early period of French colonisation was thus marred by many of the same 
problems as the previous Dutch attempts to settle the island. However, the appointment of 
Mahé de la Bourdonnais as governor general in 1735 is generally seen to have inaugurated a 
period a greater productivity, including the construction of a port at the island’s natural 
harbour in the north‐west of the island, the site of the present‐day capital Port Louis.45 It was 
the port and the surrounding town, rather than the plantation, which came to form the basis 
of the island’s economic activity. Toni Arno and Claude Orian argue that it is for this reason 
that the development of colonial Île de France must be differentiated from that of Île Bourbon 
and other French plantation colonies in the Caribbean: 
 
Aux Antilles, la plantation était une unité de production de denrées coloniales et 
l’esclave était le moteur de production ; à l’Isle de France (île‐port), l’activité 
économique consistait en l’entreposage des produits d’origine orientale et occidentale 
; la plantation n’était qu’un cadre de vie et l’esclave qu’un signe de richesse, un 
complice de la vie idyllique que le colon recherchait au soleil tropical. 46 
 
They further explain that this set of circumstances ‘facilita l’apparition rapide d’un groupe 
d’autochtones, les « métis », qui dans son mouvement ascensionnel se créa un idéal et s’érigea 
des barrières pour le protéger’, resulting in the formation of social divisions and a rigidly 
stratified social structure like that of its sister island Île Bourbon.47 For Arno and Orian, 
moreover, the fact that slaves served principally as signs of prosperity rather than as 
generators of wealth has been fundamental to the development of a specifically Mauritian 
form of social differentiation which they refer to as the ‘société de regard’, whereby 
individuals attempt to negotiate their upward mobility in relation to the position of others in 
what nonetheless remains a rigid and essentially racist social structure.48 
The respective statuses of the two colonies were to change over the course of the 
eighteenth century: coffee production on Bourbon did not prove as profitable as was first 
expected, whereas Île de France’s port ‘proved its value especially in times of war or colonial 
                                                          
44 p. 7. 
45 See Arno and Orian, p. 25. 
46 p. 7. 
47 p. 7. 
48 They characterise the process as involving a form of indirect affirmation, ‘une dépendance par rapport 
à l’assignation. Assigner et être assigné, suivre sa vie durant les agissements de l’autre que l’on exclut. Et 
même, lorsque sa propre place n’est pas en jeu, on interviendra pour faire observer la fixité de la place 
de quiconque voudrait en changer.’ Skin colour and ‘la toute‐puissance du modèle blanc’ are considered 
crucial elements here. See Arno and Orian, p. 117. 
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conquest’.49 The latter thus came to be perceived as the more valuable asset: as ‘the maritime 
advantages of Île de France’s harbors (and particularly those of the northwest port) were 
slowly recognised’, ‘the respective status of the two islands would be reversed, with Île 
Bourbon becoming somewhat of a backwater, and Île de France the crucial link in French 
colonial and commercial policy in the Indian Ocean.’50 The lack of prosperity in colonial 
Bourbon is also evident in the process of ‘prolétarisation’ of a part of its population of 
European origin, beginning in the 1800s.51 These small‐scale planters who came to be known 
as the Ti Blan or petits blancs were pushed to the isolated south east and the mountainous 
interior of the island as the land‐owning families, the Gro Blan, bought up their land around 
the more fertile coastal region.52 It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that when the British took 
control of the Mascarenes and the Seychelles during the Napoleonic wars, they chose to retain 
Île de France as a strategic military post and link to trade routes, which in 1810 was once again 
named Mauritius.53 The Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade had already been passed in 
Britain on March 25th, 1807, and was applied in Mauritius in 1813.54 However, with the advent 
of sugar production on both islands in the first decades of the eighteenth century, these 
political developments resulted only in increases in illegal slave trading.55 Indeed, overall 
activity in the region may have intensified during this period: historians maintain that ‘the 
decline of slave trading in the Atlantic was accompanied by a rise in both slave trading and 
slavery in the western Indian Ocean during the nineteenth century.’56 Ending the slave trade in 
the Indian Ocean proved more problematic than in the Atlantic due to its multidirectional 
                                                          
49 Vaughan, p. 45. See also Daniel Vaxelaire, Le grand livre de l’histoire de la Réunion, vol. 1 (Réunion: 
Orphie, 1999). 
50 Vaughan, p. 26. 
51 Alexandre Bourquin, Histoire des Petits-Blancs de la Réunion: XIXe - début XXe siècles (Paris: Karthala, 
2005), p. 30. 
52 Land in Réunion was inherited in vertical strips, beginning at the coast and ending at the ‘ligne du 
gouvernement’ at 800‐1000m altitude, so that each inheritor received land of equal quality. Thus some 
families were left with increasingly narrow strips of land. Laurent Médéa notes that in 1785, Gro Blan 
landowner Joseph Hubert offered poor white lands in the south (in St‐Joseph and St‐Phillippe) in 
exchange for their small strips. The Gro Blan population were in favour of this scheme, which separated 
them from the poorer whites who often had the same surnames. ‘C’est ainsi, à cette époque, que les 
mutations socio‐économiques apparaissent à l’intérieur de la communauté blanche qui n’existaient pas 
au début du peuplement.’ See Laurent Médéa, La Délinquance juvénile à La Réunion (Sainte‐Clotilde, La 
Réunion: Zarlor Editions, 2011), pp. 98‐100. 
53 This was ratified by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. See Jean Claude Lau Thi Keng, Inter-ethnicité et 
politique à l’île Maurice (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1991), p. 13. Réunion was occupied by the British between 
1810 and 1815 before being returned to France. 
54 Robert Harms, ‘Introduction: Indian Ocean slavery in the age of abolition’ in Indian Ocean Slavery in 
the Age of Abolition, ed. by Robert Harms, Bernard K. Freamon and David W. Blight (New Haven; 
London: Yale University Press, 2013), pp. 1‐22, p. 9. 
55  See, amongst others, Richard B. Allen, ‘Licentious and Unbridled Proceedings: The Illegal Slave Trade 
to Mauritius and the Seychelles during the Early Nineteenth Century’, The Journal of African History, 42 
(2001), 91‐116; Hubert Gerbeau, ‘L'océan Indien n'est pas l'Atlantique. La traite illégale à Bourbon au 
XIXe siècle’, Outre-mers, 89 (2002), 79‐108. 
56 Harms, p. 1. 
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nature, with slaves being transported from Africa to the Middle East and India, and from 
Africa, Indonesia and India to Réunion, Mauritius, and South Africa.57 In an attempt to gain the 
support of the established Franco‐Mauritian community, even R.T. Farquhar, the first British 
governor of Mauritius, ‘colluded in illegal slaving, though supply never met demand.’58 
The impending abolition of slavery therefore compelled plantation owners to look 
elsewhere for sources of labour, heralding the beginning of indentureship, a system of 
technically free labour which was however shaped by the previous institution of slavery in 
many respects.59 Richard B. Allen traces the beginnings of the indentured labour system back 
to unsuccessful attempts to use Chinese and Indian free workers in Mauritius and Réunion in 
the late 1820s, although ‘[t]he arrival in Mauritius on November 2, 1834, of 75 privately 
recruited Indian workers is commonly regarded as the advent of the modern system of migrant 
contract labour.’60 Slavery was officially abolished there on February 1st, 1835, but freed slaves 
were required to work for their former masters as apprentices for up to six years after this 
date.61 Given the reluctance of freed slaves to work beyond this stipulated period, a total of 
over 450,000 indentured workers were subsequently brought to Mauritius from the Indian 
subcontinent before the official end of recruitment in 1910, more than 294,000 of whom 
decided to stay in Mauritius:62 
 
Ces travailleurs indiens sous contrat (indentured labour) s’engageront à travailler 
pendant cinq ans pour un propriétaire mauricien – dans des conditions misérables, il 
faut le dire – et très peu pourront rentrer en Inde car les frais de rapatriement sont à 
la charge des travailleurs eux‐mêmes.63 
 
Given that the vast majority of indentured labourers remained on the island, then, the 
abolition of slavery and subsequent inauguration of indentureship was to have a lasting effect 
on the make‐up of Mauritian society: 
                                                          
57 Martin A. Klein, ‘The Emancipation of Slaves in the Indian Ocean’, in Abolition and its Aftermath in 
Indian Ocean Africa and Asia, edited by Gwyn Campbell (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 198‐
218, p. 198. 
58 Clare Anderson, ‘The Bel Ombre Rebellion: Indian Convicts in Mauritius, 1815‐53’ in Abolition and its 
Aftermath in Indian Ocean Africa and Asia, edited by Gwyn Campbell (London; New York: Routledge, 
2005), pp. 50‐65, p. 51. 
59 Hugh Tinker famously characterised indentured labour as ‘a new system of slavery’, however this view 
has since been critiqued. See Tinker, A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 
1830-1920 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974). For a discussion of Tinker’s appraisal see various 
chapters in Across the Kalapani: The Bihari Presence in Mauritius, edited by Marina Carter (Port Louis, 
Mauritius: Centre for Research on Indian Ocean Societies, 2000). 
60 ‘Slave Trading, Abolitionism, and “New Systems of Slavery” in the Nineteenth‐Century Indian Ocean 
World’ in Indian Ocean Slavery in the Age of Abolition, ed. by Robert Harms, Bernard K. Freamon and 
David W. Blight (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2013), pp. 183‐99, p. 184. 
61 Allen, ‘Slaves, Freedmen’, p. 15. 
62 Allen, ‘Slaves, Freedmen’, p. 16. 
63 Jean Claude Lau Thi Keng, Inter-ethnicité et politique à l’île Maurice (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1991), p. 13. 
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By 1846, only 1.3 percent of the workforce on the sugar plantations was made up of 
freed persons. […] Within ten years, there was a complete transformation of the 
labour force from slave to indentured labour and from majority African to a solidly 
Indian workforce.64  
 
It would therefore seem that we cannot underestimate the significance of Indian immigration 
to Mauritius, insofar as it ‘profoundly alter[ed] the traditional ethnic balance’ of the colony.65 
The abolition of slavery in Réunion, which took place on 20th December 1848, would 
also result in the widespread use of indentured labour; however, the number of labourers 
brought from India was significantly lower than in Mauritius because the French colonial 
administration did not have the same preferential access to the areas which the British used 
for recruitment: 
 
Réunion also went looking for indentured labour, but the British would not let the 
French recruit in India so the latter focused more on maintaining the existing labour 
force, for example, with laws making work obligatory and prohibiting vagabondage or 
begging. They also continued to bring labour in from Mozambique, indenture contracts 
masking what was essentially a continuation of the slave trade.66 
 
Daniel Vaxelaire estimates the number of indentured labourers brought from the Indian 
subcontinent at 120,000, with the majority embarking from ports on the East coast, compared 
to 15,000 from both Madagascar and East Africa, and 1,000 from China.67 As in Mauritius, 
these predominantly male workers were subject to a contract determining minimum duration 
of employment, and lived and worked under extremely difficult conditions. Despite their 
smaller numbers, however, the immigration of Indian labour in Réunion appears to have 
resulted in a comparable transformation of the labour force involved in the production of 
sugar, from mainly Kaf to almost exclusively Malbar, the informal terms used in Réunionese 
Kreol to refer respectively to slaves descendants and those of Indian indentured labourers. As 
the Réunionese sociologist Laurent Médéa explains, 
 
Avant l’engagisme et l’arrivée des Indiens [...] on est en présence de ce que l’on 
pourrait appeler un « schéma antillais » à La Réunion : il y a 85% des Noirs et 15% des 
Blancs. […] avec l’arrivée massive des Indiens, le schéma va totalement s’inverser : les 
                                                          
64 Klein, p. 201. 
65 Kenneth McPherson, ‘Mauritius: Mirror and Model of History’ in Multiple Identities in Action: 
Mauritius and Some Antillean Parallelisms, ed. by Vinesh Y. Hookoomsing, Ralph Ludwig and Burkhard 
Schnepel (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009), pp. 31‐44, p. 35. 
66 Klein, p. 201. 
67 He also notes the import of small numbers of labourers from Yemen, Vietnam, and even Australian 
aboriginal communities. See diagram entitled ‘D’où venaient les engages?’ in Le Grand Livre de l’histoire 
de la Réunion, vol. 2 (Sainte‐Clotilde, Réunion: Orphie, 1999), p. 387. 
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Malbar sont apprentis, les Kaf leur montrent les techniques pour faire du sucre. Ces 
Kaf vont partir au fur et à mesure, face à ce que l’on pourrait appeler à une 
« Malbarisation » des emplois stratégiques dans l’usine, du fait du grand nombre de 
Malbar.68 
 
Médéa maintains that it is due to this development that the Indian indentured labourers and 
their offspring were gradually able to take up management positions in the factories, whilst 
simultaneously benefitting from a stronger sense of group identity and belonging than that 
experienced by the slave descendent population, who in contrast had no shared language, 
religion, or culture. In parallel, the predominance of Indian workers in the sugar production 
workforce in Mauritius also created opportunities for social mobility. Following a steep decline 
in the price of sugar on the international market in the 1860s, the land reform known as the 
grand morcellement made it possible for Indian workers to rent or buy strips of land from 
plantation owners who were in deficit, thereby generating ‘l’émergence de toute une classe de 
petits propriétaires d’origine indienne qui vont jouer un role extrêmement important dans 
l’évolution politique ultérieure de l’île’.69 Many of those who benefitted from these 
developments would form the Indo‐Mauritian middle classes who voted for independence in 
1968.70  
It should therefore be recognised that the colonial histories of Réunion and Mauritius 
are also histories of successive waves of immigration from diverse locations. In addition to the 
heterogeneous ex‐slave population (given that slaves were brought from East and West Africa, 
Madagascar, and India), those brought as indentured labourers and the white land‐owning 
classes, traders from China and Muslims from Gujarat also immigrated to both islands in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is this diverse immigration which has resulted 
in the ethnic, cultural and racial diversity which is celebrated in discourses of harmonious 
multiculturalism; however, it has not been uncontested. Throughout the islands’ histories of 
immigration, the newly arrived have struggled to negotiate their place in the host society. 
Jacqueline Andoche et al. maintain that throughout Réunionese history, immigration has 
triggered ‘le processus d’activation du rapport historique à l’étranger nouveau venu qui 
                                                          
68 Laurent Médéa, La Délinquance juvénile, p. 116. The term Kaf comes from ‘kaffir’, the Arabic term for 
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indentured labourers, although the majority were recruited in the present‐day state of Tamil Nadu, 
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processus syncrétiques à l’île de La Réunion: Les assimilations réciproques des pratiques religieuses 
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69 Lau Thi Keng, p. 14. 
70 It should also be noted that all Mauritian Prime Ministers since Independence have been Hindu and of 
the Vaish caste, with one exception: Paul Bérenger, a Franco‐Mauritian. 
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inquiète par ses mœurs différentes, sa non intégration, et de surcroît par la couleur de sa 
peau’,71 as sectors of the population attempt to assert their anteriority and superiority by 
emphasising the racial and cultural difference of the newly arrived. In Mauritius, Catherine 
Boudet observes that changes in the terminology used to classify ethnic groups in the census 
can be said to reflect shifting perceptions of the extent to which the population of more recent 
Indian and Chinese immigration could be recognised as Mauritian: 
 
À partir du recensement de 1952, une terminologie en termes ethno‐religieux 
remplace la catégorisation en termes de race et d'origine géographique héritée des 
classifications de la société esclavagiste. Le groupe des « Chinois » est désormais 
désigné sous le vocable de « Sino‐Mauriciens », et le groupe des « Indiens » sous celui 
d'« Indo‐Mauriciens », pour mieux marquer leur appartenance à la communauté 
politique nationale.72 
 
This brief and necessarily incomplete overview of the colonial histories of Réunion and 
Mauritius has thus revealed a number of significant parallels. Both societies began as colonies 
marked by acutely asymmetrical power structures, where an affluent small white land‐owning 
minority established dominance over a poor landless majority of diverse origins. Both were 
fundamentally shaped by the establishment of a racially hierarchical social structure, and 
notions of absolute cultural and racial difference, particularly as concerns relations between 
different ethnic and socioeconomic groups. Nonetheless, several crucial contrasts have also 
become apparent, including fundamentally opposed approaches to each colony’s economic 
growth. We might also add here the contrasting views of the French and British administration 
as concerns the more recently arrived population of Indian origin.73 As we shall now see, these 
contrasts would appear to intensify in the second half of the twentieth century, as the 
respective governments choose very different paths towards postcolonial development. 
 
The Postcolonial Era: Departmentalisation, Independence and 
Socioeconomic Transformation 
 
                                                          
71 Jacqueline Andoche, Laurent Hoarau, Jean François Rebeyrotte, Emmanuel Souffrin, Immigrations 
réunionnaises: Des populations en provenance et en devenir, Rapport Acsé La Réunion (La Montagne, La 
Réunion: Etudes Ethnosociologiques de l’Océan Indien, 2008), 
<http://www.esoi.fr/images/immigration.pdf> [Accessed 11th October 2013],  p. 102. 
72 Catherine Boudet, ‘L'émergence de la démocratie consociative à Maurice (1948‐1968)’, Annuaire des 
Pays de l'Océan Indien, 17 (2003), 325‐33, pp. 328‐9. 
73 As elsewhere in the colonised world, the French administration favoured religious and cultural 
assimilation, whereas the British administration in Mauritius was influenced by Orientalism. See Patrick 
Eisenlohr, Little India: Diaspora, Time, and Ethnolinguistic Belonging in Hindu Mauritius (Berkeley; 
London: University of California Press, 2006), especially chapter 4, ‘Colonial Education, Ethnolinguistic 
Identifications, and the Origins of Ancestral Languages’, pp. 168‐201. 
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Despite divergences in their colonial trajectories, it must first be acknowledged that 
Réunion and Mauritius both began the twentieth century as sugar‐producing colonies, with 
the majority of their populations living in abject poverty. By the beginning of the twenty‐first 
century, however, their socioeconomic landscapes had been dramatically transformed. 
Independent Mauritius was proclaimed as an ‘African tiger’ thanks to astute state 
management of limited resources,74 and Réunion became a French département d’outre-mer 
(DOM), with standards of living in many respects now similar to those of metropolitan France. 
The two ‘sister islands’ have thus come to represent rather different postcolonial experiences. 
 
Departmentalisation in Réunion 
 
Following calls for greater social equality between the metropolis and her colonies, in 
1946 a political phenomenon otherwise unknown in the history of European colonialism 
occurred: Réunion, along with the Caribbean territories of Martinique, Guadeloupe and French 
Guiana, was integrated into the French nation, thereby acquiring the same official status as 
metropolitan French départements.75  The act of incorporating the territories, collectively 
characterised as les vieilles colonies, into the colonial power indeed appears as ‘un scénario 
inédit’,76 given that it occurred at the same time that anti‐colonial struggles were taking place 
throughout the colonial empires.77 It is however crucial to understand that at the time of its 
enactment, departmentalisation was perceived as a progressive option, whereas calls for 
autonomy and independence were associated with reactionary politics.78 As Chane‐Kune 
observes, the only party to oppose departmentalisation was the land‐owning aristocracy, for 
whom it represented a curtailment of their historic privileges.79 Raymond Vergès, one of two 
Réunionese representatives in the Assemblée nationale, thus presented departmentalisation 
as a means of combating the ruling hegemony in Réunion: 
 
Etre une colonie, est, par définition, être une terre d'exploitation […] Un tel état de 
choses a imprimé au pays une physionomie particulière, une structure simplifiée, 
puisque, entre dix familles de proie et un prolétariat grabataire, la classe moyenne se 
                                                          
74 See Barbara Wake Carroll and Terrance Carroll, ‘Civic Networks, Legitimacy and the Policy Process’, 
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réduit à presque rien, que les seigneurs du sucre, usiniers ou propriétaires fonciers, 
ont toujours eu pour eux, on pourrait dire à eux, l'administration, la justice, la force 
armée, bref l'appareil efficace de l'Etat, cependant que la masse de la population, 
maintenue dans l'ignorance et la crainte, n'a jamais eu qu'un droit, celui de se tuer à 
l'ouvrage et de se taire.80 
 
Political assimilation was thereby associated with the aim of reducing the colonies’ acute social 
inequality. Furthermore, it was implied that achieving this objective was the responsibility of 
the metropole. In his role as rapporteur de la commission des territoires d'outre-mer, the then 
Martiniquan député Aimé Césaire famously characterised departmentalisation as a logical 
extension of French colonisation of the vieilles colonies: 
 
L'intégration réclamée ne constituerait pas une improvisation. Ce serait, au contraire, 
l’aboutissement normal d’un processus historique et la conclusion logique d’une 
doctrine.81  
 
Though he acknowledged that French institutional presence in the vieilles colonies indicated 
that political assimilation was already underway, for Césaire, ‘le gigantesque problème social 
ne saurait être résolu que par la départementalisation.’82 Similarly, for the Réunionese branch 
of the Parti communiste français, departmentalisation was envisioned as the cure for all social 
ills; yet, as Chane‐Kune observes, it proposes a political solution to what were fundamentally 
social problems.83 Nonetheless, when faced with the extreme poverty experienced by the 
majority of the population, political actors decided to underplay any potentially problematic 
aspects of assimilation.84 Thus Léon de Lepervanche, the second député for Réunion, would 
argue in favour of departmentalisation by minimising the cultural differences between the 
colony and the metropole – differences which would be fervently defended by a subsequent 
generation of political activists: 
 
Nous tenons aussi à déclarer que nous ne connaissons pas les profondes différences 
qui existeraient entre nos populations et celles de la métropole. Il n'y a, en effet, chez 
nous aucun problème d'ordre linguistique, culturel ou national.85 
 
Consequently, the 1946 loi d’assimilation was perceived at the time of its enactment 
as a victory for the left. However, the achievement of political equality with mainland France 
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did not automatically improve standards of living in the DOMs. The historian Yvan Combeau 
depicts the period from 1946 to 1958 as that of the ‘forgotten’ department, as successive 
governments postponed fulfilling the promises of departmentalisation and granting legislative 
equality with mainland France for economic reasons. Moreover, the Réunionese branch of the 
Communist party, who had been the initial proponents of 1946 law, withdrew their support for 
the project.86 Others suggest that it was not simply economic factors which delayed the 
enactment of departmentalisation: Héloïse Finch‐Boyer affirms that during this initial period, 
‘the French administration did not want to apply metropolitan social legislation to the DOMs 
owing to their implicit belief that overseas populations were naturally poor’.87 Drawing on 
archival research, she reveals the state racism evident in government documents which 
portray the Réunionese population as ‘a culturally different people who were naturally poor’.88 
She thereby demonstrates that ‘La Reunion’s prefects and central government did not view 
DOM populations as the equals of metropolitan French’, with the partial exception of the poor 
white petits blancs, ‘the only Reunion Islanders that the administration considered worthy of 
poverty relief’ who, according to Finch‐Boyer, ‘always elicited special concern in official 
reports.’89 
Unsurprisingly, then, disillusionment with the project of departmentalisation soon set 
in. Chane‐Kune maintains that achieving social equality with the metropole had been the initial 
priority once political equality had been attained. Consequently, government policies 
appeared to show less concern for Réunion’s economic development, generating a series of 
regrettable long‐term consequences. As she observes, ‘[l]es mesures économiques sont le plus 
souvent limitées à la reconduction des activités antérieures qu’on maintient et modernise à 
force d’aides et de soutiens’.90 For example, the sugar industry was one of the first and biggest 
beneficiaries of departmentalisation, despite no longer playing a central role in the Réunionese 
economy. The administration thus missed an important opportunity to develop a postcolonial 
economic development strategy for the island, and the after‐effects of this missed opportunity 
are still apparent today, as can be seen by Reunion’s consistently high unemployment rates.91 
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Furthermore, due to the delay in applying welfare laws to the DOMs, the majority of poor 
Réunionese who had provided popular support for departmentalisation did not benefit from 
the change in political status: ‘[t]he main beneficiaries of social legislation in the DOMs during 
the 1950s were full‐time salaried workers and civil servants — a minority of the total 
populations.’92 
However, the period from 1958 to 1963 was to mark a turning point in Réunionese 
post‐departmental history, often seen as the beginning of departmentalisation proper. This 
was characterised by accelerated infrastructural development, including the construction of 
the route de littoral linking the west coast to the administrative capital Saint‐Denis, which 
opened in 1963.93 The arrival of Michel Debré, who visited Réunion whilst serving as prime 
minister under General de Gaulle in 1959, signalled the end of metropolitan indifference to 
social development in the DOMs. For Debré, ‘La Réunion could prove the viability of the French 
Republic overseas’ at a time when the legitimacy of French rule in Algeria appeared 
increasingly unconvincing.94  He therefore ‘used his influence as prime minister to improve 
awareness of overseas France in government and to create social change through legislation’,95 
and successfully mobilised metropolitan investment to finance development in Réunion, even 
prior to his being elected as député of Réunion in 1963. Finch‐Boyer highlights the significance 
of Debré’s reforms, which in contrast to previous policies were not only intended to benefit 
white recipients: ‘[f]rom 1960 Debré’s “subsidy tap” started flowing’, she states, leading to 
radical changes as concerns ‘economic mobility and racial perceptions in overseas France.’96 
Yet in spite of these developments, Debré was to prove a particularly controversial 
figure in Réunionese political history.97 Elected at a time when electoral fraud was common 
practice, Debré’s political career in Réunion reflects the fears and anxieties of the Cold War 
political context. This wider context arguably heightened the conservative elite’s fear of the 
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rising popularity of the Parti communiste réunionnais (PCR).98 The PCR’s calls for autonomy in 
response to the failure of departmentalisation were perceived by conservatives such as Debré 
as a direct attack on France itself. Françoise Vergès goes as far to suggest that any questioning 
of Réunion’s ‘Frenchness’ constituted ‘a threat to an idealized object necessary to Debré’s 
ego.’99 Indeed, this would appear to be supported by the fact that the 1960 Ordonnance Debré 
permitted the transfer of civil servants in the DOMs to the metropole if they were thought to 
threaten public order, which included questioning the French nature of the overseas 
departments.100 During this period, public assertions of cultural difference were thus treated 
as politically suspect, and as an intolerable threat to the authority of the metropole in the new 
overseas department. 
Nonetheless, the period also remains significant in that metropolitan welfare and 
social laws were henceforth gradually applied to the DOMs, although complete equality in 
terms of social legislation would take 50 years to achieve.101 However, it would seem that the 
price the Réunionese population paid for these developments was a constant requirement to 
declare allegiance to France at the expense of the development of local culture, including the 
local language. The use of Réunionese Kréol was not permitted in schools: writing in 1977, Axel 
Gauvin cites an incidence of a student who had been awarded a high mark only to have her 
work downgraded because she exclaimed her surprise in her native language.102 Eliane Wolff 
and Michel Watin thus accurately describe this second phase of departmentalisation as a 
‘processus de techno‐modernisation [qui] s’accompagne d’une forte acculturation’.103 They 
maintain that the 1946 law led to far‐reaching transformations in nearly all areas of social and 
economic life, but that these only came into effect from the mid‐1960s:  
 
La période 1960‐1980 voit en effet se produire de grandes transformations qui sont, 
pour partie, explicatives de la situation actuelle de la société. 
Ces transformations sont rapides, structurelles, massives et généralisées. Rapides 
puisqu’elles se déroulent en à peine un tiers de siècle, structurelles car elles entraînent 
une modification radical de l’organisation sociale, massives car elles intéressent toute 
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la population réunionnaise et généralisées car elles concernent pratiquement toutes 
les dimensions de la vie sociale, culturelle et économique.104 
 
The authors nonetheless advocate that recent changes must be understood in relation to the 
island’s colonial history.105 It should thus be noted that this period of accelerated 
infrastructural, economic and social development was accompanied by intense political 
scrutiny, in which the distinction between culture and politics was decidedly blurred. Vergès is 
therefore perhaps right to point out that the process of modernization which Réunion 
underwent cannot be understood outside of the political context. As she explains, 
 
Between 1963 and the mid‐1970s, a predominantly rural and poor society was 
modernized […] Supermarkets, cars and television arrived on the island together with 
the Cold War, modernization together with political demonology. Conservatives 
controlled means of dissemination previously unavailable, such as radio, television, 
and the education system. They reinforced the island’s economic and political 
dependence in ways that are still framing the island’s society.106 
 
Vergès’s analysis of this period, which tends towards an oversimplified depiction of the 
progressive nature of the PCR in contrast to Debré’s political scheming, must however be read 
alongside other accounts which are more sensitive to the complexities of political engagement 
in this period. For example, Finch‐Boyer’s ethnographic research suggests that poor, mainly 
non‐white Réunionese selectively supported and used Debré’s policies in order to further their 
own opportunities for social mobility. She describes how the newly created Fonds d’Action 
Sanitaire et Sociale Obligatoire offered paid work in school canteens to illiterate and 
uneducated non‐white women; however, these women were often required to secure 
electoral success for the local conservative candidate in order to retain their posts.107 
However, this phase of accelerated development seemed to gradually ground to a 
halt. As concerns the education system, for example, Chane‐Kune asks why results did not 
continue to improve with increased investment in infrastructure. She provides two possible 
answers: firstly, because many students in Réunion continued to live in poverty – even at the 
end of the twentieth century, it was not uncommon for homes to be without electricity and to 
have bad transportation links to school. Secondly, she points to the gap between students’ 
lived experience and the world presented to them at school, based on the metropolitan French 
model.108 Chane‐Kune also questions the assertion that Réunion’s current economic situation 
is explained by a ‘mentalité d’assistés’ amongst the contemporary population. She argues 
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instead that funding from metropolitan France must be analysed in detail in order to 
determine the principal beneficiaries of French welfare.109 Yet the fact remains that the DOM 
populations are often perceived as drains on metropolitan finances, even in cases of extreme 
emergency. Referring to the Réunionese Chikungunya outbreak of 2006, Françoise Lionnet 
maintains that ‘metropolitan perceptions of this “exotic” ailment revealed that many in France 
had great difficulty taking it seriously’,110 resulting in a significant delay in providing support to 
French citizens of Réunion suffering from a debilitating illness. 
To summarise, the period following departmentalisation was one of dramatic change 
and vast improvements in living standards. Yet given the unresolved questions of political 
autonomy, stunted economic development, and the psychological consequences of cultural 
assimilation, it becomes apparent why many scholars maintain that the social structures 
developed in the colonial period continue to pervade contemporary Réunionese society. 
Michel Robert, for example, argues that ‘l’histoire des Réunionnais [...] a toujours été celle des 
colons et des esclaves,’ and that whilst ‘[l]es temps ont évolué’, ‘les structures de la société 
restent basées sur l’inégalité’.111 In the local media and in everyday discussions, Réunion is 
often characterised as a société à deux vitesses, a metaphor which highlights the social division 
between those in work and those who have no prospect of employment.112 
 
Mauritian Independence 
 
Mauritian postcolonial history, on the other hand, is often characterised as one of the 
rare success stories of Third World development. Yet the island’s economic prospects did not 
look particularly promising at the dawn of independence. The Meade report painted an 
especially bleak picture of post‐independence Mauritius which, it was proposed, was all but 
doomed to fail due to projected over‐population and a lack of natural resources.113 The island’s 
dependence on sugar production left the national economy at the mercy of price fluctuations 
in the global market. Yet by the 1980s, government policies had resulted in a successful 
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diversification of the Mauritian economy, notably through the development of the tourism 
industry. At the same time, increased access to education and health services led to a dramatic 
reduction in birth rates. Jean‐Claude Lau Thi Keng suggests that ‘[l]’apparition d’une idéologie 
développementaliste dans la période qui succède immédiatement à l’indépendance politique 
de Maurice est l’un des facteurs qui a probablement fonctionné comme ciment d’une cohésion 
sociale’, and that it is for this reason that ‘le thème du développement a été l’une des 
constantes du discours politique.’114 The development discourse thus became a kind of 
founding myth, comparable to the idea of the American dream, in the absence of other 
unifying elements. 
It should also be remembered that independence from Britain was achieved by means 
of the ballot box, rather than as a result of any organised anti‐colonial movement. 
Independence was achieved primarily through the Indo‐Mauritian vote in 1968; however, 44% 
of those who voted opposed independence. Raj Meetarbhan argues that the fact that 
Mauritians didn’t have to fight for independence has resulted in a lack of national 
consciousness which may otherwise have been facilitated through a unifying history of anti‐
colonial struggle.115 Indeed, the possibility of conflict organised along ethnic and religious lines, 
was of concern to the colonial administration even prior to independence. It has been 
suggested that British colonial policy, heavily influenced by the experiences of colonial officers 
in British India, ‘made no attempts at any form of horizontal integration of the various 
communities’ and ‘did unintentionally divide and rule and inhibit the development of multi‐
cultural nationalism’, particularly in relation to education and cultural issues.116 This has 
resulted in a dominant conceptualisation of Mauritian society as formed not of individuals but 
of corporate ethnoreligious groups, encapsulated in the national slogan ‘unity in diversity’.117 
Belonging to the nation is thus formulated as mediated by ethnoreligious group membership, 
and it follows that ethnic identity is understood not to detract from but rather form an 
essential part of national identity. For this reason, ethnicity is generally understood as the 
primary structuring principle in academic analyses of Mauritian society: ‘elle offre un cadre 
d’interprétation extrêmement puissant et disponible que les individus appliquent à des 
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multiples circonstances de leur vie quotidienne.’ 118 However, this dominant conceptualisation 
has also been contested by alternative pan‐ethnic or supra‐ethnic forms of nationalism, which 
criticise the divisive effects of the ‘unity in diversity’ approach. This will be discussed further in 
Chapter 4 of this study. 
Therefore, despite divergent political and economic strategies, both Réunion and 
Mauritius experienced dramatic social and economic transformation in the latter decades of 
the twentieth century. The dramatic reduction in infant mortality experienced in Réunion in 
the decades following departmentalisation was described as ‘unique au monde’.119 Economic 
development resulted in similar transformations in Mauritius. It should therefore not be 
forgotten that ‘[d]ans bien des domaines (démographie, éducation, économie, habitat et 
urbanisation, etc.), La Réunion [et l’île Maurice ont] parcouru en moins de cinquante ans ce 
que bien des pays européens ont parcouru en un siècle et demi.’120 This accelerated 
development has profoundly changed what were previously rural societies where the vast 
majority of the populations lived in poverty. However, it has also had negative consequences, 
particularly for those at the bottom of the social structure. The speed of change has caused 
anxiety over changing living, working and education patterns, which can however be expressed 
in rather different ways. For example, this anxiety might be detected in the promotion of the 
cultivation, as opposed to retention, of ancestral cultures in Mauritius, which are often seen as 
an antidote to the more nefarious effects of Westernization, a side effect of economic 
development.121 Or it might be expressed as nostalgia for the Creole language amongst middle 
class Réunionese parents, who nonetheless insist that their children speak French at home to 
improve school performance. 
In addition, it must also be remembered that despite the dramatic socio‐economic 
transformation in second half of the twentieth century, prejudices are still carried over from 
the colonial era. For example, the refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the Kreol languages, 
and the valorisation of lighter skin tones and accompanying denigration of darker skin can be 
seen to persist into the twenty‐first century. Thus, although economic development and 
                                                          
118 Jean‐Luc Alber, ‘Ethnicité indienne et créolisation à l'île Maurice: les Madras, les Tamouls et les 
autres’ in Ethnicisation des rapports sociaux: Racismes, nationalismes, ethnicismes et culturalismes, ed. 
by Martine Fourier and Geneviève Vermèsta (Fontenay St. Cloud: ENS Editions; Paris: L’Harmattan 
1994), pp. 126‐39, p. 126. 
119 INSEE report cited in Chane‐Kune, La Réunion, p. 21. 
120 Nicolas Roinsard, ‘Soixante ans de départementalisation à La Réunion: une sociologie des mutations 
de l’organisation sociale et de la structure de classe en contexte postcolonial’, Revue Asylon(s), 11 
(2013), <http://www.reseau‐terra.eu/article1278.html> [Accessed August 22nd 2013]. 
121 Eisenlohr argues that ‘[d]iasporic traditions among Indo‐Mauritians cannot be understood as 
“survivals” from a time before migration to Mauritius’, contrary to what promoters of ancestral cultures, 
including the Mauritian government, may claim. He prefers instead to speak of the ‘cultivation’ of 
ancestral cultures. Little India, p. 5. 
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investment led to the development of Mauritian and Réunionese middle classes, in both 
contexts the legacy of racial hierarchy persists. Dark skin colour is still associated with low 
levels of education and low socioeconomic status, and therefore it is those at the bottom of 
the social structure in both locations who feel most acutely the legacy of racial hierarchy and 
the double oppression of race and class prejudice. Moreover, the socioeconomic 
transformations also brought about new forms of social inequality, whilst aspects of older 
power structures remain essentially unchanged. 
For this reason, then, and given the speed of development, it would seem more 
appropriate to speak of modernities in the plural rather than in the singular. Drawing on Hall’s 
concept of ‘vernacular modernities’, Wolff and Watin develop a conceptualisation of 
‘modernités réunionnaises’ to better reflect contemporary social reality: 
 
Le terme de modernités réunionnaises est proposé ici pour rendre compte de la 
situation réunionnaise actuelle ; il permet d’échapper à la binarité classique des 
Lumières entre tradition et modernité et à l’idéologie du retard à combler par une 
société dont le développement serait en décalage temporel par rapport à son 
ancienne metropole coloniale. La marque du pluriel s’impose car il n’y a pas une 
modernité unique et purement occidentale, mais des modernités qui s’expriment dans 
des temps, des lieux et des espaces différents, mais également dans les multiples 
manières de les vivre. Les modernités réunionnaises renvoient à la complexité d’une 
société encore largement marquée par sa douloureuse histoire mais qui invente et 
bricole chaque jour sa façon d’être au monde.122 
 
To summarise, then, the rapid development experienced at the end of the 20thcentury does 
not mean that the longer colonial histories of Réunion and Mauritius may be forgotten, even 
within a study of contemporary popular and youth culture such as this. Furthermore, for the 
majority of the populations, this dramatic transformation came at a cost. In Réunion, the 
context of Cold War politics required Réunionese citizens to affirm their allegiance to the 
metropole, resulting in the privileging of metropolitan French culture and the French language. 
In post‐independence Mauritius, the need to develop a diversified economy has required a 
workforce fluent in English and, to a lesser extent, French. Furthermore, a complex set of 
developments have led to the association of cultural values with ancestral cultures specifically, 
which are seen to mitigate the negative effects of rapid economic development. Both of these 
situations may be seen in different ways to have impeded the development of a sense of 
Mauritianness or Réunionness, of an ‘indigenous’ national identity which in other colonial 
contexts provided a stimulus for anti‐colonial revolutionary movements. Yet Mauritianness 
                                                          
122 Wolff and Watin, p. 10, referencing Stuart Hall, ‘A Conversation with Stuart Hall,’ Journal of the 
International Institute, 7: 1 (1999), <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.4750978.0007.107>, [Accessed 10th 
Jan 2014]. 
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and Réunionness do indeed exist as discursive constructs, albeit sometimes as bitterly 
contested ones. We will now briefly explore the impact of the political, economic and social 
transformations of the postcolonial era on the Réunionese and Mauritian cultural spheres, 
firstly in relation to Kreol language politics (to be discussed further in Chapters 2 and 3 of this 
study), and secondly as concerns the development of popular music. 
 
Evolution of Attitudes Towards Kreol Languages  
 
Today, as a French overseas department and thus politically an integral part of the 
French Republic, the official language of Réunion is French. Yet Réunionese Kreol (hereafter 
RK), spoken by 80% of the population, remains the majority language within the local 
context.123  As in many multilingual postcolonial contexts, the status of RK remains ambivalent. 
However, attitudes towards the language, previously considered as a patois or dialect, have 
undoubtedly evolved in the period following departmentalisation in 1946. In the 1970s, 
reactions provoked by the cultural assimilationist policies of the French administration led to a 
prominent militantisme culturel movement, spearheaded by intellectuals such as A. Gauvin. 
His essay Du créole opprimé au créole libéré aimed to expose the hypocrisy of language policy 
of the time, and to establish that RK was a language equally as worthy as la langue noble, 
French.124 
As a result of these efforts, there has been a significant evolution in attitudes towards 
RK. Whereas French was once the exclusive language of the local media, RK has played an 
increasingly central role in local radio and television programmes over the last three 
decades.125 The significance of the FreeDOM movement should be noted here: Réunion’s first 
private broadcaster Télé FreeDOM offered ordinary viewers a chance to go on camera and to 
express themselves in either RK or French and set up lively debates on topical issues. This was 
to prove immensely popular amongst Réunion’s poorest and most disadvantaged.126 
Furthermore, RK gained recognition in the sphere of education with the introduction of the 
CAPES de Créole in 2002.127 It is also taught and studied at the University of Réunion, which 
now has a Creole studies department. The increasing prominence of RK within the public 
sphere has thus led some sociolinguists to draw attention to the cohabitation of RK and 
                                                          
123 Philippe Vitale, ‘Le Créole réunionnais. Jalons d’un nécessaire vivre ensemble’ in Anthropologies de La 
Réunion ed. by Christian Ghasarian (Paris: Archives contemporaines, 2008), pp. 113‐26, p. 113. 
124 Du créole opprimé. 
125 See Bernard Idelson, Histoire des médias à la Réunion de 1946 à nos jours (Paris: Le Publieur; Saint‐
Denis, Réunion: Université de la Réunion, 2006), especially pp. 101‐13. 
126  Idelson, p. 105. 
127 The CAPES (Certificat d’Aptitude au Professorat de l’Enseignement du Second degré) is a national 
recruitment system for teachers in French secondary schools (collèges and lycées). 
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French, in which the traditional distinctions between the basolect and the acrolect in diglossic 
situations are no longer applicable.128 Jacky Simonin, for example, advocates the analysis not 
of a continuum between French and RK but of a singular ‘parler réunionnais’ combining both 
languages.129  
Nevertheless, as Philippe Vitale remarks, despite RK’s increased visibility in the public 
domain, popular discourses on language often reveal ‘le paradoxe d’une langue qui est, 
aujourd’hui, majoritairement pratiquée mais qui demeure déconsidérée par rapport au 
français, langue officielle de la République et de la Nation, tant par les créolophobes que par 
une grande partie de ses locuteurs.’130 RK speakers are thus required to negotiate between the 
language of everyday communication and what is perceived as the language of social mobility. 
Drawing on qualitative research with RK‐speaking mothers, Vitale argues that a complex 
process of compromise leads them to encourage their children to adopt a French‐RK 
bilingualism. This results from their awareness of different spheres of language use: whereas 
RK is valued as an authentic means of communication in the domestic sphere, French is 
promoted in education because of its perceived linguistic capital and value in the employment 
market place.131 In the contemporary context, then, where youth unemployment has hit 
record levels and mastery of French is a necessary pre‐requisite in order to find work outside 
of Réunion, it is perhaps not surprising that French continues to be associated with prestige 
and progress. Therefore, when presented in opposition to French, RK is construed as 
(temporally) backward‐ and (geographically) inward‐looking.  
In addition, the movement in promotion of RK has also been affected by the tendency 
to confuse culture and politics in post‐departmental Réunion. As Chane‐Kune explains, 
 
la promotion du créole est devenue un enjeu politique. Beaucoup pensent qu’accepter 
l’entrée du créole dans l’enseignement revient à cautionner les mouvements 
autonomistes et, pire, indépendantistes.132 
 
In response to this, a more recent development has involved the attempt to disassociate the 
valorisation and promotion of the RK from the articulation of an autonomist or independentist 
political position. This would appear to be the position espoused by the authors of Oui au 
créole, oui au français, a recent essay written by a number of Réunionese language activists. 
The essay favours of the promotion of RK within a context of RK‐French bilingualism. 
                                                          
128 See for example, Gudrun Ledegen, ‘Réalités et paradoxes du contact créole‐français à La Réunion: « 
Tééé atta je te raconte un zaffaire »’ in La Réunion, une société en mutation, pp. 101‐21. 
129 ‘Parler réunionnais ?’ Hermès, 32: 1 (2002), 287‐96. 
130 p. 117. 
131 Vitale, pp. 121‐3. 
132 Chane‐Kune, La Réunion, p. 43. 
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Furthermore, whilst it acknowledges that in 1960s and 70s, promotion of RK was associated 
with calls for political autonomy and indépendantisme, the essay suggests that the 
contemporary movement has witnessed an evolution of the situation resulting in the 
separation of language and politics.133 
In Mauritius, too, the first attempts to promote and revalorise Mauritian Kreol 
(hereafter MK) took place in the late 1960s and 1970s. This can be characterised as a parallel 
militantisme culturel movement, in which students and intellectuals played a crucial role. The 
author and playwright Dev Virahsawmy, then a student of linguistics at the University of 
Edinburgh, wrote a masters dissertation which aimed to establish, contrary to popular belief, 
that MK could be considered a language in its own right.134 However, no concrete 
developments in terms of language policy were to follow: this would come later with the 1982 
elections, resulting in a Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM) coalition government. Yet their 
promotion of MK prompted a backlash on the part of conservatives and those in favour of the 
promotion of ancestral cultures, because MK was seen as a threat to the position of ancestral 
languages.135 The failure of 1983 attempt to make MK an official language, which was 
considered too hasty, appears to have resulted in reluctance to change or develop language 
policy, which until recently was handled with extreme caution.136 This was then further 
exacerbated by the 1995 controversy over inclusion of ancestral languages in Certificate of 
Primary Education (CPE) exam. Thus there were no major changes in the status of MK until its 
introduction in primary schools in January 2012, as an optional subject rather than as the 
medium of instruction. Therefore, despite being the native language of the overwhelming 
majority of the population, MK is still not officially recognised by the Mauritian government.137 
The official language remains English, with French serving as the predominant language of the 
media and as an officially recognised second language.138 
                                                          
133 Laurence Daleau, et al., Oui au créole, oui au français: essai (Saint‐Paul, Réunion: Editions Tikouti, 
2006), pp. 12‐4. 
134 ‘Towards a Re‐evaluation of Mauritian Creole’, Unpublished Masters dissertation, (University of 
Edinburgh, 1967). 
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136 See Eisenlohr, ‘Creole Publics: Language, Cultural Citizenship, and the Spread of the Nation in 
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Unlike in Réunion, MK has not yet found its place into local higher education 
institutions. A course entitled ‘Mauritian Studies’ is taught at the Mahatma Gandhi Institute,139 
and a BA (Hons) in Mauritian and Heritage Studies is offered by the Department of History and 
Political Science at the University of Mauritius,140 but both are presumably taught in English. As 
in Réunion, the education system values first and foremost the mastery of the former colonial 
languages, English and French. In the media, the Mauritius Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) 
provides a 30‐minute daily news broadcast in MK. However, the main hour‐long nightly news 
slot is in French. That said, if those interviewed on the program speak in MK, as is often the 
case, no translation or subtitles are offered. This non‐translation of MK elements in the 
otherwise French nightly news would seem to imply an implicit recognition that MK does 
indeed function as a non‐official national language in Mauritius. MK is thus presumed to be 
understood by all, but is not seen to be sufficiently prestigious in order to be the main or sole 
language for MBC’s nightly news. In contrast, when ‘JT Kreol’, a weekly news programme in RK, 
was introduced on the state channel Réunion 1ère in March 2001, it was shown with French 
subtitles. The programme was only broadcast once a week on Saturday afternoons, but it was 
subsequently cancelled. This, in parallel, might be said to imply a reluctant acceptance of the 
hegemony enjoyed by the French language hegemony in what are considered as serious 
television and radio programs.  
 
Popular Music in Mauritius and Réunion: A History 
 
Analysis of popular culture can arguably reveal a fuller picture of the Indian Ocean 
region’s cultural heritage than more elitist forms of expression. Edward A. Alpers has argued 
that because ‘African voices [in the Indian Ocean] have been actively silenced in this 
diaspora[,] to get at the experiences of Africans in the Indian Ocean world and assess their 
sense of being of or belonging to Africa, we must look to popular culture.’141 Though Alpers 
main concern here is to problematise the idea that no elements of African culture has survived 
in Réunion and Mauritius, I would suggest that, given that it was not solely populations of 
African descent who experienced oppression, this could be applied to descendants of other 
historically subordinated groups. The medium of popular music can arguably achieve wider 
                                                          
139 ‘Centre for Mauritian and Comparative Cultural Studies’, Mahatma Gandhi Institute, 
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dissemination when compared with other forms of Réunionese and Mauritian cultural output. 
It would seem that the populations are largely unfamiliar with local literary output, for 
example, due in part to the fact that neither the Mauritian nor Réunionese (i.e. French) 
education systems place significant emphasis on the study of local cultural expression.142 
Popular music, on the other hand, has become a medium for critical discussion of important 
topics such as identity, culture, (neo)colonialism, social tensions and even political debates. 
When experienced as performance, musical forms such as maloya, sega, reggae, and seggae 
arguably provide an opportunity for dialogue. In practical terms, the audience plays a 
necessary and active role in the appraisal of the performance, inclusive of the messages and 
meanings created therein; in musical terms, the forms used are often based on or reminiscent 
of a call and response structure, which serves to foreground the communal origins of music in 
the region:143 a characteristic that appears to point back to an African or Afro‐Malagasy 
musical heritage.144 
In relation to the marginalised Creole population of Mauritius, Rosabelle Boswell 
argues that ‘[s]inging is […] an important medium for expressing Creole identity in Mauritius 
and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean’.145 Again, we might extend this to include all historically 
subordinated populations, regardless of ethnicity. This view is also reflected in Vergès’s 
evaluation of identity constructions which challenge dominant French discourses in Réunion 
and articulate alternative conceptualisations of Réunionness: 
 
Music has remained the main source of dissidence and cultural expression. The 
democratization of public space and the creation of private radios in the 1980s gave 
music a central place in cultural production and expression. […] Sega-reggae, malogae, 
maloya and sega embodied the politics of interculturality on the island. Young people, 
unable to cite the name of a local poet, know by heart the songs of Ziskakan, Danyel 
Waro, Baster, Granmoun Lélé. Concerts have become the meeting grounds of dissent 
and affirmation. The performers sing in Creole and use the instruments invented by 
slaves and indentured workers – instruments brought from the native country and 
creolized on the plantations. […] They borrow rhythms from reggae, West African 
music, Indian music, elaborating a relational cultural practice of vernacular 
cosmopolitanism. The result is Creole, but Creole is not a pure ethos – rather, the 
                                                          
142 See Valérie Magdelaine Andrianjafitrimo and Jean‐Claude Carpanin Marimoutou (eds.), Un état des 
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product of borrowing, mimicry, translation. It is a translocal creation that challenges 
the orthodoxy of national and sedentary identities.146 
 
Here we are met with an apparent contradiction. Popular music, which is based upon local 
traditional forms, but also is demonstrably shaped by wide‐ranging non‐local musical 
influences (to the extent that it may no longer be classed within the local musical genre but 
instead as a separate fusion genre), has become an important medium for the discussion of 
specifically local issues; the development of a specifically local consciousness and local cultural 
resistance; and the affirmation of specifically Réunionese and Mauritian identities which are 
marginalised within official discourses. Réunionese and Mauritian cultural actors thus appear 
to purposely foreground the interplay between the global and the local in their music as a 
means of both affirming specific local identities and of positioning and reshaping these 
identities in relation to other cultural spheres, including others which are considered as 
creolised, postcolonial and/or peripheral (see Chapters 2 and 3 for a consideration of specific 
instances of engagement with other cultures within Réunionese and Mauritian popular music). 
Yet a brief summary of Indian Ocean musical genres is also necessary to situate the 
sociological analysis of popular musics in the subsequent chapters. In order to analyse the 
works of Réunionese or Mauritian bands and artists, it is arguably first necessary to situate 
their works within the relevant musical contexts. Mauritian and Réunionese musics which are 
understood to be traditional appear to reflect Malagasy, European, African and Asian cultural 
practices brought to the islands, but which were not necessarily maintained ‘intact’ through 
the process of colonisation. These have instead developed over three centuries through an 
ongoing process of creolisation,147 leading to the formation of specific, if to some extent 
malleable, local musical forms and practices. Traditional musical forms of the Western Indian 
Ocean show some generic similarities, as can be seen in the common usage of the term sega 
throughout the region;148 however, geographic and, in the case of Réunion, political isolation 
has led to musical contrasts. Additionally, in the context of Réunion and Mauritius, distinct 
ideological meanings have come to be associated with musical forms such as the sega due to 
the two islands’ divergent socio‐political experiences during the twentieth century. I will now 
briefly consider the development of important musical trends and genres on the two islands, 
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before reflecting upon how local musical production might position itself within a globalised, 
predominantly Anglo‐American popular music industry. 
 
Mauritian sega 
 
Though previously marginalised due to its ‘primitive nature’ and sensuality,149 and, it 
would seem, its association with slave heritage,150 sega music is now recognised as a focal 
element of Mauritian national culture and as a veritable ‘national medium of musical 
expression’.151 The genre has been revitalised in recent decades, due in part to foreign interest 
generated through tourism. This trend has proved problematic in some respects, as it invites 
Mauritian performers to self‐exoticise, and/or to play the role of the ‘good Negro’ performer in 
order to fulfil the demands of the Western gaze. On the other hand, Boswell suggests that sega 
performance also provides a means of self‐validation, as it allows performers to ‘tak[e] on their 
negative stereotypes [as care‐free party lovers] and transfor[m] these into assets’; as well as 
constituting an important opportunity to benefit financially from their Creoleness and 
acknowledge the cultural heritage of slavery in a positive manner.152 Finally, sega music has 
also been used as a vehicle for cultural resistance and social protest, for example, in the ‘sante 
engaze’ movement which emerged in the 1960s performed by groups such as Soley Ruz and 
singer‐songwriters Siven Chinien and Bam Cuttayen.153 The first phase of Abaim’s musical 
production, the group discussed in Chapter 2, could also be considered as part of this 
politically‐engaged genre. 
 
                                                          
149 Boswell states that ‘until the work of a Creole singer, Alphonse Ravaton (alias Ti Frère) was 
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Seggae 
 
Seggae music, a fusion of Mauritian sega and reggae, is sometimes understood as part 
of a ‘modernization of sega music’; a move which has also led to the incorporation of 
instruments more generally associated with rock n’ roll and Western popular music, such as 
‘electric guitars and more elaborate percussion instruments’.154 Whether seggae is considered 
a separate genre in its own right, or part of a revitalisation of the traditional sega, the fact 
remains that Jamaica and the Anglophone Caribbean remains central within this musical 
configuration. And yet this musical expression of identification and cultural allegiance with the 
majority Afro‐Caribbean population of Jamaica has not, as we might expect given the 
importance attached to ethnoreligious community belonging within Mauritian society, 
resulted in increased levels of tension between ethnic communities.155 On the contrary,  
 
the popularity of seggae is not confined to the Creoles in the poorer suburbs of Port 
Louis nor is it to be associated with Rastafarians alone. […] It is a music that is reaching 
a wider ‘subcultural’ category – that of Mauritian youth in general.156 
 
It thus appears that through the music’s inherent reference to Jamaica within the framework 
of a specifically Mauritian musical creation, seggae has been able to reach across religious and 
ethnic communal boundaries. This music also offers a significant, much‐needed opportunity 
for Mauritians looking for ‘a [positive] way to identify themselves as being of Africa’,157 albeit 
through a Glissantian détour of Jamaican Rastafari culture and religion.158 Fusion genres such 
as seggae arguably played a fundamental role in the development of Indian Ocean dancehall 
music, discussed in further detail in Chapter 3. 
 
Réunionese Sega and Maloya 
 
In the context of Réunionese popular and folk music, an important distinction has 
come to be established between two musically related and yet ideologically distinct genres: 
sega and maloya. Musically, sega is often considered as an overwhelmingly ‘Europeanised 
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version’ of the first slave dances, whereas maloya is presented as ‘the only aspect of [the 
African or Malagasy slaves’] original cultures to survive acculturation’.159 However, this 
convenient polarisation avoids the more uncomfortable fact that both styles are syncretic 
forms which have combined African, European and Asian influences. The commonly perceived 
distinction between the two musical styles is thus better understood in ideological terms. As 
Carsten Wergin notes, this ideological difference can be discussed in terms of two opposing 
theories of hybridity: 
 
Séga is meant to represent a mélange of tourist imaginations, local cultural values and 
traditional music from continental France. Today, it plays a prominent role in 
performances in hotels and at tourist fairs on the island and abroad. Maloya, on the 
other hand, was first institutionalised by the Parti Communiste Réunionnais (PCR) and 
carries the image of an apparently ‘authentic’ medium for a Réunionese métissage, a 
cultural and socio‐political setting that takes into account the ‘violence, brutality and 
exile’ of the island’s creolisation. From the 1950s onwards, Maloya music functioned 
as a political tool for the PCR to support its movement for autonomy, articulating and 
representing a common Réunionese identity by using an apparently authentic 
Réunionese medium.160 
 
Sega represents a politics of mélange, or of cultural mixing. This necessarily recognises the 
pluricultural nature of Réunionese society; however, in viewing this society as composed of 
fundamentally different and wholly separate ethnic groups, it echoes colonial discourses of 
racial ‘types’ and represents what Homi K. Bhabha terms ‘cultural diversity’ (as opposed to 
cultural difference).161 Maloya, in contrast, represents métissage, a cultural politics which 
challenges rather than reflects hegemonic discourses. The concept has been outlined by 
Vergès as a means of reappropriating Réunion’s difficult history of slavery, exile, indentureship 
and institutional racism: 
 
Thinking métissage, I argue, requires accepting a genealogy and a heritage. In other 
words, the recognition of a past of rape, violence, slavery, and the recognition of our 
own complicity with the wicked ways of the world. No projection onto the Other, no 
denial of one’s complicity. Projection […] allows a denial but perpetuates the split and 
the denial of the primal scene. To recognize the split in oneself means to accept that 
                                                          
159 Andrew Smith, ‘Post‐colonial Politics and the Aesthetics of Maloya in Reunion Island’, Unpublished 
Masters thesis, (University of Leeds, 2001), see p. 25, p. 6. 
160 Carsten Wergin, ‘T’shéga, Shéga, Séga…: Music, Identity and Creolisation on Réunion Island’ in 
Multiple Identities in Action: Mauritius and Some Antillean Parallelisms, ed. by Vinesh Y. Hookoomsing, 
Ralph Ludwig and Burkhard Schnepel (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009), pp. 255‐74, p. 257. 
161 ‘Cultural diversity is the recognition of pre‐given cultural contents and customs; held in a time‐frame 
of relativism it gives rise to liberal notions of multiculturalism, cultural exchange or the culture of 
humanity. Cultural diversity is also the representation of a radical rhetoric of the separation of totalized 
cultures that live unsullied by the intertextuality of their historical locations, safe in the Utopianism of a 
mythic memory of a unique collective identity.’ The Location of Culture (London; New York: Routledge, 
2004), p. 50. 
44 
 
one can have conflicting desires and wishes, that an object can be both desired and 
rejected, that love and hate, envy and jealousy, are part of the human condition.162 
 
World Music 
 
Finally, in addition to Réunionese and Mauritian musical forms, the problematic term 
world music also warrants some consideration here. First used by academics in the 1960s to 
promote non‐Western musical diversity,163 the term was adopted into the commercial sphere 
in the late 1980s to allow previously uncategorisable artists to be grouped together in record 
shops. ‘World music’ has since taken on an extra‐commercial significance, however, and has 
come to be recognised by some as a musical genre in its own right.164 This said, as a catch‐all 
term with varying criteria depending almost entirely on where the music is being sold, the 
phenomenon of ‘world music’ remains notoriously difficult to pin down, and is often criticised 
as a neo‐colonial trend which is centred on the Western consumer. David Murphy, for 
example, argues that ‘[w]orld music is a primarily Western phenomenon: the music is 
“different” to Western pop music but increasingly repackaged in a more digestible form’.165 
Whilst this may perhaps give an accurate overview of the marketing and consumption 
of world music in the West, it does not represent a just assessment of the work of non‐
Western world music artists, many of whom retain a specific focus on their local or national 
context even after achieving international success. Moreover, ‘hybridised’ genres such as 
seggae and electric maloya which combine local musical influences with features of popular 
music often recognised as Western are not necessarily any ‘more digestible’ for the Western 
consumer than more ‘traditional’ or ‘authentic’ Third World musics. Indeed, the way in which 
such musics appear to blur boundaries between First and Third World, immigrant and citizen, 
Western cosmopolitanism and Third World cultural ‘primitivism’, would appear to suggest that 
the opposite is in fact closer to the truth. Furthermore, it should also be recognised that the 
world music commercial market offers an important opportunity for non‐Western musicians to 
get their music heard beyond their national or regional contexts. When I first started to meet 
and talk with musicians in Mauritius, I was surprised to find that they consciously worked 
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towards getting their music recognised as belonging to the ambiguous world music genre. This 
remains the case even if, when viewed from the perspective of Western academic analysis, the 
artists’ strategic use of ‘exotic’ instrumentation, pleasing syncopated rhythms and memorable 
melodies could be criticised as approaching the kind of bland ‘global pop’ sound which 
advocates of the cultural imperialism thesis argue to be indicative of the ‘cultural grey‐out’.166 
 
Creolisation: Transformation, Mixing, and Cultural Globalisation 
 
It thus becomes apparent that the term creolisation has been used within attempts to 
theorise the processes involved in development of the languages and musics recognised as 
indigenous to Mauritius and Réunion, and indeed the birth of the islands’ societies and 
cultures more generally.167 The adjective Creole has historically been used to reference the 
cultures, languages and societies of the islands (although it should be noted that when applied 
to people, the term has a more exclusive meaning in Mauritius where it usually refers to 
individuals of African or mixed descent).168 In a straightforward sense, then, creolisation can be 
interpreted as the process of becoming Creole, or as the transformation of Old World cultures 
and languages through transportation to a new environment, and it is in this respect that 
Charles Stewart suggests that the concept ‘has a rich and varied history stretching back to the 
sixteenth century’, given that ‘the idea arose implicitly the moment the term “creole” was 
coined’.169 However, this premise is arguably complicated by the variety of sometimes 
contradictory definitions and connotations attached to the term Creole within different 
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contexts and over different historical periods.170 It should also be recognised that 
contemporary academic usage of creolisation as a theoretical concept has a much more recent 
history: according to anthropologist Richard Price, the first reference in English can be traced 
back to 1928, and it was only in the 1960s that creolisation became part of a shared 
terminology used across the disciplines of linguistics and anthropology.171 
Within more recent academic usage of the concept, there remains a decided lack of 
consensus over what exactly is meant by the process of creolisation, and how the theory 
should be applied. There is debate over whether creolisation should be characterised as a 
process of transformation resulting in differentiation (of the European Creole born in the 
colony from the metropolitan European, for example) and degeneration,172 or whether 
creolisation refers to a process of mixing, whether biological, cultural or otherwise, which 
appears to have become the dominant interpretation.173 Moreover, an unresolved 
disagreement remains over whether the concept should remain confined to analysis of a 
specific sociohistorical context, usually that of the Caribbean colonial plantation,174 or whether 
the term might now be usefully applied to a wider range of contexts, and particularly in the 
study of contemporary processes of cultural globalisation.175 Finally, although creolisation has 
been associated with politically engaged scholarship, the ability of the concept to produce 
progressive political analyses has since been called into question due to its usage within 
celebratory accounts of cultural mixing or hybridity which can serve to obscure unequal power 
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relations. For some Caribbeanists, these two concerns are linked. Mimi Sheller, for example, 
has argued that 
 
Although creolization has become a keyword for processes of dynamic creation, 
agency, and self‐making in the imagery of global culture, […] there is a sense in which 
the theory of creolization was displaced from its Caribbean context. In that dislocation 
it was emptied of its resonance as a project of subaltern resistance.176 
 
A brief overview of these and other debates surrounding the term creolisation will therefore 
be provided here in order to clarify why the concept is not applied within this study of 
contemporary Mauritian and Réunionese sociocultural phenomena. This will focus primarily on 
the development of creolisation theory within Francophone postcolonial theory, particularly as 
concerns the work of Martiniquan theorists Édouard Glissant and the Créolité movement, 
before considering how the concept has been applied within Indian Ocean theorising. 
Initially drawn from the field of linguistics, creolisation has been used as a theoretical 
concept to conceptualise cultural contact within history, anthropology, and studies of 
postcolonial literature and culture. The primary concern within colonial Creole linguistics’ 
appears to have been to transform the lay term Creole into an academic category of analysis 
so that languages formed through the process of creolisation could be ‘objectively’ identified 
according to specific criteria. It should thus be remembered that, as Stephan Palmié observes, 
‘far from stimulating a revaluation of post‐enlightenment conceptions of languages as “natural 
kinds” (or, at least, “objective” entities) discretely distributed in social space, creole linguistics 
was firmly anchored in precisely such conceptions right from the start’.177 Within historical and 
anthropological scholarship in the second half of the twentieth century, however, the concept 
of creolisation was used to deconstruct assumptions and formulate a politically engaged 
critique of Western analyses of creolised societies and their histories. In contrast to previous 
theoretical frameworks such as acculturation or the plural society,178 creolisation theory 
appeared to invite a revaluation of the sociocultural legacies created within situations of 
colonial oppression which attributed agency to groups categorised as marginalised, subaltern, 
or subordinate. The historian and poet Edward Kamau Brathwaite used the term creolisation 
to underline the fact that creativity was also involved in the ‘cruel’ and violent cultural contact 
experienced by slaves in the colonies.179 In contrast to previous linguistic theorisations of 
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creolisation which reflected and sought to lend academic credence to Eurocentric prejudices, 
then, this politically engaged usage of the concept facilitated an important development in the 
theorisation of subaltern sociocultural histories which sought to give a central position to 
those voices previously written out of historical accounts, and allowed for a more nuanced, 
complex view of slave and postslave cultures which was not limited to the binary logic of 
culture retention and loss. 
It would seem that the attributing of agency to subaltern groups within colonial 
situations of cultural contact and domination constitutes one of the most important 
contributions of creolisation theory. In this respect, creolisation is considered as more 
conducive to politically engaged analyses than concepts such as hybridity, which ‘suffers from 
the disadvantage of appearing to exclude individual agency’ due to the implied perspective of 
‘the outside observer studying culture as if it were nature and the products of individuals and 
groups as if they were botanical specimens.’180 The progressive political positioning associated 
with this revised usage of the concept may have constituted one of the triggers behind the 
subsequent proliferation of creolisation theory across academic disciplines. This development 
was also preceded by the emergence of Creole political movements in various newly formed 
postcolonial states, within which ‘Creole people started to articulate an explicit form of 
cultural politics, mobilizing around the defence and advocacy of a creole identity’.181 Within 
the context of the Francophone Caribbean, and in particular in the work of theorists from the 
French DOM of Martinique, the articulation of a Creole cultural politics within calls for political 
autonomy appeared to converge with developments in creolisation theory. The concept 
proved fundamental to the emergence of new conceptualisations of culture which ensued but 
ultimately diverged from the Africa‐centric perspective of Négritude, a previous oppositional 
movement founded by black Francophone intellectuals Aimé Césaire, Léon‐Gontran Damas, 
and Léopold Sédar Senghor, who met whilst studying in Paris in the 1930s. For the subsequent 
generation of Francophone Caribbean intellectuals, Négritude constituted an important 
cultural legacy, particularly Césaire’s formulations which drew in part on the Martiniquan 
sociocultural context. Nonetheless, the movement was also accused of simply reconfiguring 
rather than doing away with the Western logic of the racial binary and post‐enlightenment 
conceptualisations of race and culture. 
Within their articulation of these critiques, the alternative possibilities presented by 
creolisation theory were explored by Martiniquan intellectuals who were grappling with the 
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social, political, and cultural consequences of departmentalisation. This can be seen in the 
early work of Martiniquan novelist and postcolonial theorist Édouard Glissant, whose 
collection of essays Le Discours antillais employs the concept of creolisation to articulate a 
critique of dominant Western perspectives of creolised societies past and present, even if the 
term itself is not used at this stage.182 Here, he reconfigures the Martiniquan history of cultural 
exchange in order to counter prejudicial accounts of cultural mixing, and calls for recognition 
of this specificity as a means of combating ‘l’universel généralisant’, the false universalisms 
propagated within Western philosophy.183 For Glissant, the framework of antillanité allows the 
Caribbean individual to move beyond the France/Africa binary which remained intact within 
Negritude, encouraging the recognition of multiple places of identity including and beyond 
Africa: 
 
Aujourd’hui l’Antillais ne renie plus la part africaine de son être, il n’a plus, par 
réaction, à la prôner comme exclusive. Il faut qu’il la reconnaisse. Il comprend que de 
tout cette histoire (même si nous l’avons vécu comme une non‐histoire) est résultée 
une autre réalité. Il n’est plus contraint de rejeter par tactique les composantes 
occidentales aujourd’hui encore aliénantes, dont il sait qu’il peut choisir entre elles. Il 
voit que l’aliénation réside d’abord dans l’impossibilité du choix, dans l’imposition 
arbitraire des valeurs, et peut‐être dans la notion de Valeur. Il conçoit que la synthèse 
n’est pas l’opération d’abâtardissement qu’on lui disait, mais pratique féconde par 
quoi les composants s’enrichissent. Il est devenu antillais.184 
 
Creolisation thus allows Glissant to formulate a new perspective on subaltern cultures which 
have developed through processes of cultural mixing and contact, which focuses not on loss 
but on cultural creation and enrichment. However, this is not simply a question of casting 
mixed cultures in a positive light, instead Glissant explicitly disavows the existence of any 
‘pure’ cultures, including the idealisation of African culture within Négritude: ‘affirmer que les 
peoples sont métissés, que le métissage est valeur, c’est déconstruire ainsi une catégorie 
« métis » qui serait intermédiaire entre deux extrêmes « purs »’.185  In later works, Glissant 
refines his position through differentiating between ‘créolisation’ and ‘métissage’, terms which 
are often used interchangeably within scholarship on the Caribbean, which is developed in 
connection with another of his key concepts, Relation. For Glissant, the Caribbean’s history of 
creolisation is the nearest real‐life instance of his utopian view of Relation as a state of total 
intercultural connectedness: 
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Ce qui s’est passé dans la Caraïbe, et que nous pourrions résumer dans le mot de 
créolisation, nous en donne l’idée la plus approchée possible. Non seulement une 
rencontre, un choc (au sens ségalénien), un métissage, mais une dimension inédite qui 
permet à chacun d’être là et ailleurs, enraciné et ouvert, perdu dans la montagne et 
libre sous la mer, en accord et en errance. 
Si nous posons le métissage en général comme une rencontre et une synthèse entre 
deux différents, la créolisation nous apparaît comme le métissage sans limites, dont les 
éléments sont démultipliés, les résultats imprévisibles. La créolisation diffracte, quand 
certains modes de métissage peuvent concentrer une fois encore. Elle est ici vouée à 
l’éclaté des terres, qui ne sont plus des îles. Son symbole le plus évident est dans la 
langue créole, dont le génie est de toujours s’ouvrir, c’est‐à‐dire peut‐être de ne se 
fixer que selon des systèmes de variables que nous aurons à imaginer autant qu’à 
définir.186 
 
Whereas the results of métissage may be predicted, creolisation is thus defined as process of 
métissage without limits, involving ‘la rencontre d’éléments culturels venus d’horizons 
absolument divers et qui réellement se créolisent, qui réellement s’imbriquent et se 
confondent l’un dans l’autre pour donner quelque chose d’absolument imprévisible, 
d’absolument nouveau’.187 It is precisely this fundamental characteristic of unpredictability 
which for Glissant leads to cultural creation and enrichment, and which in turn paves the way 
for the definitive eradication of persistent deleterious perspectives on Creole cultures: 
 
La créolisation est la mise en contact de plusieurs cultures ou au moins de plusieurs 
éléments de cultures distinctes, dans un endroit du monde, avec pour résultante une 
donnée nouvelle, totalement imprévisible par rapport à la somme ou à la simple 
synthèse de ces éléments.  
On prévoirait ce que donnera un métissage, mais non pas une créolisation. Celle‐ci et 
celui‐là, dans l’univers de l’atavique, étaient réputés produire une dilution de l’être, un 
abâtardissement. Un autre imprévu est que ce préjugé s’efface lentement, même s’il 
s’obstine dans des lieux immobiles et barricadés.188 
 
It thus becomes apparent that in Glissant’s later works, his writings on creolisation 
increasingly make use of universal and abstract language, as his engagement with the 
specificities of the Martiniquan context becomes less prominent. It would seem that the 
principal function of the concepts of creolisation and Relation is no longer to highlight the 
process of cultural creativity and enrichment within the Martiniquan or the Caribbean 
sociocultural sphere. Instead, the two concepts are now applied to cultural systems 
throughout the entire world: 
 
La créolisation ne limite pas son œuvre aux seules réalités créoles des Archipels ni à 
leurs langages naissants. Le monde se créolise, il ne devient pas créole, il devient cet 
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inextricable et cet imprédictible que tout processus de créolisation porte en lui et qui 
ne se soutient ni ne s’autorise d’aucun modèle. Ailleurs, ni la raide hybridation, ni le 
seul métissage, ni le multi‐quoi‐que‐ce‐soit.189 
 
Creolisation is thus now formulated as a truly global phenomenon, and therefore now involves 
even those Western cultures associated with theories of pure, rooted identity which proved so 
harmful to conceptualisations of Creole cultural autonomy.190 For some of his critics, this 
universalised application of creolisation theory forms part of an ‘aestheticizing, post‐political 
turn in Glissant’s work’.191 Chris Bongie, who situates this development in relation to Glissant’s 
move from Parisian publishing houses Le Seuil to Gallimard, argues that the increased 
popularity of later works must be understood to reflect Glissant’s ‘changing attitude toward 
[the] “oppositional nationalist politics”’ articulated in the Discours antillais through its detailed 
attention to the Martiniquan context.192 According to Bongie, ‘Glissant’s parting of ways with 
such partisan politics after the Discours, combined with his strong claims for the global 
crossing of cultures, meshed well with the belief in that alternative‐(to)‐politics known as 
‘cultural politics’, which has been so fundamental to dominant versions of postcolonial 
theory’,193 resulting in increased popularity with academic audiences, but also in the 
abandoning of the political project which Glissant set out in his earlier work. This assessment 
of evolutions in Glissant’s theorising would thus appear to support critiques of contemporary 
creolisation theory which claim that through universalising the concept, creolisation has lost 
much of its subversive political potential. 
A second development in Martiniquan postcolonial theory commonly associated with 
the concept of creolisation, the Créolité movement, pays explicit homage to both Césairian 
Négritude and to Glissant’s formulation of antillanité within its formulation of a new 
Francophone Caribbean identity which valorises and centralises the place of Creole language, 
culture and social identity. 194 The movement was marked by the publication of the manifesto 
Eloge de la créolité in 1989, but also refers to a wider intellectual engagement built on the 
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research of the Groupes d’Études et de Recheches en Espace Créolophone (GEREC) established 
at the Centre Universitaire Antilles‐Guyane in the 1970s and led by linguist and co‐author of 
the Eloge Jean Bernabé.195 For the Eloge authors, ‘le processus de créolisation […] désigne la 
mise en contact brutale, sur des territoires soit insulaires, soit enclavés […] de populations 
culturellement différentes’.196 The relative isolation of colonial plantation is thus presented as 
a significant factor in the facilitation of complex processes of cultural, social, and linguistic 
creolisation: 
 
Réunis en général au sein d’une économie plantationnaire, ces populations sont 
sommées d’inventer de nouveaux schèmes culturels permettant d’établir une relative 
cohabitation entre elles. Ces schèmes résultent du mélange non harmonieux (et non 
achevé et donc non réducteur) des pratiques linguistiques, religieuses, culturales, 
culinaires, architecturales, médicinales, etc., des différent peuples en présence.197 
 
Though their presentation of the process of creolisation thus recognises the role of colonial 
violence and force, the authors’ attitudes to Créolité, which is conceptualised as the end result 
of this process, are shown to be overwhelmingly positive, as is signalled by the manifesto’s 
title. Créolité is defined as ‘[l]’agrégat interactionnel ou transactionnel, des éléments culturels 
caraïbes, européens, africains, asiatiques et levantins, que le joug de l’Histoire a réuni sur le 
même sol’.198 However, the authors’ listing of the different cultural elements involved in this 
process has provoked the criticism that theorising creolisation in this way in fact reproduces 
the idea that cultures remain stable, pure and rooted prior to creolisation. Furthermore, their 
choice of terminology suggests that creolised cultures may again become fixed and 
homogenous, as is implied by addition of the ‐ité suffix to form Créolité. The opening line of 
the manifesto, ‘[n]i Européens, ni Africains, ni Asiatiques, nous nous proclamons Créoles’,199 
has been subject to a similar critique: Bongie has argued that in this representation of Creole 
identity, the Eloge authors reveal ‘a foundationalist politics of identity that is logically 
equivalent to the Old World identities that are being renounced’.200 Although the manifesto 
claims to break with modern conceptualisations of culture and identity grounded in Western 
post‐enlightenment philosophy, it therefore becomes clear that these continue to reappear 
within the authors’ elaborations on Créolité. 
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As critics such as Mary Gallagher have pointed out, the slippage between postmodern 
and decidedly modern conceptualisations of identity forms one aspect of the paradoxical 
conceptualisation of Créolité as presented within the Eloge manifesto.201 This can also be seen 
in the contrast between the authors’ future‐oriented outlook, evident in their claim that 
Créolité prefigures global postmodernity (‘cette nouvelle dimension de l’homme, dont nous 
sommes la silhouette préfigurée’),202 and the symbolic importance attached to the plantation 
context of Martinique’s colonial past. As Gallagher notes, the first element outlined within the 
manifesto’s extended discussion of Créolité is oral tradition, which is presented as a privileged 
mode of Créolité and an important means of reconnecting with the plantation past.203 She is 
thus led to conclude that ‘[a]lthough the Créolité vision is inherently programmatic and future‐
oriented, the aesthetic outlined in the main body of the manifesto is strikingly 
retrospective’.204 This assessment concurs with Richard Burton’s evaluation of the wider 
Créolité movement, inclusive of representations of Creole authenticity within novels of Eloge 
co‐authors Patrick Chamoiseau and Raphaël Confiant: 
  
Prospective and progressive in theory, Créolité is in practice often retrospective, even 
regressive, in character, falling back, in a last desperate recourse against 
decreolization, into the real or imagined creole plenitude of an tan lontan (olden 
times), of Martinique and Guadeloupe as they were before the ‘fall’ of 
departmentalization or the massive disruptions of the 1960s.205 
 
The authors’ claims to a progressive cultural politics are thus troubled by the persistence of 
what we might term Creole cultural conservatism, in which ‘creole cultural authenticity is 
overwhelmingly predicated […] on the colonial past’.206 This has led to criticism regarding the 
Créolité movements’ conceptualisation of gender relations,207 and can also be seen in the 
defensive positioning adopted in relation to contemporary processes of cultural globalisation, 
which are interpreted as indicative of cultural alienation, especially where these involve the 
consumption of Western cultures. Thus Chamoiseau and Confiant bemoan the contemporary 
‘système de consommation globale de la chose extérieure’, which is thought to encourage a 
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process of mimicry which leads Martiniquans ‘à confondre liberté et assimilation, urbanité et 
civilisation, liberté et francisation’.208 
A related aspect of this contradiction can be identified in the tension between the 
grounding of Créolité within a specific sociocultural context, and the authors’ global ambitions. 
The manifesto makes the explicit claim that ‘[l]e monde va en état de créolité,’209 reflecting the 
gradual emergence of ‘une nouvelle humanité qui aura les caractéristiques de notre humanité 
créole: toute la complexité de la Créolité.’210 As in Glissant’s later work, then, the authors thus 
expand the remit of creolisation beyond the context of the colonial Caribbean plantation, as 
Créolité is now presented as a totality which would appear to encompass global cultural 
phenomena: 
 
Craignant cet inconfortable magma, nous avons vainement tenté de le figer dans des 
ailleurs mythiques (regard extérieur, Afrique, Europe, aujourd’hui encore, Inde ou 
Amérique), de chercher refuge dans la normalité close des cultures millénaires, sans 
savoir que nous étions l’anticipation du contact des cultures, du monde futur qui 
s’annonce déjà. Nous sommes tout à la fois, l'Europe, l'Afrique, nourris d'apport 
asiatiques, levantins, indiens, et nous relevons aussi des survivances de l'Amérique 
précolombienne. La Créolité c’est « le monde diffracté mais recomposé », un 
maelström de signifiés dans un seul signifiant : une Totalité.211 
 
The authors thus bring up what has become a central point of contention within later debates 
regarding the application of creolisation theory: the idea that the sociocultural context of the 
Caribbean can be seen to prefigure the modern globalised world due to its history of cultural 
mixing and exchange, as was famously expressed by the anthropologist James Clifford’s ‘we 
are all Caribbeans now in our urban archipelagoes’.212 It would thus seem that the Eloge ‘does 
not simply theorize Caribbean cultural identity; it also lays claim to certain truths about global 
cultural identity in the present and future.’213 Therefore, although the text begins by outlining 
its deconstruction of false notions of ‘l’Universel’ governed by Western values,214 the Eloge 
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authors ultimately appear to create a new formulation of the universal, albeit one based on 
Creole and creolised sociocultural experience.215 
Within Francophone postcolonial theory, then, the concept of creolisation has most 
commonly been associated with the French Caribbean, and more specifically with the 
Martiniquan context which produced the theoretical developments discussed above. However, 
this is not to say that there has been no engagement with concept of creolisation in the Indian 
Ocean region. In the essay text Amarres, Françoise Vergès and Carpanin Marimoutou develop 
the concept of ‘indiaocéanité’ as a means of clarifying and contextualising academic theorising 
on creolisation. The text appears to demonstrate a desire to distinguish Indian Ocean 
creolisation from previous Caribbean theorising, as is demonstrated by their choice of 
metaphor, ‘amarres’, which would appear to privilege a sense of anchorage over free‐floating 
conceptualisations of postmodernist identity. In further contrast to Francophone Caribbean 
theorising, the existence of the Indian Ocean as a region resulting from creolisation is itself 
problematised, since it is acknowledged to be a ‘communauté imaginée et concrète, ancienne 
et en formation’.216 The authors thus appear to adopt a more tentative, questioning approach 
to creolisation when compared with the bold statements which characterised the Eloge, whilst 
persistently countering the assumption that creolisation is a priori a Caribbean concept. 
Throughout the text, Vergès and Marimoutou appear to adopt an overtly critical 
approach which actively addresses problematic aspects within both creolisation theory and 
Réunionese society as a site of creolisation. For example, an awareness of the tendency for 
discussion of creolisation to lead to simplistic celebrations is explicitly announced in the 
opening section of the essay. Instead, the authors conceptualise creolisation as a constant 
process which forms part of Réunionese social reality without resulting in a fixed state, as 
opposed to the Eloge authors’ conceptualisation of Créolité. This process is marked by a 
‘philosophie de l’emprunt, de la contrefaçon, de l’imitation et […une] dynamique du 
rafistolage, du bricolage’.217 However, the authors’ insist that this process of mixture, 
borrowing and restructuring is not to be idealised, nor stigmatised, nor reduced to a 
harmonious melting‐pot or ‘célébration béate de la créolité’.218 As they explain, 
 
La créolisation n’est pas un agrégat, une somme des différences. Elle se sait inachevée, 
soumise aux mutations, à la perte. Elle est emprunt, elle est mimétique et créatrice. 
Elle ne craint pas de s’enraciner car pour elle la racine n’est pas nécessairement 
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mortifère, si elle amarre c’est pour mieux laisser partir. Pas d’idéalisation du 
mouvement, mais une intégration de la distance à la terre, au lieu, à l’autre. L’amarre 
est relation qui accepte le lien, que ne craint pas d’être soumise aux sens, au désir, qui 
accepte le renoncement’219 
 
It would thus seem that overall, Amarres addresses a number of the blind spots in the 
Eloge manifesto which were outlined above. The text readdresses the balance between 
accounts of historical creolisation in the colonial era, including their continuing legacy, and an 
evaluation of contemporary Creole (here, Réunionese) society, as the authors provide a 
detailed critical account of the present‐day context in Réunion, which draws on statistical as 
well as analytical evidence, within their engagement with the concept of Indian Ocean 
creolisation. This includes a detailed critical consideration of gender relations in Réunion from 
both a historical and contemporary perspective, which examines the legacy of Réunion’s 
historical gender imbalance in relation to contemporary social problems such as domestic 
violence and prevalent homophobic attitudes.220 The authors also examine how creolisation 
relates to discourses of exclusion, taking note of the propagation of stereotypes which have 
served to stigmatise lower class Réunionese, including descendents of slaves and indentured 
labourers.221 That the text represents an attempt to theorise creolisation in relation to analysis 
of the contemporary as well as historical context can be seen in the authors’ suggestion that 
Réunionese should ‘s’amarrer dans l’histoire et non pas à l’histoire’, a positioning which 
involves recognising historical continuations but also taking responsibility for present 
circumstances, inclusive of the Réunionese natural as well as social environment.222 
Furthermore, the text addresses issues pertaining to global perspectives, globalisation, 
and the peripheral positioning of Réunion from the start, and demonstrates a critical 
awareness of the rhetorical power of Creole cultural conservatism to which the Eloge authors 
appear to succumb on occasions.223 Yet, despite the authors’ detailed, if not exhaustive, 
attention to the specificities of the Réunionese context within these various analyses, we 
cannot help but notice than their formulation of Indian Ocean creolisation in the section 
entitled ‘Créolisations india‐océanes’ remains expressed in abstract language which appears to 
lean towards universal pretensions.224 Thus, following the definition of creolisation reproduced 
above, it is asserted that ‘l’autre ne peut plus être évalué à la mesure de l’Un.’225 The text also 
reveals its own contradictions, notably in relation to the authors’ position on language politics 
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and policies. It is firstly suggested that structuring of the Réunion linguistic situation around a 
French/RK binary is not sufficiently nuanced, in that it obscures other aspects of 
multilingualism in Réunion, including the practice of Gujurati, Chinese, Malagasy, and Tamil,226 
although the authors do not acknowledge that this may result from a conscious cultivation of 
ancestral languages, rather than simply reflecting linguistic continuations. Yet later in text, as 
the authors expand upon how examining the Creole language and subaltern cultural practices 
such as maloya can facilitate an understanding of creolisation, the discussion is framed by the 
subheading ‘Une langue, le créole’.227 Finally, it should again be recognised that despite an 
apparent desire to promote RK, Vergès and Marimoutou choose to write in French, although 
they do also include a glossary of RK and other terms specific to the Réunionese context. What 
is perhaps more problematic is that on occasions when the French language is shown to be 
unable to express concepts within the text’s theoretical explorations, the authors turn to 
English concepts from Anglophone scholarship, such as ‘seascapes’,228 rather than exploring 
alternative conceptualisations drawn from the Réunionese context. 
However, in one respect, it may be unfair to compare the two accounts of creolisation 
in this way, as the principal concerns explored within both the Eloge manifesto and Amarres 
can be understood to respond to the context of the period leading up their publication. The 
Eloge thus reflects an earlier context in which Creole languages and culture were in more 
urgent need of valorisation, resulting in a privileging of their inclusion within universal 
conceptualisations of Art and Culture in response to the risk of being confined to folklore. In 
turn, Amarres can be seen to respond to earlier celebratory accounts of creolisation as cultural 
mixing, and thus attempts to develop a more critical account of Indian Ocean creolisation. 
Nonetheless, it would seem that within all of the examples of creolisation theorising discussed 
here, creolisation as a concept appears to be caught in a bind between a desire to revalorise 
Creole cultures, inclusive of aspects commonly recognised as folklore, and a desire not to be 
defined or constrained by the latter, which is often expressed through a turn towards to 
universal. It would seem that this turn has been further facilitated and encouraged by 
developments in academic theorising of cultural contact, which characterise the whole world 
as being ‘in creolisation.’229 Thus, like the Eloge authors and Glissant before them, Vergès and 
Marimoutou are not able to resist appealing to the idea that through its unacknowledged 
history of global exchange, the Indian Ocean region can be characterised as a precursor to 
globalised society in order to legitimise their claims to universal relevance: ‘Radicalement 
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marqué par le divers, l’hétérogénéité, il préfigure le monde mondialisé en formation, avec ses 
inégalités, ses tensions, ses guerres potentielles, son cosmopolitisme, sa multipolarité, son 
dynamisme, sa créativité.’230 Therefore, though the present study recognises the significant 
role that creolisation theory has played in the revalorisation of Creole languages and cultures, 
it must also be recognised that this theoretical impasse would appear to limit the theory’s 
potential to produce critical, politically engaged analysis of contemporary sociocultural 
phenomena.  
Secondly, as has been acknowledged, within the context of Francophone and French 
Creolophone academic enquiry, creolisation theory is still associated primarily with the French 
Caribbean, and in particular the work of Martiniquan intellectuals. For this reason, it would 
seem that applying the concept to the Mascarene Islands of Réunion and Mauritius brings up 
an unproductive line of debate over whether the latter can be considered as equally Creole, 
and thus equally entitled to make claims on creolisation theory, when compared with 
Caribbean region which till now appears to have held a monopoly on the theorising of Creole 
cultures. Yet as Robin Cohen and Paola Toninato have noted, ‘there are clearly many creole 
places that are simply not credited with this label by those only familiar with the Caribbean, 
who have dominated the discourse’.231 Stephan Palmié, for example, defends Caribbean‐
specific usage of creolisation theory on behalf of ‘those of us who actually study the region 
from which terms such as “creole” and “creolization” originally diffused into their current 
global, transdisciplinary discursive economy.’232 For Cohen and Toninato, defensive reactions 
of this kind are symptomatic of ‘a barely‐concealed resentment that the struggles for self‐
expression that emerges with such pain and difficulty in the Caribbean are being cavalierly 
expropriated by other people who somehow do not deserve to have their identities recognized 
in this way’.233 The subsequent analysis thus does not make use of creolisation theory as a 
means of avoiding the repetition of these debates. 
Finally, the intention to attend to social class as well as racial and ethnic social 
structures outlined earlier in this introductory chapter has confirmed my decision not to use 
creolisation as a theoretical framework. Although it was once understood as a politically 
engaged concept, the subsequent association of creolisation theory with literary and 
intellectual movements would appear to suggest that in the contemporary context, it is not 
best positioned to promote critical engagement with social class in Creole or creolised 
societies. In addition, it should also be remembered that within lay usage of the term, Creole 
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can in certain contexts refer to both the stigma of low social class and of dark skin and African 
phenotype, as is the case in Mauritius. The application of creolisation theory which aspires 
towards universalism to contexts such as this would thus appear to be incompatible with local 
interpretations of what it means to be, and to become, Creole. In the subsequent analysis, 
Creole is recognised as a meaningful social category which differentially positioned Mauritian 
and Réunionese individuals may or may not choose to identify with. Representations of 
Creoleness are understood to serve as important sites of contestation; for this reason, these 
representations form the basis of critical discussion in the following chapters.234 However, 
given the lack of common consensus over where and how it might be applied, existant 
accounts of creolisation theory do not appear to offer a productive framework for the analysis 
of contemporary popular culture in Réunion and Mauritius. Moreover, it would seem that the 
association of creolisation theory with universalising literary and philosophical analysis in the 
context of Francophone postcolonial studies makes it fundamentally unsuitable for this 
analysis of contemporary social and cultural phenomena relating to Réunionese and Mauritian 
popular and youth cultures. 
 
The Position of the Researcher 
 
During the course of my research, I was often asked how I had come to research this 
topic, often with open expressions of puzzlement. As time went on, it was assumed in 
Mauritius that I must be Réunionese, and in Réunion that I was perhaps born in the UK, but of 
Mauritian parentage. Yet despite my lack of family ties to either context, it would be unfair not 
to admit that there is also a personal motivation behind this study. My interest in the 
Réunionese context was first triggered by an eight‐month stay on the island as an English 
language assistant. I was 20 years old, and I had never travelled so far away from home before. 
As I walked through the arrival gate at Roland Garros airport and caught my first glimpse of 
Réunion’s geographical features, I marvelled at the mountains which rose up dramatically from 
the coast, contrasting against the sky which was an unfamiliarly bright shade of blue. The 
connections with the context I developed in this period working in a collège and lycée were, in 
retrospect, severely limited; yet, ironically, being employed within the state education system 
meant that I was able to speak with teachers who had strong opinions about multi‐ and 
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intercultural politics within the Réunionese school. It also gave me a very brief and partial 
glimpse into the lives of my students, and it was thanks to my experience of teaching that a 
handful of moments over the course of the year began to sow the seeds of later reflections. 
One such occasion arose in one of the last classes I taught, with a group of seconde students 
aged 15 to 16. On noticing one student scribbling Tupac, the name of the deceased US rapper, 
in his cahier rather than completing the exercise that I had given them, I saw an opportunity to 
inspire interest in learning English using his popular cultural references. However, the 
connection was lost somewhere in the numerous barriers of language, culture, race, gender, 
and social class which structured our interaction. It is perhaps understandable that the student 
was unable to see a connection between Tupac, a globalised symbol of an assertive 
oppositional black masculine identity, and myself and the language I represented, as a white 
European woman who might be assimilated into the metropolitan French population on the 
island, given that I was young, university educated, and living there temporarily. Yet in 
retrospect, this brief episode would seem to point to a sense of hope regarding the political 
potential of popular culture, even in its most commercialised forms, to bridge cultural divides, 
and to provide meaningful ways of relating to the wider world, even in unimaginable and 
unknown contexts. 
The experiences and initial reflections which eventually led to the research questions 
examined in this thesis were thus from the outset accompanied by an attempt to recognise 
and take into account the social identities I was ascribed in the Réunionese context. A growing 
awareness of my being associated with the metropolitan French or zorey population, and of 
how this could shape research relationships, ultimately led me to address the construction of 
whiteness and social class in relation to this social identity within my research. This decision 
was also shaped by reflections on whiteness resulting from fieldwork in Mauritius, where my 
previously abstract understanding of white privilege was rendered particularly concrete within 
certain interactions. In tandem, these developments were interlinked with an awareness that 
my ascribed identity as white or zorey in both locations was also gendered. Whilst my explicit 
foreignness as a white woman sometimes allowed me to evade social expectations relating to 
gender roles, in some situations it also meant that I was associated with particularly visible 
constructions of femininity and female sexuality. Within my research with young people, I 
noticed that some male participants appeared to follow a pattern of testing my gender identity 
in initial interactions through their attempts to publicly position me as an object of 
heterosexual desire. This reaction appeared to reflect a desire to establish the pre‐eminence of 
their claims to patriarchal male superiority over my racial or class privilege within the 
immediate context. It may also have served to clarify ambiguities created by the ‘honorary 
man’ conceptualisation of white female identity by enforcing an exaggerated schema of 
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normative gender roles. Furthermore, this contestation of gendered and racial privilege was 
arguably only made possible by my age, which meant that despite my being older than my 
participants, I was still identified as a young person. Yet in other interactions, other aspects of 
my white identity appeared more salient, including the association of whiteness with tourism 
(especially in Mauritius), relative affluence, and a problematic conceptualisation of the 
benevolent benefactor. As a result of the various complexities and contradictions I became 
aware of within my own interactions, then, I thus began to consider whether insights from the 
academic field of critical whiteness studies could be usefully applied within the study of 
Réunionese and Mauritian youth cultures, and particularly in order to facilitate analysis of the 
invisible, normative nature of whiteness within constructions of Frenchness. As a consequence 
of this line of enquiry, the subject matter of this thesis was extended in order to provide 
critical discussion of the zorey population in Réunion and of representations of the zorey in 
popular discourses, which can be found in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
 
Methodology 
 
I returned to the Indian Ocean in October 2011 to begin fieldwork research in 
Mauritius. Having originally planned to combine qualitative interviews with participation in 
youth associations, my interest in young people’s lived experience resulted in my privileging of 
participatory research, the reasoning behind which will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 1. Over the course of seven months (October 2011 – May 2012), I attended meetings 
and rehearsals with two youth groups: Abaim in central Mauritius, and ELI Africa in the north. 
These associations were chosen firstly because they were based in disadvantaged areas, and 
secondly, because they were not affiliated to any one ethnoreligious group in particular. Both 
associations also facilitated my attempt to take on a non‐authoritative researcher role, and to 
interact with children and young people in their native language, MK. In Réunion, my research 
was mostly centred around the town of Le Port, an area of Réunion which is often stigmatised 
and presented in the media in association with youth delinquency.235 I conducted participatory 
research with Titan Maloyèr, a youth music group which performs maloya, attending and 
participating in rehearsals over a five‐month period (March to July 2013). This was 
complemented by my volunteering involvement with a sociocultural centre from December 
2012 to July 2013, during which time I helped with an after‐school homework club for children 
at the end of the primary school cycle, aged nine to eleven. These children were thus younger 
than the age range I had worked with during my fieldwork in Mauritius, and my position within 
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the organisation required that I take an active role in disciplinary matters when necessary. Yet 
in spite of these issues, I also recognise that this period of volunteering was also very 
productive in shaping my views on young people’s engagement with, rather than simply 
passive consumption of, popular culture. It became apparent that various aspects of popular 
culture provided individual children with important avenues for self‐expression, and this was 
of heightened significance to those marginalised within the education system. 
In some cases, the relationships established through the fieldwork described above 
have extended beyond the initial period of research. This may have subsequently resulted in a 
sense of betrayal regarding the idea of writing about individuals who I had come to experience 
some level of friendship with. In retrospect, it is perhaps for this reason that I have structured 
chapters around particulars trends within popular music and youth culture, and consequently 
my fieldwork research is less prominent within the thesis. Thus, paradoxically, the attempt to 
become closer to participants through participatory research may have ultimately resulted in a 
more distanced thesis, because I felt uncomfortable about the idea of trying to reproduce 
aspects of participants’ lives which were shared with me in written academic text. However, it 
should also be emphasised that the subject matter and analysis in all of the subsequent 
chapters were directly inspired and informed by my interactions during fieldwork. The 
following analysis represents my attempt to write about the music which best reflected social 
and political currents and issues which appeared pertinent to the lives of my participants. 
This has also affected decisions regarding the referencing of data collected within my 
participatory research. As will become apparent, in this thesis there are no direct citations 
from the fieldwork diaries which constituted the principal means of documenting my research. 
Fieldnotes are understood here not as an objective source of data which can be treated as a 
separate research document once fieldwork has ended, but rather as inherently 
interconnected with and shaped by ‘our ever‐evolving memories of the field’.236 The inclusion 
of exchanges and interactions in this thesis within the main body text rather than within 
references to fieldnotes thus reflects a conscious decision to present my research in a manner 
which acknowledges that the subjectivity of the researcher is always implicated not only in the 
analysis, but also within the collection of research data. In addition, it should be acknowledged 
that the subsequent chapters contain relatively few references to fieldwork. This reflects both 
the hesitation I experienced as an unexperienced researcher at the beginning of the project, 
and my choice to ultimately favour the possibility of developing long‐term research 
relationships with associations and research participants over the short‐term aim of collecting 
a maximum amount of research data. 
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Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 1999), p. 112. 
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Methodology II: Comparative or Multi-Sited? 
 
The decision to examine popular music and youth culture in both Mauritius and 
Réunion in this study arose originally from a desire to situate Réunion in its geographical, and 
arguably geocultural and geohistorical, context, rather than conduct a comparative analysis 
with, for example, the French Caribbean DOMs on the basis of their shared political status. 
Moreover, the two islands societies are rarely considered together in academic analysis, given 
the tendency to group Réunion with France and/or other French territories, and to consider 
Mauritius alongside other Commonwealth contexts. It would seem that comparative academic 
analysis of this sort also risks partially generating its own conclusions when the decision is 
made over the choice of contexts. 
Furthermore, conducting comparative research begs the question of on what level the 
comparison is to be undertaken. Comparative approaches can sometimes be taken to imply 
simplistic research questions, which may even lie beneath more nuanced accounts, such 
‘which context is better in this regard?’ ‘Which is more ‘progressive’? Or which might be 
considered as the more unusual or ‘exotic’ for the presumed Western academic readership? 
When I first travelled between the two islands during my first period of fieldwork, I was invited 
to two dinner parties in the space of two days; the first shortly before leaving Mauritius, and 
the second upon my arrival in Réunion. When I told my Mauritian hosts of my plans to travel to 
Réunion for research purposes, one of the first questions which was asked of me was ‘but 
don’t they still have a colonial mentality in Réunion? After all, it is still a colony, for all intents 
and purposes…’  The next evening, having arrived in Réunion, my Réunionese hosts struggled 
to hide their dismay at what they saw as an unofficial policy of ethnic segregation: ‘mais à 
Maurice, c’est cloisonné, les gens ne se mélangent pas, pas comme ici’. 
On balance, it would seem that a comparative approach can prove very productive. 
This has been particularly useful in the process of studying abstract notions such as cultural 
politics, discourses on language and the politics of belonging, in that keeping track of two or 
more contexts means that no one set of politics are taken to be normative. However, my 
analysis has also tried to account for the specificities of each context, and has actively avoided 
the implication that Réunion and Mauritius can be seen as essentially the same due to 
historical and sociocultural parallels. Furthermore, my experience of field work differed 
dramatically in some respects, not least in the process of learning the two Kreol languages. 
Whereas I was soon accepted as an anomalous Kreol‐speaker in Mauritius, the fact that I was 
subsumed into the larger, non‐RK speaking zorey population in Réunion made my attempts to 
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converse in RK culturally illegible, even if I was understood to have passive knowledge of the 
language.237  For these reasons, the following chapters deal with each context individually, 
with the exception of my consideration of dancehall which covers elements of a cultural 
dynamic common to both islands. On reflection, it is perhaps more accurate to describe my 
research as multi‐sited, in that I privilege attending to contextual specificities over drawing 
neat comparative conclusions. 
The methodological choices which were made during my fieldwork research will now 
be discussed in further detail in Part I, Chapter 1. This will include a detailed consideration of 
thick participation as research methodology, drawing on the work of anthropologist Gerd 
Spittler.238 As will be discussed, thick participation is formulated in response to criticisms of 
participant observation, in order to build on the specific strengths of this type of research. The 
chapter will justify the suitability of this methodology to this particular research project within 
its discussion of apprenticeship, natural conversation and shared lived experience, which are 
all identified by Spittler as central elements of thick participation research. Spittler’s 
formulation will then be expanded upon through a consideration of potential ethical issues 
which may arise within thick participation research stemming from involvement in 
participants’ everyday lives. Though there may be no simple solutions to these ethical 
problems, it will be suggested that thick participation research can provide a means of 
foregrounding the human nature of all research relationships. Furthermore, it will be argued 
that whilst the differential status of the researcher may always impose limits on shared 
experience and participation in everyday life, the attempt to participate can be interpreted as 
a political act, the significance of which lies in its refusal to accept the incommensurability of 
researcher and researched. 
                                                          
237 This might be compared with Espelencia Marie Baptiste’s reflection on language issues which arose 
during her fieldwork in Mauritius: ‘Language became my tool in negotiating different situations. My use 
of English, French or Kreol determined whether I had access to a particular person or information. 
Speaking English, I placed myself in a position of power vis‐à‐vis my interlocutor. Using English allowed 
me to display my educational and foreign status. My use of English was usually met with surprise. In my 
fieldnotes, I constantly referred to these interactions as ‘the alien landing.’ My interlocutors usually had 
to take a moment to associate the person with the sound. Language became a different kind of 
ethnographic method. Not only did language help in acquiring data, but it also helped me to understand 
the attitudes of Mauritians of different ethnicity toward people who look like me. Through code 
switching and language use, I was able to get access to the different kinds of relationships at play in 
Mauritius. [… E]very time I used the wrong or unexpected language, I was able to force my interlocutors 
into a different sphere where they have to rethink they [sic] way they think of me and what I represent. 
Thus, my person undermined their perceptions of social reality. The times when I used the wrong 
language inevitably meant a delay in getting access to the person of information that I was seeking. […] 
Through manipulating English, French and Kreol, I was able to move in and out of different class 
statuses.’ ‘A Nation Deferred: Language, Ethnicity and the Reproduction of Social Inequalities in 
Mauritian Primary Schools’ Unpublished PhD thesis, (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 2002), pp. 46‐
7. 
238 See ‘Teilnehmende Beobachtung als Dichte Teilnahme’ [‘Participant Observation as Thick 
Participation’], Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, 126 (2001), 1‐25. 
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As will become apparent, the concept of thick participation is employed in this study in 
two respects. Firstly, my research with Abaim discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 may be considered 
as a concrete application of thick participation as a research methodology. Secondly, in a more 
general sense, the research epistemology implied by thick participation arguably involves an 
active positioning of the researcher which has informed all my interactions during fieldwork 
periods, and indeed the overall approach to the research project. In this understanding of the 
concept, thick participation is characterised by the prominence of researcher reflexivity; that 
is, an attempt to take account of my own position within processes of judgement. This may at 
times also involve delaying academic judgement in favour of openness to other forms of 
knowledge production. One result of this ongoing process of researcher reflexivity has been 
the extension of the study in order to include the critical discussion of the metropolitan French 
zorey population of Réunion presented in the final chapter of this thesis. Given that during 
fieldwork in Réunion, salient aspects of my social identity such as my socioeconomic status, 
ethnicity, and age generally coincided with that of common perceptions of the zorey, it 
appeared ethically imperative to consider the implications of this social identity in further 
detail. 
Given the disparity between these two understandings of thick participation, it must 
be acknowledged here that there is asymmetry between how the methodology is applied to 
the sociocultural contexts of Mauritius and Réunion, and to the case studies which are 
discussed in the remainder of this thesis. This has also influenced my decision to adopt a multi‐
sited rather than comparative approach in this study, as conceptualising the study as multi‐
sited opens up the possibility of applying greater methodological flexibility in response to the 
specificities of each individual research context. Given the time limitations involved in the 
production of a PhD thesis, it would not have been possible to undertake thick participation 
research with all groups involved in this study. Furthermore, it is not always practically possible 
to conduct thick participation research as to do so requires the consent of the group or 
association. Therefore, given the differential application of the methodology of thick 
participation, multi‐sitedness again appears as a more appropriate way of theorising the 
approach taken within the subsequent analysis of the cultural politics of Mauritian and 
Réunionese popular musics and youth cultures. 
The remainder of the thesis presents four case studies which are considered in relation 
to two overarching themes: the politics of language in Part II (Chapters 2 and 3), and the 
politics of belonging in Part III (Chapters 4 and 5). Chapter 2 considers the musical production 
of Abaim, a community youth music group and NGO working in a deprived area of central 
Mauritius. Chapter 3 analyses the cultural and language politics of Réunionese dancehall 
music. In both cases, the concern to challenge the stigma attached to the Kreol languages 
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appears interlinked with a desire to produce more inclusive representations of childhood and 
young people, particularly those experiencing racial and/or class‐related prejudice, and to 
thereby counter restrictive conceptions of cultural authenticity. Both chapters thus highlight 
the importance of adopting an intersectional approach to studies of popular music and youth 
cultures. In Chapter 2, Abaim’s musical representations of childhood will be shown to engage 
with complex emotions of simultaneous shame and affection experienced within Kreol 
language contexts where the mother tongue co‐exists alongside one or more languages of 
prestige. By associating the Mauritian Kreol language first and foremost with childhood, the 
music articulates an implicit critique of the language policies of the post‐independence 
Mauritian state, which instead promotes the dissemination and learning of ancestral languages 
which are considered as the property of the ethnic groups who identify with them. 
Furthermore, Abaim’s musical translations convey both a sense of equality and 
complementarity between MK and more ‘prestigious’ languages. Yet at the same time, their 
translations’ divergence from the source text would appear to point towards an autonomous 
Mauritian sociocultural experience, which itself can be seen to coexist and interact with 
globalised popular culture within the national cultural sphere. 
Chapter 3 then considers the language and cultural politics of Réunionese dancehall 
music as a ‘new’ form of black music facilitated by technological developments since the 
1980s. Despite its commercialised nature and tendency to reproduce clichéd tropes of sex and 
machismo, it will be argued that the musical production of dancehall artists in Réunion can be 
seen to engage with existing discourses on Réunionness, authenticity and modernity. Analysis 
of the juxtaposition of English and Réunionese Kreol in dancehall lyrics will demonstrate that 
the practice serves as a creative means of drawing on globalised popular cultural references in 
order to accord prestige to the Kreol language. Dancehall will therefore be seen to challenge 
the presumed mutual exclusivity of authentic Creoleness and global modernity, which arguably 
serves to further marginalise unemployed Creolophone young people in Réunion. Despite their 
very different cultural aesthetics and musical styles, then, the youth music group Abaim and 
dancehall artists in Réunion and Mauritius would appear to employ similar strategies within 
their engagement with globalised popular music, which is drawn upon as a strategic resource 
in the development of an oppositional language politics which challenges common 
preconceptions about the Mauritian and Réunion Kreol languages. Furthermore, in both cases, 
the revalorisation of Réunionese Kreol is conceptualised as central to resisting the 
marginalisation of lower‐class youth. 
The next two case studies presented in Part III explore engagement with the politics of 
belonging within popular cultural practices and output, particularly as concerns competing 
discourses on the nation and community, and the differing conceptualisations of race and 
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ethnicity these discourses produce. Chapter 4 considers how recent nationalist youth protest 
movements have been reflected upon within popular music in the Mauritian context. These 
movements characterise themselves as a progressive social force in opposition to 
communalism, the term commonly used to refer to systems of solidarity which reinforce social 
divisions between ethnoreligious groups. My analysis of the representation of the Mauritian 
national community in the music of Tritonik will reveal that a burgeoning cultural nationalism 
has developed in tandem with political nationalist protest movements. This provides the artists 
with a conceptual framework which posits the existence of a ‘natural’ national community, 
thereby making it possible to recognise the meaningfulness of ethnoreligious identities 
without asserting their primordialism. In addition, Tritonik’s cultural nationalist 
representations of community also address social divisions related to class which may be 
overlooked within the political nationalist focus on ethnic or religious difference. 
The final chapter considers what appears as a very different kind of social division in 
the Réunionese context, which nonetheless again highlights the importance of approaching 
race and social class from an intersectional perspective. A result of the ongoing process of 
reflexivity in my research practice, the chapter undertakes a critical consideration of the 
representation of the zorey (metropolitan French) population within popular discourse in 
Réunion, a social identity which I was generally ascribed during fieldwork. As will be seen, the 
zorey are commonly associated with and represented within youth culture, both in relation to 
certain leisure activities, and as a figure of contention and the target of the anger of 
Réunionese youth regarding social inequality. The chapter will thus bring insights from the 
academic field of critical whiteness studies into dialogue with the study of popular discourse 
on race and socioeconomic status in the Réunionese context, in order to demonstrate that the 
naming of the zorey can be interpreted as a political act which refutes the supposed invisibility 
and non‐racialisation of whiteness, and counters persistent implicit associations of Frenchness 
with whiteness. At the same time, however, naming the zorey can also be understood as an 
inclusive gesture in that it creates a racially marked category for the growing metropolitan 
French population within popular discourse which serves to legitimise their position as part of 
Réunionese society. 
Finally, the concluding section of this thesis will return to the thesis outlined at the 
beginning of this introductory chapter, arguing that the analysis of the case studies presented 
here demonstrates that Réunionese and Mauritian popular musics and youth cultures engage 
with political and social issues specific to each context, and that the contemporary 
sociocultural phenomena discussed here can be understood to provide particular insights as 
concerns broader sociocultural dynamics regarding cultural and language politics, and the 
politics of belonging in both societies. The analysis of the previous chapters will then be 
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brought together in order to argue for the validity of the concept of cultural politics, which can 
provide a means of bringing issues of cultural difference and social inequality together within 
politically engaged scholarship, rather than serving as an obstacle to social justice. 
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Part I: The Politics of Research  
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1. Conducting ‘Thick Participation’ Research: Some 
Methodological Reflections 
 
On Christmas Eve in 2011, I took part in the last of a series of concerts in the run‐up to 
Christmas with Abaim, at the home of a friend of founding members Alain Muneean and 
Marousia Bouvery, in Beau‐Bassin, central Mauritius. At this point I had been attending 
rehearsals and the group’s Saturday program for nearly three months, and had begun to speak 
in MK. Part way through the performance, Alain suggested that I introduce myself to those 
present, which I attempted to do in my best MK, falling back on French when necessary. As an 
additional explanation for my presence at the concert, Alain added that I was conducting 
participant observation research. Offering further clarification for those less familiar with the 
terminology of social research, he said, not without some pride, ‘sa vedir li fer tou zafer parey 
kouma nou’, ‘this means she does everything exactly the same as we do’. And this was indeed 
true: since my first visit to the organisation, I had been invited to take part in all activities, from 
singing and music rehearsals to practicing dance routines, from informal learning and teaching 
of the ravann, the hand‐held drum which serves as the principal instrument in traditional sega 
music, to the meal prepared by Abaim volunteers which we all shared at Saturday lunchtimes. I 
hoped that I had been seen to greet this invitation to participate with enthusiasm and 
gratitude, if not always with expert ability or knowledge. Yet it was never a primary aim of my 
research to become a member of the group; indeed, to do so seemed futile in the face of the 
wide‐reaching differences between myself and other members of the group.239 Although it 
may now sound naïve, until Alain spoke these words I had not questioned how I might theorise 
my interaction with the group as it had developed, seemingly naturally, over the previous 
months. 
My specific use of participant observation in this first period of fieldwork could in some 
respects be termed an accidental, or serendipitous, research strategy. I had originally thought 
that participating activities within youth organisations would constitute an initial stage to my 
research, which would principally serve to build rapport with future research participants, as 
well as providing additional benefits such as facilitating my learning of MK, the participants’ 
native language. I considered this a necessary stage to be completed prior to beginning ‘real’ 
                                                          
239 As an honorary and temporary member of the group, I obviously stood out due to, amongst other 
things, my white skin and foreign accent, even after I had begun to speak MK. Amanda Coffey suggests 
that ‘[i]t is extremely self‐centred of us to think that we can ever be a ‘fully paid up member’ [of a 
community] ... Far more likely, however, we remain an honorary member or ‘friend’ of the setting, 
despite or because of our self‐conscious relationship with the field’, p. 37. 
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research: that is, activity‐based research which would provide me with ‘real’, tangible data in 
the form of photographs, videos, and perhaps also recorded discussions. I imagined that 
during this second stage of the research I might also gradually reduce my level of engagement 
with the associations outside of the activity‐based research sessions. However, my 
preconceptions about how my fieldwork research would progress were challenged by the 
experience of undertaking research and by the role which research participants of all ages 
invited me to take. 
The essentially ‘messy’ nature of ethnographic research, and perhaps of all research 
which involves participation in the everyday lives of others, is now generally – if reluctantly – 
accepted and increasingly widely documented.240 However, whilst increasingly accepted, the 
messy nature of ethnographic research may still be seen as an unfortunate, if inevitable, part 
of the research process which may consequently be downplayed in written manuscripts, or 
even written out altogether.241 What is less frequently considered is that the messy nature of 
this type of research may itself be, at the same time, something which may lead to productive 
forms of knowledge production.242 However, it may also take time for us as researchers to find 
the words to try to convey how much we have learnt through others’ kind and generous 
inclusion of us in their lives. In short, messy research is also rich, powerful, and 
multidimensional, and can be rewarding in a personal as well as research‐related sense. In 
comparison, more systematic forms of social research may appear ‘cleaner’, but when used 
alone, they cannot produce nuanced, multidimensional research. This chapter aims to provide 
an account of my own messy research process, and of what I have learnt both as a researcher 
and human being through the various interactions which took place during two periods of 
fieldwork in Réunion and Mauritius. This account also retains an appreciation for the negative 
connotations of ‘messiness’ through its consideration of ethical issues. The chapter can thus be 
seen to keep to the conventional objective of methodology chapters; that is, to present a 
convincing case that the way in which I chose to undertake my research was the way which 
was best suited to the project, though it may do so in an unconventional way. 
The term thick participation is used in here to convey two related meanings. Firstly my 
research with Abaim and becoming a temporary member of the group may be considered as a 
                                                          
240 Enlightening reflexive accounts of the research experience can be found in, amongst others, Allaine 
Cerwonka and Liisa H. Malkki, Improvising Theory: Process and Temporality in Ethnographic Fieldwork 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), and Paul Stoller and Cheryl Olkes, In Sorcery’s Shadow. A 
Memoir of Apprenticeship among the Songhay of Niger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
241 John Van Maanen speaks of a tendency for ethnographers to write separate ‘confessional tales’, 
which offer a different account of fieldwork experiences, but stand alongside rather than replace 
traditional ‘realist’ accounts: see Tales of the Field: On Writing Ethnography (Chicago; London: University 
of Chicago Press, 2011), [1988], p. 75. 
242 There are a number of important exceptions here: see, amongst others, Allaine Cerwonka, ‘Nervous 
Conditions. The Stakes in Interdisciplinary Research’ in Improvising Theory, pp. 1‐41. 
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concrete application of elements of thick participation as outlined by the anthropologist Gerd 
Spittler, as will be discussed below.243  Secondly, in a more abstract sense, thick participation 
also refers to as an ethos which has informed all my interactions during fieldwork periods and 
perhaps all aspects of my research. In this regard, thick participation is characterised by 
researcher reflexivity; that is, an awareness of my own position within processes of judgement. 
This is in turn informed by an awareness of the always imperfect nature of our analysis, 
despite our striving to avoid cultural relativism on the one hand, characterised by the notion 
that ‘everything is as good as everything else’, and notions of absolute difference which deny 
the possibility of comparative judgement on the other. The following chapter thus attempts to 
outline a form of participatory research which might allow us to follow the advice of Paul 
Gilroy, who suggests that we 
 
adopt a more future‐oriented stance and that we make the most of our historic 
opportunity to rethink the whole question of how value is assigned to cultural forms of 
ethnic differences. […] This should be done, not so that we can say with an affected 
pseudo‐toleration that everything is somehow suddenly as good as everything else, 
but so that we can speak with confidence from somewhere in particular and develop 
not only our translation skills but the difficult language of comparative (not 
homologizing) judgement. This programme is premised upon the idea that any 
discoveries we might make could transform our understanding of the cultures from 
which we imagine ourselves to speak as well as the cultures we struggle – always 
imperfectly – to judge.244 
 
My application of thick participation as research methodology is thus variable in relation to the 
case studies presented in the following chapters of this thesis. The method was of most 
relevance to my research relationship with Abaim, and thus the data produced through this 
type of research is most prominent within Part II, Chapter 2. It is also present, though to a 
lesser extent, within Chapter 3 in the brief discussion of how my involvement with a maloya 
youth performance group in Réunion informed my analysis of the cultural politics of dancehall 
music. The other case studies presented in Part III were chosen in order to explore important 
developments in the conceptualisation of national belonging within popular culture and 
discourses as witnessed and experienced during my periods of fieldwork from 2011 to 2013. In 
contrast to the general subject matter of in Chapters 2 and 3, I had not known prior to 
fieldwork that the sociocultural phenomena discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively a 
renewed anti‐communal nationalism centred around representations of youth in Mauritius, 
and the social identity of the zorey population in Réunion, would form part of my examination 
                                                          
243 See Spittler. 
244 Between Camps: Nations, Cultures and the Allure of Race, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 253‐
4. 
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of popular cultural politics. As a result, my analysis of these case studies developed somewhat 
differently to those presented in Part II, in that the chapters produced were largely written 
retrospectively after fieldwork had ended. Consequently, thick participation research data 
does not feature in the final chapters. However, as acknowledged within my outline of the 
thesis, the impetus behind my incorporation of Chapter 5 stems from a process of researcher 
reflexivity which itself is fundamental to my understanding of thick participation as research 
methodology. It is therefore suggested here that the epistemological and philosophical 
implications of thick participation are of relevance to this study as a whole, despite the 
variable application of the research methodology in the stricter sense of the term. 
As concerns this more concrete application, my involvement with the NGO and youth 
music group Abaim in Mauritius involved participation in activities with the group over a 
period of seven months (October 2011 to May 2012), and subsequent visits in October 2012, 
March, and August 2013. This chapter aims to explore my some of the practical and political 
issues involved in conducting thick participation research with young people and children in 
postcolonial contexts and from backgrounds less privileged than my own. It will be asked 
whether thick participation research may be a particularly useful research strategy in 
situations where there are significant differences in power between researcher and 
participant, and whether it might provide a means of conducting a more ‘human’ form of 
research: that is, research which recognises and respects the humanity of both researcher and 
participant. This could also provide a means of adhering to the pleas of indigenous and Third 
World scholars who call on Western researchers to formulate a more ‘humble’ way of doing 
research.245 
 
Reformulating Participant Observation: What is ‘Thick Participation’? 
 
The concept of thick participation referred to in this chapter was developed by Gerd 
Spittler, who characterises thick participation as a ‘radicalised’ form of participant 
observation.246 Participant observation is thought to be the central and perhaps defining 
method of anthropology and ethnographic research, yet there remains some debate as to 
what extent it can be considered a method at all. It has been characterised as an all‐
                                                          
245Linda Tuhiwai Smith suggests that ‘indigenous research is a humble and humbling activity.’ 
Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (London: Zed Books; Dunedin: University 
of Otago Press, 1999). p. 5. 
246 See Spittler. 
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encompassing method, and even as ‘a predicament transformed into a method’.247 For the 
purposes of this chapter, Spittler’s definition is perhaps a useful one: participant observation 
can be understood as ‘research methods and practices in which the researcher lives in and 
amongst the group s/he is studying over a long period of time, speaks their language and takes 
part in their activities in a more or less intensive manner’.248 
Such a definition is however necessarily imprecise, because participant observation 
involves participation in everyday life, and therefore cannot be qualified as systematic. As a 
result, participant observation has been criticised in comparison to other qualitative and 
quantitative methods available to researchers. Spittler gives the following summary of some 
contemporary criticisms of participant observation:249  
 
 It lacks verifiability and representativity/generalisability,  
 It is an archaic and technically ‘primitive’ method which has not been modified 
since the early twentieth century, and which does not reflect the globalised nature 
of our times, 
 It lacks the precision and systematisation of observation methods focused on 
measurement, 
 It may fail to take into account wider historical and political processes and thus risk 
viewing ‘a culture’ in isolation and producing essentialising and/or exoticising 
representations, 
 It is time‐consuming and therefore old‐fashioned, 
 It risks producing representations which claim authority through literary devices, 
as has been shown through postmodernist critiques of ethnographic 
monographs.250 
 
Whilst he recognises that such criticisms are often justified, he argues that participant 
observation should continue to play a central role in ethnographic research because it has 
                                                          
247 Harry F. Wolcott, The Art of Fieldwork, 2nd ed. (Walnut Creek; Oxford: Altamira Press, 2005), p. 80, 
referring to James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and 
Art (Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 93. 
248 ‘Unter Teilnehmender Beobachtung […] verstehe ich […] Forschungsverfahren, bei dem der Forscher 
für eine längere Zeit in der Gruppe, die er untersucht, lebt, ihre Sprache spricht und an ihren Aktivitäten 
mehr oder weniger intensive teilnimmt’. p. 2. This and all further translations are my own, unless 
otherwise stated. 
249 Some of the criticisms in this list, such as questions of generalisability and verifiability, appear to 
imply a positivist framework, i.e. one that assumes the possibility of obtaining a singular truth through 
systematic research. This study, however, is understood from an interpretative framework which rejects 
the notion of the singular truth in social research. 
250 See Spittler, pp. 3‐5. 
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particular strengths.251 Instead of abandoning participant observation research in favour of 
more systematic, replicable, or time‐efficient methods, Spittler advocates thick participation as 
a radicalised form of participant observation which aims to capitalise upon these inherent 
strengths. As may be inferred from his terminology, thick participation is a variant of 
participant observation ‘which above all emphasises participation’.252 His use of the adjective 
‘thick’ draws on Clifford Geertz’s concept of ethnographic writing as ‘thick description’.253 He 
further clarifies that ‘[t]he “thick” in “thick participation” also means social proximity and 
shared experience’.254 In the remainder of this chapter, I will first outline Spittler’s defence of 
participant observation and formulation of thick participation. I will then discuss how the 
concept might be used to theorise and better reflect upon my experiences of fieldwork 
research in Réunion and Mauritius. 
Spittler proposes that participant observation’s strengths become apparent upon 
comparison with three alternative research strategies: he posits that ‘[p]articipant observation 
as a true‐to‐life and little systematized method has advantages in situations where language 
based research (especially interviews), systematic observation and strictly theory‐guided 
research reach their limits.’255 As has been acknowledged above, ‘[p]articipant observation is 
often unsystematic due to its closeness to reality and lived experienced’.256 However, Spittler 
suggests that this can be of benefit to researchers in situations where systematic research is no 
longer a viable option. In contrast to the natural and behavioural sciences where symbolic 
meaning does not constitute a relevant analytical category, for Spittler, ethnographic research 
‘[o]bservation must always incorporate interpretation of meaning’,257 which renders 
systematic observation impossible. Participant observation thus appears as a more suitable 
research strategy. He further elaborates that the forms of observation involved in participant 
observation are in fact closer to everyday practices of ‘seeing’ and ‘looking’ than to systematic 
scientific observation.258 Spittler conceptualises this form of observation‐as‐seeing as an 
inherently subjective process: 
 
                                                          
251 ‘Dennoch sollte die Teilnehmende Beobachtung einen wichtigen Platz im Methodenspektrum der 
Ethnologie behalten, weil sie besondere Stärken besitzt.’ p. 1. 
252 ‘[…] die vor allem die Teilnahme betont.’ Spittler, p. 12. 
253 ‘Thick Description: Towards an Interpretive Theory of Culture’ in The Interpretation of Cultures: 
Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 3‐30. 
254 ‘Dicht bedeutet auch soziale Nahe und gemeinsames Erleben.’ Spittler, p. 12. 
255 Spittler, p. 1. 
256 ‘Teilnehmende Beobachtung ist wegen ihrer Realitäts‐ und Lebensnähe oft unsystematisch. Das ist 
dort ein Vorteil, wo systematische Forschung an ihre Grenzen stößt.’ p. 7. 
257 ‘Die Beobachtung muss immer die Interpretation des Sinnes mit einschließen.’ p. 10. 
258 Spittler, p. 10. 
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Seeing is by no means straightforward and objective; instead, we take in a selection of 
what we see, and moreover we have to interpret what we have seen. The process of 
selection means that we perceive certain things, but not others.259  
 
Whereas within the dominant positivist paradigm, researcher subjectivity is often considered 
as a form of contamination which affects the validity of the research, Spittler’s formulation of 
observation‐as‐seeing can be said to reflect interpretative critiques which reject the possibility 
of complete objectivity. This recognition of the necessarily subjective position of the 
researcher‐as‐participant‐observer could be linked to the position outlined by Hans‐Georg 
Gadamer in Truth and Method,260 which posits that subjectivity is a necessary requirement in 
the process of understanding. As Allaine Cerwonka has remarked of Gadamer’s argument,  
 
understanding inevitably involves the concrete, historically situated personhood of the 
researcher. He claims more than that the positivist ideal of objectivity can never be 
reached; he asserts that we can only ever understand something from a point of 
view.261 
 
Observation‐as‐seeing is thus perhaps best understood as a form of observation which 
proceeds from the assertion that the researcher’s position is always already influencing the 
interlinked processes of observation and interpretation. This is however reformulated so that 
it is no longer seen as a form of contamination, but rather a necessary starting point to 
understanding which is also benefit to the research. Thus, through this process of reflexivity, it 
becomes apparent that within thick participation research, it is also the process of 
participation, and not just the act of observation, which provides us with research data. 
Secondly, Spittler also acknowledges that participant observation is often criticised for 
its lack of theoretical grounding.262 This view is often justified by critiques of traditional 
ethnography which aimed to give an all‐encompassing, monolithic account of ‘a culture’ or ‘a 
society’.263 Yet, as he points out, even in the case of traditional ethnography,  
 
                                                          
259 ‘‘Sehen ist keineswegs etwas Eindeutiges und Objektives, sondern wir nehmen immer eine Selektion 
vor bei dem, was wir sehen, und wir müssen überdies das Gesehene interpretieren. Selektion heißt, 
bestimmte Dinge wahrnehmen, andere nicht.’ Spittler, p. 17. 
260 2nd rev. ed., translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 
1999). Originally published as Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 1965). 
261 Cerwonka p. 25, referring to Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 396. Emphasis in original. 
262 See p. 11. 
263 Spittler refers to this as ‘collection‐centred’ ethnography [‘sammelzentriert’], p. 11. 
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there is no such thing as an unstructured observation, we are always already working 
with at least implicit theories. Not being aware of this leads to naïvity in our 
research.264 
 
Cerwonka also suggests that ‘one always reads empirical details in the field through theory, 
whether self‐consciously or not.’265 Conversely, in the research process, ‘theory is challenged 
and also reshaped by the complexity and richness of everyday social practices and 
processes.’266 She thus proposes that instead of seeing the empirical research carried out 
through fieldwork and theory‐based research as two separate processes, we would do better 
to understand ethnographic research as exemplifying ‘a processual approach to knowledge 
production’ which she argues ‘yields more complex, ethical, and life‐affirming research.’267 She 
argues that this type of ethnographic research invokes a hermeneutical epistemological 
approach. As she explains, the hermeneutics of ethnography 
 
involves a reading of social practices through theoretical concepts without simply 
reducing the practices to a mere ‘illustration’ of the theory. […] Such analytical insights 
necessarily grow out of hermeneutic process that continually and self‐consciously 
moves between theory and empirical, ethnographic detail.268 
 
This approach would appear to reflect Spittler’s formulation of ‘problem‐centred’ 
ethnography, which he suggests may ultimately produce more nuanced accounts than strictly 
‘theory‐centred’ ethnography. Regarding the legacy of Bronisław Malinowski’s ethnographic 
œuvre, which Spittler maintains has been wrongly criticised as lacking in theory;269 it is 
suggested that retaining a critical approach to theory within ethnographic research, and 
moving between abstract theory and ethnographic detail, could in fact lead to fuller, richer 
accounts:  
 
Problem‐centred research, following Malinowski, is not anti‐theoretical, instead it 
remains sceptical about its own theoretical groundings. It is not only prepared to call 
these into question, but is also always aware of the reductionist nature of all theory.270 
 
                                                          
264 ‘[…] dass es keine unstrukturierte Beobachtung gibt, dass wir daher immer schon zumindest mit 
impliziten Theorien arbeiten. Sich dessen nicht bewusst zu sein führt zu einer naiven Forschung’, p. 11. 
265 Cerwonka, p. 4. 
266 Cerwonka, p. 4. 
267 Cerwonka, p. 38. 
268 Cerwonka, p. 16. 
269 ‘Malinowskis Arbeiten werden zu Unrecht oft als theoriearm bezeichnet’. p. 11. 
270 ‘Problemzentrierte Forschung in der Tradition Malinowskis ist nicht theorielos, doch bleibt sie 
skeptisch gegenüber der eigenen Theorie. Sie ist nicht nur bereit, diese zu revidieren, sondern ist sich 
immer des reduktionistischen Charakters jeder Theorie bewusst’, p. 12. Referring to Bronisław 
Malinowski, Coral Gardens and Their Magic: A Study of the Methods of Tilling the Soil and of Agricultural 
Rites in the Trobriand Islands, vol. 1 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1935). 
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Thirdly, in relation to language‐based research, Spittler acknowledges that qualitative 
interview methods have been developed in response to recognition of the highly artificial 
nature of the interview situation.271 But as he points out, ‘these interviews are still interviews 
rather than conversations’,272 thus implying that even in more informal or unstructured 
interviews, the interview situation itself may still affect and limit what type of information the 
researcher can gather. However, this is not to say that conducting interviews, whether formal 
or informal, is always an inappropriate research strategy in ethnographic research. I would 
suggest that this depends on three aspects of the research: the research design (is it an 
exploratory study or does it have a relatively narrow focus?); the research questions (can they 
be put to participants directly? If asked directly, would you expect to get a helpful or honest 
answer?)273; and thirdly, whether participants are likely to be familiar with the interview 
context, or whether this could make them feel intimidated or uncomfortable. The last variable 
may be considered in relation to participants’ age and occupation, as well as symbolic power 
relations between researcher and researched. Thus, though interviewing might constitute an 
effective method of gathering data in the context of other research, this particular study called 
for alternatives, given that it was exploratory in nature at the outset, that it aimed to explore 
‘underlying’ questions regarding culture and everyday processes of meaning‐making which 
cannot be asked directly, and that the participants, young people from disadvantaged areas of 
Mauritius and Réunion, were not familiar with the interview environment. In addition, my 
position as a white European researcher would affect power dynamics between myself and 
participants. Being an Anglophone native speaker could also be said to accord a particular form 
of privilege, both in terms of the international value placed on the English language, and 
especially in Mauritius where English is used as the medium of education in public schools, and 
thus proficiency in English is a pre‐requirement for any form of academic success. 
Spittler also draws our attention to the different values which may be attached to the 
act of interviewing and asking questions in non‐Western contexts, where it is possible that only 
figures of authority have the right to ask questions. Thus the act of interviewing itself may 
                                                          
271 p. 7. 
272 ‘Aber auch diese Interviews sind Interviews und keine Gespräche’, p. 7. 
273 In a similar vein, Wolcott discusses different types of questions which may be addressed to 
participants: ‘[t]here are things one can learn quickly by asking direct questions revealing of what one 
wants to know. There are things one can ask directly without much assurance about the answer. There 
are things about which we do not ask, guided by our own standards, or about which interviewees do not 
offer answers, guided by theirs. And there are underlying questions, often the kinds of questions that 
undergird social research, that can neither be asked nor answered directly: What is your world view? 
Why do we have schools at all? When everyone seems so dissatisfied, why do you continue to support 
your form of government?’ p. 102. 
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evoke aspects of social control.274 Researchers should also remember that ethnographic 
research once formed part of the colonial project, and this may still affect how participants 
react to researchers. The indigenous scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith reminds us that ‘[f]rom the 
vantage point of the colonized’, ‘the term ‘research’ is inextricably linked to European 
imperialism and colonialism’: 
 
It galls us that Western researchers and intellectuals can assume to know all that is 
possible to know of us, on the basis of their brief encounters with some of us. It appals 
[sic] us that the West can desire, extract and claim ownership of our ways of knowing, 
our imagery, the things we create and produce, and then simultaneously reject the 
people who created and developed those ideas and seek to deny them further 
opportunities to be creators of their own culture and own nations.275 
 
This does not mean that conducting research in postcolonial contexts is impossible for 
Western researchers. I would instead suggest that our awareness of the consequences of 
previous ethnographic research should instead encourage us to reflect upon and reconsider 
traditional research strategies in favour of more creative and flexible methods which could 
help us work towards Tuhiwai Smith’s proposed goal of ‘humble and humbling’ research.276 
In addition to revealing the limitations of research interviews, thick participation as 
methodology also brings into question what might be described as an academic tendency to 
privilege verbal information which can be transcribed and represented as text. Although it is 
often assumed that verbal representations are more thorough and/or easier to obtain, Spittler 
maintains that this is not always the case. He proposes that in some contexts, observation is 
more practical and efficient than asking questions (for example, in relation to spatially 
organised aspects of social situations), and that it is particularly useful in cases where verbal 
expression comes up against difficulties due to the need to protect secrets or remain silent 
about certain issues.277 Thirdly, observation can be considered as a more appropriate research 
strategy in cases where skills and activities which can only be imperfectly expressed through 
language.278 In regard to this last possibility, Spittler refers to Michael Polanyi’s concept ‘tacit 
knowledge’, which, in contrast to ‘explicit knowledge’, cannot be easily related and transferred 
through verbal explanation.279 Through my involvement with Abaim in Mauritius, my own 
research involved learning various practical skills. The most immediate of these were perhaps 
                                                          
274 ‘In vielen anderen Kulturen bleibt dagegen das Fragen Autoritätspersonen vorbehalten und enhält 
ein Element der sozialen Kontrolle’, p. 7. 
275 p. 1. 
276 p. 5. 
277 Spittler, p. 8. 
278 Spittler, p. 8. 
279 As developed in Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post Critical Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998), 
[1958], and The Tacit Dimension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), [1966]. 
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learning songs and some choreographed routines from Abaim’s repertoire, learning to play the 
ravann, a circular drum used in Mauritian sega music. Though the acquiring of these specific 
skills was not the subject of my research, nor something I had purposefully set out to do at the 
beginning of the research process, my participation in these activities was in some respects 
crucial to my credibility as a member of the group. Indeed, the process of working towards 
acquiring these skills was a necessary pre‐requirement in order for me to be considered as a 
member of the group, even in a temporary and bracketed sense. 
Having thus demonstrated the continued relevance of and need for participant 
observation in ethnographic research, Spittler suggests that ‘we should try less to eradicate its 
inherent weaknesses, but rather use and strengthen its strong points’.280 In order to achieve 
this, he advocates thick participation as a ‘radicalised form of observation’ which ‘implies 
apprenticeship and practice, natural conversation and observation, lived experience and 
sensuous research’.281 These three elements will now be discussed further in relation to my 
own fieldwork research, in order to further expand upon the concept of thick participation as 
research methodology. Ethical issues which might arise in such research will also be 
considered. The subsequent discussion will seek to establish that thick participation as a 
methodology may be helpful to researchers who wish to conduct ethnographic research in a 
way which respects the humanity of both participants and researchers, and which 
reformulates the unequal relationship of researcher‐participant into one which recognises 
both parties as human beings above all else. 
 
Thick Participation: Conducting Research, Being Human 
 
The concept of apprenticeship as fieldwork method, as developed by Michael W. Coy, 
James W. Fernandez and Michael Herzfeld, and Michael Jackson,  can arguably be situated as 
part of a wider movement in anthropological research which considers the traditionally 
espoused role of the neutral observer as neither possible nor desirable, and focuses instead on 
increased participation.282 Though this position has been outlined by anthropologists who have 
undertaken actual work‐related apprenticeships, it is also shared by others: Harry F. Wolcott 
                                                          
280 p. 1. 
281 Spittler, p. 1. 
282 Michael W. Coy (ed.), Apprenticeship: From Theory to Method and Back Again (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1989); James W. Fernandez and Michael Herzfeld, ‘In Search of 
Meaningful Methods,’ in Handbook of Methods in Cultural Anthropology, ed. by H. Russell Bernard 
(Walnut Creek: Altamira, 1998), pp. 89‐219, see p. 107; Michael Jackson, Paths toward a Clearing: 
Radical Empiricism and Ethnographic Inquiry (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1989). Jackson 
argues for the full bodily participation of the researcher in everyday activities such as cooking and 
dancing. 
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suggests that ‘[t]he key to participant observation as a fieldwork strategy is to take seriously 
the challenge it poses to participate more and to play the role of the aloof observer less’.283 
Whilst there may be similarities, Spittler differentiates between the role of researcher‐as‐
apprentice and the depiction of fieldwork given in ethnographic textbooks which sometimes 
evoke a ‘second socialisation’, thus placing fieldworker in the position of a child.284 
Whilst I would not claim to have employed apprenticeship as a method in my 
fieldwork, my research can be said to reflect the idea of apprenticeship in that it involved 
learning practical skills alongside and from participants. This often occurred in brief moments 
in informal settings, such as the hour set aside for instrument practice in Abaim’s Saturday 
Care program. The element of apprenticeship in the context of my research could be said to be 
complicated by the fact that I was often learning from participants who were younger than 
myself, contrary to the commonly held perception that apprentices learn from their elders. 
However, showing that I was willing to learn from participants who were younger than myself, 
sometimes significantly so, arguably helped to establish rapport with participants. Moreover, it 
also reflected the ethos and pedagogical principles of Abaim, which are premised on the 
assertion that the learning process should ideally be a two way process and that adults can 
also learn from children.285 
Employing apprenticeship as method in fieldwork also requires researches to give up 
control of the study to some degree. Spittler notes that researcher‐apprentices do not 
necessarily decide to adopt the role of apprentice, but may instead be chosen by the 
individual(s) or group who initiates them.286 Even where contact is first made by the 
researcher, as was the case in this study, apprentice‐like research would not be possible 
without the agreement of group leaders or ‘gatekeepers’, which may later be withdrawn or 
subject to restrictions. The idea that the researcher‐as‐apprentice cannot fully control the 
learning process because s/he is also dependant on participants who decide when and if to 
share knowledge could also be, paradoxically, to the researcher’s advantage, in that it signals a 
more equal relationship between the researcher and participants. 
In addition, we might also consider the possibility that using apprenticeship as a 
method and adopting a researcher‐as‐apprentice position may serve to highlight the human 
nature of all research relationships, which can sometimes be obscured by the language of 
                                                          
283 p. 94. 
284 Spittler, pp. 12‐3. 
285 In the ‘Prefas’ to Abaim’s most recent album, Zoli letan pou zanfan (Beau‐Bassin, Mauritius: Abaim, 
2013), Alain Muneean stresses the importance of young group members’ contribution to knowledge. 
286 See his discussion of Paul Stoller’s research, p. 14, referring to Stoller and Olkes, In Sorcery’s Shadow. 
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traditional social research.287 Drawing on his experiences of apprenticeship with a Tugen 
blacksmith in Kenya’s Kerio Valley, Michael Coy maintains that 
 
[a]pprenticeship, wherever it is found, is a variety of human relationship. 
Anthropologists are as human as anyone else (sometimes in spite of their best efforts 
to the contrary) and they can be made into apprentices more genuinely than the 
anthropological tradition would have us believe. The results of being made a “real” 
apprentice are at times comical, frightening, intensely anxious, and extraordinarily 
productive in terms of field work experience.288 
 
He thus suggests that through employing apprenticeship as method, we might reach a more 
satisfactory level of authenticity in the relationships with participants than is usually achieved, 
or even deemed possible, through other forms of ethnographic research. Accordingly, 
adopting the role of a ‘real’ apprentice can be both intensely challenging and particularly 
beneficial to the research (and researcher). 
The second characteristic of thick participation discussed by Spittler is the 
simultaneous use of observation and ‘natürliche Gespräche’, or naturally‐occurring 
conversations.289 For him, this combination allows us to combat the limitations of both 
language‐based research in general and of interviews in particular discussed above, yet he also 
reminds us that ‘observation in ethnographic research is no more exact a method than 
Gespräch (conversation), rather both enhance each other.’290 He thus argues that conversation 
and observation should be seen as complementary rather than opposing practices.291 For 
example, observation may allow researchers to use appropriate vocabulary and to better 
match our questions to participants’ everyday experience.292  
Spittler presents Gespräch or (natural) conversation as an alternative to interview‐
based research. However, before conversations with participants can take place, the 
researcher must work to build the right environment. As he explains,  
 
If we want to avoid artificial interview situations with their unavoidable distortions, 
then we must focus more decidedly on situations which involve and encourage 
naturally occurring conversation. This, however, requires a [period of] participant 
observation. Such situations which enable naturally occurring conversation cannot be 
initiated at will, one must instead wait for appropriate opportunities.293  
                                                          
287 Choosing to refer to people as research ‘subjects’, for example, could be said to have this effect. 
288 Michael Coy, ‘Introduction’ in Apprenticeship: From Theory to Method and Back Again, pp. xi‐v, p. xiv. 
289 Spittler, p. 6. 
290 ‘Beobachten in der ethnologischen Forschung ist keine exaktere Methode als das Gespräch, sondern 
beide erganzen sich.’ p. 18. 
291 See pp. 15‐9. 
292 Spittler, p. 17. 
293 ‘Will man artifizielle Interviewsituationen mit ihren unvermeidlichen Verzerrungen vermeiden, dann 
muss man sich stärker auf natürliche Gesprächssituationen konzentrieren. Diese setzen aber eine 
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In the context of my own research, I found that participation in activities alongside 
participants, such as in rehearsals with Abaim, could be considered as providing a context 
which enabled naturally occurring conversation with participants. This may be because the 
shared participation in activities provided a basis for relationships between with participants 
other than the fact that I was there to conduct research, and thus went some way towards 
mitigating the artificial nature of all research relationships. Participation in activities also 
allowed me to maintain contact with participants whilst ‘waiting for appropriate 
opportunities’, and without putting pressure on them to share information with me. This 
means that the participants could choose if and when to speak to me. In light of observations 
made by other ethnographers who have worked with children, this may be considered as 
especially significant in the context of research with children and young people, who are used 
to adults initiating contact with children and being ‘primarily active rather than reactive.’294 
William A. Corsaro and Debbie Epstein suggest it may be more productive for researchers 
working with children to adopt a ‘least adult role’ through, for example, ‘waiting for children to 
approach [us], rather than initiating conversations or play with them’, and by trying ‘to speak 
to the children on their own terms at all times’.295 This is arguably facilitated by thick 
participation research. 
Using conversation as a research method may appear as a somewhat passive research 
strategy. It certainly goes against traditional advice to students to ‘constantly peste[r] those 
being observed to explain what they are doing and why’.296 However, I would suggest that 
Spittler’s endorsement of ‘waiting for appropriate opportunities’ is possibly a more difficult 
research strategy than it might appear. It may be stressful when the researcher is aware that 
there is limited period of time available for fieldwork, which puts pressure on the researcher to 
optimise on all forms of contact with participants. Furthermore, it may not always be clear 
when the ‘right moment’ to begin conversations with participants has arrived: this requires 
researchers to observe not only participants’ but also their own behaviour within interactions. 
Nonetheless, such a strategy has advantages in that it reflects ‘natural’ relationship formation 
                                                          
Teilnehmende Beobachtung voraus. Man kann solche Gesprächssituationen nicht beliebig initiieren, 
sondern muss auch güngstige Gelegenheiten warten.’ Spittler, p. 8. 
294 William A. Corsaro, Friendship and Peer Culture in the Early Years (Norwood: Ablex Pub. Corp., 1985), 
p. 28, original emphasis, cited in Debbie Epstein, ‘“Are you a girl or are you a teacher?” The least adult 
role in research about gender and sexuality in primary school’, in Doing Research About Education ed. by 
Geoffrey Walford. (London: Falmer Press, 1998), pp. 28‐41, p. 29. See also Gary Alan Fine’s discussion of 
negotiating various adult roles in With the Boys: Little League Baseball and Preadolescent Culture 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
295 Epstein, p. 29. 
296 Sara Delamont, ‘Ethnography and Participant Observation’ in Qualitative Research Practice ed. by C. 
Seale, G. Gobo, J. F. Gubrium, and D. Silverman (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2007), pp. 205‐17, p. 213. 
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with, for example, friends and acquaintances, in which there is a tacit awareness of unspoken 
rules about which subjects might be suitable for discussion and mutual respect for the other 
person’s privacy. Whilst we must remain aware of power relations between researcher and 
researched, it could be said this research strategy aims to promote a more equal relationship 
than that implied between participants‐as‐subjects and researcher‐as‐investigator.297  
In this respect, thick participation’s privileging of naturally occurring conversation 
could be said to reflect Lisa M. Tillmann‐Healy’s conceptualisation of ‘friendship as method’, 
which she posits as a ‘mode of qualitative inquiry involves researching with the practices, at 
the pace, in the natural contexts, and with an ethic of friendship’.298 This conceptualisation of 
‘friendship as method’ should however not be confused with the development of actual 
friendships with participants, though both may occur within a given research process. Thus, if 
‘[t]he convenience of gathering any type of systematic interview data is always undertaken at 
the risk of losing rapport’,299 naturally‐occurring conversation within thick participation places 
a high value on rapport with participants. We might also propose that whereas the context of 
an interview (whether formal, informal, structured or semi‐structured) implies that one party 
(the interviewer) wishes to obtain specific information about a specific topic or topics from the 
other (the interviewee); a conversation is based on the premise that both parties interact with 
the other as a whole person. Therefore, in this respect thick participation encourages 
researchers to interact with participants as fellow human beings rather than to focus solely on 
the goal of obtaining information. Conversations within thick participation could thus be said 
to work towards what Unni Wikan has called ‘experience‐near anthropology’. She argues that, 
as researchers, ‘we have to attend to people's multiple, simultaneous, compelling concerns 
and to follow them, as they move, bridging scenes and encounters, if we are to grasp what is 
at stake and how they, people in various positions, feel‐think and act’: 
 
Lives are inevitably lived as wholes, of some kind. Rather than compartmentalizing 
with our dissecting categories I want to try to recapture some of that continuity, […] Or 
to remain with the Balinese conceptualization: ‘hearts carried across.’300 
 
                                                          
297 We might consider here the experience of Paul Stoller amongst the Songhay people in Niger, who 
was lied to by his participants when conducting a survey. He subsequently told, ‘Monsieur Paul, you will 
never learn about us if you go into people’s compounds, ask personal questions, and write down the 
answers. Even if you remain here one year, one two years, and ask us questions in this manner, we 
would still lie to you […] You must learn to sit with people, Monsieur Paul. You must learn to sit and 
listen. You must learn the meaning of the Songhay adage: One kills something thin in appearance only to 
discover that inside it is fat.’ Stoller and Olkes, p. 11. 
298 ‘Friendship as Method’, Qualitative Inquiry, 9 (2003), 729‐49, p. 730. 
299 Wolcott, p. 101. 
300 Unni Wikan, ‘Toward an Experience‐near Anthropology’, Cultural Anthropology, 6: 3 (1991), 285‐305, 
p. 291. 
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The third and final characteristic of thick participation expanded upon by Spittler is the 
role of lived experience and of the senses within research. Here he distinguishes thick 
participation from purely physical participation: for him, the former necessarily requires 
increased social proximity and shared experience, which he argues facilitates a complex 
overview of social situations:301 
 
All senses are involved in this experience. Not only sight and hearing, but also physical 
and emotional feelings. [Learning about others through] shared experience is a 
difficult process. At least one’s own experience offers a partial point of access. 
However, one can also make mistakes. It is not enough to be close [to participants] or 
to find oneself in the same situations as them to experience the same thing. Here, a 
very long research period, plus additional research methods are needed to understand 
others’ experiences. However, the fact that one can misunderstand others’ feelings 
within shared experience is no reason to rule out experience as a means of access.302 
 
Whereas ethnographic fieldwork is traditionally conceived of as a purely intellectual activity, a 
renewed interested in the bodily subjectivity of the researcher has led to a reconsideration of 
the role of the senses within ethnographic research.303 Referring to Mary Weismantel’s 
argument in Cholas and Pishtacos that mainstream anthropology has disavowed sensory 
knowledge, Liisa Malkki asks, ‘if we accept that fieldwork is an embodied, and embodying, 
form of knowledge production, why should we leave a considered awareness of the senses out 
of the project of creating ethnographic understanding?’304 Drawing on Paul Stoller’s argument 
in The Taste of Ethnographic Things,305 Spittler advocates a particularly demanding approach 
to the use of the senses within ethnographic research: 
 
In these cases, for the ethnographer, thick participation means not only paying more 
attention to sensual phenomena, but also putting his/her own senses to use. S/he 
                                                          
301 ‘Unter dichter Teilnahme verstehe ich nicht nure die interpretative im Gegensatz zur rein physischen 
Teilnahme, sondern auch die soziale Nähe […] Die Nähe […] ermöglicht ein komplexe Erfassung von 
Situationen.’ p. 19. Emphasis in original. See also Spittler, Hirtenarbeit. Die Welt der Kamelhirten und 
Ziegenhirtinnen von Timia (Köln: Koppe, 1998), p. 56. 
302 ‘Zu diesem Erleben gehören alle Sinne. Nicht nur das Sehen und Hören, sondern auch das körperliche 
und seelische Fühlen. Miterleben ist ein schwieriger Prozess. Zumindest partiell bietet die eigene 
Erfahrung einen Zugang. Aber beim Miterleben kann man sich auch täuschen. Es genügt nicht, nahe zu 
sein, sich in derselben Situationen zu befinden, um das Gleiche zu erleben. Es bedarf hier einer sehr 
langen Zeitdauer bzw. weiterer methodischer Zugänge, um das Erleben anderer nachzuvollziehen. Dass 
man sich beim Miterleben über die Gefühle anderer täuschen kann, ist aber kein Grund, das Erleben als 
methodischen Zugang auszuschließen’. Spittler, p. 19. Emphasis in original. 
303 See, for example, ‘The Embodiment of Fieldwork’ regarding the bodily experience of fieldwork in 
Amanda Coffey, The Ethnographic Self: Fieldwork and the Representation of Identity (London; Thousand 
Oaks: SAGE, 1999), pp. 59‐76. 
304 Liisa H. Malkki, ‘Tradition and Improvisation in Ethnographic Field Research’, in Improvising Theory, 
pp. 162‐86, pp. 176‐7, referring to Cholas and Pishtacos: Stories of Race and Sex in the Andes (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
305 The Taste of Ethnographic Things: The Senses in Anthropology (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1989). 
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must re‐learn to smell and to feel. For [Stoller] it means putting one’s whole body, 
one’s mind, one’s eyes, one’s ears and one’s voice to use. The researcher should 
physically work and dance, and also suffer.306 
 
Furthermore, whether the researcher adopts a self‐conscious approach to the use of the body 
and the senses or not, many of the insights gained through ethnographic research may also be 
registered at the level of the body. Cerwonka therefore suggests that we would do well ‘to 
think more about how the researcher’s body is a site for analytical insight about various 
aspects of fieldwork.’307 
Whilst it incorporates use of the senses, defining what exactly it might mean to employ 
lived experience within research is perhaps harder to discern. Spittler suggest that Wikan’s 
concept of resonance may be useful here. Resonance, a term which Wikan draws from a 
Balinese theory of intercultural translation, can be described as ‘applying one's life experience 
in realization that this can be an asset, a resource, that will help one to grasp certain 
phenomena better’: in this respect, ‘resonance fosters empathy and compassion; it enables 
appreciation; without resonance, ideas and understandings will not spring alive.’308 
Researchers wishing to work towards understanding through resonance must take a more 
relativist stance towards analysis of (participants’) language within ethnography: ‘[t]he issue is 
the need to attend to what people say and the intent they are trying to convey, rather than 
groping for some ‘larger’ answers within the particulars of their spoken words.309 In this 
respect, lacking fluency in the participants’ native language might be seen as in fact an 
advantageous situation research. Whilst I was learning MK, I found that the fact that I often 
was not able to remember or later note down the exact words used by my participants forced 
me to focus on the meaning rather than words as text. 
Participation in everyday life is also identified as a necessary requirement for 
resonance in research. Here Wikan refers to Tim Ingold’s observations on his fieldwork with 
reindeer herdsmen, in which he suggests that his participation in everyday practical activities 
helped to him to ‘attend to’ their shared social world in the same way as his participants: 
 
Such communion of experience, the awareness of living in a common world, 
establishes a foundational level of sociality that exists – in Bourdieu's phrase – ‘on the 
                                                          
306 ‘Dichte Teilnahme heißt in diesen Fällen nicht nur, dass der Ethnologe diesen sinnlichen Phänomenen 
mehr Beachtung schenkt, sondern dass er auch selbst seine Sinne einsetzt. Er muss wieder riechen und 
tasten lernen. Ingesamt gilt es für ihn, seinen ganzen Körper, seinen Verstand, sein Auge, sein Ohr und 
seine Stimme einzusetzen. Er soll körperlich arbeiten und tanzen, aber auch leiden.’ p. 20. 
307 p. 34. 
308 ‘Beyond the Words: The Power of Resonance’, American Ethnologist, 19: 3 (1992), 460‐82, p. 465. 
See also her Resonance: Beyond the Words (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
309 Wikan, ‘Beyond the Words’, p. 466. 
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hither side of words and concepts,’ and that constitutes the relational baseline on 
which all attempts at verbal communication must subsequently build.310 
 
Accordingly, the researcher’s ‘painstaking engagement on a day‐to‐day basis in events and 
routines which are “theirs”’ can thus help to guard against ‘false resonances’, which can be 
created by preconceptions which are drawn from our own cultural background.311 Finally, 
Wikan advocates using our own experience as a ‘bridge’ in the process of understanding 
research participants. 
 
We need not have the ‘same experience’ to be able to attend in the same way. But we 
must dip into the wellsprings of ourselves for something to use as a bridge to others. 
[…] for resonance to work, we need to shed the stifling preconception that can be a 
stumbling block along the way: that others are essentially different from us, to be 
understood only by means of their ‘culture’; and that their words bespeak different life 
worlds. 312 
 
Wikan thus advocates using our personal and individual experience, seen here as a resource to 
be put to use rather than as an obstacle within the research process, as a means of guarding 
against notions of essential or absolute difference. Employment of the concept of resonance 
within thick participation thus again points towards a reconceptualisation of ethnographic 
research which above all recognises the research relationship as a human relationship. 
 
Limits of shared experience: Ethical issues in thick participation 
research 
 
Through the above consideration of three defining elements of Spittler’s formulation 
of thick participation, I have thus argued that as a research strategy, it can be said to promote 
recognition of both participants’ and researchers’ shared humanity. Nonetheless, this does not 
mean that conducting this type of research automatically sidesteps all ethical issues. I would 
now like to consider some of the potential problems which may arise from participation in 
everyday life within research. Firstly, it has been suggested that all forms of participant 
observation (including thick participation) work towards not only gaining an intellectual 
understanding of participants’ viewpoints, but that the ultimate goal is for the researcher to 
                                                          
310 Tim Ingold, ‘The Art of Translation in a Continuous World’ In Beyond Boundaries: Understanding, 
Translation, and Anthropological Discourse, ed. by  Gísli Pálsson, (Providence; Oxford: Berg Publishers, 
1993), pp. 210‐30, p. 223, referring to Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 2, cited in Wikan, ‘Beyond the Words’, p. 471.  
311 Wikan, ‘Beyond the Words’, p. 471. 
312 Wikan, ‘Beyond the Words’, p. 471. 
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‘feel’ what their participants feel.313 Whilst this is certainly a worthy aim, which could be said 
to reflect the concept of resonance discussed above, it must be remembered that the process 
of understanding is always a situated one and thus remains necessarily incomplete. Richard 
Johnson et al. suggest that in conducting participatory research, there is a risk that researchers 
may be led to falsely believe that they can ‘speak for’ their participants: 
 
Authors can imagine that they know what it is like for the other. They can believe that 
bridging alterity is easy. They can believe that underneath it all (‘the skin’?) ‘we’ are all 
really the same. However, this is to disempower the person the person who is being 
‘understood’. 314 
 
Their brief reference to ‘skin’ here would seem to allude to the powerful meanings attached to 
racialised signifiers such as skin colour and phenotype, which would arguably suggest that 
researchers would do well to interrogate their own racialised selves. In my case, this has 
involved a consideration of whiteness, which is developed further in relation to the 
Réunionese context in Chapter 5 of this study. 
The authors also refer in the quotation above to the work of Hans Gadamer, who 
argues that the process of understanding is by no means a neutral process, and instead can be 
seen as an assertion of power: 
 
By understanding the other, by claiming to know him, one robs his claims of 
legitimacy. […] The claim to understand the other person in advance functions to keep 
the other person’s claim at a distance.315 
 
This may also be compared to Glissant’s notion of ‘com‐prendre’, which emphasising the act of 
taking, or more specifically taking something away from somebody else, within the act of 
understanding.  
 
La question posée est la suivante: dans la magnifique perspective des cultures 
occidentales organisées autour de la notion de transparence, c’est‐à‐dire de la notion 
de compréhension, « com‐prendre », je prends avec moi, je comprends un être ou une 
notion, ou une culture, n’ y a‐t‐il pas cette autre notion, celle de prendre, d’accaparer 
? Et le génie de l’Occident a été de nous faire accepter cela […] moi je dis que ce génie 
est un génie trompeur, parce que dans comprendre il y a l’intention de prendre, de 
soumettre ce que l’on comprend à l’aune de sa propre mesure et de sa propre 
                                                          
313 Kathleen M. DeWalt and Billie R. DeWalt suggest that ‘[a] part of this process is coming not only to 
understand, intellectually, the perspective of participants in the context in which the researcher is 
working, but to “feel” the point of the view of the other’. Participant Observation: A Guide for 
Fieldworkers 2nd ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), p. 11. 
314 Richard Johnson, Deborah Chambers, Parvati Raghuram and Estella Tincknell, The Practice of Cultural 
Studies (London: SAGE, 2004), p. 238. 
315 Truth and Method (London; New York: Continuum, 2004), p. 354 [1975]. Cited in Johnson et al., p. 
238. 
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transparence. La prétention à l’universel est une des créations de L’occident pour faire 
passer la pilule de la réduction à un modèle transparent […]. On dit qu’un peuple 
accède à la culture, à l’éducation, à la civilisation quand il a atteint tel ou tel palier, et 
qu’il gravit ainsi vers ce modèles transparents.316 
 
For Glissant, the act of understanding or ‘com‐prendre’ is interlinked with the West’s false 
claim to ‘universal’ knowledge, and to the supposed transparency of knowledge. He favours 
instead an awareness of what he terms opacity, specifically, recognition of the opacity of the 
other within human relationships. Opacity may thus be defined as the right to not be 
understood (in the sense of com‐prendre): ‘ce que j’appelle l’opacité de l’étant – c’est‐à‐dire, 
non pas le refus de l’autre, mais le refus de considérer l’autre comme une transparence, et par 
conséquent la volonté d’accepter l’opacité de l’autre comme une donnée positive et non pas 
comme un obstacle – devient une nécessité pour tout le monde à l’heure actuelle.’317 He also 
uses this concept to demonstrate how global elites use their ability to ‘com‐prendre’ 
contemporary economic and other systems to maintain the status quo: 
 
Dans les bidonvilles et les ghettos de plus petites cités, les mêmes embrayages sont à 
l’œuvre : la violence de la misère et de la boue, mais aussi la rage inconsciente et 
désespérée de ne pas « comprendre » le chaos du monde. Les dominants profitent du 
chaos, les opprimés s’en exaspèrent.318 
 
In summary, therefore it can be concluded that researchers must remain aware of power 
structures which are invoked both within their relationship to participants and within the 
process of understanding itself. 
Furthermore, it could be suggested that thick participation research actually presents 
more ethical problems than the more removed stance of researcher‐as‐observer, as it may 
involve the unintentional deception of participants. Frequent participation in shared activities 
could arguably obscure the fact that all interactions between researcher and researched was 
initially premised on the aim to obtain ‘data’ which benefits the researcher’s project. 
Reflecting on her doctoral fieldwork, Carolyn Ellis recognises her participation in everyday life 
may have given a false impression to participants, though this was never intended to be the 
case: 
 
After many visits, community members seemed to forget I was doing ‘research’ and 
did not respond as though that were a salient part of my identity. After all, I was 
                                                          
316 Édouard Glissant, ‘Le chaos‐monde, l’oral et l’écrit’, in Écrire la parole de nuit. La nouvelle littérature 
antillaise, ed. by Ralph Ludwig (Paris, Gallimard: 1994), pp.111‐29, p. 126. 
317 ‘Le chaos‐monde’, p. 127. 
318 Poétique de la Relation (Paris: Gallimard, 1990), p. 155. 
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involved in their lives, and there were more important things to think about […] 
Writing a research paper hardly measured up to the trials of everyday life.319 
 
There is also a risk that high levels of participation could lead to self‐deception for the 
researcher. Developing meaningful relationships with participants, which is arguably what 
thick participation works towards, can lead researchers to believe that we have really become 
part of the group we are studying. This could negatively affect the research project, but could 
also cause up (inter)personal problems for the researcher. Though Ellis admits that she was 
concerned ‘that taking on the salient role of researcher might cut off research possibilities 
because my participants might not talk freely’, she also recognises that doing so not only 
risked making participants feel ‘used’ and ‘hurt’, but that she herself would have felt hurt if 
relationships with participants changed.320 She acknowledged a certain ambivalence in her 
own conceptualisation of her role in the community which constituted the subject of her 
research: 
 
I felt uncertain about when and who I should remind because the boundaries of this 
peninsular community, and who was included in it, were ambiguous. Likewise, my role 
was unclear even to me. Although I was a researcher, I also saw myself as a friend to 
many people there, and sometimes I felt and acted like family. 321 
 
The risk of deceiving participants and of self‐deception through participation must 
therefore be taken seriously within thick participation research. However, that this type of 
research brings up issues of ethics and morality could also be interpreted as something which 
is ultimately beneficial to the research process. At best, thick participation could be said to 
constitute an attempt to live out the moral tale of ‘not judging others until you have walked in 
their shoes’. Yet the process of walking in our participants’ shoes is necessarily limited, 
because the research period will always have temporal boundaries, even if conducted over a 
long period of time, and because it is impossible to participate in all aspects of the participants’ 
lives. Moreover, even the most intense forms of participation do not change the fact that 
researcher and researched may have lived very different lives prior to the beginning of the 
research process. In Mauritius, I saw and experienced first‐hand how being a member of 
Abaim could at times constitute an important source of self‐esteem for young people, given 
that being a member of Abaim also became part of my own, situated, identity. However, I 
could in no way claim to understand what growing up in a disadvantaged neighbourhood 
                                                          
319 Carolyn Ellis, ‘Telling Secrets, Revealing Lives: Relational Ethics in Research With Intimate Others’, 
Qualitative Inquiry, 13: 1 (2007), 3‐29, pp. 6‐7. 
320 Ellis, p. 7. 
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entailed, or what it was like to have gone through the Mauritian education system with the 
fiercely competitive CPE exams at the end of the primary school cycle, or indeed many other 
challenges which my participants faced in the short period of time which I spent with Abaim. 
Instead, I would suggest that it is the act of attempting to walk in participants’ shoes 
which is ultimately more important than the question of how successfully you walk the walk; 
that is, how successful you are in acquiring the skills and knowledge needed to participate 
effectively in everyday life and shared activities.322 This should be simultaneously combined 
with an attempt to withhold judgement, and perhaps even to withhold academic analysis in 
favour of an attempt to understand through resonance as outlined by Wikan. In a similar vein, 
in Soi-même comme un autre, Paul Ricoeur develops the concept of analogy, which posits that 
we recognise the reality of others by means of analogy with our own experiences.323 As 
Johnson et al. remark of Ricoeur’s argument, ‘[a]nalogy is not the same as comparison and it 
does not posit sameness or difference’.324 Drawing on the works of Husserl, Ricoeur posits that 
analogy can be characterised as 
 
une opération authentiquement productive, dans la mesure où elle transgresse le 
programme même de la phénoménologie, en transgressant l’expérience de la chair 
propre. Si elle ne crée pas l’altérité, toujours présupposée, elle lui confère une 
signification spécifique, à savoir l’admission que l’autre n’est pas condamné à rester un 
étranger, mais peut devenir mon semblable, à savoir quelqu’un qui, comme moi, dit 
« je ». La ressemblance fondée sur l’appariement de chair à chair vient réduire une 
distance, combler un écart, là même où il crée une dissymétrie. Ce que signifie 
l’adverbe comme : comme moi, l’autre pense, veut, jouit, souffre.325 
 
Thick participation arguably serves to encourage this process of understanding through 
analogy.  
Finally, participation can also serve as a means of showing respect for the 
communities, groups, associations and individuals we work with. It may also provide us with an 
opportunity to show our appreciation for their involvement in our research. This may be 
especially important when working with young people and across asymmetrical power 
relationships. To use Glissantian terminology, participation might be said to better respect the 
opacity of groups and communities, in that it does not rely upon participants’ translations of 
their cultural practice into transparent models. For example, my participation in Abaim’s music 
                                                          
322 ‘(D’ordinaire, l’amateur est défini comme une immaturation de l’artiste : quelqu’un qui ne peut – ou 
ne veut – se hausser à la maîtrise d’une profession. Mais dans le champ de la pratique photographique, 
c’est l’amateur, au contraire, qui est l’assomption du professionnel : car c’est lui qui se tient au plus près 
du noème de la Photographie.)’ Roland Barthes, La Chambre claire: Note sur la photographie (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1980), p. 154. 
323 (Paris: Seuil, 1990). 
324 Johnson, Chambers, Raghuram and Tincknell, The Practice of Cultural Studies, p. 207. 
325 Soi-même comme un autre, pp. 386‐7. Emphasis in original. 
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rehearsals, which may be compared to a form of informal apprenticeship, could have served to 
temporarily problematise or mitigate the position which might usually be accorded to a white 
Western (over)educated adult. Furthermore, shared participation also problematises the 
presumed boundary between the active, knowing researcher and the passive research 
‘subjects’. Moreover, thick participation may offer researchers a concrete means of showing 
participants that they would like to establish a relationship between equals, even if existing 
power structures would appear to make this impossible. Participating in the same activities 
and everyday tasks as participants could be said to convey the idea that researchers do not 
consider themselves superior to participants, even and especially when researchers are 
marked by difference and come from more privileged backgrounds. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has given an overview of Gerd Spittler’s concept of thick participation, 
and has shown how this concept has allowed me to theorise and further reflect upon my 
research experiences with Abaim in Mauritius. Building upon Spittler’s observations, the 
chapter has suggested that thick participation research can be considered as a means to 
recognise the human nature of research relationships, and may be employed in order to 
respect the humanity of both those being researcher and of the researcher. Finally, I have also 
considered some of the problematic ethical issues involved in participation in everyday life, 
which forms a necessary requirement of thick participation research. 
In terms of research methodology and epistemology, I have argued for the importance 
of shared experience and participation, whilst recognising that the differential status of the 
researcher may always impose limits. However, it is arguably the attempt to participate which 
is ultimately more important than the result, because this attempt can be read as a political 
act, in that in refuses to accept the incommensurability of researcher and researched. This 
refusal of notions of absolute and incommensurable difference will also be applied to my 
analysis of representations of cultural difference within popular culture in the chapters which 
follow. This is of particular relevance to the next chapter, which will consider the musical 
output of Abaim in greater detail, and will aim to situate this in relation to the wider Mauritian 
context as concerns the politics of language and of ancestrality. 
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Part II: Pop Music, Youth Cultures, and Kreol Language Politics 
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2. ‘Zot tou konn pik sega’:326 Abaim’s Musical Engagement with the 
Politics of Language and Ancestrality in Mauritius 
 
Does it Have to be ‘Cool’ to be Youth Culture? 
 
Shortly after arriving in Mauritius, in November 2011, I met with a university lecturer 
to discuss potential avenues for fieldwork research on youth culture. When I mentioned that I 
had made contact with Abaim and had started attending their music rehearsals, his first 
response was to make sure that I was aware that, from the perspective of young people in 
Mauritius, Abaim are not ‘cool’. This, as I understood it, was not intended as a criticism of my 
research choices, but was rather an expression of surprise that a group best known for their 
collections of songs by and for children might be included within a study exploring the politics 
of Mauritian youth culture. The central position accorded in their music to the Mauritian Kreol 
language (hereafter MK), and to traditional musical and cultural elements linked to a history of 
subordination, such as the ravann drum, may also be said to raise the issue of whether young 
Mauritians would be interested in popular music which takes a specific interest in the question 
of Mauritian cultural specificity, over readily accessible globalised popular culture, of both the 
Hollywood/Western and Bollywood/South Asian varieties.327 
Given that their recent musical production privileges acoustic instrumental 
accompaniment and the unusual quality of children’s voices, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
Abaim is neither readily associated with Mauritian youth culture, nor generally thought of as 
‘cool’. But their music has proved popular. Some songs in particular have proved surprisingly 
popular in some unexpected contexts: the group’s signature hit ‘Ti Marmit’ from the 2002 
album 16 ti morso nu lanfans (‘16 songs of our childhood’) not only enjoyed significant levels 
of radio play, but was also played in nightclubs at the time of its release. Songs from Enn Nwel 
larkansiel (‘A Rainbow Christmas’)328 such as ‘Alime tegn’, an adapted version of ‘Jingle Bells’ in 
MK, can be heard on national radio and television in the period leading up to Christmas. Part 
                                                          
326 ‘You all know how to dance sega’, lyrics from the final verse of ‘Ti Marmit’, 16 morso nou lanfans 
(Beau‐Bassin, Mauritius: Abaim, 2002). 
327 As concerns young Mauritian’s engagement with globalised popular culture, writing in the 1990s, 
Thomas Hylland Eriksen presented a rather polarised vision of the preferences of Mauritians of Indian 
origin and others: ‘[t]he Creole preference for black pop artists and actors, and the popularity of Indian 
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degree reinventions, of the metropolitan messages that are so important in the constitution of modern 
identities’. Common Denominators: Ethnicity, Nation-Building, and Compromise in Mauritius (Oxford, 
New York: Berg, 1998), pp. 130‐1. It may be that processes of diversification and hybridisation within 
global popular culture itself have since resulted in a more varied engagement with global pop culture in 
Mauritius. 
328 (Beau‐Bassin, Mauritius: Abaim, 2010). 
95 
 
of their appeal undoubtedly lies in the cute factor associated with giving children centre stage 
in performances and music videos, and in public awareness of the group’s community and 
social activism, which means that buying Abaim’s music can be considered a charitable act. 
However, situating their musical production within the wider context of contemporary 
Mauritian cultural politics would appear to point towards a more nuanced explanation of 
Abaim’s success in the field of Mauritian popular music. In this chapter, I will suggest that this 
unexpected popularity may in part be due to how Abaim’s music relates to wider debates 
within the field of Mauritian cultural politics, in particular as concerns the politics of language 
and ancestrality. The term ancestrality politics will be used here to evoke the cultural politics 
associated with the promotion of ancestral cultures and languages in the Mauritian context, 
that is, the diasporic cultures and language of origin of different sectors of the population. 
These are often contrasted with cultural elements seen to be indigenous to Mauritius, 
including the MK language.329 In his study of ethnolinguistic belonging in Mauritius, Patrick 
Eisenlohr asserts that ‘state institutions explicitly encourage the cultivation and public 
celebration of diasporic links, expending significantly more resources and effort on supporting 
ethnicized ancestral cultural traditions and ancestral languages than on the promotion of a 
national public culture transcending ethnic boundaries’, including ‘the building of cultural 
centers that are presented as the property of a particular ethnic community.’330 This dominant 
approach is captured in the metaphor of a ‘mosaic of cultures’, yet ‘[t]he image of the mosaic 
is biased, as the anthropologist Ulf Hannerz points out, because a mosaic consists of fixed, 
discrete pieces whereas human experience, claims and postures notwithstanding, is fluid and 
open‐ended.’331 The mosaic metaphor suggests that cultures ‘are all of one kind, all largely 
homogeneous in their internal characteristics, and all hard‐edged.’332Abaim’s music, it is 
argued here, calls into question this dominant approach, and begins to outline an alternative 
cultural politics which might offer more a more inclusive, and less ‘hard‐edged’, way to 
envision Mauritian culture(s). 
The subsequent analysis of Abaim’s musical production will thus aim to reveal a skilful 
engagement with Mauritian language politics, which is articulated through a concern with 
children and childhood. This, it will be argued, allows for a reformulation of the emotional 
attachment to culture and ‘cultural values’, which in turn challenges the idea that these 
                                                          
329 Many academic and other commentators have talked of the confusion of culture and religion in the 
Mauritian context: see, amongst others, Shawkat M. Toorawa, ‘Religion in Mauritius: I Have a Vision…’ 
in Consolidating the Rainbow: Independent Mauritius, 1968-1998, ed. by Marina Carter (Port Louis: 
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emotive concepts are primarily associated with ancestral cultures, as is propagated within 
official and government discourses.333 The chapter will thus attempt to explore some of the 
political implications which might in part explain Abaim’s unexpected popularity, and why they 
appear to have garnered emotive appeal amongst the Mauritian public. It will be suggested 
that Abaim’s musical production, although it cannot qualify as ‘mainstream’ popular culture 
despite having achieved a certain level commercial success in Mauritius, is significant in three 
respects. Firstly, it encourages more inclusive approaches to culture and cultural heritage in 
Mauritius; secondly, in doing so, it challenges dominant approaches to Mauritian culture as 
being a ‘mosaic’ of different cultures, as is conveyed by the state model of ‘unity in diversity’; 
and thirdly, this then compels listeners and audiences to consider new ways of imagining the 
Mauritian nation, in which the previously marginalised, such as the MK language and the 
young people involved in the music group, might be given centre stage, and in which the 
nation might be imagined as comprised of individuals rather than of corporate ethnic groups.  
I will first give a brief history of the association, before considering the pertinence of 
ethnic categories within contemporary Mauritian society, with particular reference to the 
Creole group. I will then outline dominant understandings of culture and cultural ownership in 
relation to politics of language and ancestrality, and examine how these have shaped 
strategies used to gain official recognition. The following analysis will then attempt to 
demonstrate how dominant cultural and language are challenged in Abaim’s musical 
production, and though their representation of childhood. 
 
Abaim and their Engagement with Post-Independence Mauritian 
Society: A History 
 
Abaim is an NGO working with children and young people through music and 
community‐based social activism in a disadvantaged neighbourhood of Beau‐Bassin, a town in 
central Mauritius. The association was founded in 1982, with its immediate aim being to act as 
a support front for the strike taking place at the Lois Lagesse Centre for the blind in Beau‐
Bassin, central Mauritius. The name ‘Abaim’ itself was originally an acronym for ‘Association 
pour le bien‐être des aveugles de l’île Maurice’, but by happy coincidence it is also a common 
interjection used in sega music, a medium soon taken up by the group in their fight for political 
recognition of both people with disabilities and other marginalised groups. They started 
regular rehearsals in 1988, and produced their first album, Enn lot sezon, in 1992.334 Traditional 
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Culture: Mauritius (Moka, Mauritius: Mahatma Gandhi Institute Press, 1988). 
334 Recorded under the name ‘Grup Abaim’, (Beau‐Bassin, Mauritius: Abaim). 
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instruments and musical elements were accorded a central place, and many songs expressed 
social and political critique. For example, the song ‘400 kanon pu kolon’ (‘400 canons for the 
colonisers’) gives a critical appraisal of Mauritian history, and its concluding statement, ‘nouvo 
met mem fwet’ (‘new masters, same whip’), attracted controversy at the time of release.335 
During this period, members of the group noticed that a young boy from the local 
neighbourhood began to regularly appear outside the window at the centre where they 
conducted their rehearsals. In response to this and other expressions of interest from the local 
community, the group began the Saturday Care project in 1995. This was created for children 
and young people from the local neighbourhood, a socioeconomically disadvantaged area with 
a low Certificate of Primary Education (CPE) pass rate at the local primary school.336 The 
program included the atelie ravann, a workshop in which children are taught to play the 
Mauritian handheld drum which is considered as the principal instrument in sega music: Abaim 
were in fact the first public institution to teach the instrument. Terming their approach ‘music 
for development’, Abaim has continued with the Saturday Care programme to the present day, 
and currently welcomes upwards of 60 children and young people every week. In addition, the 
association runs a community music group which involves over 40 young singers and musicians 
who attend twice weekly rehearsals. Some of the children’s parents and other local adults also 
act as volunteers: the association can thus be seen as fully integrated within the community. 
In addition to their community activism, Abaim have also risen to prominence as a 
cultural actor at the national level through the dissemination of their musical production. Since 
2000, the association has produced several albums with and for children, including 16 morso 
nou lanfans (2002), a collection of Mauritian children’s songs and games, Tizan ek so 8 frer 
(2003), traditional stories set to music, and Rekreasyon (2009), an attempt to revalorise 
Mauritian musical heritage. More recently, Abaim have also undertaken projects of what we 
might call ‘musical translation’, resulting in the Christmas album Enn Nwel larkansiel (2010), 
and most recently Zoli letan pou zanfan (2013), featuring songs developed and used with 
children involved in the Saturday Care project.337 We can thus see that Abaim’s concern with 
providing a voice for the marginalised is intricately linked with both specific concerns regarding 
the welfare of Mauritian children, and with contesting what is perceived as the devalorisation 
of the MK language. 
                                                          
335 Enn Syek de syek (Beau‐Bassin, Mauritius: Abaim, 1999). 
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Contemporary Mauritian Cultural Politics: Cultural Recognition and 
Auto-Ethnicisation 
 
Official representations of Mauritian nation highlight the harmonious co‐existence of 
diverse groups, as is implied by the slogan ‘unity in diversity’. Within this system, ‘la légitimité 
de chaque groupe ethnique à accéder aux ressources nationales (le « gâteau national ») est 
mesurée à l’aune de sa contribution à la démographie, à l’économie, voire même à l’histoire 
du pays’. As a result, ‘les groupes en présence agissant comme si les ressources étatiques 
disponibles l’étaient en quantité limitée et qu’en conséquence, toute ressource obtenue par 
une communauté le serait au détriment d’une autre’.338 According to this logic, in order to 
make legitimate claims on state resources, it is first necessary to self‐identify as a member of 
an ethnoreligious group.  We might then describe the strategies frequently used to gain 
recognition within the Mauritian state cultural apparatus as involving a process of auto‐
ethnicisation. This process is a direct result of the mosaic conceptualisation of Mauritian 
society, which presumes the existence of separate ethnoreligious groups with distinct, and 
separate, cultures. The mosaic metaphor thus represents a perspective which excludes the 
possibility of a global pan‐Mauritian culture and/or of intercultural exchange.339 An example of 
this can be seen in the institutional endorsement of ancestral languages, which ‘are considered 
the exclusive ethnic property of the particular groups claiming them.’340 In parallel, Julie 
Peghini’s analysis of government cultural policy concludes that artistic and cultural expression 
is ‘d’abord valorisée en tant qu’investissement concédé pour la promotion de la diversité 
religieuse, linguistique et culturelle, et non pas en tant qu’investissement économique, social 
et humain.’341  
                                                          
338 Catherine Boudet and Julie Peghini, ‘Les enjeux politiques de la mémoire du passé colonial à l'île 
Maurice’, Transcontinentales 6 (2008), 13‐36, pp. 16‐7. 
339 This has also been observed by other cultural anthropologists: ‘Julie Peghini s’interroge sur la 
multiplication d’instances telles les centres culturels marathes, télougous, tamouls visant à renforcer un 
quadrillage de communautés séparées, et soulève la question d’une nation multiculturelle dans laquelle 
« le métissage semble si difficile à penser »’. Catherine Servan‐Schreiber, Histoire d'une musique métisse 
à l'île Maurice: Chutney indien et séga Bollywood (Paris: Riveneuve Editions, 2010), p. 25, citing Peghini, 
‘Les impasses du multiculturalisme. Politiques, industries et tourisme culturels à l’île Maurice’, 
Unpublished PhD thesis, (Paris VIII, 2009). 
340 Eisenlohr, Little India,  p. 31. 
341 Peghini, ‘Politique culturelle, télévision nationale et cinéma à l’Île Maurice’, Études Océan indien, 44 
(2010), 243‐63, p. 256. She adds that ‘Les formes contemporaines d’art à Maurice — en particulier les 
plus novatrices comme le film Bénarès, en rupture avec l’idéologie de la cohésion nationale et du 
multiculturalisme harmonieux — ont du mal à être visibles et à trouver place dans l’espace public. 
L’activité artistique reste souvent considérée comme une activité secondaire d’embellissement ou de 
divertissement, quand elle n’est pas perçue comme trop subversive pour l’ordre politique établi et, dans 
ce cas, victime indirectement ou directement de censure.’   
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I borrow and adapt the term auto‐ethnicisation from Sandra Carmignani’s analysis of 
the movement for both national and UNESCO world heritage site recognition of Le Morne, a 
mountain in the south‐west of Mauritius associated with runaway slave communities. 
Carmignani asserts that ‘[a]n analysis of this mountain as an object of memory enables us to 
distinguish a process of what I call the “ethnicization” of the category of actors involved, a 
process which mirrors Mauritian political and social structure’. Here, ‘ethnicization’ refers to 
‘the process of essentializing the meaning of identity in which Creoles had to Africanize their 
“community” to legitimize their citizenship’.342 We can thus see that the process of auto‐
ethnicisation is reliant upon an understanding of ancestral cultures as central to Mauritian 
citizenship.343 Carmignani argues that when groups fight for cultural recognition at the level of 
the Mauritian state, ‘[c]onflicting discourses further reveal the politics of differentiation deeply 
embedded in a game of national alignment in which the Indo‐Mauritian model always 
becomes the point of reference’. This, she maintains, results in attempts to ‘see[k] and 
construc[t] Creole social and political legitimacy according to the Indo‐Mauritian model’.344  
What Carmignani refers to here as the Indo‐Mauritian model denotes the dominant 
mode of Mauritian cultural politics, according to which culture is presumed to be associated 
with legitimised ancestral cultures, which is turn are understood to be the exclusive property 
of the respective ethnoreligious groups. As regards the Mauritian Arts and Cultures ministry, 
Peghini argues that ‘[s]on soutien aux arts et à la culture revient en pratique à des actions pour 
préserver les traditions et langues dites ancestrales, à travers des subventions accordées aux 
associations dites « socioculturelles » (religieuses), qui organisent principalement les fêtes 
religieuses des différentes communautés et s’occupent des lieux de culte, car ceux qui 
contrôlent les politiques culturelles à Maurice essaient d’imposer des standards d’authenticité, 
à travers la notion de « cultures ancestrales » et leurs valorisations, ce qui limite les 
destinataires de ces politiques culturelles et donne une place essentielle aux associations 
socioculturelles’.345 Indeed, the politics of ancestrality have proved so pervasive within 
Mauritian claims for cultural recognition that it is now being adopted and adapted by the very 
group who were considered to be unable to have recourse to essentialised conceptualisations 
                                                          
342 Sandra Carmignani, ‘Competition over “Sites of Memory”: Le Morne Brabant and Creole Identity in 
Mauritius’ in Crossing Memories Slavery and African Diaspora, ed. by Ana Lucia Araujo, Mariana P. 
Candido, Paul E. Lovejoy (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2011), pp. 59‐78, p. 60. 
343 This can be compared to Boswell’s discussion of the ‘homeland requirement’: The homeland 
‘requirement’ forms a part of dominant group’s discussions on identity and also as part of the process 
necessary to identify subaltern groups.’ p. 11. Eisenlohr also argues that ‘what are regarded as Indian 
ancestral cultures and ancestral languages have emerged as central to being Mauritian, indeed, to 
claiming membership in a Mauritian nation.’ Little India, p. 5. 
344 Carmignani, p. 68. 
345 Peghini, ‘Politique culturelle’, p. 246. 
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of ancestral culture: the mixed population termed ‘Creole’.346 As Carminagni explains regarding 
the movement for recognition of Le Morne, 
 
In this power struggle, supporters of the Creole heritage were ‘restrained’ and 
compelled to play according to the rules imposed by the State system and to engage in 
a process of ethnicization of their African origins, often resulting in the reductionist 
formula: ‘Creole means African.’347 
 
The particular dynamics involved in the demarcation of the Creole group are perhaps worthy 
of further investigation. The problematic nature of the signifier Creole will be expanded upon 
below in relation to both the individual children and young people involved in Abaim’s 
community projects, and in relation to language politics. 
 
The Creole Population of Mauritius: Issues of Terminology, Race, and 
Social Class  
 
Before beginning my analysis of Abaim’s musical production, I would first like to draw 
attention to the problematic nature of the language used in academic literature to represent 
the poorest members of Mauritian society, which sometimes fails to give a sufficiently 
nuanced depiction of the intersectional positions of those who experience both racial and class 
prejudice.348 One ethnic group, the Creoles, are considered to be disproportionally 
represented amongst the socioeconomically disadvantaged. However, it would seem that 
academic analyses which start from this observation also risk evoking essentialised 
justifications for the persistence of socioeconomic inequalities in post‐independence 
Mauritius. The first difficulty arises when attempts are made to define the Creoles and the 
Creole community. Though the Creoles are often defined in academic literature as Catholics of 
African, Malagasy and mixed descent, in reality the term Creole is a residual ethnic category 
which is applied to those who cannot be recognised as Hindu, Muslim, Sino‐ or Franco‐
Mauritian. The historian Jocelyn Chan Low stresses ‘l’ambigüité extrême du concept de 
« communauté créole » à l’île Maurice’, which in contrast to the Muslim, Hindu and Sino‐
                                                          
346 Although there are significant reasons to doubt the validity of the term Creole as an ethnic category, 
in the remainder of this chapter it will not be referred to in quotation marks so as not to clutter the text. 
347 Carmignani, p. 69. 
348 The term intersectionality is generally traced back the work of Kimberlé Crenshaw, and in particular 
her article on ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’, The University of Chicago Legal 
Forum, 140 (1989), 139‐67. For a consideration of the application of intersectionality to the study of 
social inequality in Réunion and Mauritius, see Natalia Bremner, ‘Diversities at the Intersection in the 
Indian Ocean: Rethinking Social Class and Ethnicity in Mauritius and Réunion Island’, paper presented at 
Diversities @ the Intersection (London South Bank University, 10‐11th July 2014). 
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Mauritian ‘communities’, is not officially recognised by the Mauritian constitution.349 Thomas 
Hylland Eriksen also argues that, ‘[a]s an “ethnic”, the Creoles are different from the others in 
that they do not in any meaningful sense constitute an ethnic group’; and that ‘the term 
“Creole” inevitably denotes a residual category, whose members have language and religion in 
common, but who do not usually perceive themselves as a group.’350 Yet this shared language 
and religion are by no means unique to the Creole group: Christianity is practised by Franco‐
Mauritians, Sino‐Mauritians and Tamils, and MK is spoken by the majority of Mauritians of all 
ethnic backgrounds and thus can hardly be considered as a relevant marker of ethnic identity. 
Even Boswell, author of the first anthropological monograph on the Mauritian Creole 
population, acknowledges that it is ‘extremely difficult to set clear boundaries in identifying 
Creoles in Mauritius [as] Creoles are both a socially and physically diverse population.’351 
During the course of my fieldwork, my experiences and observations also led me to 
question the validity of Creole as an ethnic category. I noticed that it was sometimes used in 
an essentialising sense, and that prejudiced conceptualisations of a typical Creole type were 
used to affirm a notion of self as non‐Creole and to firmly establish Creoles as ethnic and social 
others. This would appear to support Boswell’s argument that in Mauritian society, Creole 
functions as ‘a sort of anti‐category, useful for other groups to define themselves and as a 
means to establish hegemony.’352 I am also grateful to a friend who, in a frank and open 
conversation about the pertinence of ethnic categories, helped me to recognise the utter 
meaningless of Creole as a residual marker of ethnicity, pointing out that many who might be 
classed as Creoles by others  would never self‐identity in this way. This would appear to be the 
case for the majority of young people I worked with at Abaim. During my initial seven months 
of participatory research with Abaim and three subsequent visits, only once did a young 
person explicitly self‐identify to me as ‘enn kreol’, (‘a Creole’). My interlocutor’s statement 
must however be understood in context: she said this in response to not being able to 
pronounce song lyrics in Bhojpuri during rehearsals, hesitantly whispering to me between 
verses of ‘Pani nayba’, ‘mo pa konn Bhojpuri mwa! Mo… enn kreol’ (‘I don’t know how to speak 
Bhojpuri… I’m a… Creole’).353 Her statement thus appeared to invoke a linguistic signification of 
Creole, denoting ‘one who speaks a Creole language’, rather than conveying an expression of 
her ethnic, religious, or cultural identity. 
                                                          
349 Jocelyn Chan Low, ‘De l’Afrique rejetée à l’Afrique retrouvée ? Les Créoles de l’île Maurice et 
l’Africanité’, Revi Kiltir Kreol, 3 (2003), 39‐50, p. 39. The Creoles are grouped with Franco‐Mauritians and 
other anomalous cases under the residual term ‘General Population.’ 
350 Communicating Cultural Difference and Identity: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Mauritius (Oslo: 
Occasional Papers in Social Anthropology, 1988), p. 109, p. 110. 
351 p. 44. 
352 Boswell, p. 11. 
353 From the album 16 ti morso nou lanfans. 
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A second difficulty arises when academic analyses which consider Creole as an ethnic 
‘type’ or as one of several ethnic groups of ‘communities’ within Mauritius fail to recognise the 
socioeconomic connotations of the term, which attest to the legacy of racial hierarchy in 
Mauritius. As Eriksen explains, ‘“Creole” the way it is used in Mauritius refers not only to slave 
ancestry and cultural impurity, but to low class; it belongs to the proletariat of the milieu 
populaire.’354 An intersectional approach to the Creole population thus would seem to be more 
appropriate in light of Mauritian society’s long colonial history. We also need to be aware of 
how Creole identities are presented to young people: drawing on her ethnographic research at 
an underprivileged school, Elsa Wiehe suggests that ‘[c]lass and ethnicity are intertwined 
categories of identity, and when teachers speak to students, notions of culture, race and class 
cannot be separated.’355 The term Creole is thus perhaps better understood as representing a 
position at the intersection of race and class, rather than an ethnic type, whilst also remaining 
a residual category. This is further supported by Eriksen’s observation that ‘[w]hen individuals 
who are mixed and ‘creolised’ in academic terms, are not classified as Creoles as used in lay 
terms in Mauritius, it is due to the endurance of colonial social classification, which related to 
an economic system — the colonial plantation economy — which was different, and which 
offered less flexibility and fewer opportunities for social mobility — than the present.’356 
Eriksen suggests that we are thus left with a ‘fuzzy category of Mauritian Creoles’ which 
‘includes both the traditional Creoles, that is darkskinned working‐class people most of whose 
ancestors were slaves, and a residual category of modern or postmodern Creoles, who are 
Creoles because for various reasons they do not fit in elsewhere.’357 
Of course, this is not to say that it is impossible to be both middle‐class and Creole in 
the Mauritian context. As was briefly outlined in the introduction to this thesis, the island’s 
history of slavery led to a substantial mixed population of both European and slave heritage. 
The illegitimate métis sons of white slave owners sometimes received an education in 
recompense for not receiving official recognition from their fathers, leading to the 
development of what many scholars consider as a new ethnic category, sometimes referred to 
as the gens de couleur or Coloured. Eriksen explains that ‘[e]ducated Coloureds aspiring to 
membership in Franco‐Mauritian society were – and still are – generally rejected’, ‘although 
they are socially and culturally closer to the Franco‐Mauritians than to any other group.’358 
                                                          
354 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, ‘Tu dimunn pu vini kreol: The Mauritian creole and the concept of 
creolization’, Paper presented at the Creolization Seminar, Transnational Communities programme, 
University of Oxford, Michaelmas Term (1999), p. 10. 
355 Elsa Wiehe, ‘Representations of Creole socio‐economic identities in public school in Mauritius’, Revi 
Kiltir Kreol, 9 (2009), 40‐50, p. 48. 
356 Eriksen, ‘Tu dimunn pu vini kreol’, p. 10. 
357 Eriksen, ‘Tu dimunn pu vini kreol’, p. 11. 
358 Eriksen, Common Denominators, p. 9. 
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Though the Coloured’s descendants tend to be of lighter skin colour, it must nonetheless be 
emphasised that as social categories, there is no finite distinction between groups, as is 
demonstrated by the fact that Creoles who achieve social mobility may no longer be 
recognised as such, regardless of their skin tone. Marie‐Thérèse Humbert’s novel A l’autre bout 
de moi gives a particularly powerful account of consequences of one mixed family’s attempt to 
negotiate Mauritian socio‐racial dynamics through ‘social whitening’.359 Written in the 
aftermath of independence, it would however seem that many elements of the narrative 
remain pertinent to the contemporary social context. 
To summarise, in contrast to the Réunionese context, where individuals might self‐
identify as Creole as a positive source of identity, notably to assert their legitimacy in relation 
to more recent arrivals such as the zorey (metropolitan French), Mahorais and Comorian 
populations,360 in Mauritius, Creole identity is not usually claimed in an assertive and positive 
manner, with the exception of burgeoning Creole interest groups which will be considered 
briefly below. We might deduce that this relates to different definitions of Creole on the two 
islands: in Mauritius, it primarily refers to dark skin colour, African phenotype and low 
socioeconomic status; whereas usage in Réunion is perhaps closer to the linguistic definition of 
‘one who speaks Creole’, or indeed one of the original significations of the term, namely ‘one 
who is born in the colonies’, who is thereby distinguished from either Europeans born in the 
metropole, or slaves who were brought to the colonies but born elsewhere.361 I am thus 
reluctant to label either individuals or cultural practices as Creole in the Mauritian context, 
with the exception of those movements which make a conscious claim to Creole ethnic 
identity. However, I recognise that most academic literature on Mauritian society and culture 
recognises the pertinence of ethnic or ethnoreligious groups or ‘communities’. So, for those 
scholars who wish to analyse Mauritian society as an ethnic grid or as composed of discrete 
communities, I will state that a majority – but not all – of the children and young people who 
take part in Abaim’s activities (both the music group and the Saturday program) would be 
classified as Creoles. At the same time, I am also deeply hesitant over the usefulness of the 
term Creole within academic analysis, which furthermore would appear in some cases to 
reinforce prejudicial views already circulating within Mauritian popular discourse.362 The same 
can be said of labelling members of the group as ‘defavorize’, disadvantaged. When I visited 
the association in March 2013, founding member Marousia Bouvery openly showed her 
dismay and disappointment that a radio announcement for a concert which the group were 
                                                          
359 (Paris: Stock, 1979). 
360 The zorey population of Réunion is discussed in further detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
361 For a discussion of early usages of Creole see Carpooran, ‘Créole, créolité, créolisation’, pp. 1‐2. 
362 For a discussion of Creole stereotypes, see Alain Romaine and Serge Ng Tat Chung, Les Créoles des 
idées reçues (Beau‐Bassin, Mauritius: Marye‐Pike Editions, 2010). 
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due to perform that afternoon described Abaim members as ‘zanfan defavorize’, or 
disadvantaged children, when it would be more accurate to describe the area in which they 
live as ‘disadvantaged’. This labelling process can serve to homogenise individuals and imply a 
primordial, almost biological explanation for a lack of social mobility amongst some members 
of Mauritian society. It essentialises and naturalises the association between Creole as an 
ascribed ethnic category and material poverty.363 In turn, this would appear to reflect wider 
social discourses which are expressed in the assumption amongst some teachers, as 
documented by Wiehe and Sheila Bunwaree, that lower‐class Creole children are naturally less 
able and less disciplined, as is encapsulated in the expression ‘pa kas latet ar zot’, ‘don’t 
bother making an effort for them’.364 
 
(Re)Claiming Creole Ethnicity: The Malaise créole and Creole Interest Groups 
 
Nevertheless, despite, on the one hand, a partial acknowledgment of the meaningless 
of Creole as an ethnic or social category in Mauritian society, and, on the other, the stubborn 
persistence of the term’s prejudicial connotations as concerns low social status, the term 
Creole is currently undergoing a process of recuperation and reappropriation. Various 
associations are mobilising as Creole interest groups in order to making claims on state 
resources on behalf of the Creole community, such as the movement for recognition of Le 
Morne as a heritage site explored by Carminagni. This mobilisation can be said to form part of 
a longer history: the Organisation Fraternelle/Les Verts was founded after ethnic violence 
between Creoles and Muslims in Port‐Louis in the period leading up to independence, gained 
in 1968.365 The concept of the ‘Afro‐Mauritians’ as an ethnic group was also outlined in a 1985 
publication, which aims to present the Creoles as a separate population with equal ancestral 
capital366 to other ethnoreligious groups:  
                                                          
363 There is an obvious parallel here with Finch‐Boyer’s account of the French government’s overtly 
racist approach towards the supposedly ‘natural’ poverty experienced by non‐white citizens in Réunion 
and the DOM. 
364 See Wiehe and Sheila Bunwaree‐Ramharai, ‘Elusive Multiculturalism in Post‐Gatt Mauritius’ in 
Towards the Making of a Multi-Cultural Society: Conference Papers, ed. by S Nirsimloo‐Gayan, 
Conference ‘Towards the Making of a Multicultural Society’ 18‐21 November 1996, Mahatma Gandhi 
Institute, Moka (Moka, Mauritius: Mahatma Gandhi Institute Press, 2000), pp. 238‐52, p. 247. 
365 For an account of the interethnic relations and conflict in the period leading up to and following 
independence, see Jocelyn Chan Low, ‘Affrontements inter‐ethniques, démocratisation et 
décolonisation dans l’île Maurice de l’après‐guerre’, in La Réunion et l'océan Indien: De la décolonisation 
au XXIe siècle. Actes du colloque de Saint-Denis de la Réunion, 23-25 octobre 2006, ed. by Yvan Combeau 
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366 Ancestral capital refers to the context in which, as Eisenlohr has thoroughly explored in his analysis of 
ethnolinguistic belonging, ‘a politics of ancestral cultures in which the cultivation of ancestral language is 
central is one of the most important features of postcolonial Mauritian politics; it places those 
Mauritians with recognized claims in such ancestral cultures and languages in an advantageous position 
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If the Indo‐Mauritians, Tamilo‐Mauritians and Islamo‐Mauritians are capable of tracing 
out and maintaining their link with the great peninsula, the Sino‐Mauritians with 
China, the Franco‐Mauritians with France or England, the Creolo‐Mauritians with 
nowhere, the Afro‐Mauritians should at least be bold enough to undergo the process 
of Africanization.367 
 
This tendency appears to have been further accelerated by the arrival of the concept 
of the ‘malaise créole’ in public discourse in 1993, and the death of seggae singer Kaya in 
police custody and subsequent riots in February 1999. Roger Cerveaux, the priest who first 
used the term ‘le malaise creole’, argued that the Catholic Church should play a greater role in 
helping the poorest members of Mauritian society, who for Cerveaux are for the most part 
Creole Catholics: 
 
Je crois que parmi les cultures qui existent à Maurice […] le mal‐vivre se trouve parmi 
les créoles qui sont le plus dans difé (c’est‐à‐dire ‘dans le feu, dans les difficultés’). Je 
ne veux pas dire qu’il n’y a pas de démunis ailleurs. Mais il y a une grosse 
concentration chez les créoles.368 
 
We can thus see that, since the 1990s, a concern with marginalisation and social deprivation in 
Mauritian society has been conceptualised in ethnic terms, and that some Creoles are now 
choosing to organise as a corporate ethnic group in order to gain cultural recognition. The 
recent snowballing of Creole movements thus appears to echo in some respects the 
development of Hindu organisations’ influence in matters usually thought to be the domain of 
the state, such as education policy, in the period following independence. This has been 
analysed by Eisenlohr who notes that, in this context, ‘the building of a separate group identity 
and the struggle for political goals go hand in hand.’369 
 
The Politics of Language and Ancestrality in Post-Independence 
Mauritius 
 
Ancestral cultures, and especially ancestral languages, have therefore emerged in 
post‐independence Mauritius as the locus for cultural decolonisation, and are thus closely 
                                                          
vis‐à‐vis those who lack such claims. The Mauritian politics of ancestral language produce a sense of 
nationhood in which diasporic identities; rather than themes of local origin or indigenousness, becomes 
primary.’ Little India, p. 19. 
367 Gaëtan Benoît, The Afro-Mauritians: An Essay (Moka, Mauritius: Mahatma Gandhi Institute, 1985), p. 
62. 
368 Interview in Week-End, 7th February 1993. Cited in Hubert Gerbeau, ‘Religion et identité créole à l'île 
Maurice’, Histoire, monde et cultures religieuses, 12 (2009), 53‐71, p. 64. 
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associated with what we might term the process of (re)establishing postcolonial dignity.  
However, reformulating this process as a question of obtaining official recognition for 
ancestral cultures and languages effectively sidesteps the issue of granting recognition to the 
subaltern culture of the formerly colonised, including their vernaculars, MK and Bhojpuri.370 
Doing so transforms a postcolonial quest for social and cultural justice into a metaphorical 
battle between one supposedly ancient civilisation and another. Whilst it might prove an 
effective strategy in the eyes of the former colonisers, evoking ancient civilisations in order to 
express a sense of postcolonial dignity, that is, to assert the formerly colonised’s status as 
human and as equal to the former colonisers, arguably does nothing to address the problems 
of the formerly colonised in the new postcolonial nation. As Eisenlohr observes, the Mauritian 
concern with ancestral languages ‘is not about the national language or the language of 
administration but about the “preservation” of Hindu as an ancestral language, sometimes 
dubbed “mother tongue,” and about the infrastructure the state should provide for the 
cultivation of ancestral Hindi’.371 By substituting the legitimate question of the status given to 
the de facto national language, MK, the movement to promote ancestral languages such as 
Hindi thus does nothing to challenge the linguistic hegemony of the former colonial languages, 
English and French. As was briefly discussed in the introduction, this has resulted in an emotive 
formulation of ancestral cultures as the ‘bearers of cultural values’: 
 
Mauritian state institutions have found the ideology of cultural purity focused on 
ancestral language useful as a counterbalance to the ongoing project of economic 
development. […] the Mauritian government attempts to combat the negative 
consequences of economic modernization by the introduction of ‘human values’ and 
‘cultural values’ into the school curriculum, which in turn are to be promoted through 
the study of ancestral languages.372 
 
The preference for the ancestral language‐based route to postcolonial dignity may also 
be partly explained by the complex emotions evoked by the language of everyday 
communication, MK. A. Gauvin has discussed the complex set of feelings Kreol speakers in 
Réunion have towards both the native language and imposed colonial one: 
 
Le problème des sentiments linguistiques est en fait beaucoup plus compliqué que la 
simple aliénation. Nombre des Réunionnais sont partagés entre deux sentiments : 
‐ d’une part, l’attirance vers la langue noble, et la honte de leur langue maternelle ; 
                                                          
370 Bhojpuri was once widely spoken in rural Mauritius, but the 2011 census now shows that 84% of 
Mauritians now speak only Kreol at home. 2011 Population Census, 
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‐ d’autre part, un sentiment d’amour pour cette dernière et de répulsion vis‐à‐vis du 
français. 
Ces deux sentiments sont étroitement mélangés : ils aiment leur langue maternelle et 
ils la détestent (parce qu’ils en ont honte) ; c’est tout le problème de l’amour‐haine. En 
même temps, ils sont attirés et repoussés par le français.373 
 
As further evidence of the profound affection felt towards Réunionese Kreol, A. Gauvin 
recounts a variant of a common joke, in which those who leave the island for the métropole 
and then claim to have forgotten how to speak their native language when they return are the 
subject of humorous derision. In Mauritius, a similar attitude is taken towards Mauritians who 
have lived abroad and subsequently claim to have forgotten MK.  It would thus seem that any 
attempt to forge an alternative means of obtaining postcolonial dignity by including rather 
than dismissing MK must first address the complex psychological effects of a love‐hate 
relationship with the native language. In the remaining part of this chapter, I will consider how 
Abaim, through both their musical production and work in the community, are arguably 
working to change mentalities towards MK, so that it may ultimately be repositioned as central 
to representations of the Mauritian nation. This also involves rethinking the relationship 
between MK and English or French from one of competition to compatibility, and considering 
the perspective of children, who are confronted with the privileging of the languages of the 
former colonisers within the Mauritian education system. I will suggest that Abaim addresses 
the complex emotions discussed above by encouraging existing feelings of affection towards 
the native language. This is achieved in their musical translations, which represent MK as the 
language of childhood in Mauritius, whilst combating the shame attached to MK by presenting 
it as equal to and compatible with the languages of the former colonisers, and as part of an 
autonomous Mauritian culture. 
 
Abaim’s Representations of Mauritian Childhood and the Mauritian 
‘Mother Tongue’ 
 
Children and childhood have played a central role within the musical production of 
Abaim from 2002 onwards, not simply as a target audience, but as actors involved in various 
stages of the music‐making process, from composition to performance. Daniella Bastien, an 
anthropologist and previous member of Abaim’s youth music group, characterises this phase 
of musical production as ‘un retour à l’enfance [qui] revaloris[e] cette période d’innocence par 
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laquelle est passé chaque être humain.’374 The concern with children and childhood is of 
course inextricably linked to the group’s work in the community, which in turn is structured in 
such a way that children are encouraged to express themselves and thus contribute to the 
process of writing lyrics. During the time I spent with the association, the first hour of the 
group’s Saturday programme, known as ‘lakonpagnman skoler’ or l’accompagnement scolaire, 
was often spent looking at phonetics and rhyme in MK at the same time that the children were 
taught to write using the new standardised orthography. In addition to these preparatory 
exercises, in other sessions song lyrics were discussed, and children were invited to present 
ideas and write additional verses. For example, while I was still learning MK myself, I worked 
with a group who wrote a verse which was to be included in the song ‘Vakans’.375  
We can thus see that questions of language, and in particular the position of MK as the 
mother tongue of the young people involved in the group, is central to Abaim’s representation 
of childhood. Furthermore, Abaim’s representation of MK as the language of an imagined 
Mauritian childhood may arguably have a secondary consequence: their musical production 
could be said to provide middle‐class Mauritians, who still speak their mother tongue, MK, on 
a daily basis, but whose socioeconomic position has usually been achieved through their 
mastery of English and/or French, with an alternative way to identify with the language. 
Though their social status is dependent upon fluency in ‘international’ languages, MK remains 
the language of childhood even for upwardly socially mobile Mauritians. The association of the 
language with childhood experience, through the medium of what we might call Mauritian 
nursery rhymes, is highly emotive, and reflects the perhaps unrecognised emotive value that 
speakers in diglossic contexts invest in the basolect, which they simply do not have in the 
acrolect, whether this be French of English in this case.376 Thus, Abaim’s production can be said 
to evoke or even reawaken the affection involved in the ‘love‐hate’ relationship with Kreol 
languages discussed by A. Gauvin above. 
We might think that this valorisation of childhood as a period of innocence is not 
necessarily indicative of a progressive cultural politics. However, when taken into account 
along with a consideration of language politics in Mauritius, this valorisation of childhood 
could also be understood as a demand on behalf of all children for the right to their native 
                                                          
374 Daniella Bastien ‘L’expression de la créolité dans la production musicale à Maurice: le cas du Grup 
ABAIM’, Revi Kiltir Kreol, 7 (2007), 48‐57, p. 55. 
375 Field notes, 19th November 2011. The song is featured on Zoli letan pou zanfan (2013). 
376 The presence of two colonial languages, which are commonly used for more formal (and especially 
written) forms of communication, arguably renders the linguistic situation in Mauritius more complex 
than the classic model of diglossia as outlined by Charles Ferguson in ‘Diglossia’, Word, 15 (1959), 325‐
40. For a detailed discussion of multilingualism and language use in Mauritius, see Daniel Baggioni and 
Didier de Robillard, Ile Maurice: Une francophonie paradoxale (Paris; Université de la Réunion, Faculté 
des lettres et sciences humaines: L’Harmattan, 1990). 
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language. Within the current education system, Mauritian children are encouraged to outgrow 
the language of their childhood as soon as possible after starting primary school. Though MK 
has been included in the primary school curriculum as an optional subject since January 2012, 
English remains the medium of education in all subjects except French, and thus fluency in 
English is a prerequisite for academic success. In turn, doing well at school is understood to 
provide crucial possibilities for social mobility: ‘même parmi les milieux les plus démunis de la 
population mauricienne, l’importance de l’éducation pour briser le carcan de la pauvreté et 
accéder à une vie meilleure est perçue par pratiquement tout le monde.’377 The resultant 
pressure on children to master a foreign language at a relatively young age is perhaps the 
reason why MK is ultimately conceived as competing in a zero‐sum game with other languages 
such as English and French. According to this logic, the admission of MK into the curriculum 
takes away scarce resources from the learning of English or French. This viewpoint was 
expressed by a majority of those interviewed by Aaliya Rajah‐Carrim in a survey on the 
introduction of MK in schools, for whom ‘it seems futile to allocate limited resources for the 
teaching of this language at school’.378However, as Rajah‐Carrim rightly concludes, her 
respondents’ comments 
 
sho[w] that Kreol is constantly set in opposition to other languages. Its position or 
status is defined with respect to that of other varieties. This way of defining the creole 
variety underlines the negativity attached to the language.379 
 
Therefore, in order to convince the public that MK deserves both official recognition 
from the government (which may have been partially granted through its inclusion within the 
curriculum from 2012) and popular recognition from Mauritians, adults and children alike, 
Abaim’s musical representations of childhood must also combat the stigma attached to MK. 
Again, this objective parallels that of the NGO’s work in the community: at every rehearsal and 
every Saturday assembly, chairs are positioned in a circle so as to encourage participation from 
all present, with the medium of communication being that of the children’s mother tongue, 
MK. These occasions, and in particular that of the Saturday assembly, where members present 
news items  and volunteer to preside over the proceedings, provide children with a concrete 
demonstration of how MK can and should be used in more formal contexts. This experience 
can thus be said to counteract the ‘attirance vers la langue noble’ (or in the Mauritius, ‘les 
                                                          
377 Patricia Day‐Hookoomsing, ‘Aspects institutionnels et sociaux de l’éducation à l’île Maurice’, in 
Maurice: De l’île sucrière à l’île des savoirs, ed. by Emmanuel Grégoire, Vinesh Y. Hookoomsing, Gérard 
Lemoine (Vacoas, Mauritius: Editions Le Printemps, 2011), pp. 252‐78, p. 268. 
378 ‘Mauritian Creole and Language Attitudes in the Education System of Multiethnic and Multilingual 
Mauritius’, Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 28: 1 (2007), 51‐71, p. 68. 
379 Rajah‐Carrim, p. 68. 
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langues nobles’) encouraged by the education system. In terms of their musical production, 
the stigma attached to MK is challenged through translations and adaptations of songs. This 
process of translation is interpreted here as a political act which advocates the equality of the 
different languages within the Mauritian sphere whilst simultaneously asserting the existence 
of an autonomous Mauritian culture. 
 
Musical Translations: Demonstrating Equality of MK and English and 
Autonomy of Mauritian Culture 
 
I will now consider some of Abaim’s more recent albums which make use of 
translations and adaptations of songs into MK. These will be analysed here as musical 
translations, given that their production involves more than the translation of text. The first 
album to make extensive use of these was Enn Nwel Larkansiel (2010), (‘A Rainbow 
Christmas’). Commenting on the inspiration behind the album, Alain Muneean explains that 
‘nwel enn tematik ki santral dan lavi zanfan’ (‘Christmas is something central to children’s 
lives’), and that, given the climactic differences between Christmas as experienced in Mauritius 
compared with Europe and North America, the rainbow emerged as the most appropriate 
symbol to express magic of Christmas for Mauritian children.380 The album thus aims to convey 
the idea of a Mauritian Christmas, which requires a reconsideration of the discrepancies 
between the representation of Christmas in globalised popular culture, such as in songs and 
films, and the reality as experienced by children in Mauritius. However, this must also involve 
an acceptance of enjoyment in globalised forms of popular culture which does not necessarily 
indicative of cultural alienation. As Alain Muneeam explains, 
 
Maleresman nou’nn import nwel avek so lanez, ek so lasemine, avek so monto blan 
tou sa la. E, selman, bann melodi ki ena dan sa bann sante‐la, zot bann melodi ki, an 
fet, inn resiste a letan. Sa vedir ki zot inn bien anrasine dan nou mem, zot nou melodi 
osi sa. Se pou sa rezon‐la ki nou’nn trouv li importan met nou an pe avek nou mem. 
Seki pa ti bon ladan, se sa bann referans a lanez, a tou bann zafer ki pa dan nou 
kontext. 
 
Unfortunately we have imported Christmas with [images of] snow, the chimney, white 
coats etc. Yet the melodies of those [popular Christmas] songs, those melodies have 
resisted time passing. This means that they have become a part of ourselves, that they 
are our melodies too. It’s for this reason that we thought it was important to put 
ourselves at peace with ourselves. What wasn’t good/appropriate was all those 
references to snow, to all those things which don’t exist in our context.381 
 
                                                          
380 Interview on DVD, Enn Nwel Larkansiel (Beau‐Bassin: Abaim, 2010). 
381 Interview, Enn Nwel Larkansiel. 
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He goes on to explain that, during the preparation of the album, he considered it Abaim’s 
mission to replace Western‐centric references with ones which Mauritian children would be 
able to relate to. He discusses the example of ‘Jingle Bells’, which was translated as ‘Alime 
tegn’ (literally ‘on off’, in reference to twinkling lights used to decorate houses) because in the 
Mauritian calendar, the Hindu festival Divali comes shortly before Christmas. From the 
perspective of Mauritian children, then, the magic and excitement of Christmas is prefigured 
by the twinkling lights of Divali. The adaptation of the now infamous ‘Jingle Bells’ as ‘Alime 
tegn’ thus provides alternative images of Christmas which are directly drawn from the lived 
experience of Mauritian children. 
It thus becomes apparent that different forms of translation and adaptation are used 
in Enn Nwel Larkansiel. ‘Alime tegn’ differs dramatically from the source text, offering instead 
an image of Christmas Day from a child’s perspective which is firmly placed in the Mauritian 
context: ‘Soulie an bas sapin / finn bien verni’ shows us that it is not stockings, but well‐
polished shoes which have been left under the Christmas tree. The second verse’s list of 
presents ends with ‘iniform pou nou al lekol’, (‘uniform to wear to school’), which connotes 
both the beginning of the school year in Mauritius, which starts in January, and the importance 
placed on education by both parents and children. Along with the musical arrangement, which 
abandons the bells traditionally heard in ‘Jingle Bells’ in favour of the Mauritian ravann drum 
and a mandolin which can be said to evoke the twinkling of fairy lights, ‘Alime tegn’ can be 
considered to successfully combine the melody and structure of a now globally popular 
Christmas song with a lyrical and musical exploration of Mauritian children’s experience of 
Christmas. It is this which then can be said to open up a space for the articulation of an 
autonomous Mauritian social and cultural experience. This is arguably further developed in the 
song’s music video, which contains short frames of various individuals miming along to the 
song when the chorus is played, linked by the visual aid of a red frame decorated with beads 
and presents.382 The viewer is thus presented with snapshot images of individuals in different 
locations, including a market place, a busy traffic clogged road, a farm and other places of 
work, none of which reflect exoticised, postcard‐like representations of Mauritius and its 
multiethnic harmonious society. The video can therefore be said to provide the viewer with an 
alternative community of experience to that promoted in official representations used in the 
tourist industry. 
In contrast, other musical translations on the album, such as ‘Ridolf’, Abaim’s MK 
translation of ‘Rudolph the Red‐Nosed Reindeer’, and ‘Santa Claus is Coming to Town/Vomie 
to tchek sa’ provide close lyrical translations of the source text. They can thus be compared to 
                                                          
382 Available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3VwzSuznqWM>, [Accessed 25th April 2014]. 
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adaptations of Anglophone children’s songs like ‘This Old Man’ and ‘Heads Shoulder Knees and 
Toes’ on Abaim’s most recent album Zoli letan pou zanfan (2013), where both English and 
Kreol versions are given equal weight in the songs. This arguably demonstrates to children that 
both languages are of equal value, and that both languages can co‐exist in a symbiotic 
relationship. In this respect, such translations can be said to present an egalitarian relationship 
between the source and target languages (here, English and MK), which could encourage a re‐
evaluation of the relationship between the two languages as one of complementarity rather 
than competition. The album was also created with ostensibly practical purposes in mind, 
notably in relation to the dearth of material available to primary teachers at the time of the 
official introduction of MK in the school curriculum as an optional subject in January 2012. 
When I returned to Mauritius for the official launch of the album, hosted by Abaim at their 
centre in March 2013, I saw that the association had invited a number of primary school 
teachers who were positively inclined towards the teaching of MK and presented them with 
copies of the album in order to underline its potential as a teaching resource. 
Interestingly, however, even within these two songs we can find examples of 
adaptations which diverge from the source text. In ‘Ridolf’, the reindeers’ names listed at the 
beginning of the song in the source version are translated as the names of Tizan and his 
brothers, characters in Mauritian folklore who also feature on one of Abaim’s previous albums, 
Tizan ek so 8 frer.383 This acts as a clin d’œil to Mauritian listeners who realise that Abaim have 
chosen not to stick to the script. The incongruity between the English and MK versions is 
heightened by the call‐and‐response structure, where the solo voice first sings in English and 
the chorus responds in MK. The listener arguably experiences a similar form of temporary 
disorientation in the bilingual ‘Santa Claus is Coming to Town/Vomie to tchek sa’. Here, the 
transition between English and the MK translation is facilitated by a musical interlude in which 
the rhythm changes from binary to the tertiary rhythm of séga, where the only musical 
accompaniment is provided by the ravann drum. Tchoule, half‐shouted half‐sung short vocal 
expressions, can then be heard over the percussion, including ‘met sapin mama!’ (literally, ‘put 
up the Christmas tree mum!’). This short vocal exclamation can be said to bring together both 
Western images of Christmas, the family surrounding the Christmas tree, and the act of 
‘tchoule’ in séga music, where ‘mama’ is used as an ambivalent term of address which could 
evoke either family‐like relationships or heterosexual desire, such as in ‘roule mama!’, which 
invites female listeners to dance.384 
                                                          
383 The character Tizan is also found elsewhere in folklore in the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean. 
384 Sega music itself could be said to encapsulate an ambivalence between the family and romantic love 
and heterosexual desire: dance is considered sexual, yet séga music is often played and danced to in 
family settings. See Servan‐Schreiber, pp. 
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We can thus see that Abaim’s musical translations can be interpreted as providing 
both children and adults with important messages regarding the status of the MK language, 
and of Mauritian sociocultural experience. These translations can also be said to invite 
discussion of and even to question the idea of cultural ownership. As was discussed above, the 
concept of cultural ownership is normally understood in ethnicised or ethnoreligious terms in 
Mauritius, whereby ethnoreligious groups are understood to have exclusive ownership of 
‘their’ ancestral cultures. Yet such a concise definition of cultural ownership is troubled by 
Abaim’s musical translation. If we take the musical arrangements into account, which make 
use of traditional/folk instruments like the ravanne and the jerrycan, the songs in translation 
presented in both Enn Nwel Larkansiel and Zoli letan pou zanfan could arguably encourage a 
process of re‐appropriation of Anglophone nursery rhymes and Christmas songs, which 
perhaps facilitates identification with the ‘foreign’ songs and ultimately allows children to 
claim that ‘this is (also) mine’, ‘this is (also) Mauritian’. Indeed, in relation to the latter album, 
the idea of cultural ownership is broadened to such an extent that ‘This Old Man’ and ‘Head, 
Shoulders, Knees and Toes’ are referred to by one review article in national newspaper as ‘des 
“world folk songs”’, which suggests that through their popularity and ‘exportation’ these songs 
have transcended both linguistic (Anglophone) and national (UK or US) contexts.385 
 
Abaim: Reconfiguring Understandings of Culture 
 
In an email discussion regarding opinions relating to ethnoreligious communities and 
how these might be presented in academic analysis, Alain Muneean gave me the following 
summary of his own position on the matter: 
 
Lor sa kestion kominote la, nou pozision sorti depi enn kestionnman klasifikasion 
dimounn lor baz ras ou kominote enn kote e lot kote, nou konsidere ki apre trwa siek 
listwar an komin, pa kapav pena kiksoz ki finn inifie seki finn vinn lepep moris. E bann 
eleman kiltirel kouma langaz e lamizik  sega , zot bann prev pou tousala. 
 
About the issue of ‘communities’, our position comes from a questioning of the 
classification of people on a racial or communitarian basis, and in addition, we think 
that after three centuries of a common [Mauritian] history, it is not possible that no 
unifying elements have developed which bring together those who have become the 
Mauritian people. And cultural elements like the Kreol language and sega music are 
the proof of this.386 
 
                                                          
385 ‘ALBUM PÉDAGOGIQUE: Abaim sort “Zoli letan pou zanfan”’, Le Mauricien, 20th February 2013 
<http://www.lemauricien.com/article/album‐pedagogique‐abaim‐sort‐%E2%80%9Czoli‐letan‐pou‐
zanfan%E2%80%9D>, [Accessed 28th March 2014]. 
386 Alain Muneean, founding member of Abaim. Personal communication, 20th February 2014. 
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Abaim’s position on culture and cultural ownership in Mauritius thus hardly sounds like a 
radical one. The account given above might appear rational and measured to anyone 
unfamiliar with the particular dynamics of Mauritian cultural politics. However, it is also 
fundamentally at odds with the official line on culture, encapsulated in the national slogan 
‘unity in diversity’, which considers the unity of the Mauritian nation as posited on state 
recognition of corporate ethnic groups. Abaim’s musical production and correlated social 
action discussed in this chapter can be said to undermine this dominant perspective in three 
respects: firstly, by engaging with the complex emotions evoked by the MK language in 
representing the latter as the language of childhood in Mauritius; secondly, by producing 
musical translations which reduce the negative stigma associated with MK by demonstrating 
its equality with English; and thirdly, by diverging from the source text in translations to 
demonstrate the existence of an autonomous Mauritian sociocultural experience, even when 
globalised popular culture is present. It may thus be concluded that Abaim’s approach to 
culture could be said to call in question and subvert dominant approaches to cultural and 
linguistic ownership in Mauritius. 
In the following chapter, a rather different means of valorising Kreol languages within popular 
music will be explored. We will proceed from the context of Mauritius to Réunion, and from 
music which is not considered as ‘cool’ due to its association with childhood and conscious 
engagement with language politics as a means of promoting greater inclusivity and equality in 
Mauritian society, to Réunionese dancehall music, which is criticised for being too ‘cool’, or in 
other words, overly commercialised and therefore unable to express political critique. 
Although its engagement with language politics is perhaps subconscious, I will try to suggest 
that this is no less important. Though the evidence for the arguments presented in the next 
chapter is somewhat tentative, these ideas are presented in order to encourage a wider 
debate on young people, popular culture, Kreol languages and social inequality in Réunion and 
Mauritius. This might then encourage a more open‐minded approach to what might appear as 
mindless or banal globalised pop culture, but may in fact be seen to engage with crucial social 
issues in the local context. 
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3. Youth Culture, Globalised Blackness, and Kreol Musical 
Identities: The Cultural and Language Politics of Réunionese 
Dancehall Music 
New Black Popular Musics: Rupture with a Soulful Past? 
 
For Paul Gilroy, perhaps the most prolific cultural studies critic of black popular music, 
the types of music which have been facilitated by new technology since the 1980s are 
understood to constitute a complete break from previous forms of black musical expression.387 
This break is conceptualised not simply in technological or aesthetic terms: instead, it is 
thought to reflect a radically different set of cultural politics characterised by an alternative 
conceptualisation of identification and solidarity, which fatally compromises the musics’ 
potential to articulate a critique of neoliberalism and global capitalism. In contrast to previous 
forms of musical expression, which expounded a utopian critique of the racialised violence of 
slavery and the capitalist system of which it was a part,388 according to Gilroy the new digitally‐ 
and technologically‐enhanced musical forms can be characterised as soulless. He asserts that 
the soulful nature of black music prior to the 1990s represented ‘the site of a kind of 
ambivalence about the memory of slavery and the desirability and the obligation to forget 
things which are difficult’.389 In contrast, the music of contemporary black artists ‘may be part 
of the soul tradition, [but] its yearning is defined by the immediate needs of the body’, as 
Nabeel Zuberi has remarked of Gilroy’s assessment of African‐American R ’n’ B artists R. Kelly 
and Mary J. Blige.390 Gilroy situates this musical and political development within the context 
of cultural globalisation, which has facilitated the dissemination of African‐American popular 
music and culture on a global scale, but which he argues has ultimately resulted in the ‘decay’ 
of the black public sphere.391 He thus expresses his scepticism regarding the greater visibility 
that cultural globalisation has conferred upon black popular music: 
 
The specific traditions of public interaction that were originally products of the agency 
of slaves are being surpassed. They are […] declining now that postslave cultures are 
being recomposed around new priorities and opportunities associated with digital 
media, de‐industrialization, and the growth of consumerism. The cultural achievement 
provoked by slave life provided more than the contested core of American identity: 
                                                          
387 Richard C. Green and Monique Guillory, ‘Questions of a “Soulful Style”: Interview with Paul Gilroy’ in 
Soul: Black Power, Politics, and Pleasure, ed. by Monique Guillory and Richard C. Green (New York; 
London: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 250‐65, p. 253. 
388 See Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (London: Verso, 1993), especially 
‘“Jewels Brought Back from Bondage”: Black Music and the Politics of Authenticity’, pp. 72‐110. 
389 Cited in Green and Guillory, p. 259. 
390 Sounds English: Transnational Popular Music (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001), p. 145. 
391 See ‘“After the Love Has Gone”: Bio‐politics and the Decay of the Black Public Sphere’ in Between 
Camps, pp. 177‐206. 
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they supplied a platform for youth cultures, popular culture, and style of dissent far 
from their places of origin. Today they are fractured by the obvious divisions between 
north and south, by overdeveloped and underdeveloped regions of the planet that are 
being enforced by the globalization of commerce and power. They remain powerful 
but the breadth of their appeal has created new difficulties. Are they local or global 
forms? To whom, if anyone, do they belong?392 
 
The common tropes of sex and violence in new black musical forms such as hip‐hop 
and dancehall are often regarded as indicative of the musics’ apolitical nature, and as 
symbolising a return to primitive, pre‐political desires. However, Gilroy further accuses these 
new musical forms of ‘revolutionary conservatism’, demonstrated in their promotion of 
consumerism, their objectification of women, and above all in their having abandoned the 
radical political possibilities encapsulated in previous forms of black Atlantic musical 
expression.393 In addition, Gilroy deplores the use of technology where it reveals a lack of 
musical skill in comparison to previous genres. Thus, hip‐hop and rap are conceptualised in 
terms of a regression from soul and funk, because in these forms, ‘liberation and justice are 
still demanded but have taken a back seat in recent years to revolutionary conservatism, 
misogyny, and stylized tales of sexual excess.’394 Similarly, the development of the genre 
known as ragga or dancehall in Jamaica was highly criticised by foreign music critics and fans in 
the West for its deviation from what they saw as the simultaneously more political and more 
spiritual nature of reggae. As Norman C. Stolzhoff explains, from the perspective of the ‘reggae 
romanticists’, 
 
Dancehall music was seen as a decadent and nihilistic movement, a response to 
Marley’s death and Seaga’s prime ministership, and slackness became a threat to 
everything that roots reggae had stood for.395 
 
However, both genres, which are both already the result of various ‘border crossings’ between 
and beyond the US and Jamaica, have enjoyed unprecedented, and, for some, unexpected 
global success.396 This success was arguably facilitated, but by no means guaranteed by 
                                                          
392 Between Camps, p. 178. See also his Darker than Blue: On the Moral Economies of Black Atlantic 
Culture (Cambridge; London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010). 
393 See Gilroy’s discussion of the ‘revolutionary conservatism’ of hip hop in ‘“After the love has gone”: 
Bio‐politics and ethno‐poetics in the black public sphere’ in Back to reality? Social Experience and 
Cultural Studies, ed. by Angela McRobbie (Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 
pp. 83‐115, p. 110. 
394 Between Camps, p. 178. 
395 Wake the Town and Tell the People: Dancehall Culture in Jamaica (Durham; London: Duke University 
Press, 2000), p. xxi. Stolzhoff himself critiques this simplistic opposition between reggae and dancehall, 
noting that ‘ironically, roots reggae had become something of an orthodoxy to these primarily white 
fans, and it blinded them to the larger musical culture’. p. xxi. 
396 See Gilroy, ‘Bio‐politics’. 
117 
 
technological advances such as the mp3 format and the internet. This has since led to the 
development of dancehall and hip hop cultures in a variety of social and cultural contexts 
associated with young people and youth culture all over the world.397 
This chapter takes as its subject matter the impact and consequences of the global 
dissemination of black popular music in one particular context, that of the south‐west Indian 
Ocean. More specifically, it aims to explore the cultural practices and symbolic meaning 
attached to these cultural products and practices amongst young people in Réunion, 
particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds who may experience both racial and class‐
related discrimination and stigmatisation. In doing so, it aims to heed Gilroy’s call to attend to 
the political and ethical ramifications of academic engagement with vernacular forms, and his 
pertinent reminder that even politically engaged criticism ‘irrespective of [its] noblest motives 
– is revealed to be inadequate where it moves too swiftly and too simplistically to either 
condemn or celebrate’.398 Though I offer a more optimistic interpretation than Gilroy’s 
generally negative assessment of ‘new’ black musics, the following chapter aims to avoid 
uncritical celebration.399 Its central argument is that the cultural and language politics of 
Réunionese dancehall music can be said to undermine two hypotheses put forward by Gilroy 
and others concerning the cultural politics of ‘new’ black musics: firstly, that they represent a 
total rupture with previous musical forms, and secondly, that this signals what Gilroy refers to 
as the ‘decay’ of the black public sphere, brought about by the musics’ inability to articulate a 
critique of global capitalism. On the contrary, it will be suggested here that dancehall can be 
said to engage with pertinent issues regarding language politics in Réunion, and that it offers 
crucial alternative representational strategies for marginalised young people in Réunion. These 
arguably allow young people to assert their Creoleness/authenticity as Réunionnais at the 
same time as their participation in global modernity. Given that some young Mauritians would 
appear to engage with dancehall and other popular culture which consciously draws on global 
blackness in similar ways, a brief comparison will be made with the Mauritian context at the 
end of the chapter, though it must be remembered that socioeconomic, socio‐political and 
linguistic specificities result in the prioritisation of different political issues. 
 
                                                          
397 See, amongst others, the collection of articles in Global Linguistic Flows: Hip Hop Cultures, Youth 
Identities, and the Politics of Language, ed. by H. Samy Alim, Awad Ibrahim, and Alastair Pennycook 
(New York: Routledge 2009); Marvin Sterling, Babylon East: Performing Dancehall, Roots Reggae, and 
Rastafari in Japan (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); and Sonjah Stanley Niaah, Dancehall: From 
Slave Ship to Ghetto (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2010). 
398 ‘Bio‐politics’, p. 84. 
399 It should however be recognised that ‘“After the Love Has Gone”’ and ‘“All About the Benjamins”: 
Multicultural Blackness – Corporate, Commercial, and Oppositional’ both offer a somewhat revised 
version of earlier arguments, in which Gilroy recognises the subversive potential of some elements of 
the ‘new’ musical expression. See Between Camps, pp. 177‐206, and pp. 241‐78. 
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Dancehall in Réunion 
 
Despite having originated over 15,000km away in Jamaica, dancehall music has 
become a popular medium of cultural expression in the Indian Ocean French overseas 
department of Réunion. Young people especially appear to identify with dancehall songs 
written in the local vernacular, Réunionese Kreol (hereafter RK), in spite of the genre’s foreign 
origins. It will be suggested here that this musical expression can be interpreted as a space in 
which the Kreol language’s place within global modernity is rearticulated and reaffirmed. I will 
attempt to show that the language politics of Réunionese dancehall serve to combat the 
common consensus that RK is (temporally) backward‐ and (geographically) inward‐looking. 
This is achieved in part through the juxtaposition of RK with English and Jamaican Creole 
English within popular dancehall songs. Therefore, though dancehall is generally considered as 
apolitical, the following analysis will seek to show that the music articulates a critique of 
dominant discourses in Réunion regarding language, prestige, and global modernity.  
This chapter will attempt to delineate some aspects of the language politics of 
Réunionese dancehall as a popular music genre. In particular, I will explore acts of linguistic 
borrowing,400 notably from Jamaican Creole English, and their possible signification. It will be 
suggested here that the inclusion of English in songs otherwise in RK could be interpreted as a 
means of challenging dominant discourses regarding the Kreol language. Dancehall music may 
be understood as a field within which social actors with limited symbolic capital attempt to 
articulate a sense of self and of community in and on their own terms, and thereby call into 
question harmonious images of racial métissage propagated within official discourses which 
can serve to obscure entrenched social inequalities. Though the fragments of English included 
in dancehall songs may be dismissed as insignificant, or as simply indicative of the 
pervasiveness of Anglophone catchphrases within global youth culture, I offer a different 
reading of these instances of borrowing. Through juxtaposing and combining RK with Jamaican 
Creole English, artists may attempt to benefit from the prestige of English as an international 
language and confer this prestige onto their own vernacular. Including fragments of English 
and Jamaican Creole English within their songs allows artists to assert themselves as 
cosmopolitan individuals within the global spheres of both youth culture and black culture. In 
this respect, the juxtaposition of the two languages can be said to function in a similar way to 
                                                          
400 I will not discuss here whether this phenomenon can be considered as an example of linguistic 
appropriation, though in reference to Jane H. Hill’s work on the subject, Rudolf P. Gaudio suggests that 
non‐Western centric forms of linguistic appropriation need not serve to delineate a normative field of 
‘White Public Space’. See Jane H. Hill, ‘Language, Race, and White Public Space’, American 
Anthropologist, 100: 3 (1998), 680‐9, and Rudolf P. Gaudio, ‘The Blackness of “Broken English”’, Journal 
of Linguistic Anthropology, 21: 2 (2011), 230‐46, pp. 230‐1. 
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the inclusion of different varieties of English in Nigerian hip hop, in which artists ‘draw on hip 
hop and (to varying degrees) African American English to signal their participation in what we 
might provisionally call a transnational Black public and/or a global hip hop “nation”’.401 
Additional parallels may be drawn to Mela Sarkar’s assessment of Quebec hip hop and to 
Jennifer Roth‐Gordon’s analysis of young Brazilians’ engagement with both US and Brazilian 
rap.402 As Roth‐Gordon explains, 
 
Hip Hop’s connections to the racialized U.S. ghetto enable more marginalized youth to 
transcend national, economic, and linguistic boundaries and to tap into U.S. power and 
prestige. Conversational sampling and race trafficking thus offer Brazilian youth 
tangible ways to enhance their symbolic capital, accumulating First World prestige in 
the face of their increasing marginalization in Brazil.403 
 
Dancehall can thus be said to promote an ethos of what we might call cosmopolitan 
blackness, and to therein offer alternative representational strategies to lower‐class RK‐
speaking youth who experience racial and class‐related discrimination and stigmatisation. It 
could however be argued that, by virtue of their creolised cultural heritage, the marginalised 
youth who identify with dancehall music are indeed already cosmopolitan, if we understand 
this to denote ‘behaviours, values or dispositions manifesting a capacity to engage cultural 
multiplicity’.404 Yet they are not recognised as such. Françoise Lionnet has unpacked the 
connotations of creolisation and cosmopolitanism, which she argues need not be considered 
as mutually exclusive and reveal our own prejudices instead, given that ‘l’insulaire des régions 
antillaise ou mascarine, liéés à la notion de « créolité », est aussi forcément un cosmopolite.’405 
The cultural politics of dancehall are thus significant in that they offer an alternative way for 
Réunionese youth to envisage their participation in global modernity, which allows them to 
circumnavigate the implied model of Frenchness which is presented as the dominant mode of 
development and modernity in contemporary post‐departmentalisation Réunion.406 
                                                          
401 Gaudio, p. 241. 
402 See Mela Sarkar, ‘“Still Reppin’ Por Mi Gente”: The Transformative Power of Language Mixing in 
Quebec Hip Hop’ in Global Linguistic Flows: Hip Hop Cultures, Youth Identities, and the Politics of 
Language, ed. by H. Samy Alim, Awad Ibrahim, and Alastair Pennycook (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 
139‐57; and Jennifer Roth‐Gordon, ‘Conversational Sampling, Race Trafficking, and the Invocation of the 
Gueto in Brazilian Hip Hop’ in Global Linguistic Flows, pp. 63‐77. 
403 pp. 74‐5. 
404 Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, ‘Introduction’ to Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context 
and Practice, ed. by Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 1‐22, 
p. 1. Interestingly, in this brief outline of one of the meanings attributed to the term ‘cosmopolitan’, this 
is qualified as ‘individual’ behaviours, values and dispositions. This could be said to imply a Western‐
centric bias which thus prevents Creole/creolised societies from being recognised as cosmopolitan. 
405 Françoise Lionnet, Le Su et l’incertain. Cosmopolitiques créoles de l’océan Indien, coll. Essais et 
critiques littéraires (La Pelouse, Trou d’Eau Douce, Mauritius: L’Atelier d’écriture, 2012), p. 14. 
406 Vergès speaks of slippage between Frenchness, development, progress and whiteness in her 
formulation of the colonial family romance, which for her characterises the relationship between 
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However, it must also be acknowledged that the rise in popularity of Réunionese 
dancehall music over the past two decades is also commonly interpreted as signifying a 
complete break with the island’s musical past.407 This is experienced as a double rupture, 
because Réunionese dancehall not only breaks with common themes within postslave musics 
as articulated in black popular musical forms, such as the articulation of racial uplift, and the 
expression of soul through communion with the audience in live performance,408 but it also 
appears to turn its back on Réunion’s musical heritage and cultural traditions. In addition to 
the apparent privileging of technology within the production process, which would appear to 
rend traditional instruments obsolete, this new music is also marked by its foreignness 
because it self‐identifies as a musical genre which originated in Jamaica. Dancehall music is 
thus criticised for both its aesthetic and political qualities. Moreover, local audiences may find 
it particularly controversial that the music appears to privilege the world outside the island, 
constructed within the Réunionese imaginary as the ‘mond’ déor’, in opposition to the local, 
the ‘mond’ péï’.409 This is particularly problematic when viewed in the context of a complex 
history of devaluation of local culture and cultural assimilation under French colonial and post‐
departmental rule. To confront this issue within popular music would seem to add further 
insult to injury, as popular musical expression has previously provided a space in which this 
cultural devaluation has been contested and, in some respects, successfully challenged: it 
should be remembered here that popular music played a significant role in the backlash to 
French cultural assimilation following departmentalisation.410  Furthermore, as the 
                                                          
Réunion and the metropole: ‘With this fable, the French state aspired to substitute an ideal model of 
filiation for the historical colonial filiation. Colonial family romance invented one parent, the Mère‐
Patrie, and consequently sought to impose a process of identification that rejected the reality that each 
human being has two parents. Colonial family romance established a founding myth, the myth of the 
“unique root” against which Édouard Glissant has argued. The construction of an ideal parent associated 
with whiteness and Europe denied the dimension of race in the making of colonial identity. The fable 
gave France the means to console itself when colonized “children” would rebel and to repress the 
reasons for which they rejected her. It was their ingratitude, rather than her tyrannical “love,” that 
explained their behaviour.’ Monsters, pp. 4‐5. 
407 The genre is sometimes also referred to as ragga or ragga dancehall. 
408 For a more detailed discussion see, for example, Gilroy’s discussion in ‘“Jewels Brought Back from 
Bondage”’ in Black Atlantic. 
409 From this perspective, what is significant is that the music originates from somewhere other than 
Réunion, rather than official national boundaries (which posit that Réunion forms part of France), or 
that Jamaica also has a colonial history or that it also belongs to the global south. For a discussion of the 
importance of the ‘couple d’opposition « mond’ pays/mond’ dehors »’ as a structuring principle in 
relation to the island’s long and continuing history of immigration, see Andoche et al., Immigrations 
réunionnaises, p. 112. 
410 See, amongst others, Monique Desroches and Guillaume Samson, ‘La quête d’authenticité dans les 
musiques réunionnaises’ in Anthropologies de la Réunion, ed. by Christian Ghasarian (Paris: Éditions des 
archives contemporaines, 2002), pp. 201‐18, pp. 211‐4; and Carsten Wergin, ‘T’shéga, Shéga, Séga…: 
Music, Identity and Creolisation on Réunion Island’ in Multiple Identities in Action: Mauritius and Some 
Antillean Parallelisms, ed. by Vinesh Y. Hookoomsing, Ralph Ludwig and Burkhard Schnepel (Frankfurt 
am Main: Peter Lang, 2009), pp. 255‐74, p. 257. 
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ethnomusicologist Guillaume Samson has pointed out, dancehall would appear to refer to a 
different symbolic universe when compared with Réunionese genres such as maloya: 
‘[p]orteurs tous deux de revendication et de contestations, le maloya et le ragga dancehall  
s’inscrivent de fait dans des univers de référence symbolique différenciés : le monde (rural) de 
la plantation (et l’ancestralité malgacho‐africano‐indienne qui y est encore associée dans les 
représentations collectives) pour l’un, l’identité créole urbaine pour l’autre.’411 
Nevertheless, I wish to suggest here that we need to adopt a more nuanced approach 
to the cultural politics at play in these new musical forms, starting with a rejection of the 
assumption that such ‘forms of consciousness are doomed by their unholy locations to remain 
forever merely pre‐political’.412 I believe that a closer look at dancehall music in Réunion and 
Mauritius shows us that the rupture framework outlined above is inadequate. Furthermore, it 
risks establishing a dichotomy between old, traditional, locally‐based musical forms which 
represent progressive cultural politics, and new, technologically‐enhanced, globalised and 
commercialised musical forms with ‘bad’, or reactionary cultural politics.413 While binary 
oppositions are perhaps never suitable tools for analysis of complex cultural phenomena, I will 
also counter the rupture thesis with what appears to be a particularly contentious proposition: 
namely, that we can in fact identify forms of continuity with both the musical expressions of 
the subaltern population of Réunion, referred to here as ‘traditional maloya’ for practical 
purposes, and with the once‐resistant music of the 1970s and 1980s, commonly termed 
‘electric maloya’, some of which has now been co‐opted by the mainstream to a certain 
extent. 
I thus wish to move beyond binary vision in proposing that the rising popularity of 
dancehall music in Réunion – particularly, it would seem, amongst young people and the 
working class – can and should be taken seriously in academic analysis. I argue that this can be 
interpreted as reflecting an alternative cultural politics which is in some respects oppositional 
to dominant and official discourses on what constitutes ‘Réunionness’. Though they may not 
always be automatically apparent or ‘programmatically constituted’414, dancehall’s cultural 
politics challenges many persistent discourses about lower‐class experience in Réunion, which 
often draw on nostalgic, romanticised, and exoticised representations of the ordinary people 
                                                          
411 Guillaume Samson, ‘Appropriations, héritages et stratégies de légitimation musicale: reggae et ragga 
dancehall dans le champ culturel réunionnais’ in Musiques au monde: la tradition au prisme de la 
création, ed. by Emmanuelle Olivier (Paris: Editions Delatour, 2012), pp. 177‐200, pp. 177‐8. 
412 Gilroy, ‘Bio‐politics’, p. 84. 
413 A similar opposition is also hinted at in Gilroy ‘Exer(or)cising Power: Black Bodies in the Black Public 
Sphere’ in Dance in the City, ed. by Helen Thomas (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 21‐34. 
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of Réunion, the Creoles.415 The alternative conceptualisation of Réunionness formulated by 
dancehall artists challenges safe touristic representations of cultural difference expunged of 
their historical specificity. They thereby resist tendencies to essentialise this constructed sense 
of Réunionness as being defined by Larényon lontan, a nostalgic vision of Réunion’s rural 
past.416 In this respect, Réunionese dancehall can be said to begin to deconstruct the 
romanticisation of rural poverty which brackets the struggles of the urban and rurban 
unemployed and working poor, including a significant number of young people, whose 
presence serves as an awkward reminder to the Réunionese middle classes that post‐
departmentalisation social mobility has not succeeded in wholly upturning the racial hierarchy 
of the colonial era.417 
This chapter also aims to explore aspects of engagement with what I will refer to here 
as globalised black popular culture from the perspective of young people in socioeconomically 
disadvantaged areas of Réunion and Mauritius, two island societies in the Western Indian 
Ocean. It will be suggested that images of blackness circulating in popular culture, and in 
particular those associated with dancehall, have facilitated the development of alternative 
representational strategies amongst lower‐class youth in Réunion and Mauritius, which offer 
young people a different means of conceptualising racial difference in the local context. The 
chapter thus aims to develop a partially positive reading of interaction with ‘globalised black 
culture’ within two Indian Ocean contexts, despite the very valid criticisms of many black 
scholars who draw attention to the hypervisualised nature of these representations of 
blackness and the fact that black culture is heavily implicated in its own commodification.418 
Through their selective identification with these images, young people are able to draw on an 
association with First World modernity and cosmopolitanism in order assert their own 
participation in global modernity, which can in turn can be seen to mitigate experiences of 
racism and other forms of prejudice experienced in their respective societies. Identifying with 
                                                          
415 When used to describe individuals and popular groups, the term Creole has very different meanings 
in Réunion and Mauritius: here it is used to refer to anyone who is recognised as identifying with the 
island culturally or linguistically, regardless of ethnicity. 
416 For a critical discussion of the claims to authenticity which are activated with representations of 
Larényon lontan, the island’s rural past, in the contexts of, respectively, contemporary village festivals in 
Réunion’s mountainous interior, and contemporary regional tourism policy in Réunion, see Véronique 
Tréport, ‘La fête, la tradition, outils de « réappropriation » du territoire des Hauts’, in Géographes et 
historiens dans la compréhension et la gouvernance des espaces et sociétés de l'Océan Indien: Actes du 
Grand séminaire de l'océan Indien, 29-30 octobre 2009, CREGUR-CRESOI, Université de La Réunion, ed. 
by Jean‐Michel Jauze and Yvan Combeau (Saint‐Denis, Réunion: Université de La Réunion, 2010), pp. 21‐
30. See also David Picard, Tourism, Magic and Modernity: Cultivating the Human Garden (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2011). 
417 Youth unemployment rates can reach 70% in the worst affected areas of Réunion. 
418 See, amongst others, Gilroy Between Camps and Darker than Blue. 
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the prestige associated with US black celebrities and other ‘super blacks’ also offers young 
people a means to become ‘culturally visible’ from their globally peripheral location.419 
I suggest that, in this respect, the cultural politics of Réunionese dancehall can be 
likened to Deborah A. Thomas’ formulation of ‘modern blackness’ as an alternative, subaltern 
articulation of the nation in the Jamaican context.420 She defines modern blackness as ‘a 
subaltern aesthetic and politics from which to make claims upon the earlier forms of 
nationalism that gained state power in Jamaica [and as] a bracketed blackness that continually 
deconstructs the creole nationalist motto by calling attention to the relations of power that 
are often erased within the creole formulation.’421 This be can used to theorise the 
intersectional nature of ethnicity and class, particularly in relation to the experience of 
blackness as subalternness which cannot however be reduced to class because subaltern 
status is also constructed in racialised terms.422 The following analysis seeks to show that the 
juxtaposition of English with RK can be interpreted as a means of asserting the 
contemporaneity of RK and of associating it with an ethos of transnational aspiration. 
Secondly, it aims to outline important elements of the alternative representation strategies 
offered by Réunionese dancehall, namely; the articulation of an alternative conceptualisation 
of global modernity, ghetto fabulous eclecticism, and an eschewal of dominant notions of 
respectability and promotion of other forms of progress premised on an ideal of Frenchness. 
The latter two aspects can both be characterised as a continuation of the cultural politics of 
previous subaltern forms of Réunionese musical expression. 
However, it must first be acknowledged that such claims are arguably problematised 
by the medium of expression itself, as dancehall is known to be an imported genre originating 
from outside Réunion. Therefore, given the importance attached to dancehall’s ‘foreignness’, 
which would appear to undermine its very legitimacy in the Réunionese cultural sphere, I will 
begin with a discussion of questions of legitimacy and authenticity in the incorporation of 
Jamaican musical genres in Réunionese popular music. 
                                                          
419 Livio Sansone, ‘The new blacks from Bahia: Local and global in Afro‐Bahia, Identities: Global Studies in 
Culture and Power, 4 (1997), 457‐93, p. 463; Paul Willis, ‘Foot Soldiers of Modernity: The Dialectics of 
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pp. 404‐5. 
420 Modern Blackness: Nationalism, Globalization, and the Politics of Culture in Jamaica (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004). 
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From Jamaica to the Indian Ocean: Musical Legitimacy and Authenticity 
 
The development of locally‐produced dancehall music, inspired by the Jamaican genre 
but generally sung in the local language, RK, must arguably be situated in relation to the 
importation of its parent genre, Jamaican reggae.423 Propelled by the iconic status of Bob 
Marley as the first Third World superstar, the international success of reggae may have been 
secured through the approval of majority white US and European markets, but it did not fail to 
reach had other postcolonial and/or peripheral spaces, including the islands of the western 
Indian Ocean.424 Starting in the late 1970s, the media presence of reggae seems to have 
solicited an almost instantaneous identification from Réunionese musicians and listeners. As 
Samson explains, this identification was accompanied by a recognition and assertion that the 
genre’s cultural politics mirrored those of Réunionese maloya, a folk music form created by 
slaves as a means of expressing their suffering, which was later taken up by the Parti 
communiste réunionnais from the late 1950s as a symbol of Réunionese cultural autonomy.425 
That the two genres were regarded as compatible, even interrelated, can be seen in the song 
titles of early orchestres de bals (recording and live performance groups) who incorporated 
reggae into their repertoire, such as ‘Ça même reggay bourbon’, and ‘Reggay, ça meme 
maloya’.426 For Samson, these titles convey ‘la façon dont on était susceptible d’interpréter et 
de justifier cette adoption du reggae dans le cadre de l’identité musicale réunionnaise’;427 that 
is, as a foreign musical form which nonetheless made deep and pertinent appeals to the 
Réunionese social memory and sense of historical justice. 
It should also be noted, however, that Réunionese musical identity itself was arguably 
undergoing significant changes in this period, as demonstrated by the evolution of what was to 
become maloya électrique, which combined elements of Réunionese folk music with the 
                                                          
423 Norman C. Stolzhoff proposes that, despite music critics’ tendency to emphasise both political and 
aesthetic discontinuities, both the dancehall and reggae genres form part of a longer musical continuity 
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426 See Les P’tits Piments, Maloya_Reggay (Disques Jackman, 1977), 45 record. Song titles cited in 
Samson, ‘Appropriations’, p. 181. 
427 ‘Appropriations’, p. 181. 
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instruments and techniques of modern global ‘pop’. Samson suggests that it was this 
‘hybridised’ form of electric maloya which was especially influenced by reggae and Rastafarian 
philosophy, which were seen to be congruent with maloya’s politics of resistance and 
protest.428 Created by groups of cultural militants, including poets and writers as well as 
musicians, maloya électrique was often self‐consciously political in nature: ‘leurs chansons 
avec des themes qui portent sur la langue créole, les rapports dominé‐dominant, l’esclavage, 
les rapports à la France […] ne sont orientés que vers un but celui de “tirer maloy dan’ zie 
Créoles” qui signifie “ouvrir les yeux des Réunionnais”’.429 That said, its passionate call to the 
masses to react against the French government’s policy of cultural assimilation was sometimes 
criticised for its paternalistic and jingoistic overtones. Nonetheless, this constituted a 
significant development in terms of Réunionese musical production: as Samson points out, 
maloya électrique also served to bring maloya into the mainstream and to the attention of 
cultural industries and the media at a time when record production was dominated by sega.430 
The incorporation of reggae into Réunionese pop music could thus be viewed as an extension 
of the experimentation with musical fusions in the electric maloya era, which echoed and 
perhaps responded to the West’s musical markets’ growing fascination with world music. This 
would appear to be supported by the fact that some electric maloya groups, including Bastèr, 
also produced reggae tracks.431 It also occurred in dialogue with the popular musics of the 
region, notably the development of Mauritian seggae, a fusion of sega and reggae, and in 
particular the success of Kaya, which in turn inspired Réunionese fusion groups producing 
seggae and malogué, terms used to refer to fusion genres combining, respectively, sega and 
reggae and maloya and reggae.432 
The identification with the alternative worldview articulated by reggae music thus 
appears to have played a significant role in the development of Réunionese popular music at 
                                                          
428 ‘Appropriations’, p. 181. 
429 Lucette Labache, ‘La question de l'ethnicité à l'île de la Réunion: vers un melting‐pot?’ Unpublished 
PhD thesis, (Paris: École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1996), p. 114. Labache also reminds us 
that songs with this type of lyrical content were often censured prior to the commencement of François 
Mitterrand’s presidency in 1981. 
430 ‘Appropriations’, p. 182, p. 181. For an account how sega was incorporated within mainstream pop 
music from the 1930s onwards, in contrast to maloya which was seen to be incompatible with 
modernity, see Desroches and Samson, pp. 203‐7. 
431 See, for example, the cover of ‘Redemption Song’ included on Bastèr, Raskok (Saint‐Denis, Réunion: 
Discorama, 2001). For an analysis of Bastèr’s music, including Bob Marley covers, see Carsten Wergin, 
‘World Music: a medium for unity and difference?’ Paper presented to the EASA Media Anthropology e-
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432 Kaya’s albums include Zistwar Revoltan (Saint‐Denis, Réunion: Discorama, 1996), and Best of Kaya: 
Seggae Experience (Curepipe, Mauritius: Meli Melo Music, 1998). Unfortunately it is difficult to obtain 
CDs of his albums, despite the continued popularity of his music, although many songs can be found 
online on video‐sharing websites. Naéssayé are the group most often associated with the launch of the 
malogué genre in the early 1990s, a collection of their most popular songs can be found on the album Le 
meilleur de Naéssayé (Saint‐Denis, Réunion: Discorama, 1999). 
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the end of the twentieth century, and yet, because of its foreignness, the appropriation of 
reggae risked undermining the very legitimacy and authenticity of artists claiming to represent 
local popular culture. Choosing reggae or dancehall as a means of musical expression would 
seem to imply a problematic privileging of the non‐local over the local, of the world outside 
the island, ‘déor’, over the local ‘péï’.433 Samson identifies an additional problem as regards 
dancehall’s claims to legitimacy: non‐Réunionese musical genres are measured against 
standards set by musicians and performances outside of the local context, which may prompt 
the assumption that Réunionese dancehall is automatically inferior to Jamaican music.434 In 
response, certain strategies may be used to legitimise the position of foreign musical forms 
within the Réunionese cultural sphere, including the invocation of a shared history of slavery 
and racial violence which is thought to mitigate the ‘foreignness’ of Jamaican musical forms:  
‘[l]’objectif poursuivi est ici la justification d’une ressemblance et d’une sorte de fraternité 
jamaïco‐réunionnaise, qui est censée « autoriser » l’appropriation musicale.’435 Nonetheless, 
with the emergence of dancehall in the 1990s as the popularity of reggae and reggae fusion 
appeared to be in decline,436 Réunionese musicians may have distanced themselves from 
criteria which automatically positions their musical output as lesser imitations. In addition, 
dancehall music would appear to promote a less dogmatic approach to Rastafarian philosophy, 
which could be said to further reduce the pressure on Réunionese musicians to adhere to 
foreign standards of authenticity. As a locally produced form of music which draws on a 
foreign genre, Réunionese dancehall would seem to reveal a creative tension produced by 
conflicting desires. Dancehall appears to express a celebration of Réunionese specificity which 
aims towards greater visibility, whilst simultaneously situating the latter in relation to a global 
context. This tension may itself be consciously exploited by some artists. It will be suggested 
here that this tension may be negotiated through Réunionese dancehall’s re‐articulation of the 
relationship between the RK language, and by extension, Réunionness, and notions of global 
modernity. 
It would thus seem that the opposition between tradition and modernity also needs to 
be problematised within considerations of musical legitimacy in Réunionese popular music.437 
We might consider here the problematic way in which local musical genres, and in particular 
‘traditional’ maloya, can be repositioned as belonging to Réunion’s past even within processes 
of valorisation which aim to promote these previously marginalised forms of cultural 
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expression.438 Maloya’s authenticity is thus partially reliant on being associated with a 
particular, often romanticised vision of Réunion’s past. Yet, as was outlined in the introduction, 
the various changes brought about through departmentalisation and the global economy at 
the end of the twentieth century have irrevocably changed the Réunionese social landscape. 
Fixing Réunionese musical authenticity in the past would thus seem to preclude the possibility 
of representing contemporary experience whilst producing music which can be recognised as 
legitimately Réunionese. Conversely, it problematically conceptualises modernity as inherently 
at odds with authentic ‘Réunionness.’439 The presumption of a binary opposition between 
modernity and Réunionness or Creoleness (inclusive of the RK language) even appears to be 
implied within Samson’s own analysis: he suggests that ‘[d]epuis les années 1930, le séga fait 
figure de musique à la fois moderne (par son orchestration notamment) et créole (par la 
langue).’440 Describing the music as both modern and creole arguably reinforces the opposition 
established between the two and thereby precludes the possibility of a creole modernity. 
I therefore suggest that, because of the powerful challenge they present to the 
presumed antagonism between modernity and Creoleness, the cultural politics of Réunionese 
dancehall cannot be dismissed as insignificant, despite the genre’s highly fragmentary 
inclusion of English and Jamaican Creole English terms, and despite its foregrounding of 
apparently apolitical central themes such as sex and violence.441 Instead of focusing on 
legitimacy and authenticity in the terms outlined above, I thus suggest that the different 
musical fusions and ‘adoption’ of foreign musical genres can instead be interepreted as a 
strategy which is selectively employed in order to better represent the post‐
departmentalisation social landscape. In the following section of this chapter, I will consider 
the consequences of this specifically in relation to language. 
 
Language Politics in Réunionese Dancehall: Alternative Modernities 
 
                                                          
438 This dynamic could be applied to the process of applying for intangible cultural heritage status to 
UNESCO, gained in 2009. See Guillaume Samson and Carlos Sandroni, ‘The Recognition of Brazilian 
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<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ssRj3cW‐Yk>, [Accessed 30th April 2014]. 
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It could be argued that the deployment of RK alone within this urban music genre, 
often in an informal register which may be influenced by contemporary youth slang, serves to 
counter the assumption that the language ultimately does not belongs to the present moment, 
which thus positions the RK language as not only ante‐modern but also anti‐modern. It can 
thus be said to counter the injustice of this assumption on behalf of the majority of the 
Réunionese population, for whom the Kreol language forms very much an important part of 
the present because it is the medium of everyday interaction. Moreover, the language of 
dancehall can be seen to contrast with the more poetic variant of RK used by some electric 
maloya musicians, exemplified in the compositions of Gilbert Pounia of the group Ziskakan and 
Danyèl Waro.442 Their experimentation with RK as a means of expression included neologisms 
presented as alternatives to French loan words, and made a conscious effort to revive terms 
which had since fallen out of general usage. This reflected a cultural politics which countered 
the dominant discourse of the time, and sought to prove that the RK language could be 
considered equal to French, la langue noble.443 In contrast, the language used in dancehall 
music appears to aim not to change or innovate but to reflect everyday language usage, and 
that of young people in particular, to emphasise its ‘real’ belonging to the contemporary era. 
Hence French may be included alongside RK, and there is no attempt to excavate words from 
the past if they are no longer relevant to contemporary experience. 
Nonetheless, it is proposed here that it is through acts of linguistic borrowing from 
English (whether standard or Jamaican Creole English) that Réunionese dancehall asserts the 
compatibility of the RK language with global modernity. This proves a stark exception to the 
rule that the language used attempts to reflect contemporary usage. Indeed, it would appear a 
somewhat paradoxical strategy given that lower‐class fans of the music are unlikely to have 
even a working knowledge of English, having been perhaps marginalised within the education 
system early on for not demonstrating sufficient mastery of the French language. Yet the 
continued popularity of the genre would appear to suggest that the inclusion of unfamiliar 
English lexical items has not been detrimental to young people’s sense of identification with 
the music. I therefore suggest that the inclusion of fragments of English can be understood as 
indicative of the transnational outlook of Réunionese dancehall. This aspect of Réunionese 
dancehall’s language politics can arguably be compared with Thomas’s formulation of ‘modern 
blackness’ in the contemporary Jamaican context, a term she uses to refer to an alternative 
and oppositional cultural politics which situates itself in opposition to Creole nationalism in 
                                                          
442 See Carpanin Marimoutou’s analysis in ‘Oralité et Ecriture. Les chansons créoles de Danyel Waro et 
de Ziskakan’ in Formes-Sens/Identité, ed. by Jean‐Claude Carpanin Marimoutou and Daniel Baggioni 
(Saint‐Denis, Réunion: Université de la Réunion, 1989) pp. 151‐64. 
443 See A. Gauvin. 
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Jamaica. As an alternative cultural politics which Thomas argues proves particularly resonant 
amongst the Jamaican lower classes, modern blackness is ‘unapologetically presentist and 
decidedly mobile’ and it ‘challenges the past‐tenseness of “folk” blackness’.444 Moreover, ‘[t]he 
modernity of modern blackness, therefore, is […] decidedly self‐conscious and transnational, a 
modernity both constituted by and constitutive of an acute awareness of local‐global 
relationships – politically, economically, socio‐culturally, and racially.’445 Whilst Reunionese 
dancehall music might not always appear to overtly foreground racial issues, in contrast to 
modern blackness’s conscious engagement with questions of race, the characteristics outlined 
above may arguably also be applied to the language politics of Réunionese dancehall.  
It would also appear significant that, through the inclusion of a perceptibly Jamaican 
Creole‐inflected variant of English, dancehall artists appear to evoke minor transnational 
connections with the global south, however fleeting this connection may appear, bound as it is 
within lexical fragments.446 During my fieldwork in Réunion in 2013, in a conversation about 
which Réunionese artists were popular with young people with members of Titan Maloyèr, a 
maloya percussion group, I explained that when I first heard the song ‘Ou lé sir gyal’ by New 
Generation I didn’t understand the word ‘gyal’ as being Jamaican Creole English, given that the 
rest of the song’s lyrics are in RK.447 One of the members of the group then explained to me, 
‘ici à La Réunion on dit pas “girl”, on dit “gyal”’. This would seem to indicate not only the 
prevalence of certain Jamaican Creole English‐inflected lexical items within the sphere of 
popular culture in Réunion, but also that my interlocutor was both aware of the difference in 
pronunciation between the two varieties of English, and that it was logical for him that, when 
faced with a choice between the two, young Réunionese like himself should adopt the 
Jamaican Creole rather than what is perceived to be a more standard English pronunciation. It 
would thus appear that the ‘fraternité jamaïco‐réunionnaise’ alluded to by some Réunionese 
musicians and cultural actors as a legitimating strategy is also being consciously drawn on by 
young people within their own everyday constructions of social identity. 
At this point, it is perhaps worth considering some short extracts of dancehall lyrics in 
further detail. All of the extracts discussed below contain instances of linguistic borrowing 
from Jamaican Creole English and/or English, which is juxtaposed with RK, the predominant 
language of expression. The following extracts are taken from popular songs by established 
dancehall artists. Kaf Malbar (David Damartin), a dancehall musician from Le Chaudron, a 
disadvantaged neighbourhood to the east of Saint‐Denis, is thought to be one of the pioneers 
                                                          
444 Thomas, p. 13. 
445 Thomas, p. 228. 
446 See Lionnet and Shih. 
447 The song’s title can be translated as ‘[if] you are sure, girl’. Released 2012. Music video and song 
available here, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VBe5BTMsrLI> [Accessed 30th April 2014]. 
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of the genre. Previously known as KM David, his stage name refers to his creolised heritage, 
which includes both Kaf (Afro‐Malagasy) and Malbar (Tamil) elements. In a song entitled 
‘Kaniar ting’, Kaf Malbar chooses to use the Jamaican Creole‐inflected ‘ting’, rather than 
standard English ‘thing’, in his representation of the ‘kaniar’ experience. ‘Kaniar’ is a 
derogative term usually applied to urban male youth, roughly equivalent to the French term 
racaille. It would seem that in its focus on this specifically Réunionese lexical item, the song 
makes a conscious attempt to reappropriate the term ‘kaniar’, and to cast those labelled as 
such in a more positive light. The first verse appears to give an account of Kaf Malbar’s 
understanding of the song’s principal subject, the ‘kaniar’ experience: 
  
Kaniar ting c plis rasta plis golden plis good senorita 
Plis burn dem donc babylone i maille pa 
Si li pass la boom faya basta 
Plis goodness kan i s’agit de conscience‐ness  
Kaniar pli burn dem i natty play 
Rasta faya burn dem i natty play 
C’est ça i apel Kaniar ting !448 
 
The song thus appears to provide an unusually complex example of code‐switching in 
R dancehall: it is atypical in that English is included in verses and not only in the song’s refrain 
as most often appears to be the case. The seemingly eclectic choice of vocabulary in this 
extract can be seen to vary between RK, French, Jamaican Creole English, and lexical items 
specific to Rastafari philosophy, such as ‘babylone’. We might also note the use of the RK 
present tense marker, ‘i’, within sentences which are otherwise in Jamaican Creole English. It is 
true that the verse succeeds in conveying some ideas about what it means to be a true 
‘kaniar’: namely, that it involves, firstly, being a ‘rasta’, better understood here as a ‘rude boy’ 
rather than a strict adherent of Rastafarian religious and philosophical principles; secondly, 
being able to attract ‘good senorita’ (members of the opposite sex, from a presumed 
masculine perspective); and thirdly, being prepared to act (‘burn dem’) in the face of perceived 
threats from the forces of Babylon because ‘babylone i maille pa’, (‘Babylon doesn’t mess 
about’). However, the lyrical content of the verse can but appear fractured under the weight of 
the sheer level of linguistic borrowing in this verse. The resultant message to the listener may 
simply be that, if you are a true ‘kaniar’, you will understand this particular expression of 
‘kaniar’ experience on an instinctive level. This would also appear to be suggested by the 
repetition of ‘kaniar ting’ in the song’s refrain, which offers no further explanation as to what 
constitutes archetypal ‘kaniar’ experience. In this respect, the song can be seen to relate to a 
                                                          
448 A subtitled version of ‘Kaniar ting’ (which could be translated as ‘[It’s a] Rudeboy Thing’) can be found 
here, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0lQnDM0h_w>, [Accessed 30th April 2014]. 
131 
 
simultaneous dynamic of inclusion, signified by the creation of a community of belonging 
amongst ‘kaniar’, and distinction/exclusion (of those who are not ‘kaniar’). This characteristic 
is described by Samson as ‘très significati[ve] du movement ragga et Réunionese dancehall.’449 
Samson also identifies a similar dynamic at work in the lyrics of Malkijah (Marie Klore), 
the only prominent female artist within the dancehall genre in Réunion. As he observes, the 
inclusion/distinction dynamic can also lead to the articulation of ‘une pluralité 
d’appartenances identitaires’,450 as can be seen in Malkijah’s evocation of her Parisian 
childhood alongside her Réunionese heritage, and the role of Rasta and dancehall culture in 
her decision to return to Réunion in ‘Come Back Again’ on the album Eruption.451 The lyrics are 
mostly in (standard) French, but Malkijah peppers this with vocabulary specific to both the 
Réunionese and Jamaican/Rastafarian contexts. We might also note the use of English in the 
song’s refrain: 
 
Come back a back a back a back a back again 
Malkijah arrive avec des lyrics qui dégainent 
 
Here it would seem that the inclusion of English forms part of a form of lyrical play, in which 
the repeated sound of ‘a back’ appears to almost simulate machine gun‐fire. This could be 
interpreted as a powerful assertion of Malkijah’s presence on the Réunionese dancehall music 
scene: a message which is targeted towards a predominantly Réunionese audience which, 
paradoxically, is thus achieved through the inclusion of English vocabulary. 
In addition, Malkijah’s recent hit ‘Partage’ also makes significant use of English in its 
refrain: 
 
Partage massif put your hands up, 
Toute la communauté put your hands up, 
Ce son lé spécialement pou zot452 
 
This song would also appear to address a community of RK‐speaking listeners: this is also 
implied by the fact that its verses are primarily in RK. Nonetheless, the refrain features a 
mixture of both French and RK, along with the English phrase ‘put your hands up’, a common 
expression in globalised commercial pop music. Due to the positioning of this phrase, there is a 
partial rhyme which links the English ‘put your hands up’ to the RK ‘pou zot’, ‘for you (pl.)’, 
which directly addresses the community of listeners. This association of the two lyrical 
                                                          
449 ‘Appropriations’, p. 191. 
450 ‘Appropriations’, p. 191. 
451 (Saint‐Denis, Réunion: Discorama, 2008). 
452 Released 2013. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6p6T717bAn4>, [Accessed 30th April 2014]. 
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elements through rhyme could indeed be interpreted as encapsulating the language politics of 
Réunionese dancehall. In linking together the international prestige of English with the RK 
language and its community of speakers, dancehall lyrics such as the examples discussed 
above can be said to counter the assumption that RK cannot form part of a global modernity. 
The language politics of dancehall discussed here can thus be seen to be specific to the 
Réunionese context: it would seem that the symbolic inclusion of English phrases and lexical 
items would not create the same effect in Mauritian ‘new’ black musics, given that English is 
the language of education and thus the language is closer to young people’s everyday lived 
experience. However, in the following part of this chapter, we will see that the significance of 
alternative representational strategies which can be developed through engagement with 
dancehall arguably also applies to the Mauritian context. Indeed, the appropriation and 
incorporation of ‘new’ black musical forms such as dancehall, rap and hip‐hop can be said to 
offer alternative strategies to Mauritian youth in a similar way. Through identifying with this 
music, rather than, say commercial sega or other forms of music recognised as indigenous 
Mauritian creations, it would seem that young people can identify with globalised black 
popular culture in order to differentiate themselves from both the white population and an 
ethnically diverse middle class population. As Mauritian artist Tony Farla, ‘Soul T’ has 
commented as regards choosing behind his anglicised stage name: 
 
quand tu es jeune, c’est le rêve de tout Black de vouloir vivre le rêve américain. Je sais 
que les Rastamans parlent, eux, de retourner en Afrique, mais il faut être réaliste. 
Entre le continent noir, aujourd’hui, et ce que représente l’Amérique, comme 
technologies et facilités, le choix est évident. Et quand tu vois le train de vie des 
rappeurs, cela a de quoi fasciner.453  
 
The alternative representational strategies offered by ‘new’ black musics in Mauritius then can 
be interpreted as particularly significant, as it offers young Mauritians who are ascribed an 
ethnic identity as ‘Creoles’ an alternative means of conceptualising African descent without 
recourse to crude models which reduce Creole to African, as per the auto‐ethnicisation 
tendency encouraged by official discourse and propagated within the Mauritian government’s 
approach to arts and culture discussed in Chapter 2. They can therefore be said to offer a more 
nuanced formulation of black identity which speaks to the experiences of young Mauritian’s 
life world better than the ancestral model.  In order to give a sense of how vital these 
representational strategies might be for some young people as concerns contesting existing 
                                                          
453 Sedley Assonne, ‘Tendance musicale. Assistons‐nous à une américanisation de notre folklore ?’, Revi 
Kiltir Kreol, 3 (2003), 87‐9, p. 88. 
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discourses in race and ethnicity, I will now consider two exchanges which appear to hint at 
new, alternative formulations of blackness and/or subalternity.  
 
‘Je vais me faire un peu plus black’: Young People’s Construction of 
Blackness in Mauritius and Réunion 
 
It would seem that dancehall might offer young people positive alternative 
conceptualisations of black Creole or Kaf identity, which, it would seem, are developed 
through interaction with globalised black culture, including popular music and related audio‐
visual forms such as music video clips which have become increasingly accessible through 
television and the internet. The rise in popularity of dancehall music in both Réunion and 
Mauritius would appear to point towards a tendency for young people to identify with these 
alternative images of blackness which may be especially prominent amongst those who 
experience social marginalisation. We will now consider in more detail two brief exchanges 
from my fieldwork which both seem to demonstrate changes in the social meanings associated 
with blackness, dark skin colour and the history of slavery. These may tell us something about 
young people’s un/changing perceptions of race in relation to social mobility, most notably in 
relation to positive assertions of blackness which appear to draw inspiration from images 
circulating within globalised black popular culture. However, we must be wary of uncritical 
celebration, as the following accounts would also appear to reveal the persistence of racial 
stereotypes. Furthermore, as the second exchange makes clear, there are also alarmingly 
persistent notions of stigma attached to blackness and the history of slavery, which 
nonetheless forms part of the national histories of Mauritius and France. 
The first exchange occurred during my first experience of the social life of Mauritian 
middle‐class youth, at a nightclub with a 20‐something Mauritian female friend and a mixed 
group of her friends, in terms of both gender and ethnicity. This provided me with the initial 
trigger to think critically about whether globalised black popular culture might be said to have 
an impact on young Mauritians’ conceptualisations of race. At the end of the night, some of 
her friends asked whether we would go out with them again the following evening. When I 
politely declined, one of them, feigning defensiveness, turned to me and said: ‘it’s because I’m 
Chinese isn’t it?’ He then continued his joke by saying, ‘OK, well tomorrow I’ll try to get a tan, 
I’m gonna make myself a bit more black’, presumably so as to make the prospect of spending 
the evening with him more attractive. Although we were speaking in French, he used the 
English term ‘black’ rather than ‘noir’, and most significantly he didn’t say ‘Creole’, the term 
commonly used to refer to black people in Mauritius. His choice of language would thus 
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appear to evoke images of blackness in globalised popular culture. Without wanting to read 
too much into this humorous account of the social meanings attached to ethnicity, the joke 
here seems to point to the ‘cultural capital’ of blackness in a certain contexts, most notably 
those associated with popular culture, youth, and ‘being cool’. In this respect, the joke could 
be seen to indicate a reversal of common assumptions regarding the correlation between 
race/ethnicity and social status in the Mauritian context, where Sino‐Mauritians are associated 
with high socioeconomic status and business, but black ‘Creoles’ are assumed to be poor and 
uneducated. We could therefore ask whether, in this instance, the symbolic capital of 
blackness ‘trumps’ actual financial or social capital? 
However, we can also identify several problematic aspects within this apparent 
postmodern valorisation of blackness. Firstly, the idea that an ethnically marked ‘Chinese 
Mauritian’ who nonetheless benefits from the positive values attached to lighter skin colour 
could feasibly ‘become black’ suggests an extreme level of malleability and hybridity. This 
could be said to present a ‘watered‐down’ conceptualisation of blackness which privileges the 
mixed‐race individual, thereby disassociating darker‐skinned representations of blackness from 
this positive imagery of ‘black cool’. The joke also evokes problematic stereotypes of black 
masculinity, in that it appears to play on an assumption that a ‘black’ or mixed‐race man would 
be more attractive to me, as a white woman, than a ‘Chinese’ Sino‐Mauritian. Perhaps most 
importantly, this revalorisation of black identity within the context of young people’s lived 
experience in Mauritius is not necessarily incompatible with the expression of prejudices 
towards lower‐class black Creole individuals. Ironically, I later discovered that these same 
‘middle‐class’ young Mauritians who seemed to want to emulate ‘black cool’ on some level, 
also made a point of avoiding the particular nightclub which was known as a hangout for ‘real’ 
Black people, that is, working‐class Creoles.  
The following year, during my fieldwork in Réunion, another chance conversation 
seemed to confirm the idea that young people’s identification with positive and assertive 
images of ‘postmodern’ black identity within popular culture are not always accompanied by a 
change in mentalities in other respects. Whilst catching up on work at the library one 
Wednesday afternoon, I bumped into Kevin,454 one of the boys who attended after school 
sessions at a local social centre where I volunteered. To give his sisters who were looking after 
him a break, I came to sit with him in the children’s section, where he chose a book to read to 
me. We then flicked through some of the other books, and I noticed a French translation of a 
book recounting the story of an escaped slave, ‘Henry and the freedom box’, which 
immediately caught my attention. On seeing the front cover, Kevin exclaimed ‘That boy is as 
                                                          
454 Names have been altered to protect the identity of participants. 
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black as coal!’, as if he was purposefully trying to be provocative. The fact that he was speaking 
in French rather than Kreol also suggests that the comment wasn’t a natural reaction. I 
suggested that we read it together, but Kevin didn’t seem as interested as I was in the story of 
Henry’s escape from slavery. But he then surprised me: he interrupted my telling of the story 
to ask ‘what does ‘slave’ mean?’ Before I had time to explain, however, he interrupted me 
again, saying, ‘but in any case’, pausing with dramatic flair, and putting on my sunglasses for 
additional show, ‘that doesn’t interest me because I’m a star – with your sunglasses I’m a star!’ 
Needless to say, Kevin’s skin colour is in fact quite similar to that of the boy on the 
front cover. Again, I wouldn’t want to read too much into the comments of a nine year‐old 
boy, which it seems were intended to be somewhat theatrical and partially inspired by a lack 
of interest in the book. But I couldn’t help but think that his comments seemed to reflect a 
desire to differentiate and separate his own subjectivity and identity from what is perceived as 
the humiliation of the history of slavery. This may be further complicated by his own particular 
social situation: as a child of Mahorais origin (with family from the French overseas 
department of Mayotte), he is the victim of discrimination in Réunion, where Mahorais and 
Comorian populations marked amongst other things by darker than average skin colour 
experience prejudices similar to those confronted by North African immigrants in France. The 
Kreol term Komor, which doesn’t differentiate between legal Mahorais migrants and 
potentially undocumented immigrants from the Comoros Islands, was used in a disparaging 
manner by several of the other children at the social centre during my time there. Given his 
own experiences of life in a working class town in Réunion, therefore, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that for Kevin, ‘stardom’ – whether real or imagined – is seen as an ideal means 
to avoid or mitigate racial and other forms of stigmatisation, or at least provide a form of 
temporary escape. The remainder of this chapter will consider how the popular music genre of 
dancehall might be said to engage with both the ethos of ‘black cool’ disseminated through 
globalised black culture, and the lived reality of lower‐class youth in Réunion and Mauritius.  
 
Alternative Representation Strategies: Ghetto Fabulous Eclecticism 
 
Réunionese dancehall can thus be seen to form part of a wider set of popular cultural 
practices which promulgate which I will term here ghetto fabulous eclectic self‐
representational strategies. This conceptualisation offers a new perspective on cultural 
practices and representational strategies apparent amongst young people and music artists in 
Réunion which might otherwise be dismissed as a lack of real investment in marginal 
subcultures in favour of a superficial identification with internationally circulated images of 
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‘black cool’. My use of the term ‘ghetto fabulous’ refers to representation styles which may 
appear crass and exaggeratedly populist; and ‘eclectic’ refers to the fact that there seems to 
be no, or very few, limits to what may be appropriated by Réunionese youth culture within 
these representational styles. In parallel to the fashions of the early hip hop stars, who took 
the logos of what were deemed fashionable designer brands by an affluent middle class, and 
altered the size or appearance so that became grotesque and offensive to middle‐class taste; 
Réunionese ghetto fabulous eclecticism selectively appropriates familiar images of ‘black cool’ 
and cultural references to other marginalised ‘ethnic’ cultures, and combines and juxtaposes 
the sometime clashing or contradictory signs, creating new meanings in the process. 
For example, the fragmented use of Jamaican English discussed above can be 
identified as an indicative of a ghetto fabulous eclectic aesthetics. This can also be combined 
with what may seem to be fragmented, token or superficial references to other marginal or 
subordinated cultures. Yet in spite of its apparent triviality, I posit that ghetto fabulous 
eclecticism makes an important political point, as it involves a tacit recognition that even 
within marginal youth cultures, there are always processes of domination and oppression at 
play, and that contradictions necessarily arise when cultural movements expand from the 
margins and become commodified by the popular culture industry. A further example of 
ghetto fabulous eclecticism in Réunionese youth culture can be found in creative appeals to 
the colour symbolism of red, green, and gold. Over the course of the twentieth century, these 
colours have come to symbolise African resistance to European colonial domination through 
their association with the Ethiopian flag and Pan‐African movements, and have in turn played a 
crucial role in the visual codification of Jamaican Rastafari and associated cultural forms such 
as reggae within global popular culture. However, it would seem that in Réunion, the colour 
symbolism is now used to express a form of defiance that appears to have been somewhat 
detached from both Rastafari philosophy and resistance to European colonialism. This defiance 
may still articulate a form of cultural opposition, but unlike Rastafari philosophy or Pan‐
Africanism as a political philosophy, it does so by rejecting what might be termed respectability 
politics, a set of values that have been devised by the dominant system. Thomas gives the 
following outline of the construction of respectability in the context of postindependence 
Jamaica: 
 
By selecting certain cultural practices (those of the postemancipation rural peasantry) 
and excluding other (those of the rapidly growing urban unemployed), the cultural 
policy adopted at Jamaica’s independence reflected a vision of cultural ‘progress’ and 
‘development’ that prioritized ‘respectability.’ Respectability, here, is a value complex 
emphasizing the cultivation of education, thrift, industry, self‐sufficiency via land 
ownership, moderate Christian living, community uplift, the constitution of family 
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through legal marriage and related gendered expectations, and leadership by the 
educated middle classes.455 
 
In the Réunionese context, the presence of red, white, and blue (the colours of the French flag) 
within official contexts may be said to serve as a visual cue for Réunionese respectability 
politics. Within the sphere of popular culture, then, the combination of red, green, and gold 
arguably constitutes a marginalised, but nonetheless potentially subversive, alternative 
tricolor. This can be seen, for example, in local fashion trends such as t‐shirts which present RK 
expressions such as ‘ma pa la ek sa’ (‘I don’t give a shit’) in extra large, bold print in a 
combination of red, green, and yellow. Here, the visual referencing of colours symbolising both 
Pan‐African and Rastafarian counter‐cultural movements would appear to lend greater 
legitimacy to the generalised rejection of societal expectations expressed by the slogan itself. 
At the same time, however, the choice of language (a particularly informal variety of RK) would 
appear to express a specifically Réunionese form of cultural opposition. 
Dancehall’s oppositionality to respectability politics in the Réunionese context will now 
be explored further within a consideration of how the genre might be said to relate to the 
notion of cultural militantism. Cultural militantism, a concept often associated with reactions 
to French cultural policy in the post‐departmental era, is commonly conceptualised as a fight 
for the recognition and valorisation of Réunionese cultural specificity – a fight which dancehall 
is accused of having given up on.456 It will be proposed here that  Réunionese dancehall music 
may be considered in terms of continuity with previous oppositional subaltern musical forms, a 
controversial argument which thus counters the notion that dancehall constitutes as break or 
rupture with previous musical culture. 
 
Continuities with Subaltern Musical Expression: Respectability and 
Militantism 
 
In its aggressive propagation of a marginal youth culture, dancehall clearly engages 
with the politics of respectability. I suggest that in this respect it can be seen as an example of 
what Paul Gilroy has termed (in reference to Leroi Jones) as the ‘changing same’. Multiple 
aspects of dancehall music, such as its some graphic language, its use of onomatopoeia, 
notably in replicating the sounds of violent aggression, and its flamboyant representations of 
sexuality, all work together to simultaneously disgust and captivate bourgeois viewers. This 
could parallel the ways that early maloya performances may have both repulsed and intrigued 
                                                          
455 pp. 5‐6. 
456 For an brief overview of this period, see pp. 36‐7 of this study. 
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the land‐owning classes of colonial Réunion, which allowed them to assert their cultural 
superiority. 
Furthermore, Réunionese dancehall rejects the assumed link between respectability 
politics and progress by not only situating Kreol languages and cultural elements firmly within 
modernity, but also by promoting an alternative view of progress. This can be seen in the 
common evoked notion of ‘militer’ in dancehall music, meaning to fight or struggle against an 
oppressive social structure. The notion of ‘cultural struggle’ as expressed in the term 
‘militantisme culturel’ is firmly established in the Réunionese cultural sphere; however, this 
established meaning is more likely to associated with the overtly political electric maloya music 
of the 1970s and 1980s. Nonetheless, the constant pumping rhythm of dancehall, and 
reoccurring lyrical motifs such as ‘baisse pa les bras’, ‘tienbo, larg pa’ (‘hold on, don’t let go’) 
would appear to betray an ‘obstinate and consistent commitment to the idea of a better 
future’.457 
Nevertheless, it must also be acknowledged that the notion of ‘militer’ as a cultural 
struggle has been reconceptualised within dancehall music: it appears to function on a 
symbolic level, with artistes recasting themselves ‘soldats’ who are prepared to fight on behalf 
of Réunion, although it is rarely clear who or what constitutes their enemy.458 However, the 
predominance of violent gestures in dancehall videos would seem to suggest that the concept 
of a cultural struggle or ‘fight’ is understood here in a more literal sense. Nonetheless, the 
depiction of violence occurs on a mainly symbolic level, such as through mimicking gun 
shooting actions, and through the effects of onomatopoeia in dancehall lyrics.459 Yet, though 
artists would appear to be simply mimicking US or Jamaican gun crime, which is not a 
widespread feature of life in the most disadvantaged areas of Réunion), it could also be said 
that artists themselves may see this as a legitimate way of representing the violence of 
everyday life, remembering that the history of La Réunion is to a great extent premised on 
violence. 
Thus, although it does so through problematic and reductive tropes which associate 
Réunionese lower‐class masculine experience with violence, dancehall arguably makes visible a 
marginalised sector of the population. In this way, it can be considered to continue the fight 
instigated by the militants culturels of the electric maloya era, but through an adapted 
aesthetic which is adopted to better address the contemporary context. 
                                                          
457 Gilroy, Black Atlantic, p. 35. 
458 Performance names often reflect this tendency: such as Soldat Rolian, and Soldat Tatane of the group 
New Generation. Malkijah has also referenced the more conventional elements of the soldier/army 
leader trope in several music videos. 
459 Kaf Malbar featuring Delta, ‘Klak klak klak pow’, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ssRj3cW‐Yk>, 
[Accessed 30th April 2014]. 
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Ethnographic Research: Further Preliminary Signs of Continuity 
 
After having conducted ethnographic research with young people who form part of 
the ‘neo‐traditional’ music groups, I am led to conclude that for many of the young people I 
worked with, both ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’, acoustic and electric, and ‘indigenous’ and 
‘exogenous’ musical forms all form part of their musical universe, without this being 
experienced as contradictory. Young people may switch between one form and another in the 
same musical performance: a rehearsal of ‘maloya’ percussion may lead to a jamming session 
with ‘traditional’ instruments but vocals in a ‘toasting’ style similar to that of Jamaican 
dancehall DJs. Furthermore, it should also be recognised that there have also been attempts to 
combine elements of dancehall with neo‐traditional maloya, such as by the group El Diablo and 
in the cross‐over hit ‘Fo nou tienbo’ by the maloya group Lindigo featuring New Generation.460 
Thus, individuals who are involved in groups who perform neo‐traditional maloya do 
not necessarily see any contradiction in the fact that the music they perform in the group and 
the music they listen to at home ‘s’inscrivent de fait dans des univers de référence symbolique 
différenciés : le monde (rural) de la plantation (et l’ancestralité malgacho‐africano‐indienne 
qui y est encore associée dans les représentations collectives) pour l’un, l’identité créole 
urbaine pour l’autre.’461 This is not to say that they are not aware of stylistic and musical 
differences: indeed, some of the young people involved in these groups were skilled musicians 
with a keen awareness of musical and rhythmic difference. However, their propensity to blend 
‘traditional’ with ‘new’ musical forms would appear to suggest that the common themes of the 
music are considered ultimately more significant. These, it would seem, include the idea of 
défouler, of dancing, playing, or singing away one’s troubles, and of music shared by a 
community. However, the young person’s community may be linked by technology rather than 
actual physical presence, thus forming a community of listeners through radio, the internet, 
the nightclub or the party. 
This is not to say that dancehall music is musically most similar to traditional maloya or 
the neo‐traditional reincarnation of it which is performed today. What is being suggested here 
is that dancehall and traditional maloya can be said to have similar social functions in their 
respective contexts, and it is these functions which may be subconsciously picked up on by 
young people engaging with popular music in Réunion. The fact that today, traditional maloya 
is now more likely to be fused with dancehall‐like elements perhaps shows that the formerly 
                                                          
460 <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vN69GBzue‐U>, [Accessed 30th April 2014]. 
461 Samson, pp. 177‐8. 
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popular electric maloya holds no significant political meaning for young people today, which 
might suggest that the majority of fans of electric maloya are now middle class as well as 
middle aged. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As has been established here, the cultural and language politics of Réunionese 
dancehall warrant our attention in spite of the music’s apparently apolitical nature. I have 
attempted to demonstrate that dancehall artists and fans can be considered to participate in a 
process of rearticulation of their position, and that of their native language, RK, within global 
modernity. In this respect, they can be seen to challenge dominant discourses in which a 
fundamental opposition is presumed between Creoleness and modernity. To disavow the 
existence of RK and creole culture within the context of global modernity would appear to 
serve the purposes of the ‘créolophobes’ who would like Kreol to ‘fade away’ and ‘die out’ 
quietly, without causing much of a fuss. The practice of juxtaposing dancehall lyrics in RK with 
Jamaican English, English, and even French lexical items can thus be interpreted as a political 
act, even if the lyrics in themselves have no overt political content: namely, that the RK 
language, culture, and those people who identify with it are here and firmly part of the global 
present. It asserts that RK and its speakers are not a part of a romanticised anachronistic rural 
past, but part of the urban, post‐industrial present. 
In addition, I have also argued dancehall’s engagement with images of blackness 
circulating in globalised black popular culture can be seen to offer young people in Réunion 
alternative self‐representational strategies, in a way that might be compared to Thomas’ 
formulation of ‘modern blackness’.462 This chapter has sought to demonstrate how the cultural 
politics of Réunionese dancehall outline alternative conceptualisations of modernity through 
practices of ghetto fabulous eclecticism, through its eschewal of respectability politics, and its 
struggle for other alternative forms of progress as defined by the ethos of militantisme 
culturel. Dancehall thus invites Réunionese youth to stand up for themselves and to be proud 
of their subaltern cultural heritage, which would seem to undermine the idea that authentic 
Réunionese culture is irrefutably corrupted. It also would appear to encourage young people in 
both Réunion and Mauritius to take advantage of economic opportunities presented to them. 
It also provide those who are marginalised within the education system and the employment 
market with an alternative source of self‐esteem; namely, Creole cosmopolitanism and ghetto 
fabulous eclecticism. 
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To summarise, it is suggested here that interaction with globalised black culture offers 
crucial resources, whilst persistent forms of stigmatisation linking black skin to slavery remain. 
Nonetheless, the practice of drawing on contemporary cultural practices of other postslave 
societies, notably Jamaica in the musical sphere has proved vital in creating new hybrid 
cultural forms which challenge locally‐situated reified notions of race and ethnicity. In the 
following section of this thesis, I will further examine popular culture’s engagement with 
discourses on race and cultural difference. Chapter 4 will consider the role of popular music in 
particular of disseminating a form of Mauritian cultural nationalism whose proponents 
nonetheless wish to characterise the movement itself as inclusive and progressive. 
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Part III: Pop Music, Young People, and the Politics of Belonging 
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4. Morisyen avan tou? Morisyenism, Cultural Nationalism and the 
Representation of Community in the Music of Tritonik 
 
In September 2011, a month before I travelled to Mauritius to begin fieldwork, I found 
out that a social media group called ‘Wanted: 15,000 Youngsters to Save Our Future’463 was 
generating attention. The group’s founders aimed to mobilise Mauritian youth for a large‐scale 
demonstration on September 10th 2011, which called for political and social change.464 As the 
movement gained the attention of the press, some journalists drew parallels with the Arab 
Spring protests which had taken place earlier in the year, implying a form of transnational 
political continuity made possible by new technology, in particular internet‐based social 
media.465 However, the ideology espoused by the group, which attracted over 20,000 
members, was later summed up by the founders as ‘the Mauritianism thematic’.466 The 
objectives of the demonstration were outlined in a 20‐point manifesto, which included both 
specific requests, including the establishment of a minimum wage of over Rs8000 per month 
(approximately €210), and more abstract goals such as putting an end to divisive cultural 
politics and creating a more just and inclusive economy. 467 The movement thus appeared to 
combine demands for radical political change in favour of greater social and economic equality 
with nationalist rhetoric. 
This and other pan‐nationalist movements in 2011‐2012 undoubtedly reflected to 
some extent the atmosphere of global protest created by international media coverage of the 
protests movements such as the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement. Indeed, Time 
magazine named 2011 as ‘Year of the Protester’. Nonetheless, these seemingly new forms of 
Mauritian nationalism remain grounded within the specificities of Mauritian politics and 
                                                          
463 ‘WANTED: 15,000 Youngsters to Save OUR Future!’, 
<http://www.facebook.com/groups/azirmaurice/> [Accessed 29th June 2012]. The ‘Wanted’ movement 
has since been renamed as ‘Azir Moris’ (‘Act Mauritius’). 
464 In relation to Mauritius’ total population of 1.2 million, 15,000 is a significant number. 
465 ‘La création de ce groupe a été certainement inspirée par les initiateurs du printemps arabe. Un 
mouvement qui a déjà touché pas moins de cinq pays de l’hémisphère nord. Maurice sera‐t‐il le premier 
pays du sud à importer ce mouvement d’agitation qui est en train de transformer le nord de l’Afrique et 
le Moyen Orient ?’ Jean‐Yves Chavrimootoo, ‘Mobilisation sur Facebook: 15 000 jeunes Mauriciens prêts 
à descendre dans la rue’, L’Express, 2nd September 2011, <http://www.lexpress.mu/story/28428‐
mobilisation‐sur‐facebook‐15‐000‐jeunes‐mauriciens‐prets‐a‐descendre‐dans‐la‐rue.html#comment> 
[Accessed 29th June 2012]. It should be noted, however, that unlike their Arab Spring counterparts, the 
movement did not call for a complete overhaul of the current political system. 
466 ‘We started as a Facebook Group page which initially rallied a record of 21k members in less than a 
month around the Mauritianism thematic.’ <http://azirmoris.com/azir/who‐we‐are/> [Accessed 29th 
June 2012]. 
467 Noor A. Essack, ‘Seki nou le/What we are calling for/Ce que nous voulons’, published in Le Mauricien, 
30th August 2011, 
<http://www.lemauricien.com/article/manifeste‐%E2%80%98wanted‐%E2%80%93‐
15000%E2%80%A6%E2%80%99> [Accessed 29th June 2012]. 
144 
 
society, given that they themselves are constructed in opposition to communalism and 
dominant conceptualisations of the nation which foreground the separateness of distinct 
ethnoreligious groups. In the Mauritian context, the term communalism is used to refer to ‘les 
formes de regroupement et d’entraide reposant sur des bases ethniques et religieuses’, and is 
used to denounce what are perceived as unethical practices in the political sphere.468 
However, though all mainstream political parties condemn the practice, it is not theoretically 
incompatible with dominant discourses which envisage the nation as being essentially 
composed of ethnoreligious groups, rather than individual citizens.469 Thomas Hylland Eriksen 
therefore suggests that political actors tend to adopt a pragmatic, if contradictory approach: 
‘[a]s a rule, symbolic expressions of ethnicity are encouraged by Mauritian politicians, while 
communalism is overtly discouraged but widely practised.’470 
This chapter aims to situate recent expressions of Mauritian nationalism in relation to 
both Mauritian political history since independence and to academic engagement with 
nationalism as a political, social and cultural phenomenon. Drawing on the concept of cultural 
nationalism as formulated by John Hutchinson and others, I will analyse the recent first album 
of the group Tritonik, which I suggest here may be understood as indicative of a cultural 
nationalist undercurrent which has accompanied the recent renewed interest in political 
nationalism in Mauritian politics and the wider society. Hutchinson has argued that, despite a 
growing awareness of the importance of national identity to the modern state, academic 
analysis has thus far focused on political nationalism,471 without giving sufficient consideration 
to ‘cultural nationalism as a movement distinct from that of political nationalism concerned 
with the identity and regeneration of the national community’.472 The study of expressions of 
cultural nationalism has therefore been formulated as an attempt ‘to widen the scope to 
include not only socio‐political manifestations, but also such factors as the images of the 
nation in the media, or the myths of the national that exist in the popular imagination’, 
informed by the observation that ‘much of the power of nationalism is bound up in activities 
that lack strict definitions’.473  
                                                          
468 C. Gabriel, ‘Communalisme, structures sociales et dépendance économique à l’île Maurice’, Politique 
Africaine, 10 (1983), 97‐112, p. 98. Catherine Boudet, ‘L'émergence de la démocratie consociative à 
Maurice (1948‐1968)’, Annuaire des Pays de l'Océan Indien 17 (2003), 325‐33, p. 325. 
469 See Patrick Eisenlohr, Little India: Diaspora, Time, and Ethnolinguistic Belonging in Hindu Mauritius 
(Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 2006), p. 5. 
470 Common Denominators: Ethnicity, Nation-Building, and Compromise in Mauritius (Oxford, New York: 
Berg, 1998), p. 14. 
471 Dynamics, p. 8 
472 Hutchinson, ‘Re‐interpreting Cultural Nationalism’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 45: 3 
(1999), 392‐407, p. 392. 
473 Stuart Murray, ‘Introduction’ to Not on any Map: Essays on Postcoloniality and Cultural Nationalism, 
ed. by Stuart Murray (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), pp. 1‐18, p. 3. 
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In the following analysis, it will be argued that recent expressions of Mauritian 
nationalism, which will be referred to here as morisyenism, or ‘Mauritianism’, cannot be fully 
understood within the framework of political nationalism, and that, in accordance with 
Hutchinson’s plea, we would do well to consider cultural nationalism as a distinct movement 
within recent formulations of morisyenism. My point here is not that morisyenism cannot be 
considered as a political movement. This is clearly evidenced in the articulation of specific 
demands, central amongst which is the abolition of the requirement for electoral candidates to 
declare which ‘community’ they belong to out of the four officially recognised Mauritian 
communities, as is currently required by the Mauritian Constitution.474 I am however 
suggesting that the political movements which characterise themselves as nationalist or 
morisyenist have also been accompanied by what we might describe as a cultural nationalist 
movement which appeals to a more abstract set of ideals and a politico‐cultural mentality. It is 
perhaps this more abstract expression of morisyenism which has gathered wider support, 
especially amongst young people in Mauritius. It has also arguably served to open up debate 
regarding both the question of national belonging, and of social marginalisation and inequality. 
As explained above, cultural nationalism assumes the existence of a national 
community, a concept which sits uneasily with the official recognition of sub‐national ethnic 
and religious communities in the Mauritian context. However, drawing on Partha Chatterjee’s 
analysis of anticolonial nationalism, I will suggest here that tensions created through the 
interplay of different conceptualisations of the nation must in fact be understood as central to 
expressions of morisyenism.475 This will be supported by analysis of the Mauritian popular 
music artists Tritonik’s recent album Project One,476 which I read as an expression of cultural 
nationalism. This should be understood as complementary to but ultimately distinct from 
recent political nationalist movements, though it should be recognised that the group has also 
showed open support for morisyenist social protest.477 Various songs on the album can be 
seen to invoke the notion of a national community as the basis for development and 
improvement, and draw upon the figure of the artist as a cultural renovator. However, it is also 
significant that their representation of the national community also foregrounds the issue of 
                                                          
474 The Constitution, First Schedule Section 31 (2), Article 3 ‘Communities’, 
<http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/AssemblySite/menuitem.ee3d58b2c32c60451251701065c521ca/?cont
ent_id=38c54555fc808010VgnVCM100000ca6a12acRCRD#first>, [Accessed 23rd May 2014]. 
475 See Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), in particular ‘Communities and the Nation’, pp. 220‐40. 
476 (Rose‐Hill, Mauritiusː Jorez Box, 2012). 
477 At a concert to mark their album launch a few weeks prior to the protest ‘Vers enn nouvo repiblik’ 
(‘Towards a New Republic’) which took place on 10th March 2012, singer Eric Triton said that he would 
be present amongst demonstrators and encouraged audience members to participate. He is also 
included in a list of named participators on the social media page used to organise the protest, 
<https://www.facebook.com/#!/groups/349975511713500/>, [Accessed 27th May 2014]. 
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social class, and is based in and articulated through popular cultural expression: consequently, 
it does not conform to the objectives of previous cultural nationalist movements which aimed 
to develop a new national high culture.478 In this respect, Tritonik’s representations of the 
national community can be said to represent marginalised experience which provides an 
alternative narrative to that of the Mauritian success story of economic development and 
political stability which has become dominant since the 1980s.479 
 
Morisyenism: A ‘New’ and Progressive Nationalism? 
 
The prominence of the rhetoric of youth and renewal within recent protest 
movements, as well as the deployment of social media sites as means of political mobilisation, 
would appear to suggest that these expressions of morisyenism represent a new form of 
nationalism. However, it must also be recognised that calls for national unity have previously 
been deployed within Mauritian politics as a response to what is perceived as the divisive 
nature of communalism. In this respect, the expressions of morisyenism in the protests of 
2011 and 2012 arguably form part of a longer history of opposition to communalism which can 
be traced back to the establishment of the Mouvement Militant Mauricien political party 
(MMM), founded in 1969 by Paul Bérenger, Dev Virahsawmy and Suresh Moorba, amongst 
others.480 Like the social actors involved in more recent protests, the MMM of the late 1960s 
and 1970s saw morisyenism as a means to encourage national unity and thereby protect 
citizens from the negative consequences of communalism, ‘qui représente, pour le M.M.M., un 
obstacle très sérieux au développement de la collectivité, et ceci dans tous les domaines.’481 
Furthermore, they regarded national unity as essential to achieving ‘true decolonisation’, 
which was not considered to have been obtained at the time of official independence, granted 
                                                          
478 See John Hutchinson, The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the 
Irish Nation State (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987). 
479 For an example of this type of academic representations of Mauritius see Larry W. Bowman, 
Mauritius: Democracy and Development in the Indian Ocean (San Francisco: Westview Press; London: 
Dartmouth, 1991). 
480 The political legacy to movements of the period directly following independence, including the early 
MMM, is consciously acknowledged by the ‘Wanted’ group: see their ‘Reconstruisons le Mauricianisme’, 
(2011), <http://www.fichier‐pdf.fr/2011/09/14/reconstruisons‐le‐mauricianisme/reconstruisons‐le‐
mauricianisme.pdf> [Accessed 13th August 2014], p. 11 of 14. At the time of writing, Paul Bérenger is still 
active in politics, and is the current leader of the MMM. Dev Virahsawmy is no longer a member of the 
party, he is now better known as a writer, playwright, and advocate of the Creole language. Pierre Livet 
and André Oraison argue that the group were strongly influenced by the events of May 1968 in France. 
‘Le Mouvement Militant Mauricien’ in L'Ile Maurice: sociale, économique et politique (1974-1980). 
Extraits de l'Annuaire des Pays de l'Océan Indien (Aix‐en‐Provence: Presses universitaires d'Aix‐Marseille, 
1984), pp. 91‐142, pp. 94‐5.  
481 Livet and Oraison, p. 97. 
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in 1968, as only national unity could form the basis of ‘une réelle démocratie économique et 
sociale, correspondante à l’avènement d’un nouveau socialisme typiquement mauricien.’482 
Thus, contrary to common perceptions of nationalism as being inherently linked to 
conservative values and regressive social programs, morisyenism was constructed as both anti‐
imperialist and progressive in diametrical opposition to communalism, which was seen as a 
threat to national progress and conducive to neo‐imperial economic policies. Drawing on 
interview research with individuals who self‐identified as anti‐communalist, Jean‐Claude Lau 
Thi Keng explains that from the perspective of the anti‐communalists, ‘on trouve une 
association ou identification du capitalisme au communalisme d’un côté, et du socialisme au 
mauricianisme d’un autre côté.’483 This stems from the perception that communalism served 
to divide the working class, whereas morisyenism was seen as a way of uniting the workers to 
act together in order to bring about socialist reform. This sentiment arguably inspired one of 
the MMM’s campaign slogans, ‘Lalit de klas pa lalit de ras’, which advocates class war as 
preferential to conflict between different ethnic communities. Furthermore, in the late 1960s, 
the MMM were able to associate their nationalist critique of communalism to a critique of the 
increasingly unpopular political establishment. In the period directly preceding independence, 
the negotiations which took place between the Parti Travailliste (PT), the party of the Hindu 
majority, and the Parti Mauricien Social Democrat (PMSD), which represented the interests of 
the economically dominant Franco‐Mauritian minority, appeared to confirm a lack of 
continuity between the interests of the political elites and those of the communities they were 
supposed to representː 
 
Cette décision d'alliance par le haut sans concertation avec les bases politiques a pour 
effet d'opérer une rupture entre les élites politiques et le peuple mauricien […] Dans 
ce système consociatif émergent, tout se passe comme si les élites avaient plus 
d'intérêts en commun avec les élites des autres groupes qu'envers les autres membres 
de leur propre groupe.484 
 
Communalism was thus understood as a practice which ultimately could be harnessed to 
benefit primarily the political elites, who drew their legitimacy from their position as 
representatives of the island’s different communities but in reality were out of touch with 
‘their’ community’s views. For the MMM, this embodied the worst consequences of 
communalism, as a ‘pratique politique consistant à accentuer les divisions entre les 
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483 Lau Thi Keng, p.105. 
484 Boudet, p. 333, referring to B. Lehembre, L'Ile Maurice (Paris: Karthala, 1984), pp. 166‐7. 
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communautés et à manipuler ces divisions pour en retirer des avantages de classe ou 
politiques’.485 
However, despite the enormous popular support for the party during the elections of 
1976 and 1982, where in coalition with the Parti Socialiste Mauricien (PSM) they obtained all 
62 seats in the Legislative Assembly, the MMM encountered numerous difficulties in the realm 
of practical politics. These included several ideological fractures resulting in the departure of 
different factions within the party, and their vision of a united Mauritian culture ultimately 
resulted in political defeat, as was demonstrated in the failure to institute MK as a national 
language in 1983 and their subsequent electoral defeat.486 Many, like Eriksen, consider the 
MMM to have renounced their anti‐communalist ideals following their near defeat in the 1976 
elections in favour of political pragmatism: ‘the MMM Politburo, now interpreting the 
situation in ethnic terms (admitting the pragmatic validity of a model of society as divided 
along ethnic lines), realised the need for a wider alliance before the 1982 election’, resulting in 
an alliance ‘with a small populist Hindu party with a sound rural base [the PSM]’.487 However, 
more recent formulations of morisyenism have also fallen prey to criticisms and accusations of 
lacking integrity.  We might therefore ask to what extent morisyenism is tenable as a political 
position which associates nationalism with socialism, progressive political policies, anti‐
imperialism, and which recognises the existence of ethnic diversity within Mauritius but which 
vehemently rejects any form of social division along ethnic lines. 
As concerns recent formulations of morisyenism, it must be first be recognised that 
these have not proved entirely incompatible with the dominant neoliberal capitalist narrative. 
For example, communalism may be represented as ‘backwards’ in such a way that can imply 
superior social status. This is commonly expressed in the pejorative expression ‘ti lespri’, 
(‘small‐minded’), which is used to describe individuals whose actions are seen to be 
communalist. The act of calling someone ‘ti lespri’ may thus also be interpreted as not only a 
way of asserting the superiority of one political position and ideology over another 
(morisyenism over communalism), but also as implying a superior social status through implied 
cultural capital. This would seem to complicate the association with morisyenism with a 
political stance which is sympathetic to, and claims to be representative of, the working class. 
Secondly, if expanded to encompass all expressions of patriotic pride, we can see that popular 
                                                          
485 Mouvement Militant Mauricien, Pour une Ile Maurice possible (Port Louis, Mauritius: Mouvement 
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consumerism pervades aspects of morisyenism. For example, in the lead up the Independence 
Day in March 2012, there was a noticeable trend for buying small Mauritian flags designed to 
be attached to cars as a way of demonstrating popular nationalist sentiment. It would also 
seem that Mauritian businesses did not fail to take advantage of the popularity of nationalist 
sentiment: local supermarkets advertised ‘prix mauricien!’ and made extensive use of the 
Mauritian flag in displays in order to promote products as ‘100% mauricien’.488  
Finally, despite the apparent popularity of popular expressions of nationalism, it must 
also be recognised that many local commentators have voiced their concern as regards its 
supposedly progressive aspects and its ability to challenge the communalist practices within 
Mauritian politics. These include Catherine Boudet, the leftist political group Lalit, and 
journalists who point to the dangers of distinguishing between ‘true’ Mauritians and others: 
for this reason, they tend to denounce morisyenism as simply ‘another form of 
communalism.’489 
We might therefore question to what extent morisyenism can be understood as a 
progressive form of nationalism, given that in some contexts it seems to have been reduced to 
a marketing strategy which relies on a vague notion of national belonging. I suggest that it is 
helpful here to operate the distinction between political and cultural nationalism. In contrast 
to political nationalism, cultural nationalism ‘is not always directed to the state [in that its] goal 
is the defence and activation of the historical community’.490 Lau Thi Keng maintains those 
who identify politically as anti‐communalists, far from rejecting the existence of separate 
ethnic communities in Mauritius, consider the ethnic or religious community as the locus of an 
emotive and ‘natural’ form of belonging. Communalism is thus understood as the result of a 
natural tendency to look out for ‘one’s own’; whereas, in contrast, anti‐communalism is 
conceptualised as a rational form of politics which resists this tendency.491 According to the 
anti‐communalist logic, therefore, the nation does not in any way constitute a ‘natural’ 
community, but is rather ‘made up of all those who, whatever their cultural origin or “way of 
being”, collectively decide to assert (or re‐assert) the right of self‐determination’.492 
Expressions of political nationalism thus appear to tend towards a Jacobin understanding of 
the nation as comprised of rational individuals for whom there is ‘no logical connection 
                                                          
488 Paper presented by Yannick Jeanne, summarised in ‘Rapor Konferans Lalit Lor Stratezi: Kritik Kont 
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between the body of citizens of a territorial state and the identification of a “nation” on ethnic, 
linguistic or other grounds’.493 This approach could be interpreted as a successful negotiation 
between nationalism as political philosophy and the social reality of ethnic diversity in 
Mauritius, in that it allows for recognition of different ethnic and religious communities whilst 
simultaneously asserting that the nation‐state operates within ‘a zone of pure politics’ which 
cultural, religious, racial and ethnic difference are erased because their presence would ‘only 
pollute and corrupt the rational processes of the state’.494 
However, the attempt to do away with the notion of community or to prove its 
irrelevance to the modern nation state arguably comes into difficulty. Chatterjee suggests that 
this reassertion of universal categories can be problematic in a context of opposition to 
colonialism and imperialism. He observes that, for example, ‘when the secular historian asserts 
that although medieval rulers may often have acted to inflict damage upon the institutions or 
followers of a rival religion, there was nothing “religious” about this – it was all “politics” – the 
claim also empties the domain of politics of that culturally rooted sense of moral solidarity that 
the same historian would need to uphold when talking, for instance of the struggle of the 
“nation” against colonial rule’.495 It would seem that this ‘culturally rooted sense of moral 
solidarity’ is inextricably linked to the concept of a national community. An additional 
consequence of the outright rejection of the national community is that political nationalism 
arguably does not challenge the dominant narrative of capital which, according to Chatterjee, 
‘seeks to suppress that other narrative of community and produce in the course of its journey 
both the normalized individual and the modern regime of disciplinary power.’496 As a direct 
result of this, the Jacobin understanding of the nation limits the potential of political 
nationalism to form a critique of imperialism, given that the ‘moment of capital’ was central to 
the universalisation of European history, and its narrative ‘turn[ed] the violence of mercantilist 
trade, war, genocide, conquest and colonialism into a story of universal progress, 
development, modernization, and freedom.’497 This would thus appear to problematise the 
construction of Mauritian political nationalism as both progressive and as anti‐imperialist. 
In contrast, cultural nationalism posits the existence of a national community, rather 
than simply a collection of like‐minded rational individuals. It is precisely this assertion of a 
‘natural’ national community which has been interpreted as indicative of the conservative and 
reactionary nature of cultural nationalist movements and yet, as Susanna Rabow‐Edling 
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observes, cultural nationalism’s concern with the idea of regeneration of the national 
community is seen as providing an impetus for social change.498 In this way, cultural 
nationalism can be seen to avoid the pitfalls of the Jacobin, purely political conceptualisation 
of the nation state, which do not resist the narrative of capital which, moreover, was used 
historically to justify European colonialism. We might therefore draw a parallel here between 
the concept of cultural nationalism and Chatterjee’s analysis of anticolonial nationalism, in that 
he posits that anticolonial nationalisms ‘construct their national identities within a different 
narrative, that of the community [as t]hey do not have the option of doing this within the 
domain of bourgeois civil‐social institutions’.499 Before applying the concept of cultural 
nationalism to the representation of community in the musical production of Mauritian music 
artists, it is perhaps helpful here to consider Chatterjee’s arguments in more detail, particularly 
as concerns how the concept of anticolonial nationalism, which he discusses in relation to 
colonial and postcolonial Indian history, might be applied to the Mauritian context. 
 
Senses of Community within Anticolonial Nationalisms and the 
Postcolonial Nation-State 
 
As has been recognised by Chatterjee and others, nationalism was seen to play an 
important role in the liberation movements of the twentieth century which called for a 
definitive end to imperial rule. However, subsequent academic engagement with postcolonial 
cultures and societies has tended to remain ambivalent or even hostile towards nationalism 
due to the ‘recognition that, despite the pre‐colonial existence of the non‐Western natio based 
on concepts of ethnic community, a predominantly European model of evolution has been 
employed whenever an ex‐colony, often in a context of anti‐colonial politics, has wished to 
assert its own identity.’500 Indeed, it has been suggested that the postcolonial states which 
were created from former colonies serve as exemplary cases of Benedict Anderson’s 
conceptualisation of the nation as ‘imagined community’, given the multi‐ethnic, multi‐lingual 
and multi‐religious make‐up of many of such states.501 As a multiethnic former colony with no 
aboriginal population, Mauritius appears as a case in point. Building upon this observation, the 
social anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen advocates recognition of the ‘extremely modern’ 
nature of the Mauritian nation: he suggests that ‘the idea that the nation is a human invention 
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[…] is a trivial fact to virtually all the citizens of [this] society, [who] know that their nationhood 
must be defined, created and recreated by themselves.’502 Such an understanding of the 
nation would thus appear thoroughly at odds with the presumption of a natural, prior‐existing 
national community advocated by cultural nationalists.503  
However, Chatterjee’s formulation of anticolonial nationalism has challenged the 
application of Anderson’s thesis of the modularity of the nation to colonial and postcolonial 
contexts, arguing that the situation in which anti‐colonial nationalism developed renders them 
irreducible to the Andersonian model. Chatterjee highlights one particular point of tension 
specific to anticolonial nationalisms, which he argues were already beginning to be formulated 
during the period of colonial rule. This was made possible by a theoretical separation of ‘inner’ 
and ‘outer’ realms, whereby anticolonial nationalism could assert legitimacy in the inner realm 
of spirituality and culture even when the colonial administration exerted total control over the 
‘outer’ material realm.504 However, after gaining independence, ‘[i]ronically, it became the 
historical task of nationalism, which insisted on its own marks and cultural difference with the 
West, to demand that there be no rule of difference in the domain of the state.’ The 
postcolonial nation‐state drew heavily on liberal‐democratic state ideology, operating around 
the division between public and private realms.505 Chatterjee argues that is here that the 
postcolonial leadership encounters an underlying contradiction within the project of 
postcolonial nation building:  
 
the moral‐intellectual leadership of the nationalist elite operated in a field constituted 
by a very different set of distinctions – those between the spiritual and the material, 
the inner and the outer, the essential and the inessential. That contested field over 
which nationalism had proclaimed its sovereignty and where it had imagined its true 
community was neither coextensive with nor coincidental to the field constituted by 
the public/private distinction. In the former field, the hegemonic project of 
nationalism could hardly make the distinctions of language, religion, caste, or class a 
matter of indifference to itself. The project was that of cultural “normalization,” like, 
as Anderson suggests, bourgeois hegemonic projects everywhere, but with the all‐
important difference that it had to choose its site of autonomy from a position of 
subordination to a colonial regime that had on its side the most universalist 
justificatory resources produced by post‐Enlightenment social thought. 506 
 
Thus, according to Chatterjee, the postcolonial state is met with not only the inadequacies of 
the public/private distinction as a means of structuring political life, but also with the problem 
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of asserting its independence from the colonial regime. As a result, the progression from 
anticolonial nationalist movement within the colonial state to independent postcolonial state 
requires a rhetorical and conceptual switch, from emphasising difference from the colonisers 
to asserting of theoretical equality and a certain level of cultural homogeneity amongst all 
members of the new state. At this point, the relevance of his arguments to the Mauritian 
context may not appear immediately obvious. As a pluriethnic postcolonial state, the 
Mauritian state formerly recognises the legitimacy of separate ethnoreligious communities in 
its Constitution. In this respect, then, ‘essential’ difference amongst members of the new 
postcolonial state thus also forms part of the new imagined national community. Furthermore, 
in stark contrast to contemporary Indian history, in Mauritius independence was negotiated 
and ultimately decided upon by means of a democratic vote, and was preceded by neither 
violent uprising nor a concerted popular movement for independence.507  
Nevertheless, the Mauritian state can also be seen to have encountered the same 
contradiction as outlined above, in that the process of official nation building has drawn upon 
the same Western liberal and democratic ideology which Chatterjee refers to when he 
suggests that processes of the modern state have become embedded in contemporary Indian 
history.508 This is generally expressed in the form of a tension between a desire for 
proportional representation of different communities, and the assumption of the rational 
individual in political decision‐making processes. One example of this can be recognised in the 
‘best‐loser’ system, conceptualised as a correction to improve proportional representation 
under the Westminster system which Mauritius inherited from Britain at independence. The 
system allocates eight additional seats in the National Assembly to the most successful 
unelected candidates after elections have taken place in order to ensure a fairer 
representation of each officially recognised ‘community’.509 Indeed, the concern with 
proportional representation for the island’s communities and minorities can be traced back to 
the period prior to independence: ‘[w]hen Mauritius was divided into forty single‐member 
constituencies by the Electoral Boundaries Commission of 1958, one of the main 
considerations was to “provide an adequate opportunity for all the main sections of opinion in 
Mauritius to elect their representatives to the Legislative Council in numbers broadly 
corresponding to their own weight in the community.”’510 Nonetheless, in language evoking 
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the liberal notion of the rational individual acting in self‐interest, the same Commission was 
also concerned ‘that the system of voting should be such as to facilitate the development of 
voting on grounds of political principle and party rather than on race and religion’.511 The 
tension between recognition of internal difference and liberal and democratic ideology 
continues to shape contemporary Mauritian politics. This is indicated by the contradiction that 
voting on an ethnic basis is not overtly encouraged by any political party, and yet the practice 
can be seen to inform all major parties’ policies and campaigns: ‘tous les grands partis 
politiques mauriciens se proclament désormais – à partir de 1965 environ – nationaux et anti‐
communalistes, bien que, d’une part, leurs pratiques soient souvent déterminées par des 
considérations communales et que, d’autre part, il existe une espèce de reconnaissance 
officieuse de chaque communauté dans un parti politique précis.’512 
We can thus see that an attempt to balance and negotiate between two different 
conceptualisations of the nation, one based on Western liberal democratic ideology, and 
another based on the colonial categories of community, has shaped the development of 
Mauritian politics since the period prior to independence. It is perhaps helpful at this point to 
consider in further detail Chatterjee’s analysis of the consequences of colonial rule, and of the 
role of the postcolonial nation‐state in relation to changing formulations of the notion of 
community. Drawing on the work of Sudipta Kaviraj, Chatterjee proposes that colonisation led 
to a significant transformation of the understanding of community in the Indian context, which 
involved ‘the impoverishment of the earlier “fuzzy” sense of community and an insistence 
upon the identification of community in the “enumerable” sense’: 
 
Earlier, communities were fuzzy, in the sense that, first, a community did not claim to 
represent or exhaust all the layers of selfhood of its members, and second, the 
community, though definable with precision for all practical purposes of social 
interaction, did not require its members to how ask many of them there were in the 
world. The colonial regime […] sought to fashion the conceptual instruments of its 
control over an alien population precisely by enumerating the diverse communities 
that, in the colonial imagination, constituted the society over which it had been 
destined by History to rule.513 
 
Again, this would not seem to apply to the Mauritian context, where we cannot speak of a pre‐
colonial ‘fuzzy’ sense of community because permanent settlement on the island did not 
predate colonisation. However, what would appear significant here is that there have been 
important changes and discrepancies between what were decided upon by colonial 
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administrators as relevant ethnic categories over the course of Mauritian colonial history.514 As 
Lau Thi Keng maintains, ‘on est contraint de considérer la structuration actuelle comme un 
point précis dans l’évolution générale des systèmes classificatoires n’impliquant aucune 
transhistoricité des groups eux‐mêmes.’515 Daniella Police‐Michel has also demonstrated that 
the term ‘Creole’, used today to refer to Mauritians of African and mixed descent, has been 
applied to almost all ethnic and racial groups in Mauritius over its colonial history.516 
Therefore, even ‘enumerated’ communities are shown to be unstable over the longue durée of 
Mauritian colonial history. We might also question whether the ‘community’ divisions which 
were deemed significant by colonial administrators were accepted as such by those so 
categorised: Eriksen suggests that, even today, for the poorest in Mauritian society poverty is 
more pertinent as a social marker than ethnic or religious group, resulting in less concern for 
endogamy and the maintenance of group boundaries.517  
It thus seems plausible that ‘fuzzier’ conceptualisations of community have existed in 
Mauritius alongside the ‘enumerated’ communities which the colonial state used to legitimise 
its control and which arguably continue to perform a similar function within the postcolonial 
state and its institutions. We might consider here the various meanings attached to the word 
‘nasyon’ as used within in MK, which might refer to ethnicity, race, or caste dependent on the 
context in which the term is used. Much more rarely, the term is used as its English or French 
equivalents to signify nationality or nation, as in the MMM campaign slogan ‘enn sel lepep, 
enn sel nasyon’ (‘One people, one nation’): Eriksen suggests that ‘the word is used normatively 
within political rhetoric’.518 The use of ‘nasyon’ within everyday language in Mauritius might 
therefore be compared to the various meanings attached to ‘jāti’ in the Indian context to 
which Chatterjee attributes particular significance.519 He posits that it is precisely because of 
these semantic slippages that one can  
 
belong to several jāti, not simultaneously but contextually, invoking in each context a 
collectivity in which membership is not a matter of self-interested individual choice or 
contractual agreement but an immediate inclusion, originary, as it is by birth. We 
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should not be surprised therefore when political discourse permits the imagining of 
collective solidarities to slide from one particular form to another, each activated 
contextually but proclaiming each time a bond of kinship, a natural bond that unites all 
who share the same origin and who therefore must share the same destiny.520 
 
It is this fuzzy conceptualisation of community which, I suggest, would seem to best 
correspond with the idea of a national community propagated within expressions of Mauritian 
cultural nationalism, as will be expanded upon in the analysis below. Here we must remember 
that, contrary to political nationalists, ‘[c]ultural nationalists fear a statist project imposing a 
legal uniformity on its members will lead to a loss of distinctiveness and internal diversity on 
which national vitality depends’.521 Hutchinson further explains that the cultural nationalist 
understanding of community is flexible enough so as to ‘permi[t] the imagining of collective 
solidarities to slide from one particular form to another’ in the same way as the fuzzy 
communities discussed by Chatterjee above: 
 
A community is a “spontaneous” or organic order, historically prior to individuals. But 
though holistic this conception is not totalitarian. For a cultural nationalist an 
authentic individualism develops through a participation in a dense network of 
overlapping and intermediate sites of identity — gendered, occupational, religious, 
and regional, which must be preserved, for the impulse to diversity is the dynamo of 
national creativity.522 
 
However, we must also recognise that the fluidity implied in such multiple forms of 
belonging and solidarity within the national community is, as Chatterjee observes, threatened 
by the very structure of the postcolonial nation state itselfː ‘the fuzziness which enabled a 
wide variety of solidarities ranging from subcaste to gender to nation to be encompassed 
under the single rubric of jāti has come under great strain when those solidarities have been 
forcibly inserted into the grid of the modern regime of power’.523 This, he argues, has resulted 
in ‘an unresolved tension through which the twin constituents of political discourse within the 
modern domain – one, the categories of the liberal‐democratic state produced theoretically in 
the West, and the other, the categories that made up the Orientalist construction of India – 
are continuously being re‐created in ever more unrecognizable forms.’524 The same unresolved 
tension can arguably be identified in popular expressions of morisyenism. For example, the 
popular expression ‘morisyen avan tou’ (‘Mauritian above all else’) is used by individuals not 
simply to affirm their national identity but also to undermine the idea that ethnic identity, 
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because of its supposedly primordial nature, will always be more fundamental to the 
construction of identity. This prioritisation of identities can thus be seen to draw on ‘political 
discourse of the “modern” kind which insists that these collectivities have a fixed, determinate, 
form, and, if there are several to which an individual can belong, that there be a priority 
among them’.525 Yet at the same time, the expression would seem to stem primarily from a 
frustration with the Mauritian status quo as regards national identity, that is, the necessity of 
having a sub‐national ethnic or religious identity which results in the impossibility of being 
‘just’ Mauritian. Indeed, in this respect, the act of asserting that one is ‘morisyen avan tou’ can 
be interpreted as a critique of the fixity of ethnic and religious identity in the Mauritian 
context. However, in prioritising national identity, the expression also paradoxically 
foregrounds other forms of belonging: if one is Mauritian above all else, then one must also be 
identified in some other way. The implied significance of ethnic identity could therefore be 
said to naturalise and justify colonial/‘Oriental’ categories at the same time that the expression 
appears to try to question their validity. 
We are thus presented with a complex interplay between both Oriental/colonial and 
Western categories which are both invoked in conceptualisations of the nation resulting in a 
tension which appears to form a necessary and central part of any expression of nationalism 
within the contemporary Mauritian context.  In the remainder of this chapter, we will explore 
how such tensions are negotiated within the representation of national community in popular 
music. In the following analysis, I will suggest that what is significant about the representation 
of community in Tritonik is that it can be seen to activate a ‘fuzzy’ understanding of 
community at the same time as it engages with the idea of a national Mauritian community 
and the politics of morisyenism. Their representations of community sometimes delineate ‘us’ 
from ‘them’ within the national community, but it is significant that this distinction is never 
coterminous with ethnic or religious ones. The division between the ‘us’ group and others is 
perhaps better understood as one which is ideological, based on the values of cultural 
nationalism and the national community as providing the basis for a fairer society. The group’s 
concern with values within their representations of the national community thus appear to 
invoke the concept of cultural nationalism as a project of moral uplift and rejuvenation of the 
community in the face of modernisation which is seen as a threat to the community. Despite 
being situated in very different contexts, Tritonik may thus be considered to reflect a similar 
position to that of the German romantics in eighteenth‐century Europe, concerned with 
finding a middle way between tradition and progress, and between ‘the extremes of individual 
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liberalism, which the Romantics believed destroyed all social bonds, and the extremes of 
communalism, which they felt suppressed individual liberty.’526 
It should be clarified that Tritonik, the group discussed here, can be said to represent 
an alternative popular music scene which is differentiated from that of, for example, 
commercial séga through its willingness to engage with political issues. This differentiation can 
be seen in the views of one commenter, expressed in response to a youtube video of their 
song ‘Pa pou mor kouyon’ (‘Not going to die an idiot’):  
 
Sa group la ek surtou sa boug eric triton la en mari fort. lamizik ek ban paroles ena bku 
sense, vo bku plis ki sa ban sanT local ki p fer hit la. 
  
This group and especially that guy Eric Triton are really good. There is a lot of sense in 
their music and lyrics, it is worth a lot more than all those local songs which are 
commercially successful.527 
 
However, the group remain clearly situated within the realm of popular culture. The analysis 
below will seek to demonstrate that Tritonik can be considered to advocate a position of 
cultural nationalism, in that their music depicts a national community, rather than simply an 
abstract national body. This community is presented as being in need of moral regeneration, 
which is to be made possible through the figure of the artist and artistic practice. Tritonik’s 
music might thus be said to activate ‘fuzzy’ modes of belonging and solidarity which would 
appear more appropriate to conceptualisations of the national community which invoke 
tensions between Western and colonial Oriental categorisations. It could be suggested that the 
invocation of ‘fuzzy’ modes of community, including the national community, provides a more 
effective platform for mobilisation and social change than referring to ‘universal’ 
conceptualisations of the nation as made up of individual citizens who make rational choices in 
their own self‐interest. 
 
Tritonik: The National Community and the Artist as Cultural 
Nationalist 
 
The group Tritonik takes its name from their lead singer, Eric Triton, an established 
blues singer and musician. The group is also formed by Norbert Planel (percussion) and Shakti 
Ramchurn (tabla). They released their first album, Project One, in March 2012, shortly before 
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the 10th March demonstration event ‘Lamars pou enn nouvo repiblik’. The album is generally 
upbeat in character, yet on first appearances it does not appear overtly (Mauritian) nationalist 
in character. Indeed, the prominence of the tabla throughout the album might be said to 
indicate the group’s desire to characterise themselves as ‘world music’ or ‘fusion music’.528 Yet 
it would also seem that the album aims to address a specifically Mauritian audience: not only 
are all songs sung in MK, but also the use of pronouns, and in particular the first person plural 
‘nou’, serves to demarcate a Mauritian community of listeners and audience members. In the 
following analysis, I will consider both the album’s representation of this Mauritian 
community, and the role of the artist within this.  In this respect, I will argue that the album 
can be read as an expression of cultural nationalism which would appear to share 
characteristics of the cultural nationalist movement in Ireland, and of Romanticist 
conceptualisation of national community. 
On the whole, the album Project One seems to reflect a cultural nationalist view of the 
artist’s role within the formation of the ‘new’ national community as a leader of reform. 
According to Hutchinson, within cultural nationalism, 
 
What triggers [the artist] into collective action is evidence of social demoralisation and 
conflict which they believe results from a loss of continuity with the national heritage 
and a subsequent adoption of foreign values. […] This vision when renovated in 
contemporary idioms to speak to the present will restore a sense of common pride 
and energy and sense of direction. Cultural nationalism then is an educational 
movement directed to inner or moral reform’.529  
 
Indeed, Tritonik’s articulation of cultural nationalist themes within popular music might be said 
to constitute one such example of renovation in ‘contemporary idioms’. The role of the artist 
in working towards regeneration would appear to be represented in the musical message of 
Tritonik through the use of imperatives. There are highlighted in bold below in the lyrics of ‘Ca 
va, ca va pas’: 
 
Pou ki nou kilitir evolye  
Ki nou lamisik avanse 
Ki nou mesaz traverse 
 Napa ezite melanze 
 
Pou ki nou pa res dan lerer  
Pou nou ava bizin koz maler  
 
So that our culture evolves 
So that our music progresses 
So that we get our message across 
Don’t hesitate to mix (mélanger) 
 
So that we don’t stay misinformed 
So we will need to speak about 
unhappiness 
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Pou nou kapav sort dan galer 
Napa ezite kominike 
 
[Refrin:] Parfwa laba ‘ça va’, isi ‘ça 
va pas’  
 
Parfwa isi ‘ça va’, laba ‘ça va pas’ 
(x2) 
 
‘ça va, ça va pas’, me ‘ça va’ 
 
Aret bwar pike fime pou nanye 
 
Lavenir nou pei, kiltir melanze 
 
 
Pou ki napena divizion  
Nou tou nou ena mem rezon  
Ansam nou enn sel nasyon  
Napa ezite melanze (x2) 
 
[Refrin] 
 
Pou ki napena division [etc.] 
So we can get past our problems 
Don’t hesitate to communicate 
 
[Chorus: ] Sometimes over there 
things are going well, and here not 
so well, 
Sometimes here things are going 
well, but there not so well, 
It’s ok, it’s not ok, but it’s ok 
 
Stop drinking, injecting, smoking for 
no reason 
Mixed culture is the future of our 
country 
 
So that there are no divisions 
We all have the same reason 
Together we are one nation 
Don’t hesitate to mix (mélanger) 
 
[Chorus] 
 
So that there are no divisions  [etc.] 
 
We can thus see that ‘mixing’ and ‘communicating’ are presented here as solutions or possible 
courses of actions in order to improve and develop ‘lavenir nou pei’, the country’s future. 
Within expressions of morisyenism, these two concepts are considered as ideologically 
opposed to communalism, which privileges supposedly ‘pure’ ancestral cultures and 
devalorises cultural mixing. Yet the fact that these more abstract imperatives are combined 
with concrete advice, such as ‘stop drinking, injecting, smoking for no reason’, would seem to 
link personal improvement to a wider, more abstract notion of nation‐wide regeneration, 
understood here as a cultural project. Whilst the song contains no direct references to anti‐
communalist logic, the foregrounding of the ideas of mixing and communicating clearly 
opposes the conceptualisation of Mauritian society as a ‘mosaic’ of distinct cultures and 
ethnoreligious groups. 
Hutchinson’s reference to the artists’ ‘vision’ may also be used to point towards 
cultural nationalism in ‘Vinn gete’ (‘Come see’). The song arguably provides the most obvious 
example of the artist figure as regenerator of the national community: it is sung in the first 
person, and each verse begins with the repeated phrase ‘mo’nn fer enn vizyon’ (‘I had a 
vision’). However, other lyrical elements would appear to call into question the song’s 
nationalist critique of communalism. For example, ‘Vinn gete’ begins with a list of places of 
worship relating to different religions etc in Mauritius, which could make the song appear 
compatible with dominant discourses of the ‘mosaic of cultures’ composite Mauritius. 
161 
 
Furthermore, the presence of tourists is again implied in the idea of ‘the world taking the plane 
to come and see’ (‘lemond pe pran avyon vinn gete’). The preceding ‘list’ could thus be 
interpreted as a check‐list for cultural tourists wishing to see the harmonious Mauritian 
multiethnic society.530  
However, this interpretation is arguably complicated by the foregrounding of the MK‐
speaking subject in the repeated phrase ‘mo’nn fer enn visyon’: the song portrays the 
speaker’s personal vision, which clearly invokes the trope of the artist as innovator within 
cultural nationalism. Secondly, the notion of ‘enn sel batiman’, also repeated after each list of 
religious or racial difference, would appear to confirm the song’s focus on (national) unity, and 
could indeed be interpreted as a symbolic representation of the Mauritian nation. 
Furthermore, the unity created by difference being housed together in ‘one building’ appears 
to be facilitated by self‐expression and communication: ‘artist ti pe exprime / lepep ti pe 
kominike’ (‘Artists were expressing themselves / The people were communicating’). Again, the 
artist is portrayed as playing a central role in creating unity and facilitating communication and 
expression of ‘the people’. The song’s verses evoke a hypothetical and quasi‐religious or 
spiritual ‘vision’, which then sharply contrasts with the chorus which emphasises reality and 
immediacy: ‘come see, come have a look’, ‘vinn gete’. This could be said to imply that the 
artist’s role also encompasses acting as a mediator, namely being able to translate political 
messages for the people, and move between different levels of conceptualisation of the 
national community. 
 
‘Vinn gete’ 
Mo’nn fer enn vision 
Legliz tamp moske 
Pagod synagog 
Dan enn sel batiman  
Finn monte… 
Mo’nn fer enn visyon 
Jesu ar Shiva 
Allah ar Bouddha 
Dan enn sel batiman  
Pe exprime… 
 
[Refrin:] Lemond finn soke 
Lemond finn alisinne 
Lemond pe pran avyon 
Vinn gete 
 
I had a vision:  
Church, temple, mosque,  
Pagoda, synagogue 
In one building  
Which was built 
I had a vision:  
Jesus and Shiva,  
Allah and Buddha 
In one building  
Expressing themselves 
 
[Chorus:] The world is shocked 
The world thinks it’s hallucinating 
The world is taking the plane  
[To] come see 
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Mo’nn fer enn visyon 
Metis, nwar, blan, rouz  
Ble, zonn, ver 
Dan enn sel batiman  
Pe vibre… 
 
Mo’nn fer enn visyon 
Artist ti pe exprime 
Lepep ti pe kominike 
Dan enn sel batiman 
Pe sant linite 
I had a vision:  
métis, black, white, red  
Blue, yellow, green, 
In one building 
Vibrating 
 
I had a vision:  
Artists were expressing themselves,  
The people were communicating 
In one building,  
Singing unity 
 
The song thus clearly sets out a cultural rather than political nationalist perspective, in that 
cultural difference and multiculturalism are highlighted rather than obscured in representation 
of the supposedly neutral citizen. Cultural and religious difference is thus presented as 
belonging within the national community, rather than as a corruptive force which is both 
incompatible with and damaging to national unity. 
Perhaps the clearest vindication of the role of art as a means of social reform and 
development is expressed in ‘L’art vaincra’. This song also reflects the cultural nationalist belief 
that artists should play an important role in implementing social change for ‘the moral 
regeneration of the historic community and its way of life’.531 At the same time, however, 
Tritonik can be said to advocate a democratic approach to artistic expression: there is a clear 
invitation to the listener or audience to ‘pran to pinso’, (‘take your paintbrush’), to take up a 
form of artistic expression so as to ensure a peaceful society, ‘koumsa mo sir pa pou ena lager’. 
The pronoun ‘nou’ perhaps does not create an palpable sense of national community in the 
same way that it does in other songs, but the underlying threat of ‘lager’ (literally ‘war’ or 
conflict) would appear to imply potential social divisions within the Mauritian social context. 
The concept of cultural difference is also expressed in the idea that art must be used to ‘reunir 
tou kilitir’, to reunite all culture(s). However, at the same time the universal reach of the 
chorus would appear to suggest that the songs message may not be limited in relevance to the 
Mauritian social context: 
 
‘L’art vaincra’ 
L’art vaincra  
Tou mo lavi mo pou kriye 
 L’art vaincra  
Mem kan mo mor li pou kontinie  
L’art vaincra 
 Se enn langaz iniversel 
 
L’art vaincra 
All my life I will sing/cry out 
L’art vaincra 
Even when I’m dead it will continue 
L’art vaincra 
It’s a universal language 
 
                                                          
531 Rabow‐Edling, p. 102, see also Hutchinson, Dynamics, p. 16. 
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Nou bizin servi li  
Koum’ enn fil kondukter 
Pou reunir tou kiltir  
Nou bizin servi li  
Donn li so valer 
Pou met lalimyer dan leker 
 
Pran to pinso met kouler  
Pran kreyon, rakont tou maler  
Pran to zoutiy, donn boner 
Koumsa mo sir pa pou ena lager 
We need to use it 
As a common thread 
To reunite all cultures 
We need to use it 
Appreciate its true value 
To shine light into our hearts 
 
Take your paintbrush and colour 
Take a pencil, share your worries 
Take your tools, give joy 
That way I’m sure there’ll be no 
conflict 
 
This message notwithstanding, the song’s use of French within the refrain might be 
seen as problematic when viewed in terms of the song’s universalist outlook: it could be taken 
to imply that the French language is more suitable for the expression of philosophical concepts 
and ‘higher’ art. But it should however be noted that MK predominates with the lyrics. The 
code‐switching in the song’s refrain could therefore be seen as an attempt to represent 
Mauritian sociolinguistic reality, thereby highlighting the everyday cosmopolitanism of 
Mauritius as a multilingual society. 
The multilingual nature of Mauritius is also invoked in album’s first track, entitled 
‘Madam sere’, which makes reference to a coded form of MK often used by or with children, in 
which every syllable of each word is repeated directly preceded by ‘g’, so that ‘madam sere’ 
become ‘magadamgam segerege’. By apparent coincidence, the song’s title thus makes a 
reference to, and perhaps pays a form of homage to the music genres of seggae and reggae, 
which played a central role within developments in Mauritian popular music in the 1980s and 
90s (as was briefly discussed in Chapter 3).532 The song opens with a catchy guitar riff, in 4/4 
time rather than the 6/8 or 3/4 of séga, and the impression of a fast pace is sustained 
throughout, notably by the tabla. In this sense, the music seems to encompass both ‘generic 
international pop’ and the idea of fusion with the tabla serving as musical motif, whereas the 
national frame of reference is implied through language (MK). Yet here it must be 
acknowledged that, even within this linguistic community, a distinction is implied between 
those who appreciate the laughter provoked by Madam Sere, which is associated here with 
nostalgia and remembrance of the past, and those who see Madam Sere as inappropriate. This 
perhaps is stated most clearly in the final verse, which is the only part of the song to be sung in 
standard MK, which sets up a distinction between the first person ‘mo’ and third person plural 
‘zot’: ‘This language that I’m speaking [...] Always made me laugh […] They told me “don’t 
speak like that”(“You’re rude!”)’ 
                                                          
532 See pp. 102‐5 of this thesis. 
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‘Madam Sere’ 
[Refrin:] Magadamgam sege rege 
Langangazgaz nougou tigi 
kozgozsege 
 
Longantangan nougou tigi kozgoz sa 
langaz‐la 
Mege wigi tigi rigigogologo 
Mege agazorgordigi ligi pe disparet 
Mo’nngon anganvigi ragapelgel ligi 
 
[Refrin] 
 
Agazorgordigi mo’anganvigi 
sangantege 
Mege wigi mogo rigigogologo 
Agavangan kigi li disparet 
Mo’nngon anganvigi ragapelgel ligi 
 
[Refrin] 
 
Ki sa langaz ki mo pe koze (Mil nef 
san lontan) 
Ti fer mwa touzour gagn riye (he he 
he he!) 
Zot ti dir mwa napa koz koumsa (To 
malelve!) 
Parksi enn bann la pa ti kompran 
nanye 
 
[Refrin] 
[Chorus:] Madam sere 
The language we used to speak 
 
 
A long time ago we spoke this 
language  
Yes, it was funny 
But today it is disappearing 
I wanted to remember it 
 
[Chorus] 
 
Today I want to sing 
 
Yes I am funny 
Before it disappears 
I wanted to remember it 
 
[Chorus] 
 
This language that I’m speaking 
(1900 a long time [ago]) 
Always made me laugh (hey hey hey 
hey!) 
They told me ‘don’t speak like that’ 
(‘You’re rude!’) 
Because a group of people over 
there couldn’t understand a thing 
 
[Chorus] 
 
Thus, through its emphasis on humour and shared laughter, ‘Madam Sere’ could be 
interpreted as not creating an ‘inside’ community brought together in their shared laughter 
and shared understanding of the code. At the same time, however, it also marks an ‘outside’ 
community of those who don’t understand and could in this way be interpreted as creative 
camouflage on the part of the ‘colonised’.533 However, the final two lines of the last verse 
would seem to evoke a different kind of community again, who see the language as a threat to 
their values of ‘respectability’.534 We can thus see that the representation of community here, 
first invoked through the use of the third person plural pronoun ‘nou’ in the opening chorus, is 
in fact smaller than the national community. This directs our attention to the distinction 
between the ‘nou’ in‐group brought together through shared use of the Madam Sere code 
                                                          
533 See Glissant, Le Discours antillais, pp. 32‐3. 
534 For a discussion of respectability politics in the Jamaican context, see Thomas, pp. 5‐6. 
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language, and a disapproving group referred to as ‘zot’, ‘they’ who frown upon usage of the 
coded language. The burden of being understood is therefore presented as always being 
placed on the Mauritian MK‐speaking subject, or maybe even more specifically the MK‐
speaking child, given that Madam Sere is generally associated with children. Indeed, the 
repeated use of Madam Sere in the song could be said to constitute a form of opposition to 
the respectability politics evoked in the final verse. This could in turn be seen to reflect 
children’s experience of language learning at school, where they are expected to learn English, 
the official medium of teaching, as native speakers, and therefore their access to knowledge 
and the curriculum is dependent on their acceptance of this burden of understanding. 
Beneath the upbeat tempo, expressions of humour and light‐hearted tone, ‘Madam 
Sere’ could thus be said to imply a concern with youth and young people which parallels the 
target audience for the protest movements organised in 2011 and 2012 such as the September 
‘Wanted’ protest. Additionally, its concern with both young people and the revival of cultural 
practices associated with the past reflect two central issues within cultural nationalism. 
Hutchinson understands cultural nationalism therefore not as a conservative cultural 
movement, but rather as a response to social breakdown incurred by modernisation 
articulated by and on behalf of the youth population: 
 
The peculiar nationalist vision is a utopian response to large‐scale social breakdown 
generated by modernisation when the stable social landmarks of family, 
neighbourhood, and religion have been swept away. This breakdown is felt most 
intensely by the young, unhoused by the erosion of tradition by secular doctrines of 
improvement. Nationalist movements are children’s crusades motivated by a 
desperate need to belong and by a revulsion against established institutions.535  
 
Hutchinson also argues that the ‘young urban intelligentsia [constitute] the cadres of cultural 
nationalism, who, driven by a desire to liberate their kinsmen from backwardness, return to 
the traditional ethnic culture in order to make it the basis of a vigorous modern community’.536 
Given the nonexistence of a precolonial, indigenous culture, ‘traditional culture’ is perhaps 
best understood here as the cultural practices associated with the historically subordinated 
population of Mauritius, rather than the practices of any one ethnic group. This again would 
seem to parallel the protest movements which associated themselves with morisyenism. 
Eriksen also argues that ‘supra‐ethnic national identity’ as a ‘form of identification is most 
evidently present in parts of the growing urban middle class, among intellectuals, academics 
and the like’, although he also maintains that ‘there have been historical situations where very 
                                                          
535 John Hutchinson, ‘Re‐interpreting Cultural Nationalism’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 45: 
3 (1999), 392‐407, pp. 393‐4, see also Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson, 1966), pp. 94‐7. 
536 Hutchinson, ‘Re‐interpreting Cultural Nationalism’, p. 404. 
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large numbers of Mauritians have visibly associated themselves with the multi‐ethnic nation 
rather than with their ethnic group.’537 
The representation of youth is further developed in Tritonik’s ‘Zenn’ (‘Young’). Here, 
however, the nation of Mauritius itself is characterised as ‘young’, a characteristic which is 
then extended to all members of the national community in the song’s chorus: ‘Young, our 
country is young / Our history is young / Our culture is young / Together we grow (up) with 
respect’. The song thereby appears to evoke the need for development and regeneration 
through unification of the national community. Furthermore, the last verse would seem to 
highlight the importance of artists and cultural actors in the process of developing the young 
country and becoming a ‘real’ paradise. In this respect, Tritonik can be seen to advocate a form 
of cultural nationalism which would appear conceptually close to that advocated by the 
German Romantics, for whom 
 
art was not only the central organ of Bildung, it was also the means of achieve social 
and political reform. Providing the people with a model of virtue, art alone had the 
power to bring them together and motivate them to act.538 
 
This can be compared with the representation of the artist’s unifying role in ‘Vinn gete’. 
Furthermore, the song appears to suggest a revalorisation of the past which would appear to 
parallel the Romantics’ desire to find a middle way between tradition and progress. In doing 
so, the song arguably develops a counter narrative to dominant discourses concerning 
Mauritian ‘modernisation’, a process thought to have begun relatively recently through 
diversification of the economy following independence, in which the development of the 
luxury tourism industry is thought to have played a considerable role. In contrast, Tritonik 
assert here that, if Mauritius is considered today as a paradise, whether primarily in a touristic 
sense or otherwise, it is because of the efforts of ‘dimounn mizer’, those at the bottom of the 
social structure, rather than the colonial or postcolonial ruling elites and those who hold 
political and economic power.539 
The repeated phrase at the end of each verse would appear to give a central position 
within the song to ‘dimounn mizer’, literally translated as ‘poor people’ but perhaps better 
                                                          
537 ‘A Non‐ethnic State for Africa? A Life‐world Approach to the Imagining of Communities’ in Ethnicity 
and Nationalism in Africa: Constructivist Reflections and Contemporary Politics, ed. by Paris Yeros 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp. 45‐64, p. 52. 
538 Rabow‐Edling, p. 103, in reference to arguments developed by Herder and Schlegel. 
539 In his analysis of the tourism industry, Emmanuel Gregoire tells us that ‘[l]es principaux groupes 
mauriciens présents dans la filière touristique sont directement liés aux grandes propriétés sucrières 
franco‐mauriciennes, notamment les quatre principales familles (Dalais, Espitalier‐Noël, Lagesse et de 
Spéville) qui contrôlent une partie de l’économie du pays’. ‘Développement touristique et reproduction 
sociale à l’île Maurice’, Civilisations, 57 (2008), 91‐106, 
<http://civilisations.revues.org/1141?lang=en#ftn9>, [Accessed 23rd May 2014]. 
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understood here as the historically disenfranchised, those without the necessary power or 
cultural capital to write their own histories. A significant distinction from previous expressions 
of cultural nationalism thus becomes apparent here: whereas previous movements ‘sought to 
construct a secular, activist high culture evoking historic and ‘authentic’ national models of 
heroism in order to stir the young to action’,540 Tritonik’s promotion of art and the artist in the 
development of the national community is formulated on behalf of ‘dimounn mizer’, which 
would thus appear to privilege popular forms of cultural expression over the establishment of 
a national ‘high culture.’ 
 
‘Zenn’ 
Mo finn ne apre lesklavaz  
Dan enn milye sovaz 
Karo kann, dan bwa, lor la plaz 
 
An bann lipie montay 
Mo’nn grandi dan enn paradi  
Konstrir kouma dan lanfer 
Avek lafors dimounn mizer (x2) 
 
Mo finn tomb dan enn relizion  
Rod fer mwa vinn mouton 
Desendan desan‐z‐an zistwar 
Zot dir mwa 2000 an 
Mo zanset konstrir paradi 
Travay kouma dan lanfer 
Avek lafwa dimounn mizer (x2) 
 
[Refrin:] Zenn nou pei zenn 
Zenn nou zistwar zenn 
Zenn nou kiltir zenn  
Ansam nou grandi dan respe (x2)  
 
Azordi mo nepli zanfan 
Konn koz ar gran dimounn 
 
Fer rapor dir seki pa bon 
 
Pou trouv enn solisyon 
Lil Moris pou enn vre paradi 
Si krwar dan lar dan nou kiltir 
 
Pou donn lazwa dimounn mizer 
I was born after slavery  
In a savage place 
Sugar cane fields, in the forest, on 
the beach,  
In the mountain foothills 
I grew up in a paradise  
Which was built as if in hell, 
With the strength of poor people 
 
I fell into a religion  
That wanted to make me a zombie 
Descendant of 200 years of history 
They tell me 2000 years 
My ancestors built paradise 
[But] worked as if they were in hell 
With the faith of poor people 
 
[Chorus:] Young, our country is 
young 
Our history is young 
Our culture is young 
Together we grow (up) with respect 
 
Today I’m no longer a child 
[I] know how to speak with 
respected elders 
Make connections and say what is 
not right 
To find a solution 
Mauritius will be a real paradise 
If [we] believe in art and in our 
culture 
To make poor people happy 
 
                                                          
540 John Hutchinson and David Aberbach, ‘The Artist as Nation‐builder: William Butler Yeats and Chaim 
Nachman Bialik’, Nations and Nationalism, 5: 4 (1999), 501‐21, p. 510. 
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Similarly, ‘Ki pe fer pou nou?’ (‘What is being down for us?’) is firmly grounded in the 
Mauritian context, in ecological as well as sociological terms. It is therefore perhaps the song 
which most clearly evokes a sense of national community. This community is defined 
relationally, firstly as a human community presented in opposition to the animal community of 
the Mauritian ecosystem, and secondly in relation to a community of tourists, who are 
presented as having a negative and restrictive effect on both the animal and human 
communities of the island. 
 
Bann zanimo dan lafore  
Pa giny problem pou nanye 
Se nou bann zom ki pe sanz tou 
 
Ki pe pran zot lafore 
Nou pe kontign  
Konstrir lotel  
Pou fer touris amize 
Ki pe fer pou nou ? 
 
 
[Refrin:] Tang nepli trouve 
Liev napli trouve 
Zako pe oblize sot sime 
Kann pou nepli pouse,  
Zwazo pou nepli sante 
Zot pou bizin kriye… 
 
Bann morisyen kontan zot lil 
Zot bien kontan amize 
Al lor la plaz enn ti dife 
Nou tou sante nou danse 
Zot vinn dir  
Nou pa fer tapaz 
Bizin les touris repoze 
Ki pe fer pou nou ? 
 
[Refrin] 
Animals in the forest 
Don’t get into any problems 
It’s us humans who are changing 
everything 
Who are taking their forest 
We are continually 
Building hotels 
So that tourists can enjoy 
themselves 
What is being done for us? What is 
this doing for us? 
 
[Chorus:] You no longer find tanrecs 
You no longer find hares 
Monkeys have to cross the road 
Sugar cane won’t grow 
Birds won’t sing 
They will have to shout out… 
 
Mauritians love and care about their 
island 
They like to enjoy themselves 
Go to the beach, [start] a little fire 
We all sing and dance 
They come tell 
Us not to make noise 
[That we] need to let the tourists 
rest 
What is being done for us? What is 
this doing for us? 
[Chorus] 
 
Again, Tritonik can be seen here to contest the dominant impulse to speak well of 
Western tourists because of the importance of tourism to the island’s economy. In this 
respect, the repeated questioning of ‘ki pe fer pou nou?’, ‘what is this doing for us?’ could be 
interpreted as a direct critique of government policies which are seen as putting the needs of 
tourists before those of Mauritian citizens. The implication of a national ‘personality’ in the 
second verse might appear problematic in that it would seem to evoke reductive stereotypes 
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of fun‐loving islanders;541 however the opposition to tourists serves to build a strong sense of 
national community, which might be seen to override any internal divisions. Furthermore, the 
relationship to the ecosystem would appear to confirm the ‘naturalness’ of the national 
community, who ‘kontan zot lil’, ‘love their island’, whereas the construction of hotels for 
tourists is presented as damaging to animal habitats. 
To summarise, therefore, the representation of community within Tritonik’s album 
Project One would seem to be compatible with a cultural nationalist vision of national 
community, which is presented as the impetus for social change in order to progress and 
develop a more just society, whilst drawing on cultural practices identified as traditional, and a 
subaltern reading of Mauritian history as cultural resources. Of particular significance here is 
the representation of the artist as leader and instigator of moral regeneration; however, it is 
important to recognise that Tritonik would appear to also promulgate the democratisation of 
culture, in which listeners and audience members are invited to participate in artistic 
expression as a means of avoiding social conflict. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have thus explored various facets of popular nationalist expression within the 
context of both contemporary protest movements and popular culture. It has been suggested 
here that the claims of morisyenism as a political movement which asserts its progressive and 
anti‐imperialist nature have been problematised through its adoption of Western liberal 
democratic categories. As a result, all expressions of Mauritian nationalism may be seen to be 
marked by a tension between conflicting conceptualisations of the national community. It was 
suggested that the music of Tritonik can be interpreted as indicative of a wider sentiment of 
cultural nationalism. Despite several significant parallels with previous forms of cultural 
nationalism, however, their conceptualisation differs in that it privileges popular cultural 
expression rather than the development of a new national high culture, and advocates instead 
the democratisation of culture. 
At the time of writing, a process of political reform as regards the proportional 
representation of Mauritian communities seems inevitable, and it would seem that this 
                                                          
541 Eriksen suggests that, in the Mauritian context, this stereotype is most often associated with the 
Creole population. ‘Formal and Informal Nationalism’, p. 15. This could be considered as an additional 
complication, in that this expression of a national personality could be seen to centralise one ethnic 
group; however, changing lifestyles would appear to suggest that a positive valorisation of ‘knowing 
how to enjoy oneself’ would be better associated not with an ethnic group but with the youth 
population of Mauritius in general. 
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possibility is already being seriously entertained by the current government.542 We can thus be 
said to be entering a new era as regards the official political representations of ‘communities’ 
within Mauritius, which might result in the privileging of a new conceptualisation of the 
individual citizen, based perhaps on Republican conceptualisations, which focus on the 
individual citizen within the national body and suppress the narrative of community. However, 
as we have seen here, a simultaneous cultural nationalist movement has supported the 
political movement whilst asserting the existence of a natural national community. In the case 
of Tritonik, this has been achieved by activating ‘fuzzy’ conceptualisations of community which 
allow for a series of different contextual solidarities and modes of belonging. We have yet to 
see how these might be affected by political reform, and indeed whether cultural nationalism 
will periodically surface in the Mauritian context as Hutchinson claims it does in Europe, as ‘a 
recurring movement, periodically crystallising even in the advanced metropolitan centres at 
times of deep‐seated social crisis, when a statist nationalism seems to have failed, in order to 
offer new pathways for individual and collective action.’543 
In the following and final chapter, what appears as a rather different engagement with 
the politics of belonging will be explored in the Réunionese context. This will take the form of a 
critical examination of the zorey population, residents of Réunion from metropolitan France, a 
group within which I was often assimilated during my fieldwork. The naming of the zorey is 
interpreted here as a political act which is understood to have resulted in the creation of a 
social identity which both draws on and shapes the representation of the zorey in popular 
discourses. As will be seen, an examination of these representations can also serve to open up 
discussion of fundamental questions of cultural difference and social inequality in 
contemporary Réunion, although due to socio‐political specificities, this is evidently framed 
rather differently when compared to Mauritian debates. Whereas this chapter has shown how 
Mauritian cultural nationalism has been employed within popular music in order to counter 
the presumed primordialism of ethnoreligious belonging in Mauritius, the subsequent 
discussion will outline how the naming of the zorey can be seen to challenge the invisibility and 
normativity of whiteness within constructions of French national identity. The following critical 
analysis of zorey identity can therefore be seen to continue this chapter’s examination of 
popular culture’s engagement with competing discourses on the nation and community, and 
the differing conceptualisations of race and ethnicity these discourses produce. 
  
                                                          
542 See ‘Consultation Paper ‐ Electoral Reform’, which outlines possible alternatives for the ‘best loser’ 
system. Published online in Le Mauricien, 25th March 2014, 
<http://www.lemauricien.com/article/consultation‐paper‐electoral‐reform>, [Accessed 27th May 2014]. 
543 ‘Re‐interpreting cultural nationalism’, p. 393. 
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5. Becoming Zorey in Réunion: Privilege, Whiteness, and 
(In)visibility in the French Overseas Department 
 
Zorey,544 the Réunionese Kreol word for ‘ear’, is the term popularly used in Réunion to 
designate people of metropolitan French origin. It may seem like an odd choice for a study 
which aims to apply a cultural studies approach to the Réunionese sociocultural context to 
devote a chapter to analysis of the zorey, a small but well‐represented and relatively privileged 
sector of the Réunion population. When I set out to begin fieldwork, I had no intention of 
studying the zorey as a recognisable social group, nor to attempt to provide an account of 
zorey culture or identity in the Réunionese social context, if such a thing can be said to exist, 
given that they are generally perceived as a transitory population.545 Yet the presence of zorey 
stereotypes within popular culture and discourses would suggest that they now arguably form 
part of the Réunionese social landscape, with a recognisable social identity associated with 
youth, development, and modernisation, educational qualifications, and a higher than average 
socioeconomic status.546 Neither had I planned to attend to the issue of whiteness, or indeed 
to my own whiteness, with further critical consideration; that is, above and beyond the 
recognition that Réunionese society, like that of many other postcolonial countries and 
regions, has long been structured by means of a racial hierarchy, in which white people hold 
the most privileged positions at the top of the social structure.547 However, doing research in 
La Réunion as a young white European means that, whether I like it or not, I am often 
identified as zorey, though whether or not I could truly be considered as a zorey provoked 
much debate amongst some of my zorey and Réunionese friends. 
It thus appears impossible for me to avoid giving at least a cursory introduction to the 
zorey population in La Réunion, a group with which I could not completely identify (being 
                                                          
544 The term has various alternative spellings: zoreil, zoreille, z’oreille, which reflect the term’s 
etymology. 
545 A series of articles on the zorey in the French newspaper L’Express state that INSEE figures suggest 
that 30% of the population leave every 5 years. Laurent Decloître, ‘Les “Zoreys,” une communauté à 
part,’ L’Express, 26th May 2010, <http://www.lexpress.fr/region//les‐zoreys‐une‐communaute‐a‐
part_903045.html>, [Accessed 11th October 2013]. Andoche et al. claim that such an identity may 
indeed be increasingly recognised, differentiated from both other réunionnais and metropolitan French 
living in France. One of the respondents gives the following evaluation of her social identity in Réunion: 
‘Ca m’a mise mal à l’aise pendant longtemps, mais maintenant je me sens vraiment métropolitaine de la 
Réunion, avec mes différences d’avec les gens de France, avec mes différences aussi d’avec les créoles 
de la Réunion.’ Immigrations réunionnaises, p. 93. 
546 These perceptions are reflected in statistics which show that the metropolitan‐born population have 
a higher level of both qualifications and employment compared with Réunionese born on the island. 
INSEE, ‘Des differences de qualification et d’intégration économique selon l’origine’ Revue économie de 
La Réunion N° 136, (May 2010) 
<http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?reg_id=24&ref_id=16104>, [Accessed 24th February 
2015]. 
547 Yet this is not to deny the existence of poor white populations in Reunion, such as the Ti Blan. 
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marked by my accented French and, in some cases, by my knowledge of Réunionese history 
and cultural specificity), but to which I was often ascribed membership by virtue of my white 
European appearance and inability to speak Réunionese Kreol fluently. However, over the 
course of both my field research and my engagement with the literature of the expanding field 
of critical whiteness studies, I became convinced that a more thorough analysis into the power 
dynamics and politics of the zorey population in Réunion is warranted. Given that the zorey 
population are associated with youth and the pursuit of leisure in particular ways, it would 
seem fair to suggest that the group and its representations should be addressed within the 
study of Réunionese youth cultures. In addition, as has been acknowledged within my 
evaluation of researcher positioning in this study, my own interactions with youth cultural 
practices were structured by my ascribed zorey identity in Réunion, and by my status as a 
white foreigner in Mauritius. It thus seems appropriate that the analysis of representations of 
race and social class within popular musics and cultures in previous chapters, which was 
approached from an intersectional perspective, should be followed by a critical discussion of 
whiteness within contemporary popular cultural phenomena which again attends to the ways 
in which categories of race and social class intersect within representations. 
In this chapter, it will be argued that the act of naming the zorey, and the identification 
and sense of cultural belonging and cultural specificity that it evokes, is perhaps more 
significant than is implied by casual and sometimes humorous tones in which the term itself is 
used. Examining the issues brought up by the naming and ‘bringing into existence’ of the zorey 
group as a social, socioeconomic, cultural, linguistic and even racial entity can help to 
illuminate various contradictions as concerns how we conceptualise racial and cultural 
difference in relation to material social inequality. This is arguably relevant to all social 
contexts, but of particular importance in postcolonial settings like Réunion where the legacy of 
racial hierarchy continues to have a significant impact on life chances and social mobility. 
Examining zorey identity involves at least two interacting elements: the act of naming, that is, 
the act of identifying people from mainland France as zorey as soon as a relation with La 
Réunion is established, such as upon their arrival on the island as either permanent or 
temporary residents, and secondly, considering how those identified as zorey then themselves 
relate to this attributed, seemingly ‘additional’ identity. Doing so is worthwhile not only 
because it is rarely given serious consideration, and has not yet been the subject of extensive 
academic analysis,548 but also because it brings up important questions concerning attitudes to 
                                                          
548 When asked in an interview why there have been so few studies of the zorey population, Andoche 
responded that ‘le sujet reste tabou et politiquement incorrect’, in contrast to studies of Tamil or 
African cultural specificities in Réunion. Interview conducted by Decloître in ‘Le zorey, c'est le pouvoir’, 
L’Express, 26th May 2010, <http://www.lexpress.fr/region//le‐zorey‐c‐est‐le‐pouvoir_903047.html>, 
[Accessed 11th October 2013]. 
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(im)migration within Réunionese society. It also raises critical questions regarding issues of 
invisibility and visibility in relation to race and racial difference. Considering the position of 
zorey individuals in La Réunion can thus be said to bring together issues of identity politics and 
cultural and racial difference with those of social inequality and oppression, whereas identity 
politics has sometimes been seen as a means of obscuring questions of social inequality. Yet 
both these concepts also need to be clarified in light of the fact that any engagement with 
questions of social justice has arguably been further complicated by Réunion’s political 
integration into the French nation. As will be seen here, this is further exacerbated by the 
dominance of the Republican ‘colour‐blind’ discourse within debates concerning questions of 
race and ethnicity. 
 
Becoming Zorey: Identity, Relation, Performativity 
 
My analysis starts from the recognition that, although both zorey and Réunionese are 
French citizens and thus the zorey are not ‘foreign’ in an official sense, this may be contrary to 
their lived experience of moving to and living in Réunion. As Jacqueline Andoche et al. point 
out, 
 
En effet, l’accueil fait aux Métropolitains ainsi que leurs conditions d’intégration font 
qu’ils forment une communauté différente de celles des locaux installés durablement 
dans l’île. Et ceci tant du point de vue de leurs statuts, de leurs modes de vie, de 
l’image qu’ils ont et donnent d’eux‐mêmes, que des représentations que les autres se 
font d’eux.549 
 
This experience, as the authors rightly observe, results in a ‘décalage entre constat 
sociologique et catégorisation statistique’.550 Being considered as cultural foreigners in 
Réunion may be the first of several disorienting experiences for metropolitan French who 
might have previously considered Réunion, with its department code 974, as a French 
department ‘like any other’.551 Hence, because Réunion is, after all, supposedly an integral part 
of the French nation, any serious consideration of the metropolitan population in La Réunion 
and their relations with their ‘host' society risks exposing the contradictions and discrepancies 
                                                          
 
549 Andoche et al., Immigrations réunionnaises, p. 10. 
550 Andoche et al., Immigrations réunionnaises, p. 10. 
551 According to Nicolas Roinsard, in the parlance of the French government of the time, the process of 
departmentalisation was intended to ‘rompre avec l’ère coloniale et de « faire des DOM des 
départements comme les autres » en s’assurant que leurs indices économiques et sociaux se 
rapprochent progressivement de la moyenne nationale’. 
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between the political status of the French overseas department and lived reality in Réunion in 
social, economic and cultural terms. 
My approach is also informed by the assumption that a symbolic transformation takes 
place when a person from mainland France moves to La Réunion and thus becomes zorey. A 
parallel can be drawn here with Abigail Adam’s and Diane M. Nelson’s conceptualisation of 
becoming gringo/gringa: in the same way that ‘the term gringo necessitates a relationship 
with Latin America – a North American is not a gringo until she crosses a border’,552 a 
metropolitan French individual is not a zorey until s/he arrives in La Réunion, even if, officially, 
this does not entail the crossing of national borders. In turn, Réunionese society has been and 
continues to be shaped by the presence of the zorey population. Therefore, as Nelson and 
Adams suggest, the process of construction within relational identities must be understood as 
operating in both directions: 
 
Gringo is a category produced through interactions, and as such, it works on a variety 
of borders including but not limited to national frontiers, stereotypes of phenotypic 
difference, sartorial codes, and – as ‘gringa’ (marked by the Spanish feminine) – 
gender boundaries. In turn, the gringa changes the places she goes.553 
 
For Adams, the term gringa therefore emerges ‘not as a label for a North American 
(mis)placed in Latin America, but as a person shaped by her relation to Latin America, a 
relationship that shifts’.554  Given that the concept of relationality has now become somewhat 
overused within academic engagement with identity, belonging and social interaction, it may 
appear all too obvious to state that my approach, like Nelson’s, is one which understands 
identity to be relational. Yet what is perhaps interesting about analysing zorey as a social 
identity, either self‐claimed or ascribed by others, is that it clearly shows that the context 
precedes any development of ‘meaning’ attached to the identity: zorey, as a concept, an 
identity, does not exist prior to contact between the metropolitan French individual and the 
Réunionese social context. This can be compared with Judith Butler’s approach to gender 
identity, as outlined in Gender Trouble and further clarified in various later works:  
 
Sociological discussions have conventionally sought to understand the notion of the 
person in terms of an agency that claims ontological priority to the various roles and 
functions through which it assumes social visibility and meaning. Within philosophical 
discourse itself, the notion of ‘the person’ has received analytic elaboration on the 
                                                          
552 Diane M. Nelson, A Finger in the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999), p. 41, referring to Abigail Adams, ‘Gringas, Ghouls and Guatemala: 
The 1994 Attacks on North American Women Accused of Body Organ Trafficking’, Journal of Latin 
American Anthropology, 4: 1 (1999), 112‐33. 
553 Nelson, Finger in the Wound, p. 41. 
554 ‘Gringas, Ghouls and Guatemala’, p. 129. 
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assumption that whatever social context the person is ‘in’ remains somehow 
externally related to the definitional structure of personhood, be that consciousness, 
the capacity for language, or moral deliberation.555 
 
In contrast, Butler’s conceptualisation of gender as performative aims to work against both 
sociological and philosophical analyses of identity which posit the subject, the ‘self’, as 
ontologically prior to the context in which s/he is situated. As she explains, 
 
In this sense, gender is not a noun, but neither is it a set of free‐floating attributes, for 
we have seen that the substantive effect of gender is performatively produced and 
compelled by the regulatory practices of gender coherence. Hence […] gender proves 
to be performative ‐ that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be. In this sense, 
gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to 
preexist the deed. […] There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender ... 
gender is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ which are said to be its 
results.556 
 
Can we thus posit that the process of becoming zorey is a performative one?  Can indeed the 
same be said of all forms of racial identification? Can race, like gender, be understood as ‘the 
repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame 
that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being’?557 
The constructed, situated, and performative nature of racial identities is perhaps easier to for 
us accept than understanding gender to be as such, if only because racial identities are not 
always structured around a (male/female) binary like gender identities are – although the 
language of racial identification, perhaps most obviously in the association of certain skin 
tones with the colours ‘black’ and ‘white’, would suggest that binaries have also played an 
important role in the construction of racial identities. Whereas zorey may be perceived as a 
noun, a fixed category which a metropolitan French subject may try to resist, redefine, 
subvert, or reject altogether, it is arguably better understood as a verb, in the same way that 
Butler reconceptualises gender. However, as Butler clarifies, to argue that gender is 
constructed does not signify that subjects have complete freedom to ‘choose’ within this 
process: 
 
There is a tendency to think that sexuality is either constructed or determined; to think 
that if it is constructed, it is in some sense free, and if it is determined, it is in some 
sense fixed. These oppositions do not describe the complexity of what is at stake in 
any effort to take account of the conditions under which sex and sexuality are 
assumed. The ‘performative’ dimension of construction is precisely the forced 
reiteration of norms. In this sense, then, it is not only that there are constraints to 
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performativity; rather, constraint calls to be rethought as the very condition of 
performativity. Performativity is neither free play nor theatrical self‐presentation; nor 
can it be simply equated with performance. Moreover, constraint is not necessarily 
that which sets a limit to performativity; constraint is, rather, that which impels and 
sustains performativity.558 
 
That this could be a productive way of thinking about race becomes apparent when this is read 
in tandem with Gilroy’s formulation of anti‐anti‐essentialism. For Gilroy, anti‐anti‐essentialism 
is a position which avoids both the pitfall of essentialist and anti‐essentialist approaches to 
black identity, which ‘sees racialised subjectivity as the product of the social practices that 
supposedly derive from it’.559 He suggests that black musical practices may be particularly 
instructive in this regard: 
  
Music and its rituals can be used to create a model whereby identity can be 
understood neither as a fixed essence nor as a vague and utterly contingent 
construction to be reinvented by the will and whim of aesthetes, symbolists, and 
language gamers. Black identity is not simply a social and political category to be used 
or abandoned according to the extent to which the rhetoric that supports and 
legitimises it is persuasive or institutionally powerful. Whatever the radical 
constructionists may say, it is lived as a coherent (if not always stable) experiential 
sense of self. Though it is often felt to be natural and spontaneous, it remains the 
outcome of practical activity: languages, gesture, bodily significations, desires.560 
 
To clarify, I am not saying that the process of becoming zorey is any more performative 
or relational than any other form of racial identification. It is simply that becoming zorey is a 
particular example of racial and racialised identification where it would be impossible to claim 
that the zorey subject is ontologically prior to the social context. However, the fact that zorey 
identity cannot escape its relationality, its situatedness, does not necessarily make it less 
‘meaningful’, neither as concerns how it is ascribed by others, nor when it is claimed in self‐
identification by zorey themselves. Furthermore, this process is shown to be by no means 
straight forward but in fact conflictual, and it relates to a field of contestation in which 
individuals negotiate meanings in their attempt to find an ‘appropriate’ social identity in the 
‘new’ Réunionese, rather than metropolitan French, social context. These identities must be 
‘appropriate’ in the sense of being acceptable to the subject her‐/himself, and in relation to 
the expectations of others. 
In the following analysis, zorey is understood as loaded signifier which connotes not 
only place of birth – in the metropole, mainland France, rather than on the island – but also 
racial and socioeconomic privilege. The term functions as a powerful evocation of both 
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whiteness and a relatively high socioeconomic status in conjunction with middle‐class values. 
Yet it should also be remembered here that whiteness has not always been automatically 
associated with wealth in Réunionese society, as is affirmed by the history of the Ti Blan or 
petits blancs, the poor whites of the colonial era and their descendents, victims of an 
irreversible process of ‘prolétarisation’ during the era of slavery whose lack of wealth and 
fertile lands differentiated them from the Gro Blan, the wealthy land‐owning class.561  
However, the popular association between high socio‐economic status and the zorey 
population persists.562 At times, these connotations may not accurately reflect the 
socioeconomic position of some zorey individuals. Nonetheless, having arrived in Réunion 
‘from the metropole’, zorey individuals are considered direct representatives of (middle‐class) 
Frenchness and a set of cultural values which were foreign to the majority of the Réunionese 
population prior to departmentalisation, but have since been adopted by the Réunionese 
middle class.563 To understand how the significations and connotations attached to the term 
zorey have developed within the social context, it is first necessary to consider the historical 
context in which the first wave of zorey migration to Réunion took place. I will then examine 
contemporary representations of the zorey within popular discourses and the contested 
etymology, or etymologies, of the term, before expanding upon the significance of the zorey 
social identity in relation to visibility, racialisation, and whiteness in the Réunionese and 
French national context. 
 
Contextualising the Zorey: Departmentalisation and Immigration 
 
The zorey population of La Réunion, as distinct from the descendents of prior 
immigration from France and Europe, commonly referred to today as the Ti Blan and Gro Blan, 
is directly related to departmentalisation and the French government’s vision of development 
and progress for the island: 
 
Dès 1946, puis tout au long des décennies suivantes, la départementalisation est 
présentée par l’État comme une politique de développement, de rattrapage et 
d’égalité avec la métropole. Il s’agit, pour reprendre les mots de l’époque, de rompre 
avec l’ère coloniale et de « faire des DOM des départements comme les autres » en 
s’assurant que leurs indices économiques et sociaux se rapprochent progressivement 
de la moyenne nationale.564 
                                                          
561 See Alexandre Bourquin, Histoire des Petits-Blancs de la Réunion: XIXe - début XXe siècles (Paris: 
Karthala, 2005). 
562 This would not appear to be unfounded: in 1996, Labache noted that zoreys formed 10% of 
population, but take up 16% of the jobs. 35% of high‐status civil servant jobs are taken by zoreys. p. 187. 
563 See Wolff and Watin. 
564 Roinsard. My emphasis. 
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 With the enactment of the 1946 law, Réunion became a département d'outre-mer (DOM), and 
thus acquired the same official status as all other metropolitan French departments. However, 
unlike mainland France, Réunion was still essentially a plantation society, with a mono‐crop 
economy,565 high levels of poverty, poor infrastructure, and, for the vast majority of the 
population, limited access to education and non‐existent social mobility. Sociologists Wolff and 
Watin describe the transformations instigated by the French government as part of the 
process of ‘catching‐up’ with the metropole as a ‘processus de techno‐modernisation’ 
accompanied by ‘une forte acculturation'.566 This process of techno‐modernisation required a 
skilled workforce, yet at the time, the majority of the Réunionese population was illiterate. 
Skilled and semi‐skilled personnel from mainland France were thus imported in order to fill a 
gap in the labour market, notably in the public and health sectors.567 As Andoche et al. discuss 
in relation to government documents of the period, ‘[l]e rapport publié en 1956 à la 
Documentation Française sur « L'action sociale dans les territoires d'outre‐mer » illustre bien 
les préoccupations du « service des affaires sociales » de ce ministère et sur la nécessité 
d'organiser la venue massive de personnels qualifiés de la métropole.’568 In addition, projects to 
improve Réunion’s limited infrastructure required technicians and engineers. A guide written 
for French citizens looking to move to the overseas territories in 1954 suggests that these 
posts could be taken up by non‐qualified workers who, by moving to the DOM, could hope to 
benefit from an accelerated career path: 
 
Nous ne saurions trop répéter que c’est dans cette direction que doivent s’engager les 
jeunes français, même s’ils ne possèdent aucun diplôme officiel. En effet, s’ils ont fait 
des études primaires ou secondaires suffisantes, leur valeur propre, alliée à une 
préparation de courte durée, peut leur permettre d’accéder au grade d’adjoint 
technique dans le cadre des Travaux publics d’outre‐mer. Après ce ne sera qu’une 
question de travail et d’intelligence pour franchir tous les échelons […] Et ceci 
s’adresse aussi aux jeunes gens qui, ayant fait de bonnes études secondaires, ne voient 
s’ouvrir devant eux, en France métropolitaine, que des débouchés aléatoires ou 
médiocres.569 
 
It is interesting that the author uses the term ‘français’ to refer exclusively to the metropolitan 
French population, which would suggest that the populations d’outre-mer were considered as 
                                                          
565 Roinsard states that in 1946, two‐thirds of workers were employed in the sugar industry. 
566 Wolff and Watin, p.6, p. 7. 
567 Roinsard. 
568 p. 72, my emphasis. 
569 Louis‐Gabriel Droux, Guide F.O.M. Guide pratique pour ceux qui veulent vivre en France d’Outre-Mer 
3rd ed. (Paris: Société parisienne d’édition, 1954). Cited in Andoche et al., Immigrations réunionnaises, 
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neither ‘really’ French nor suitable candidates for the work which was offered to young 
metropolitan French men, including those without qualifications.570 Thus, the start of mass 
migration from the metropole to Réunion cannot be wholly disassociated from racist attitudes 
which refused the Réunionese population equal status as French citizens.  
We have thus outlined the context in which the first wave of zorey migration to 
Réunion took place in the period of departmentalisation. However, official statistics show that 
the zorey population has continued to increase year on year: the percentage of the 
Réunionese population born in metropolitan France rose from 1.4% in 1967 to 7.4% in 1997,571 
and is now around 10% according to the latest (2006) census results.572 Ironically, whereas it 
would be illegal under French law to include information regarding other Réunionese ethnic 
groups in official statistics, the zorey population can be estimated from the census data, as this 
includes information about place of birth and place of residence five years prior to the census 
date. Migration from the metropole to Réunion has thus not only continued, but has also 
accelerated, long since the initial need for skilled labour was met. Nonetheless, public sector 
jobs in Réunion continue to be dominated by zoreys: Roinsard states that in 2000‐2001, nearly 
half of all posts created locally were taken by metropolitan‐born candidates.573 Moreover, as in 
all other overseas departments, these posts benefit from a bonus which results in salaries 32 
to 52 percent higher than those paid in the metropole. In addition, zoreys are also well‐
represented in the top‐end of the private sector: ‘on dénombre trois fois plus de chefs 
d’entreprise chez les Métropolitains que parmi les Réunionnais’.574 
In any consideration of contemporary zorey identity, then, it would seem that it is 
crucial to recognise the extent to which the first wave of zoreys came to be seen by the 
Réunionese population as representative of French, Western, and modern cultural values – 
values which were to play a central role in the shaping of a Réunionese middle class in the 
                                                          
570 There is an interesting and informative contrast here between these young unqualified metropolitan 
employees who could improve their career prospects and attain a superior social status by moving the 
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in 1963, see G. Gauvin, Michel Debré et l’île de la Réunion. See also Anny Dominique Curtius, ‘Utopies du 
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second half of the twentieth century.575 This was also the case even for those zoreys who 
migrated as unqualified or semi‐skilled workers, who presumably would have come from 
working‐class rather than middle‐class backgrounds. Nonetheless, on their arrival in the 
department, their socioeconomic status as permanent full‐time employees (their financial 
capital), combined with their European phenotype and mastery of the French language (their 
cultural capital), meant that zorey were, and still often are, placed at the top of the 
Réunionese social structure. This would appear to break with long‐standing social dynamics 
regarding immigration and integration. In their overview of historical immigration to the 
island, Andoche et al. identify a pattern of stigmatisation of new arrivals;576 from slave owners 
giving preferential treatment to Creole slaves (born on the island) compared to those born 
elsewhere, to the demonization of indentured labourers from India as religious Others 
encouraged by the Catholic Church.577 The legacy of fear and rejection of the non‐assimilated 
Other can arguably also be seen to continue to influence contemporary attitudes towards the 
recently immigrated population of Mahorais and Comorian origin, both referred to as ‘Komor’ 
in RK, who generally occupy low socioeconomic positions.578 The zorey population, however, as 
one of the more recent arrivals, seem to have escaped this phenomenon of simultaneous 
racial othering and proletarianisation, presumably thanks to their association with Frenchness, 
whiteness, and high socioeconomic status, to an extent regardless of their actual financial 
circumstances. Yet this is not to say that zorey migration to Réunion has not gone uncontested, 
as becomes apparent when we consider how the zorey population are related to and 
represented within popular discourses and culture. 
 
Conceptualising the Zorey: Colonial References, Youth, Gender 
 
In contrast to marginalised (im)migrant groups, then, the zorey ‘ne font pas l’objet 
d’une méfiance ni d’un rejet systématiques’, yet their presence would appear to create 
                                                          
575 Wolff and Watin speak of ‘[l]a « moyennisation » de la société, qui intervient dans les années 1980’: 
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tensions resulting from the invocation of a paternalistic colonial relationship configuration 
which generates a desire to both imitate and spurn the zorey.579 As a result, relations with the 
zorey ‘peuvent être de cordialité, mais aussi de rivalité, notamment pour tout ce qui touche à 
la question de l’emploi, du rapport au travail, et aussi souvent de l’expression identitaire.’580 
Paradoxically, then, the zorey can be symbolically positioned both as colonial benefactor, and 
as a direct competitor within a field of limited resources. A related aspect of the zorey‐as‐
competitor discourse can be found in association of zorey migrants with the verb ‘profiter’, as 
is expressed in ‘ils sont venus pour profiter du soleil’, ‘de la plage’, or even more insidiously, 
‘des salaires indexés’, the increased salaries (often accompanied by relocation packages) paid 
to civil servants in overseas France. The particular connotations of ‘profiter’ as used in this 
context reflect a common perception that young zorey who come to Réunion on a temporary 
basis are there to have fun and enjoy themselves at the island’s expense in some respect, 
whether environmental, financial, cultural, or societal. This reading of the zorey as a transient 
population motivated by self‐gain who take from Réunionese society without contributing in 
return would also appear to invoke a colonial frame of reference which associates the group 
with irresponsible colonisers. The evocation of unequal colonial power relations would thus 
appear to play an important role in eliciting a negative emotive response within 
representations of the zorey, a response which would appear to be justified by observations 
that zorey civil servants have previously ‘tended to adopt a colonial attitude quite rapidly in 
their stay’,581 and ‘have a lifestyle that is distinctly colonial in feel’.582 
These colonial resonances and their emotive appeal thus appear to result in 
contradictory relations with the zorey. On the one hand, the figure of the zorey may undergo a 
process of idealisation which stems from French colonial practices and discourses, still present 
within contemporary cultural practices in Reunion. For example, Lucette Labache’s 
quantitative study of ethnicity in Réunion, which asked respondents which of a series of ethnic 
groups they admired, revealed the zorey to be the most ‘prestigious’ group in Reunion, and the 
group best positioned to serve as a ‘modèle de référence’ and ‘répère’. For Labache, ‘[c]es 
resultats montrent une fascination des Réunionnais pour les Zoreils.’583 On the other hand, 
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however, zoreys may also be confronted with a form of prejudice which might be termed anti-
zoreyisme. Though some zoreys and others characterise this as a form of racial discrimination, 
it is arguably better understood as an expression of anger in reaction to rising levels of social 
inequality in contemporary Réunion. In the early 1990s, it was suggested that  
 
parmi les composantes de la dynamique sociale apparues depuis un demi‐siècle, on 
notera la plus récente, encore discrète mais en pleine évolution : un sentiment de 
réserve, et parfois de rejet de la part des Réunionnais à l’égard des ‘zoreils’, sentiment 
surtout marquée chez les jeunes. Il ne s’exprime pas actuellement en termes de 
racisme véritable – du moins s’il y a préjugés racistes, ils sont motives par des 
considérations d’ordre économique.584 
 
Contemporary evaluations suggest that socioeconomic inequality continues to fuel anti‐zorey 
sentiment: within his sociological study of youth deliquency in Réunion, Laurent Médéa 
maintains that ‘les rares manifestations des tensions ou de ressentiment entre personnes ou 
communautés se dessinent autour de critères économiques (« on s’attaque aux riches ») 
plutôt qu’ethniques, même si certaines communautés symbolisent le pouvoir ou la richesse 
(les groups Zorey et Gro blan), toujours selon les témoignages recueillis.’585 
The fact that anti‐zorey sentiment is thus associated most often with the youth 
population of Réunion would seem to suggest that Réunionese relations with the zorey are 
shaped by generational structures and concerns. This appears to be supported by the fact that 
the practice of graffiti, which has developed as an oppositional youth culture in Réunion,586 
constitutes an important means of expressing anti-zoreyisme. The slogan ‘zorey dehors’, or 
‘zorey déor’ in RK, can be found in graffiti on public buildings, road sides, and other visible 
public locations all over the island.587 The generationally specific aspects of zorey relations can 
perhaps be clarified by examining the particular ways in which the zorey population are 
associated with representations of youth in Réunion. Firstly, it must be recognised that this 
association does not simply reflect demographics: although it has been claimed that the zorey 
are ‘plus jeunes que la moyenne du département (26,5 % ont entre 15 et 29 ans)’,588 it is 
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perhaps more accurate to state that the majority of this population are working‐age adults. 
However, Laurent Decloître’s assertion that ‘ils débarquent dans la force de l’âge’, would 
appear to be largely true, given that in 2006, half of newly arrived zorey were aged between 25 
and 45.589 The common perception of the zorey as a young population thus appears to be 
based in part on lifestyle choices associated with young adulthood, made possible by their 
comparatively higher pouvoir d’achat. This can be seen in the unofficial renaming of the town 
of Saint Gilles on the west coast of the island, which is visited primarily for its beaches and 
nightlife, as ‘Zoreyland’. Furthermore, certain leisure activities, such as surfing590 and 
adventure sports like canyoning,591 are understood to be dominated by zorey. Though of 
course other factors are undoubtedly involved in the difference in preference for these leisure 
activities, the resultant association of the zorey with an idealised youth or extended youth 
lifestyle is nonetheless shown to be directly connected to the group’s relatively higher 
socioeconomic status. As has been acknowledged, this serves as a source of tension which may 
be particularly palpable for young Réunionese who due to a lack of financial or other resources 
are not able to enjoy this type of idealised youth lifestyle. An additional development which 
may further reinforce the perception of the zorey as a youth population point is that increasing 
numbers of Réunionese of the same age are migrating to the metropole and elsewhere to find 
work. Young adults within the zorey population may thus find themselves rendered particularly 
visible, perhaps as a source of resentment, due to the relative shortfall in Réunionese 20‐ and 
30‐somethings who they appear to have in some respects replaced. This interpretation again 
reveals a positioning of the zorey as competitor which, as has been shown, has particular 
significance for the youth and young adult population of Réunion. 
Finally, it should be recognised that not only generational, but also gendered social 
dynamics have affected representations of the zorey. These must be understood in the context 
of developments following Réunionese economic restructuring in the second half of the 
twentieth century after departmentalisation, which resulted in loss of jobs in agriculture, and 
predominantly within sugar cane production. As Helen M. Hintjens has observed, this 
disproportionally affected the Réunionese working class men previously employed in this 
sector.592 As she points out, ‘the change from a primary, commodity‐based economy to a 
tertiary, service‐oriented economy has resulted in a greater proportion of jobs being made 
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available to women’.593 From the 1980s onwards, then, Réunionese women have occupied a 
more active role in the local economy, a development which has significantly impacted on 
gender relations. Hintjens emphasises the speed at which these transformations took place, 
creating ‘a context of rapid changes in local gender relations between men and women’ 
resulting from the ‘dramatic shift in employment from mainly manual and agricultural work, 
performed largely by creole men, to clerical and service employment, where creole women 
almost equal men’.594 Referring to statistical analysis conducted in the late 1980s, she 
maintains that as a consequence, ‘the relative position of the two sexes had altered as 
dramatically as employment patterns’.595 Though this assessment must of course be tempered 
with an acknowledgement that the apparent favouring of Réunionese women within process 
of economic restructuring was accidental, that unemployment continues to remains higher 
amongst women, and that the pied à riz popular conceptualisation of the Réunionese wife as 
bread‐winner is thus largely a myth, it would seem that the gendered nature of these 
transformations cannot be denied.596 As Hintjens succinctly concludes, ‘[t]he effect, overall, 
has been to marginalise poor creole men from economic life.’597 
Given that these changes occurred during a period in which zorey immigration was on 
the increase, it would seem fair to suggest that relations between zorey and Réunionese, and 
particularly those of a heterosexual nature, were undoubtedly affected. Hintjens proposes that 
personal advertisements in Réunionese newspapers in the early 1990s can be considered as a 
pertinent example of how these changing relations were played out within popular discourse. 
As she explains, 
 
Usually metropolitan (often military) men seek creole mistresses. Creole women, on 
the other hand, tend to be looking for husbands, and often for metropolitan men as 
partners. Being passed over in this way causes anger among creole men, who see 
these women as alienated and mentally colonised, and metropolitan men as sexually 
aggressive and colonising.598  
 
Hintjens suggests that at the time of her research in Réunion, this resulted in a palpable 
resentment ‘among the young unemployed, but also among students, that metropolitan men 
are more attractive to creole women and “take our women away”’, an expression which 
reveals that patriarchal gender roles have however not been entirely undermined by the 
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increased participation of Réunionese women in the local economy.599 Hintjens goes on to 
note the potential for political manipulation within this emotive response, remarking that ‘the 
slogan Réunion aux Réunionnais appears to have more resonance among young men than 
among young women [as it] reflect[s] the formers’ feelings of hurt pride and economic and 
social marginality’ which is further compounded by ‘a continued colonial mentality of 
“untouchability” in relation to white women’.600  
Of course, gender relations in Réunion have continued to evolve in the twenty years 
since Hintjens’ observations. Nonetheless, although the example of the personal 
advertisements and the reactions they provoked appears as a rather flagrant account of both 
zorey and Réunionese gender stereotypes, I must also acknowledge that during fieldwork I also 
encountered negative conceptualisations of ‘Creole men’ which appeared to reflect a 
continuation of elements of this discourse. In June 2012, during a conversation in a shared taxi 
to the airport with a middle‐aged Réunionese woman and a young zorey returning to France 
after working on the island for six months, the former instigated a discussion of ‘les créoles’, 
signifying here Réunionese men. After relaying a list of negative characteristics which largely 
fitted the stereotype of the macho yet irresponsible and unreliable Creole man, the 
Réunionese woman asked about our experiences in an apparent attempt to establish 
sympathy and empathy. Yet when the zorey woman asked her in an honest bid for 
clarification, ‘mais vous, vous n’êtes pas créole?’, the conversation came to a close. The 
question appears to call into question the implicit understanding that, due to the 
particularities of gender relations in Réunion, a Creole woman could be forgiven for 
renouncing her solidarity with Creole men, in this situation in order to foster commonality with 
zorey women, but also potentially in order to establish relationships with zorey men. Though 
no subsequent comparative discussion of zorey men followed, the Réunionese woman’s 
eagerness to hear our negative experiences with Creole men as zorey women appeared to 
imply an underlying comparative judgement which presented ‘our’ zorey men in a favourable 
light. 
It has thus been established that the representation of the zorey within popular 
discourses, which has over time resulted in the establishment of a stereotype, has been 
fundamentally shaped by, firstly, the invocation of a colonial frame of reference and 
asymmetrical colonial power relations; secondly, generational structures and issues pertaining 
to both the symbolic representation of youth and the lived experience of young Réunionese; 
and thirdly, transformations in Réunionese gender relations which in turn have reified 
differences between constructions of zorey and Creole masculinities. It thus becomes apparent 
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that the anxieties produced by these representations have created a focus on zorey men which 
arguably obscures the particular social dynamics which are generated through the integration 
of zorey women. As a result, in its dominant mode, the zorey stereotype is assumed to be 
male, unless it is explicitly stated otherwise. It would therefore seem that, at the level of 
representation, the differences between constructions of zorey and Réunionese masculinities 
and feminities have not resulted in the overturning of traditional gender roles in Réunion, 
notably as regards the implication that male gender is normative. In the remainder of this 
chapter, however, I will attempt to show that the act of naming the zorey can in contrast be 
seen to challenge representations of whiteness as normative within the French national 
context. Despite their privileged position, the act of naming French metropolitans as zorey 
does in some way invoke a marginal status as non‐integrated new arrivals, a identity which 
may then be contested by ‘creolised’ zorey individuals. Let us now turn to the etymology of the 
term zorey in order to expand upon the significance of this act of naming. 
 
What’s in a Name? Etymology and Use of the Term Zorey 
 
No definitive etymology of the term zorey exists. We know approximately when, but 
we do not know why the Réunionese population exactly started calling metropolitan French 
zorey. In his 1974 linguistic survey, Robert Chaudenson notes that, according to his 
respondents, the term was not used prior to the First World War.601 Chaudenson suggests that 
the most likely etymology for this use of zorey could be as a translation of ‘mena sofina’ (lit. 
‘red ears’), a Malagasy expression for Europeans which Réunionese soldiers could have heard 
whilst stationed in Madagascar in the First World War. He further suggests that usage of term 
may have been facilitated by the RK expression ‘fé zorey’ meaning faire le sourd, given that 
metropolitan officers would not have understood Réunionese soldiers conversing amongst 
themselves in RK.602  
For the purposes of this analysis, however, it is perhaps more instructive that a 
number of etymological explanations circulate within Réunionese popular discourse. These 
range from more benign accounts of metropolitan French people’s ears burning and becoming 
red in the sun, and the newly‐arrived having difficulties in understanding Kreol, hence the need 
to tendre l’oreille; to the suggestion that the zorey once were thought to act as spies and were 
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in effect ‘ears’ for the French administration in Paris. Another popularly evoked explanation is 
yet more sinister: the term is linked to the amputation of ears as a punishment for runaway 
slaves in the colonial era, and the image of the chasseurs des marrons, the hunters of runaway 
slaves employed by the French Compagnie des Indes, returning from their missions 
brandishing the severed ears, and possibly other body parts, of slaves who had run away from 
the plantations. Though, as Chaudenson points out, this is an unlikely etymology given that 
usage of the term zorey only dates back to the early twentieth century, the fact that this has 
become an etymological explanation in popular discourse gives an idea of the feelings of 
bitterness and anger that the zorey population evoke. One significant factor here is that, as 
discussed above, although the zorey who arrived in Réunion after departmentalisation were 
new arrivals, they did not undergo the same social and economic marginalisation which other 
groups experienced. Furthermore, whereas other migrants may not have successfully 
integrated in Réunionese society, and thereby benefit from no longer being socioeconomically 
marginalised, until established on the islands for two generations or more, zorey individuals 
appear to benefit from an ‘automatic’ privileged socioeconomic status, including those who do 
not intend to settle permanently on the island. It would seem that this can be tied to two 
ostensible factors: the fact that zorey migrants to Réunion are Francophone, and thus exhibit 
mastery of French, the language of privilege, and the fact that they are also predominantly 
white. 
However, it would seem that the racial connotation of the term zorey is not considered 
as the term’s primary signification. This is instead thought to refer to a person from mainland 
France, or even more generally, somebody from ‘outside’, i.e. not from Réunion. As Andoche 
et al. explain, ‘[l]’angle collectif renvoie à la notion de réunionnité qui se jouant sur cette 
opposition générale “dedans”/“dehors”, permet de distinguer entre les populations 
historiquement intégrées (“mond’ pays”) et celles qui migrant récemment, sont considérées 
comme des étrangers (“mond’ dehors”)’.603 In this sense, ‘foreignness’ is the first and most 
important criteria used in determining who should be categorised as zorey, although this 
concept of foreignness does not take into account the official nationality of individuals. Given 
that a proportion of the Réunionese non‐zorey population is also ‘white,’ whiteness is not 
specifically evoked by the term, and yet it is implicitly recognised that the term could never be 
used to apply to someone who is non‐white. Here another parallel to use of ‘gringo’ in Latin 
America becomes apparent in that the term is used for North Americans, or even more 
restrictively: according to Diane M. Nelson, ‘[i]n Latin America gringo (masc.) is a disrespectful 
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term for people from the U.S.’604 When I was called ‘gringa’ (the feminine variant of ‘gringo’) 
during a visit to Brazil, it was explained to me that it wasn’t necessarily an offensive term and 
could be considered a synonym for ‘foreigner’. Yet when I asked, they conceded that the term 
would never be used to describe a non‐white Westerner. In a similar way to ‘gringo’ in Latin 
America, zorey doesn’t simply correspond to ‘foreign’, and yet neither does zorey mean 
‘white’, because some Réunionese ‘Creoles’ are also white. Therefore, zorey could be said to 
signify the combination of ‘foreignness’ (in the sense of belonging to the ‘mond’ déor’), with 
whiteness. Yet, for most Réunionese, the racial connotations of the term remain secondary: 
the term is rarely acknowledged as a signifier of whiteness. When I asked Réunionese friends 
and acquaintances whether they would consider me as zorey despite my British (i.e. not 
French) nationality, they most commonly replied that they would because the term zorey 
refers to somebody who comes from outside of Réunion. They would never mention my 
European phenotype or whiteness as a justification for my inclusion in the zorey category. This 
is in stark contrast to the experience of a black friend who also grew up in England but has now 
lived in Réunion for several years: she is more likely to be called kafrine605 and mistaken for a 
réunionnaise, and would certainly never be called a zorey. 
And yet, despite an apparent reluctance to engage with the racial connotations of the 
term, becoming zorey through interaction with the Réunionese social context arguably raises 
the issue of whiteness, and of one’s own whiteness. Conceptualising whiteness as an ‘issue’ in 
this way can itself be seen as having a radical impact: as Richard Dyer points out, ‘in the West, 
being white is not an issue for most white people, not a conscious or reflected on part of their 
sense of who they are’.606 Thus being categorised in terms of one’s racial positioning can be a 
particularly disorientating experience for white individuals. Becoming zorey no longer allows 
French metropolitan subjects to believe that they are somehow living ‘racially neutral’ lives, 
which they may still believe to be the case even after having recognised racial oppression in 
the lives of others.607 In the following section, I intend to further explore this in relation to the 
notion of racial (in)visibility, including the ‘invisibility’ of whiteness and of white people’s racial 
privilege from the dominant (white) perspective. 
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Race, Whiteness and Colour-Blindness: Issues of (In)visibility 
 
Considering the position of the zorey in Réunionese society from a critical perspective 
brings up multiple questions of visibility and invisibility in connection with race and interracial 
relations. These are relevant not only with regard to the specificities of the Réunionese 
context, but also to those of the French state, and of the Western world in general, given that 
zorey individuals are considered as direct representatives of both, particularly as concerns the 
continuing prevalence of the ‘colour‐blind’ discourse on race. Questions of (in)visibility may be 
considered as working on a number of different levels. Firstly, and more generally, they evoke 
the invisibility of Réunion as a département d’outre-mer within the French media and, 
specifically, within French discourses on the nation. Through her critical analysis of the French 
media’s and government’s reaction to the 2006 Chikungunya outbreak in La Réunion, 
Françoise Lionnet decries ‘the centre‐periphery relationship that underwrites the continued 
marginalization of the DOM as invisible fragments of the French nation’.608 Réunion, which can 
boast neither the tourist appeal of Martinique or Guadeloupe, nor Guyane’s space 
programme, may indeed be the least visible of the four original DOM.609 Lionnet suggests that 
‘Reunion seems to become significant and “visible” in public discourse only when it is the site 
of catastrophic natural, medical or political events’.610 It could be suggested that one reason 
for this is that Réunionese people, as racial, linguistic, socio‐economic, and possible religious 
Others, are ‘illegible’ as French citizens – or at least as equal French citizens – within 
mainstream political discourse.611 Race and nationality in this sense can be equated with 
Butler’s reformulation of sex within her conceptualisation of gender as performative:  ‘“Sex” is, 
thus, not simply what one has, or a static description of what one is: it will be one of the norms 
by which the “one” becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a body for life within the domain 
of cultural intelligibility’.612 Being, for example, dark‐skinned and French may not necessarily 
bring one’s cultural intelligibility into question, but being dark‐skinned, French and living on a 
‘tropical island’ (apparently without a specific geographical location),613 in addition to speaking 
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a different language within everyday interaction which itself serves as an indicator of different 
cultural values, which in turn result from a different sociohistorical context, may do so. 
Secondly, the differential power structure invoked by the racial order affects visibility 
of certain individuals and groups, and vice‐versa. David Theo Goldberg reminds us that 
 
visibility and invisibility are not simply states or conditions of being. Rather they 
characterise, express, reflect, or they are the effects of strategic relations.614 
 
 These strategic power relations can be effective to such a point that they render non‐white 
individuals literally invisible. In a different political context, that of the US, where the ‘colour‐
blind’ approach to race remains prevalent nonetheless, Ruth Frankenberg conducted 
ethnographic research amongst white women of differing ages and class backgrounds. When 
she inquired about her respondents’ childhoods, in several cases she noted that non‐white 
figures such as maids and household employees were literally erased from individuals’ 
memories, although the respondents may have been physically close. She suggests that what 
may have made these ‘forgotten and suddenly remembered’ women ‘invisible’615 was the 
asymmetrical power structure between differentially racialised individuals:  
 
it is primarily through employer‐employee, class‐imbalanced relationships that women 
from apparently all‐white homes encountered women of color. If not themselves in 
positions of clear authority, these white middle‐class women must have seen their 
parents in such positions, able to summon and dismiss the racially different Other at 
will. It is perhaps in this sense of control and authority that the home was indeed all 
white, and the neighborhood similarly so.616 
 
She notes that in her respondents accounts of childhood, ‘[e]ven the presence or absence of 
people of color seemed to be as much a social‐mental construct as a social‐physical one’.617 
When another respondent, Clare, says that there were ‘probably’ no black children in her 
primary school, but possibly one or two, Frankenberg explains that this can be seen as 
indicative of a white‐centred viewpoint: 
 
Clare’s standpoint here is clearly different from that of the African American 
townspeople themselves, for whom it would be impossible to confuse existence with 
nonexistence. What Clare’s cloudy memory on this point perhaps indicates is the lack 
of importance accorded to Black people in the community by whites.618 
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Unsurprisingly, therefore, although zorey in Réunion could be considered as an ethnic 
minority, though not in the sense that the this term is often employed in the West, and 
although they are ‘othered’ through linguistic, cultural and other forms of difference which 
show them to belong to the ‘mond’ deor’ rather than to Réunion, they are highly visible as a 
social group. They are unlikely to be elided or ‘forgotten’ in the same way that non‐white 
individuals were in the above accounts. Yet it is significant that this visibility operates in a 
different way to the (usually unacknowledged) forms of visibility that they may be accorded in 
the metropolitan French context. Indeed, becoming zorey entails moving from a social 
framework where the dominant group (white European) is juxtaposed against ethnic 
minorities, which may also include individuals of mixed and partially European heritage, to a 
system in which zorey are contrasted with the ‘indigenous’ Réunionese. Yet paradoxically, 
from a European or Western perspective at least, the Réunionese group is, and is recognised 
as, a racially and culturally heterogeneous group, whereas the zorey are presumed to be 
racially and culturally homogeneous. (This may give a partial explanation of why it would not 
be discursively possible to include representation of non‐white individuals within the zorey 
group). But still, despite, or because of their homogeneity, it is the zorey who are marked as 
Other in Réunion. Thus, zorey individuals are primarily visible, or, in Butler’s terms, become 
‘culturally intelligible’ by means of a sociocultural, socioeconomic, and racialised group, rather 
than as individuals marked in other (gendered, classed, etc.) ways. 
The third aspect of (in)visibility highlighted by the zorey in Réunion relates therefore to 
the supposed invisibility of whiteness. Frankenberg gives the following three‐fold definition of 
whiteness: 
 
First, whiteness is a location of structural advantage, of race privilege. Second, it is a 
‘standpoint,’ a place from which white people look at ourselves, at others, and at 
society. Third, ‘whiteness’ refers to a set of cultural practices that are usually 
unmarked and unnamed.619 
 
It is these cultural practices which, as Frankenberg, Dyer, and others have evidenced, are 
presented ‘simultaneously as generic or normative and as an apparently empty [or residual] 
cultural space.’620 For Frankenberg, the discursive repertoire used by respondents’ which 
criticised white (American) culture as being ‘formless’,621 when analysed, proves ineffectual 
and even counter‐productive as a form of anti‐racist discourse. As she explains, 
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A far‐reaching danger of whiteness coded as ‘no culture’ is that it leaves in place 
whiteness as defining a set of normative cultural practices against which all are 
measured as into which all are expected to fit. This normativity has underwritten 
oppression from the beginning of colonial expansion.622 
 
This recognition would appear to provide much of the motivation behind one of the aims of 
critical whiteness studies: that is, to ‘name’ whiteness and thereby begin to undo its supposed 
normativity.623 It could be proposed that a similar dynamic is brought into play in the act of 
naming the zorey subject/object. This is the case even if, in terms of the first and primary 
meaning of the term, which evokes a ‘dedans/dehors’ binary, normativity is simply shifted 
from the metropolitan French to the Réunionese cultural sphere without calling into question 
the legitimacy of having one such set of normative cultural values, leaving aside for a moment 
the difficulties which one might encounter in trying to visualise, even in the abstract, one 
singular Réunionese cultural sphere. Because, in naming the zorey, or, to borrow Butler’s 
terms, ‘zoreying the zorey’,624 the Réunionese subject identifies the individual as forming part 
of a group – a group which is both characterised by cultural specificity (and racial specificity – 
even if, as I argue, the racial connotations of the term are underplayed), and marked as Other. 
The zorey individual can thus no longer maintain the illusion of their ‘normalcy,’ that they are a 
non‐racialised human being, ‘not of a certain race, […] just the human race’.625 Not only is s/he 
marked as raced, culturally different and Other, but s/he is also becoming ‘viable’ and 
‘culturally intelligible’ as part of a sociocultural and racial group. In stark contrast to white 
people in the West, then, zorey in Réunion are more visible as a cultural and racial group than 
as individuals. 
It thus becomes apparent that, although the privileged racial position of whiteness 
may prove to be invisible to white people (Peggy McIntosh conceptualises this as an ‘invisible 
weightless knapsack’ full of things which may ‘come in handy’626), this may not be the case for 
(racial) others. Frankenberg suggests that ‘[w]hiteness, as a set of normative cultural practices, 
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is visible most clearly to those it definitively excludes and those to whom it does violence.’627 In 
the act of naming of the zorey, the Réunionese subject thus demonstrates ‘the critical capacity 
of the black [here, Réunionese] gaze to tease out the subtleties of whiteness and thereby 
reflect whiteness back to whites themselves.’628 The same may be said of the particular nature 
of the ‘colour‐blind’ approach to cultural and racial difference within French Republican policy 
and discourse, which in fact belies the false universalisms of what we might term a white‐
centeredness. The French conceptualisation of the individual citizen, which draws from the 
theories of the Enlightenment, constructs as its ideal the neutral and disinterested subject who 
strives for objectivity, which allows him [sic] to attain truth and knowledge. In his extended 
discussion of the cultural meaning of whiteness, Dyer puts forward the case that ‘there is 
something especially white in this non‐located and disembodied position of knowledge’,629 an 
argument which would appear to completely undermine the Republican universalist rhetoric 
through and in which white French subjects’ identities have been and continue to be formed. 
A fourth aspect of invisibility is thus raised by Dyer’s shrewd analysis of 
representations of whiteness. He suggests that in dominant (white) discourse, whiteness has 
traditionally been defined not in terms of physical attributes, in stark contrast to definitions of 
other racial ‘types’,630 but rather  in relation to ‘spirit’, discipline, and being able to transcend 
bodily desires. Thus what makes ‘whiteness’ white is in fact invisible – it concerns non‐bodily, 
and therefore non‐visible, elements of the individual. Dyer argues that this position draws 
from the imagery of Christianity and, significantly, from the paradox of ‘incarnation’: 
 
 of being that is in the body yet not of it. […] All concepts of race, emerging out of 
eighteenth‐century materialism, are concepts of bodies, but all along the have had to 
be reconciled with notions of embodiment and incarnation. The latter become what 
distinguish white people, giving them a special relation to race. Black people can be 
reduced (in white culture) to their bodies and thus to race, but white people are 
something else that is realised in and yet not reducible to the corporeal, or racial.631 
 
This definition of whiteness as being above all concerned with the ‘spirit of mastery over their 
and other bodies, in short their potential to transcend their raced bodies,’632 i.e. that which can 
only be ‘hinted at’, but not definitively shown, through the visible body, proves however to be 
problematic in a number of ways. Dyer proposes that, in a visual culture, social groups benefit 
                                                          
627 p. 229. 
628 p. 107. 
629 p. 4. 
630 Dyer notes that that it would be impossible to produce, for white people, ‘the kind of taxonomy of 
typification that had been done for non‐white peoples […] because the privilege of being white in white 
culture is not to be subjected to stereotyping in relation to one’s whiteness’. p. 11. 
631 p. 14‐5. 
632 Dyer, pp. 24‐5. 
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from being visually identifiable: ‘[b]eing visible as white is a passport to privilege’. Yet, he goes 
on to outline the first paradox of white (in)visibility: 
 
Yet […] whiteness also needs not to be visible. The claim to racial superiority resides in 
that which cannot be seen, the spirit, manifest only in its control over the body and its 
enterprising exercise in the world. Moreover, the ultimate position of power in a 
society that controls people in part through their visibility is that of invisibility, the 
watcher.633 
 
As has been established above, ‘[l]ooking and being looked at reproduce racial power 
relations’; and yet white people cannot maintain their privileged position of ‘observer’ of 
(racial) others if they themselves are not seen as ‘white’.634 Dyer suggests that the choice of 
the colour white as the term to define the skin colour of people of European origin serves to 
provide a solution, if only a temporary one, to the paradox of the (in)visibility of whiteness: 
 
Whites must be seen to be white, yet whiteness as race resides in invisible properties 
and whiteness as power is maintained by being unseen. To be seen as white is to have 
one’s corporeality registered, yet true whiteness resides in the non‐corporeal. The 
paradox and dynamic of this are expressed in the very choice of white to characterise 
us. White is both a colour and, at once, not a colour and the sign of that which is 
colourless because it cannot be seen: the soul, the mind, and also emptiness, non‐
existence and death, all of which form part of what makes white people socially white. 
Whiteness is the sign that makes white people visible as white, while simultaneously 
signifying the true character of white people, which is invisible.635 
 
This can then allow for a conflation of (male gendered) whiteness with a universal or ‘neutral’ 
subject position, much like that constructed within French Republican discourse: 
 
non white people are presumed to be still, and perhaps forever, at the stage of 
‘particular, local sensations’, not having made the move to disinterested subjecthood. 
[…] They are the particular, marked, raced, whereas the white man has attained the 
position of being without properties, unmarked, universal, just human.636 
 
To thus conclude this discussion of (in)visibility in relation to race, whiteness, and 
French Republican discourse, ‘zoreying the zorey’ could arguably be seen as a way of 
redressing the invisibility and supposed normativity of white culture and white privilege. It 
could thus be considered as a means to demand some form of responsibility from whites for 
the unequal positions of whites and non‐whites in the racially structured society – both 
                                                          
633 Dyer, p. 44. 
634 Dyer, p. 45. 
635 Dyer, p. 45. My emphases. 
636 p. 38. 
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historically and in contemporary Réunionese society. The act of naming someone as a zorey is 
one which marks the white individual, s/he who, knowingly or unknowingly, may have been 
the ‘unmarked marker of others’ differentness’.637 It delimits them as ‘foreign’, as a particular 
form of French citizen rather than ‘a universal and universalising’ citizen, and even 
differentiates between them from other light‐skinned people in Réunion. ‘Zoreying the zorey’ 
therefore arguably constitutes a formidable challenge to the supposed ‘normativity’ of 
whiteness in both the regional (Réunionese) and national (French) social context. 
‘Zoreying the zorey’ also confronts the racially privileged – and especially those for 
whom their racial privilege is invisible or ‘normal’ – with the unsettlingness of being seen first 
and foremost as a ‘racialised being’, an experience which is powerfully conveyed by Linda 
Martin Alcoff in relation to reactions to mixed racial heritage: ‘[w]hen mythic bloodlines which 
are thought to determine identity fail to match the visible markers used by identity discourses 
to signify race, one often encounters these odd responses by acquaintances announcing with 
arrogant certainty ‘But you don’t look like...’ or then retreating to a measured 
acknowledgement ‘Now that you mention it, I can sort of see...’ to feel one’s face studied with 
great seriousness, not for its (hoped for) character lines, or its distinctiveness, but for its 
telltale racial trace, can be a particularly unsettling experience’.638 This experience would seem 
in some respects to parallel Butler’s discussion of ‘cultural intelligibility’, or, in this particular 
case, the limits of cultural intelligibility. Furthermore, the figure of the zorey makes evident 
sharp contrasts between what is necessary for ‘cultural intelligibility’ in the Réunionese and 
metropolitan French social context: whereas in the latter any form of cultural or ethnic 
‘difference’ can risk intelligibility, in the former, racial, ethnic, cultural and class‐related 
specificity forms an important part of intercultural communication. 
 
Whiteness and (In)visibility in the Mauritian Context: Some Comparisons 
 
The preceding discussion has thus applied insights from both representational and 
ethnographic analysis from what has come to be known as the academic field of critical 
whiteness studies to the Réunionese context, resulting in a productive engagement with the 
politics of zorey identity as concerns the visibility and normativity of whiteness. It might then 
be asked whether aspects of this analysis might also be applied to a consideration of the social 
identities associated with whiteness in the Mauritian context. In contrast to the Réunionese 
context and the French Republican policy of colour‐blindness, ethnic particularity is inscribed 
                                                          
637 Frankenberg, p. 198 
638 ‘Philosophy and Racial Identity’ in Ethnic and Racial Studies Today, ed. by Martin Bulmer and John 
Solomos (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 29‐44, p. 31. 
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with the Mauritian constitution, which recognises four distinct ‘communities’. The population 
groups which are identified as white, including the Franco‐Mauritians and recent South African 
immigrants, are however grouped within the residual category of the General Population. This 
categorisation is usually contested from the point of view of those claiming to represent the 
majority of Mauritians regrouped here, usually conceptualising all non‐white members of the 
General Population as a particular ethnic community, the ‘Creoles’.639 However, applying the 
insights of critical whiteness studies, the official categorisation might be criticised for not 
explicitly addressing issues of white privilege. It could therefore be argued that this should be 
changed in order to make whiteness visible in Mauritius in the same way that the creation of 
the category zorey within popular discourse arguably works towards making white privilege 
explicit in the Réunionese context. 
In one respect, however, white privilege is particularly visible in Mauritius, if we take 
into account the continuing legacy of the racial hierarchy, whereby a small group of white 
people hold the most privileged positions at the top of the social structure, as has also been 
the case in Réunion. Unlike Réunion, however, Mauritius does not have a historical population 
of poor whites, which would appear to render instances of white privilege yet more explicit. 
However, it would seem that the comparison with analyses of normative whiteness in the 
contexts of Europe and the US is made difficult by the fact that whiteness is not always 
presented as ‘neutral’ in Mauritius. However, it would appear problematic that whiteness in 
postcolonial Mauritius is not automatically associated with visible manifestations of power and 
authority. This results from developments following independence, from whenceforth political 
power has generally been associated with the majority Hindu population, at least as concerns 
the highest level of political representation, the role of Prime Minister. In tandem, the sphere 
of influence of historically dominant Franco‐Mauritian families has moved from the public to 
the private sector, where they now exert control over the Mauritian economy.640 
Finally, though Mauritius has also experienced immigration of white population groups 
in recent decades, particularly from South Africa, no direct equivalent to the zorey social 
identity exists in the Mauritian social context. This is arguably due to the relatively invisibility 
of white population within everyday life in Mauritius, whether this be powerful Franco‐
Mauritian families, or immigrant South Africans who live in gated communities. Whiteness 
                                                          
639 See my discussion of ‘The Creole Population of Mauritius: Issues of Terminology, Race, and Social 
Class’ in Chapter 2 of this study. 
640 See Gregoire’s analysis of the Mauritian tourism industry: ‘[l]es principaux groupes mauriciens 
présents dans la filière touristique sont directement liés aux grandes propriétés sucrières franco‐
mauriciennes, notamment les quatre principales familles (Dalais, Espitalier‐Noël, Lagesse et de Spéville) 
qui contrôlent une partie de l’économie du pays’. ‘Développement touristique et reproduction sociale à 
l’île Maurice’, Civilisations, 57 (2008), 91‐106, <http://civilisations.revues.org/1141?lang=en#ftn9>, 
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thus remains primarily associated with tourism, which evokes a much more visible, although 
temporary, white population group. For this reason, an individual or group identified as white 
who does not originate from Mauritius is thus more likely to be read socially as a tourist, or 
where positioned as non‐tourist due to, for example, length of residence, they are more likely 
to be seen as a social anomaly rather than integrated into a visible and recognised social 
group. The lack of visibility as a social group would thus appear to prevent the development of 
contestatory discourses which might parallel expressions of anti-zoreyisme in Réunion. 
Furthermore, in being positioned as tourists who are understood to give to Mauritius 
financially, white individuals recognised as outsiders may be associated with a colonial 
benefactor role which, unlike in Réunion, is not problematised by the simultaneously 
conceptualisation of the white outsider as competitor. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In her preface to the tenth anniversary edition of Gender Trouble, Judith Butler 
provides the following explanation of her objectives behind the publication of the text, and the 
often misinterpreted concept of performativity in relation to gender identity: 
 
the aim of the text was to open up the field of possibility for gender without dictating 
which kinds of possibilities ought to be realized. One might wonder what use ‘opening 
up possibilities’ finally is, but no one who has understood what it is to live in the social 
world as what is ‘impossible,’ illegible, unrealizable, unreal, and illegitimate is likely to 
pose that question.641 
 
Could talking about zoreys in La Réunion open up possibilities in a similar way? Though some 
may deny, ignore, or accept it, zoreys may also come to resent the additional identity they 
acquire upon arrival on the island. This can result in a tendency to essentialise the Réunionese 
population in reaction to what is perceived as their essentialising of the zorey individual. Could 
an acceptance of zorey as a situated, relational and performative identity – as all racial 
identities indeed are – provide a solution? And do zorey who somehow are not quite French 
enough, or quite rich enough, figure as ‘illegible’ in Réunionese society, within which the image 
of whiteness and Frenchness is still so powerfully linked to prestige and power?642 And would 
accepting that ‘white’ can mean poor and uneducated, or at least accepting that white is not 
an ‘empty’ or ‘normative’ cultural reference serve to somehow undo, or at least undermine, 
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642 In his MA thesis on maloya music and rituals, Benjamin Lagarde says of others’ reactions to him as a 
French (white) student (poor) in Réunion: ‘[l]’idée d’un Zorey pauvre parait impensable’, p. 11. 
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the ‘dazzle’ of whiteness643 which, it must be remembered, is closely interlinked in complex 
ways with the ‘dazzling’ mastery of the island’s ‘more prestigious’ language, French? Could this 
in turn help us to accept that there is no inherent reason why non‐white RK‐speaking 
individuals cannot be successful, intelligent, rich, or physically attractive, without having to 
model themselves on white or zorey cultural traits in some way? 
Butler goes on to explain her account of performativity in relation to a struggle against 
‘the normative violence implied by ideal morphologies of sex’ and ‘presumptive 
heterosexuality’: 
 
The dogged effort to ‘denaturalize’ gender in this text emerges, I think, from a strong 
desire both to counter the normative violence implied by ideal morphologies of sex 
and to uproot the pervasive assumptions about natural or presumptive 
heterosexuality that are informed by ordinary and academic discourses on sexuality. 
The writing of this denaturalization was not simply out of a desire to play with 
language or prescribe theatrical antics in the place of “real” politics, as some critics 
have conjectured (as if theatre and politics are always distinct). It was done from a 
desire to live, to make life possible, and to rethink the possible as such. [...] How must 
we rethink the ideal morphological constraints upon the human such that those who 
fail to approximate the norm are not condemned to a death within life?’644 
 
As Butler herself recognises may be the case, race does not function here as a perfect analogy 
for either gender or sexuality. The ‘normative violence’ implied by performative race roles is 
arguably not as extreme, and yet stereotypes, prejudices and other lasting effects of racial 
hierarchy continue to have significant effect on people lives and within people’s interactions 
with racial and socioeconomic Others. The implication of violence in relation to individuals 
who are seen not to ‘fit’ gender norms is arguably greater than that towards individuals who 
do not ‘fit’ racial categories – which themselves may be recognised to be changeable and 
slippery, at least in some cases. It would seem that as concerns race, it is more the effect of 
being categorised, marked, or racialised which does violence to individuals, as it has done from 
the beginnings of colonisation in Reunion, and continues to do so today. It is precisely the 
supposed ‘unmarkedness’ of the category of ‘white’ that has formed the basis of its legitimacy 
as the dominant social group: so much so that physiologically ‘white’ people who did not fit 
the expectations of the group’s superior socioeconomic status, had to be renamed and thus 
categorised much like non‐whites, as was historically the case with the petit blanc population. 
                                                          
643 ‘Notions of the primitive and the civilised which had been integral to pre‐modern understanding of 
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644 Gender Trouble, p. xxi. 
199 
 
Yet here we must also recognise that zorey individuals also engage in social acts and 
cultural practices which challenge received ideas about social class and the racial order in 
Réunion. In turn, this can be seen to raise the question of the responsibility of the Réunionese 
population as regards the perpetuation of the racial hierarchy. Examples of these practices 
include wearing ‘scruffy’ clothes, as is typical of the island‐style fashion adopted by many 
young zorey, growing dreadlocks, and wearing flip flops. All of these can be seen to value 
comfort and practicality over the social pressure to dress to match one’s perceived social 
status. Such apparently benign acts could arguably lead some Réunionese to question their 
own internalization of colonial mentalities concerning what constitutes ‘appropriate’ 
behaviour for differently racialised social groups. 
What may prove potentially even more complex is the question of zorey engagement 
with practices, ways of living and cultural forms generally considered to be Réunionese and/or 
in some way indigenous to the island. This brings up complex issues regarding white 
appropriation of black cultures, and simultaneously invokes white anxiety over where the line 
is drawn between respectful interest in another culture to inappropriate intrusion. It also 
raises the particularly controversial question of which cultural practices are considered to be 
‘truly’ or ‘authentically’ Réunionese, and who might be thought to have ownership of these 
cultural practices. This is alluded to in Benjamin Largarde’s account of his experience of trying 
to subvert zorey stereotypes, living at the time in St Gilles on the island’s west coast, popularly 
known as ‘Zoreyland’. By the end of his stay, however, he had adopted elements of 
‘traditional’ Réunionese culture, such as using a bertel, a bag worn like a rucksack made from 
vacoa leaves. This prompted a variety of reactions:  
 
‘« Il se moque de nous » (entendu dans le bus) ; « Rentre chez toi ! » (lancé, depuis la 
fenêtre arrière d’une voiture […]) ; “Aou lé pa tro à la mode – tu es démodé » 
(Madame Baba [‘informant’] en riant […]) ; « A ou lé Kréol ? – Tu es Créole ? » 
(commerçant) ou « Ou in vré Kréol koméla – Maintenant tu es un vrai Créole » (des 
amis créoles).’645 
 
Yet he also cites a 29‐year‐old friend who says of the zorey in his commune:  
 
Ils cuisinent créole, ils apprennent notre culture. Il y en a même pour travailler la terre. 
Leurs enfants, zorey ou zoréol, grandissent ici avec ceux des Réyoné. Avant il n’y avait 
aucun habitant ici et l’ile n’appartenait à personne alors c’est eux, c’est banna les 
Créoles de demain ! »646 
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It could thus be concluded that the whilst the zorey are marked as outsiders in the Réunionese 
context, the naming of the zorey, when accompanied by openness to learning about 
Réunionese cultural specificity, could constitute a first step towards integration within the 
island’s heterogeneous society. 
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Conclusion: In Defence of Cultural Politics 
 
This study set out to explore how contemporary popular music and youth culture 
engages with political and social issues in Réunion and Mauritius. It is informed by the 
assumption that popular culture is not ‘doomed to remain forever merely pre‐political’,647 and 
reflects a willingness to take popular cultural seriously within academic analysis. It has also 
been shaped by a conscious decision to privilege the experiences and cultural practices of 
young people from disadvantaged backgrounds. At the beginning of this thesis, it was asked 
whether popular cultural practices and output can be said to respond to the postcolonial 
politics and social conditions of the two island societies, which remain heavily marked by their 
respective histories of racial violence, and which today find themselves positioned at the 
periphery of global economic flows and at the mercy of neoliberal capitalist financial markets. 
Despite the complex relationship between popular culture and capitalism, given that popular 
culture is constituted through and characterised by its commodification, the preceding analysis 
sought to demonstrate that popular culture might serve to create a space in which criticism of 
existing structures of power could be expressed, thereby formulating an oppositional and 
progressive cultural politics. In opening up such an alternative, oppositional space, popular 
culture can therefore been seen to engage with dominant discourses on Mauritianness and 
Réunionness and point towards alternative conceptualisations and representational strategies 
which aim to speak to those who are marginalised within dominant discourses, and to 
challenge neo‐colonial hegemonies which continue to affect the life chances of marginalised 
young people. 
Following an outline of the study’s methodological approach in Part I, the preceding 
analysis has thus presented a number of case studies in which popular music and related 
aspects of youth culture in Réunion and Mauritius can be said to engage with the postcolonial 
politics of their respective contexts. This was divided into a consideration of popular music’s 
engagement with contemporary language politics, which was itself often mediated through re‐
appropriations of globalised culture, in Part II (Chapters 2 and 3); and with the politics of 
belonging in Part III (Chapters 4 and 5), which explored aspects of competing discourses on the 
nation‐state and community, and how these are positioned in relation to differing 
conceptualisations of race and ethnicity. 
 
Part I: The Politics of Research 
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Just as the present study acknowledges the political potential of popular culture, it 
also recognises that the research process itself is necessarily political, and is ultimately shaped 
by the politics of the researcher. In Part I, therefore, I outlined the methodological approach 
which informed the ethnographic research I undertook in Réunion and Mauritius, and 
discussed this in particular in relation to my involvement with Abaim, an NGO and community 
music group involving young people from a disadvantaged neighbourhood in central Mauritius. 
I questioned to what extent practices of thick participation, might shape the relationship 
between researcher and participants, particularly in situations where these are conditioned by 
significant differences in terms of power, social status and cultural background, as was the 
case in my own experience of conducting research.648 I argued here for the importance of 
shared experience, with reference to Wikan’s concept of resonance as an alternative – and 
complementary – way of understanding ethnographic data, which might serve to guard against 
our perhaps instinctive desire as scholars to decipher text rather than to comprehend the 
meaning that participants are trying to convey to us.649 However, I also drew attention to the 
particular ethical issues that may arise when conducting this type of research because of the 
ambiguous researcher role. As both researcher and fellow member of the music and 
community group, my own research experience led me to acknowledge that it was in fact 
inevitable that through prolonged and frequent interaction, we risk becoming part of people’s 
lives, and vice versa. 
Choosing to adopt a thick participation approach in ethnographic research therefore 
involves choosing to share our personal lives, and not just our research personas, with 
participants. It also means choosing to value participants as individuals, and to value rapport 
over speed, efficiency and range of data collection. As a result of conducting thick participation 
research, I cannot say that I was guaranteed an ‘insider’ or emic viewpoint on either Mauritian 
or Reunionese popular culture. However, it would seem fair to say that the position from 
which I approached my analysis changed as a result of my experiences, and as I learnt from my 
participants. One such result of my experience of conducting research and of living in 
Mauritius over an extended period of several months concerned my changing opinions 
towards nationalist movements when formulated as the basis for social change in favour of 
greater equality. As a result, I was able to consider cultural engagement with nationalism from 
a less dismissive perspective, which I previously saw as a concept which was necessarily 
politically conservative rather than progressive due to my inability to disassociate it from the 
context of recent European political history. My perspective on commoditised forms of 
globalised popular culture was also significantly altered by seeing how young people in 
                                                          
648 See Spittler. 
649 See Wikan, Resonance: Beyond the Words. 
203 
 
Mauritius and Réunion appeared to engage with these ‘imported’ or ‘foreign’ musical forms, 
and what meanings they attached to them. 
 
Part II: Globalised Popular Culture, Language Politics and Youth 
 
The ever‐increasing global circulation of cultural forms which marks our contemporary 
era is popularly bemoaned as the cause of young people’s perceived preference for globalised 
popular culture and waning interest in locally produced culture in peripheral locations like 
Réunion and Mauritius. Young people’s participation in ‘traditional’ music groups like Abaim 
(see Chapters 1 and 2) and Titan Maloyèr (discussed in Chapter 3) would appear to trouble this 
assessment; however, it cannot be denied that young people’s access to global popular culture 
has been greatly facilitated by technology such as the internet and satellite television. The 
increased visibility of black, often African‐American culture within globalised popular culture 
would appear to add another layer of complexity to cultural developments within Réunion and 
Mauritius, given that its impact arguably remains ambivalent: Ellis Cashmore, for example, has 
sought to demonstrate how the prominence of black culture in the US entertainment industry 
does not necessarily promote a more progressive cultural politics, as within this power 
relations remain essentially unchanged. Indeed, he suggests that ‘[t]he most significant value 
of black culture may be in providing whites with proof of the end of racism while keeping the 
racial hierarchy essentially intact.’650 Constructions of racialised subjectivity and ethnicity 
within popular culture which are subsequently projected beyond their original local or national 
context as globalised popular culture thus appear at best problematic as a basis for the 
development of oppositional politics in the ‘receiving’ peripheral locations. Yet pessimistic 
accounts of cultural imperialism651 are challenged time and again by empirical ethnographic 
analyses which suggest that globalised cultural forms can undergo processes of ‘re‐
localisation’, and thereby develop meanings specific to the local context in order to voice social 
critique.652  The global reach of the musical cultures of reggae and hip hop would appear as 
two very pertinent examples in this regard. However, if we accept Gilroy’s assertion that ‘black 
global culture as a world culture is American’,653 we might then ask how do young people in 
                                                          
650 The Black Cultural Industry (New York; London: Routledge, 1997), p. 2. 
651 Space does not permit a full discussion of the concept of cultural imperialism here. For a discussion of 
the problematic nature of the term see John Tomlinson, Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), especially ‘The Discourse of Cultural Imperialism’, pp. 
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652 See, for example, Sarah Daynes, ‘The Musical Construction of the Diaspora: The Case of Reggae and 
Rastafari’ in Music, Space and Place: Popular Music and Cultural Identity, ed. by Sheila Whiteley, Andy 
Bennett and Stan Hawkins (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 25‐41. 
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peripheral locations relate to representations of black subjectivity, noting that the concept of 
blackness itself is arguably tied to a history of oppositional political movements in the US 
context, including the Civil Rights and Black Power movements, of which neither Réunionese 
nor Mauritian history has direct equivalents. 
As globally peripheral locations where the languages of everyday communication (MK 
and RK) are conceived as minority languages on an international level, despite remaining the 
majority language within their respective island contexts, analysis of the circulation of 
globalised popular music and cultural forms in Réunion and Mauritius must arguably also take 
into account the politics of language. RK and MK are yet to be fully accepted and incorporated 
within official spheres in either Mauritius or Réunion; they remain stigmatised and devalued in 
relation to the former colonial languages of French and English, which are perceived as 
languages of prestige and of international importance. The preceding analysis thus asked how 
Kreol languages might interact with other languages within popular culture. The combination 
of Kreol languages with those recognised as ‘international’ could appear to confirm the 
marginalised nature of the Kreol languages and their inevitable decline, as they are thus 
presented as no longer relevant to the (post)modern world. However, in the musical texts 
discussed in Part II (Chapters 2 and 3), it was suggested that actors can be seen to creatively 
draw on global culture within their inclusion of international languages, predominantly 
English(es), in order to accord prestige to the respective Kreol languages. Therefore, despite 
their very different cultural aesthetics and musical styles, the youth music group Abaim 
(Chapter 2) and dancehall artists in Réunion and Mauritius (Chapter 3) can be said to employ 
similar strategies within their engagement with globalised popular music. It would seem that 
the latter plays a strategic role in the development of an oppositional language politics which 
challenges common perceptions and the neo‐colonial tendency to devalorise the Kreol 
languages which has persisted into the postcolonial present. 
In both cases, the concern with the revalorisation of the stigmatised Kreol language 
appears interlinked with a conscious effort to provide representation of childhood and youth 
in the respective contexts. In Chapter 2, this is expressed through Abaim’s implicit critique of 
‘auto‐ethnicisation’, the dominant strategy used in demands for cultural recognition which are 
legitimated by their being made on behalf of a recognised ethnoreligious group. This strategy 
relies upon an ethnicised notion of cultural ownership which underlies Mauritian official 
discourse on culture. It was argued that Abaim’s musical representations can be seen to 
develop a counter‐narrative to dominant discourses on culture and language, in that they 
appear to reject the model of auto‐ethnicisation and instead claim recognition for MK on 
behalf of all children in Mauritius, rather than a specific ethnic group. Furthermore, it was 
suggested that by associating MK with childhood, Abaim engage with complex emotions of 
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simultaneous shame and affection experienced within multilingual contexts where the mother 
tongue co‐exists alongside one or more languages which are considered as languages of 
prestige and as linguistic capital crucial for social mobility. Abaim’s position on language 
politics is thus situated in stark contrast to that of the post‐independence Mauritian state, 
which attempts to sidestep these issues through instead promoting a conceptualisation of 
postcolonial dignity which is founded upon the dissemination and learning of ancestral 
languages. Finally, it was proposed that Abaim’s musical translations convey both a sense of 
equality and complementarity between MK and more ‘prestigious’ languages which would 
appear to anticipate parents’ concerns and to engage with ongoing debates regarding the 
introduction of MK in schools in January 2012. At the same time, however, their translations’ 
divergence from the source text would appear to point towards an autonomous Mauritian 
sociocultural experience and sociocultural specificity, which itself can be seen to coexist and 
interact with globalised popular culture within the national cultural sphere. This in turn can be 
said to further problematise overly simplistic conceptualisations of cultural ownership, in that 
it allows Mauritian children to say of what have become globally popular songs ‘this is also 
mine’, and therefore also Mauritian. Thus, despite the fact that the globalised culture engaged 
with here would appear to speak to notions of a process of global cultural homogenisation 
resulting in Anglophone cultural dominance, and thereby support the cultural imperialism 
thesis; the analysis of Abaim’s musical translations would seem to suggest that even the most 
commercialised and banal forms of global pop culture, such as Christmas songs, can be shown 
to provoke creative responses on the part of locally‐based actors. Furthermore, these 
responses can be seen to speak directly to the problems of their national context, most 
notably here concerning the status of MK and its position within the education system in 
relation to the rights of Mauritian children.  
The images of youth invoked by dancehall music discussed in Chapter 3 appear far 
removed from the associations with innocence which might be evoked within Abaim’s 
representations of Mauritian childhood experience. However, dancehall as a genre would 
appear to also be concerned with making visible the problems of young people, particularly 
those from the lower classes. Similarly, it also conceptualises the revalorisation of RK as central 
to resisting the marginalisation of lower‐class youth, although this revalorisation would appear 
to be formulated rather differently here. The preceding analysis attempted to establish that, 
despite its seemingly commercialised nature and reproduction of clichéd tropes of sex and 
machismo, the musical production of dancehall artists in Réunion can be seen to engage with 
existing discourses on Réunionness, authenticity and modernity. I suggested that the 
juxtaposition of English and RK in dancehall lyrics challenges the presumed mutual exclusivity 
of authentic Creoleness and global modernity, which arguably serves to further marginalise 
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unemployed Creolophone young people in Réunion. Therefore, though in many cases 
Reunionese dancehall would appear to exemplify the ‘bio‐politics of fucking’ much maligned 
by Gilroy, which he claims have obscured and replaced the political agency of previous black 
musical forms, it was argued that dancehall in Réunion can also be seen to engage with 
political issues and that therefore it does deserve to be taken seriously within academic 
analysis.654 
Furthermore, building on my observations and participatory research with a maloya 
youth music group in Le Port, a disadvantaged urban area in Réunion, I suggest that the 
rupture framework set out by Gilroy in his criticism of post‐soul black musical expression 
cannot be applied wholesale to the Réunionese context, in that we can identify continuities 
and parallels with previous forms of musical expression. The conceptualisation of struggle, 
encapsulated in the term ‘militer’ and ‘militant’, can be seen to link dancehall artists to the 
proponents of politically‐engaged electric maloya of the 1970s and 1980s, which aimed to act 
as a porte-parole for subordinated Réunionese culture in the face of French acculturation 
following departmentalisation. Furthermore, the centrality of the concepts of ‘défouler’, and 
of playful engagement with shock and vulgarity (sometimes in relation to expressions of 
sexuality), can be seen to suggest a continuity which stretches further back to maloya as the 
musical practices of the subordinated population in the colonial era.655 Both maloya and 
dancehall can thus be conceptualised as subaltern forms of expression, concerned with 
conveying and speaking to the experience of subordinated population in Réunion; however, 
because maloya has now been sanctified by official processes of cultural recognition, notably 
through gaining status as world intangible heritage granted by UNESCO in 2009, it could be 
asked whether its capacity to resist marginalisation has diminished. Dancehall, on the other 
hand, arguably continues to oppose this through an articulation of a Kreol modernity which is 
self‐proclaimed as both authentically Réunionese through its proximity to the lived experience 
of the lower classes, and as insistently part of global modernity. Thus, though dancehall can be 
said to advocate a rather different set of cultural politics as compared to the production of 
Abaim, both are concerned with establishing the place of both their respective Kreol languages 
and of Creolophone children and youth in global modernity, thereby affirming the continued 
relevance of RK and MK as living, evolving languages, rather than as symptomatic of a dying 
culture. 
 
                                                          
654 Gilroy, ‘Bio‐politics’, p. 88. 
655 This would appear to parallel Stolzhoff’s approach to Jamaican dancehall and previous musical 
practices of the subordinated classes, who contends ‘that the dancehall has been a space of cultural 
creation and performance since the slavery era, even though the name given to this constellation of 
oppositional practices has changed over time.’ Stolzhoff, p. 3. 
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Part III, The Politics of Belonging: Contesting Community, Race, and 
Nation within Popular Culture 
 
It would therefore seem that the findings of Part II suggest that globalised culture can 
play an emancipatory role within Réunionese and Mauritius popular music, especially as 
concerns its representation of children and young people. This would seem to indicate that 
contrary to popular belief, young people’s engagement with globalised popular culture need 
not always be symptomatic of global cultural homogenisation or cultural alienation. However, 
there remains a need to balance celebratory accounts of forms of ‘pop cosmopolitanism’656 
with a continued awareness of specificities of the local contexts. In this respect, we would 
perhaps do well to heed the calls of those who counter an emphasis on global flows with 
assertions of the continued relevance of the national context within cultural analysis.657 These 
assertions would appear to be supported by the analysis of Part III of this study, which 
considered how Réunionese and Mauritian popular culture can be seen to articulate an 
oppositional postcolonial politics through negotiating and contesting categories of community, 
race and nation. This was discussed in relation to cultural nationalism in Mauritian popular 
music (Chapter 4), and the metropolitan French zorey population of Réunion (Chapter 5). 
Mauritian and Réunionese popular culture can thus be seen to challenge the continuing legacy 
of their colonial histories in the shaping of their contemporary societies both by drawing on 
globalised popular music as a strategic resource, and by engaging with and contesting existing 
discourses on the nation, and the role of community and ethnicity. In other words, exploiting 
globalised cultural forms is thus not the only possible way to counter neo‐colonial hegemonies 
which perpetuate social inequality and adversely affect lower‐class young people’s life 
chances. 
Prior to conducting fieldwork, I primarily visualised my research as structured by the 
contrasting spheres of the local and the global, but I soon realised that the two spheres often 
appeared to blur, making it difficult to maintain a clear‐cut distinction in relation to either 
popular music or to the lived experienced of young people. In addition, focusing on the 
interaction between the local and the global can appear to prematurely proclaim the decline 
                                                          
656 Though Henry Jenkins conceives of this notion primarily in relation to consumption of Asian popular 
culture in the US, he also notes the possibility of resistance to Anglo‐American domination through 
alternative modes of consumption: see ‘Pop Cosmopolitanism: Mapping Cultural Flows in an Age of 
Media Convergence’ in Globalization: Culture and Education in the New Millennium, ed. by Marcelo M. 
Suarez‐Orozco and Desiree Baolian Qin‐Hillard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), pp. 114‐
40, p. 118. 
657 Ian Biddle and Vanessa Knights, for example, argue for a reconsideration of the national in 
‘Introduction: National Popular Musics: Betwixt and Beyond the Local and Global’ in Music, National 
Identity, and the Politics of Location: Between the Global and the Local, ed. by Ian Biddle and Vanessa 
Knights (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 1‐18. 
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of the nation‐state. My initial experience of fieldwork in Mauritius, however, led me to 
reconsider the relevance of the national context to analysis of popular music and youth 
culture. The question of the national context would appear to be further brought into relief in 
the context of this study by the difference in political status enjoyed by Mauritius, an 
independent nation‐state, and Réunion, which as a département d’outre-mer (DOM) forms, in 
political and administrative terms, an integral part of France. Furthermore, the preceding 
analysis also demonstrated that cultural continuity cannot be presumed within the national 
territory in either context: indeed, the analysis of Mauritian nationalism undertaken in Chapter 
4 presumes a certain level of division between ethnic groups, which is seen to be emphasised 
by communalism, and Chapter 5 reveals the disparity between the social interpretations of 
ethnic identity and of the intersection of race and class in the Réunionese and metropolitan 
French contexts, which would appear to be crystallised in the zorey population’s lived 
experience in Réunion. 
Thus, Chapter 4 explored of representations of Mauritian nationalism by means of an 
analysis of both political nationalist movements within post‐independence Mauritian politics, 
and of what was identified as a simultaneous cultural nationalist movement. The 
representation of the national community in popular music was analysed, where Tritonik, a 
group who showed open support for recent protest movements, was considered as a case 
study. I suggested that the construction of nationalism in post‐independence Mauritius 
characterises itself as a progressive social movement which positions itself in opposition to 
communalism, the term commonly used to refer to political and other practices which are 
seen to lead to the reification of social divisions between ethnoreligious groups. After giving an 
overview of nationalism in postindependence Mauritian politics and having established the 
shortcomings of political nationalism on a theoretical level, I then considered the concept of 
cultural nationalism and how this might apply to the music of Tritonik as cultural text. I argued 
that they can be said to formulate a cultural nationalist vision of the Mauritian national 
community, and that they use the concept of cultural nationalism and its assertion of a prior 
existing national community in order to formulate a social critique of contemporary Mauritius, 
thereby engaging with contentious issues such as tourism and environmental conservation. 
However, in contrast to political nationalist social critiques which tend to focus on the 
divisiveness of communalism, their main concern appeared to be the division of society along 
class lines and differentials in relations of power. Tritonik can thus be said to make claims and 
voice a critique on behalf of the disenfranchised and oppressed which is addressed to those 
who hold power, the government and the ruling elites. 
As problematic  as nationalism may appear as a strategy and theme on which to base 
calls for a more equitable society and progressive social change when viewed from the 
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perspective of Western politics, we can thus see that in the context of both movements for 
greater recognition for MK, for example, as formulated by Abaim (see Chapter 2), and of the 
vision of social change envisaged in Tritonik’s music (see Chapter 4), it is the necessarily 
imagined national community that appears to have triggered demands for change within 
Mauritian society. For the moment at least, it would seem that in the Mauritian context, the 
concept of the national community opens up rather than closes down debate as regards social 
exclusion and social inequality. Engagement with the national community and nationalism has 
arguably opened up a space in which issues of marginalisation and increasing social inequality 
can be discussed, whereas previous conceptualisations of community in Mauritius may have 
served to obscure such issues. Formulations of cultural nationalism can thus be understood ‘to 
make cultural identity a premise of political action rather than a substitute for it’658 whereas 
the dominant discourse of ‘unity in diversity’ arguably does not. 
Nationalist sentiments have also provided a basis for calls for social change in favour of 
greater social equality in the post‐departmentalisation history of Réunion, perhaps most 
concretely in the calls for political autonomy formulated by the Parti communiste réunionnais 
(PCR) from the late 1950s onwards.659 The process of departmentalisation, through which 
Réunion became part of the metropole, the former colonial power, has arguably rendered the 
question of nationhood particularly complex. Through the rapprochement of political ties, 
Réunion has benefited from dramatically improved standards of living and from significant 
infrastructural development, but departmentalisation has arguably also created an additional 
set of economic, social, cultural, and indeed psychological problems, as Glissant indicated in 
relation to his native Martinique in the opening observation to Le Discours antillais.660 Whereas 
the political will for independence has been less fervently advocated in recent years, cultural 
and social actors continue to draw on competing visions of Réunionese nationhood in order to 
contest the dominance of Frenchness in twenty‐first century Réunion. 
In the final chapter of this study, I suggested that a critical consideration of the zorey, 
the metropolitan French population of Réunion, and their representation within popular 
discourse can be seen to illuminate many of the problems and contradictions surrounding the 
question of nationhood in contemporary Réunion. The fact that the zorey (who now form 10% 
of the population) are characterised as cultural foreigners in Réunion, and that their 
interactions with the Réunionese social context might are experienced as such, highlights the 
                                                          
658 Gilroy, ‘British Cultural Studies and the Pitfalls of Identity’ in Black British Cultural Studies: A Reader 
ed. by Houston Baker, Manthia Diawara and Ruth Lindeborg, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996), pp. 223‐39, p. 238. 
659 For an overview see Gilles Gauvin, ‘Le parti communiste de la Réunion (1946‐2000)’, Vingtième Siècle. 
Revue d'histoire, 68 (2000), 73‐94. 
660 pp. 11‐2. 
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paradoxical nature of French overseas departmental status. Furthermore, it may be said to 
contest the supposed total integration of the DOM into the French nation. The critical 
perspective adopted in this chapter led me to advocate an understanding of race and 
whiteness which is informed by Judith Butler’s conceptualisation of performativity in relation 
to gender: I suggested that race, like gender, is best understood as a verb, resulting in this 
context in the ‘zoreying of the zorey’. As a social identity, therefore, zorey is best understood 
as a processual identity formed through interaction with the Réunionese social context.  The 
naming of the zorey can thus be interpreted as a political act which refutes the supposed 
invisibility and non‐racialised nature of whiteness. This can be read not only as a rejection of 
the colour‐blind approach to race which can serve to uphold institutional racism, but also as a 
defiant countermove to the discourse of Frenchness as whiteness, which denies full citizenship 
to non‐white French populations, including those in the DOM. Paradoxically, however, the 
naming of the zorey can simultaneously be interpreted as an inclusive gesture, in that it 
creates an ethnic moniker or ‘tag’ for the growing metropolitan French population which 
thereby legitimises their position as part of Réunionese society in the popular imaginary, in 
which the pertinence of racial and ethnic identity in everyday life is acknowledged despite the 
fact that ethnic difference is not officially recognised by the French state. 
It could however be argued that analysing the experience of what is commonly 
perceived as a privileged group would appear to call into question one of the principal aims of 
this study, namely to foreground the experience of marginalised youth. Nonetheless, I 
maintain that understanding the experience and categorisation of the zorey population 
constitutes an important means of understanding the wider dynamics of Réunionese society in 
terms of how race and class intersect. In this respect, the analysis here can be seen to build on 
that of Chapters 2 and 3 in that it advocates an intersectional approach to the study of youth 
cultures, although admittedly here we see the interaction between categories of race and 
social class in Réunion from a rather different angle from that discussed in the analysis of 
dancehall music. Yet just as dancehall offers young Réunionnais alternative representational 
strategies which can be seen to negotiate the fixity of blackness as indicative of low 
socioeconomic status, the figure of the zorey savatte as young and lacking in actual financial 
capital to sustain the symbolic capital of French whiteness can also be seen to negotiate and 
perhaps work to undermine the fixity of the Réunionese racially hierarchical social structure. 
Finally, considering the zorey population also brings us back to issues of researcher reflexivity 
and authenticity which have underpinned the approach adopted in this study. 
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Limitations, Contributions, and Areas for Further Research 
 
The various case studies presented in this thesis might thus be seen to support the 
assertion that popular music and youth culture can be seen to engage with postcolonial 
politics in Réunion and Mauritius, and to formulate oppositional discourses in relation to what 
are perceived as neo‐colonial hegemonies which continue to structure young people’s lives. 
However, I am also aware that I might be accused of selectively choosing popular cultural 
forms which can be most easily characterised as representative of a progressive politics, such 
as the music of Tritonik (discussed in Chapter 4), which would appear to demonstrate a clear 
awareness of and a consciousness engagement with contemporary Mauritian political issues. 
This is the charge which was made by Jim McGuigan against proponents of cultural populism 
amongst British Cultural Studies researchers, who he criticises for adopting ‘a disingenuous 
selectivity in populist cultural research, a characteristic veering away from disconfirming 
instances, instances when “the people” do not quite measure up to sentimental 
expectations.’661 It is certainly true that the present study by no means represents a 
comprehensive anthology of Mauritian and Réunionese popular culture, which itself would be 
beyond the scope of a doctoral thesis, and that selection has therefore taken place. This 
selection, however, was primarily informed by my experience of living and conducting 
participatory research in Réunion and Mauritius. I chose to write about the artists and music 
genres, and wider trends and issues within popular culture, which research participants and 
friends appeared to identify with, and ascribe particular meanings to. This arguably in fact led 
me to consider musical forms which I personally might not have chosen to analyse because 
they do not appear to present an obviously and unproblematically progressive cultural politics. 
Dancehall music (Chapter 3) appears as a particularly acute example of this, but similarly 
Abaim’s utilisation of internationally popular children’s songs (Chapter 2) and Tritonik’s 
articulation of a form of cultural nationalism (Chapter 4) do not automatically appear to 
represent a particularly progressive set of cultural politics. 
I have suggested that my analysis establishes the necessity of an intersectional 
approach to issues of race, ethnicity and class within popular music and youth culture in both 
Réunion and Mauritius. This would seem to trouble William F.S. Miles’s assertion that ethnicity 
remains the most important structuring principle in Mauritian society, an observation which 
would seem to inform much sociological analysis.662 In contrast, this study’s consideration of 
how categories of class and ethnicity are negotiated within popular culture shows us that an 
intersectional approach is needed which also pays attention to the importance of class in 
                                                          
661 McGuigan, pp. 171‐2. 
662 ‘The Mauritius Enigma’, Journal of Democracy, 10: 2 (1999), 91‐104, p. 101. 
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Mauritian society. This could be traced back to the decision to foreground the experience of 
lower‐class youth within my analysis; however, a concern with interrogate relations of power 
can be seen to run throughout the chapters of this study. For example, this would appear to be 
implied in Tritonik’s privileging of subordinate experience in their representation of Mauritian 
society, which they assert was literally built by ‘dimounn mizer’, the poor and disenfranchised, 
contesting the official history taught in schools and disseminated elsewhere in the public 
sphere which foreground the role of the colonisers. I am thus led to conclude that in order to 
work towards a better understanding of the dynamics of Mauritian and Réunionese society, it 
is perhaps less constructive to ask whether it is ethnicity or social class which constitutes the 
‘driving social force’, but to ask how these two and other categories interact. I propose that a 
consideration of popular culture may be particularly instructive here, particularly as concerns 
studies which wish to privilege those with the least resources and least symbolic capital, such 
as the working class and young people, as it constitutes a space in which actors and consumers 
can negotiate with alternative representational strategies which resist the legacies of racial 
hierarchy and (neo)colonial prejudice, although they may also bring up a new set of 
limitations, such as those imposed by gender roles and stereotyped representations of black 
masculinity. 
However, this also brings to light a limitation of this study: namely, that it generally 
restricts its intersectional approach to a consideration of class and race/ethnicity, and does not 
include issues of gender or sexuality in any detail. I am also aware that there is also a 
disproportionate representation of male artists and performers within my analysis, despite 
attempts to rectify this where possible (see, for example, the consideration of Malkijah, a 
female dancehall artist in Chapter 4). Given the prominence of gender roles within both 
globalised black popular culture and Réunionese and Mauritian popular music, this would 
appear as a fertile area for further research, which could be used to establish how young 
people draw on and develop different versions of femininities and masculinities within their 
cultural consumption and practices. It could then in turn be asked how these interact with the 
formulations of oppositional cultural politics discussed in the present study, and whether the 
gender politics of popular culture can also be characterised as progressive and as resistant to 
neo‐colonial hegemonies within Réunionese and Mauritian society. 
Finally, the present study is also limited by the decision to privilege popular music 
within my analysis of popular culture. However, I have chosen to do so because it is perhaps 
the most established of popular cultural forms in Réunion and Mauritius. In both locations, 
popular music is historically associated with subordinated populations, and has more recently 
been linked to oppositional movements which questioned the truly postcolonial nature of 
Réunion and Mauritius in the 1960s and 1970s. Further research would be therefore be 
213 
 
needed in order to compare the politics of other forms of popular cultural expression with 
those of popular music, and consider the extent of interplay between different forms, such as 
in music videos which are circulated via the internet. 
 
The Politics of Popular Music and Youth Culture: Equality and 
Difference 
 
In very different ways, the popular cultural practices discussed in this study are 
concerned with representing sectors of the population which are perceived to be marginalised, 
and constructing a reformulation of Mauritianness or Réunionness which might prove more 
inclusive and be able to foreground the experience of the lower class youth.  It would also 
seem that many Western researchers, myself included, who become interested in studying 
Other cultures are often drawn to the subject matter through a combined concern with issues 
of social inequality and of cultural difference. We thus find ourselves studying contexts with a 
history of extreme levels of social inequality which was justified and naturalised through a 
colonial ideology of absolute difference which affirmed the superiority of European culture, 
and where the social hierarchies established in the colonial era continue to make themselves 
apparent in the most cursory observations of these ‘postcolonial societies’. This is arguably the 
objective Prabhu wishes to work towards in her reformulation of postcolonial studies, which 
aims ‘to align more closely the notion of hybridity in postcolonial studies with the exigencies 
that led to the founding of this academic discipline itself.’663 
In his reflections on the issue of cultural identity in the preface to Identité et société 
réunionnaise: nouvelles perspectives et nouvelles approches, Michel Wieviorka states that ‘les 
identités culturelles ne sont jamais longtemps totalement indépendantes des inégalités 
sociales, la différence n’est jamais longtemps dissociée de la hiérarchie et de l’injustice 
sociales’.664 Yet attempting to address both issues at the same time has proved problematic. 
Trying to address issues of social inequality through a politics of cultural difference, more 
commonly referred to as ‘identity politics’, has been recognised by some academics as an 
effective strategy in certain contexts, but it is generally seen as ‘communalist’ or ‘tribalist’ due 
to the recurrent problem of (self‐)essentialisation. The increasing political valency of identity 
politics is also bemoaned by many on the left for having sidelined what is seen as the more 
pressing issue of social inequality, which is conceived of from a Marxist perspective in terms of 
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by Laurent Médéa (Paris: Karthala, 2005), pp. 15‐22, pp. 18‐9. 
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social class.665 Yet at the same time, these movements have at least brought to our attention 
that many of the supposedly universal values which are supposed to be upheld by national 
institutions are tied to Eurocentric, male, bourgeois conceptualisations of ‘the citizen’, ‘the 
human’, etc. 
In response to engagement with these issues within postcolonial studies, in his critique 
of the centrality of issues of ‘hybridity’ and ‘inbetween‐ness’ within postcolonial theory, 
Hallward argues against cultural studies in favour of 
 
a sharp conceptual break between culture and politics. The idea of a ‘cultural politics’ is 
a disastrous confusion of spheres. If politics is to mean anything at all, it should apply 
only to the domain of strictly in‐different principles: principles of justice and equality, 
principles that apply to all relations without discrimination. […] As far as the political 
pursuit of justice is concerned, we need to find the courage to accept that the whole 
ethico‐culturalist ‘predication based upon recognition of the other must be purely and 
simply abandoned. For the real question – and it is an extraordinarily difficult one – is 
much more that of recognising the Same’, i.e. the austere in‐difference of egalitarian 
justice itself. As a matter of universal principle, it is everyone who deserves security, 
legal protection, access to health and education, and so on.666  
 
I don’t think any scholars interested in cultural politics would disagree with this last statement. 
However, as of yet, we have no real practical experience of this ‘austere in‐difference of 
egalitarian justice’ because our institutions are still marked by ‘European provincialism’ and 
other forms of discrimination and prejudice. In other words, the ‘norm’ is still skewed towards 
benefiting some individuals more than others: we need only to think of the idea of whiteness 
as an ‘invisible rucksack’.667 ‘Universal’ values appear much easier to uphold from a position of 
privilege: and conversely it is perhaps easy to understand why those who have first‐hand 
experience of the non‐neutrality of institutions would turn towards identity politics as a 
possible solution, and thereby begin their political quest for social equality from an affirmation 
of cultural difference. Until we reach a stage where cultural difference is not read through an 
implicit hierarchy, and where different values are no longer attributed to different cultural, 
ethnic and racial identities, then it would seem that Hallward’s proposition can only work at 
the theoretical level. 
In short, it would seem that we are still grappling with the question of how to devise 
universal notions of justice and equality when the concepts themselves appear so tied to 
Eurocentric ideals. Furthermore, we live in an increasingly divided world in which ‘difference’ 
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for many has very real consequences, and, contrary to postmodern assertions of identitarian 
fluidity, is not simply a colourful mask to be put on or taken off at will. I believe that culture, 
and perhaps popular culture in particular, can be understood as a sphere in which we continue 
to grapple with such issues, but these are often formulated in more immediate terms which 
can be related to lived experience more easily. The various forms of popular music and social 
phenomena presented in this study have all been analysed in terms of their cultural politics. I 
believe this to be a valid approach which has allowed me to treat in a balanced way my 
combined concern with social inequality and cultural, ethnic and racial difference. This thesis 
does not attempt to claim that all forms of culture, popular or otherwise, are necessarily and 
intrinsically political; I instead suggest that culture interacts with social contexts, and it is this 
interaction which has political potential. This is why some Kreol‐speaking writers have spoken 
of the impossibility of producing work in Kreol without being it being interpreted as an 
expression of cultural militantism, because within the context, writing in Kreol is not the norm 
and the language is not considered ‘worthy’ of high literature, which makes writing in Kreol a 
political act. 
Many of the cultural actors studied here would appear to be concerned with not only 
gaining recognition of their cultural difference and making themselves visible from the globally 
peripheral location of the Western Indian Ocean, but also with a more abstract objective: the 
assertion of equal humanity. Réunionese dancehall posits the existence of a Kreol‐speaking 
youth culture which is equally modern and equally global in relation to its Jamaican and 
metropolitan French counterparts. The act of calling a metropolitan French person zorey 
asserts that I, as a Réunionese subject, am equally able to name you as an ethnic, cultural and 
linguistic other, in the same way that you may name me. It is also an inclusive gesture, in that 
it includes zorey on a equal footing to other groups as forming part of the Réunionese social 
make‐up, though this may not be on their own preferred terms of the neutral citizen of the 
neutral Republic. Thus, the assertion of difference within movements and social phenomena 
termed ‘identity politics’ can in fact be interpreted as a response to not having been 
recognised as equal, that is, as equally human due to systematic denials of the rights of group 
in question. It could therefore be argued that, while such phenomena continue to take place, 
we do indeed need to recognise the interrelatedness of cultural difference and social 
inequality, and that considering the politics of popular culture may provide us with one means 
of doing so. 
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